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The purpose of this document is to set out and frame the nature of the 
research to be undertaken over the next three years in order to complete 
the Doctorate of Business Administration (DBA). 
 
This document will identify the area to be researched and develop this into 
a number of themes and resulting research questions that will form the 
basis of a doctoral thesis.  Five further Documents are to be produced for 
the DBA and this, the first document, sets points of reference for the 
remaining five, including the reflective journal. 
 
Overview of the Research Topic 
 
The objective of this research project is to establish the nature of strategic 
turnaround in the English Local Government Sector and its conversion into 
sustainable strategic practices.  Local Government has long been a focus 
for central government attention in terms of total expenditure, service 
provision, Value for Money, regulation, control structures and service 
delivery.  Overlaying this have been the major ideological thinking of 
management within the public services generally including the advent of 
New Public Management and the Third Way doctrines which have been 
considered internationally as well as in the UK context.  
 
More recently, the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) process 
in the UK has identified, through external audit assessment, a framework 
4 
 
against which Local Authorities can be measured in terms of both service 
provision and strategic management.  This has resulted in a trigger to 
identify Local Authorities that are thought to be performing poorly and/or 
below nationally recognised targets. 
 
Local Authorities that do not perform well under the CPA process have 
been faced with a need to review their management functions and service 
delivery (including prioritisation), sometimes through central government 
intervention.  It is these responses at the strategic level that form the 
basis of the research to be undertaken. 
 
As a strategic overview for this research project I am looking to address 
one basic premise.  If I were a Chief Executive starting a new job with a 
local council, what strategic processes would I expect to see in place to 
allow the council to respond effectively to any challenges that were placed 
upon it.  This is a personal interest and one that comes from a working life 
of 20 years or so in and around the local authority sector. 
 
I must stress that I have not been, nor do I currently have a desire to be 
the Chief Executive of a Local Authority.  My interest in the topic comes 
from a desire to work in the future with Local Councils to ensure that they 
have appropriate processes in place to determine strategies and 
structures that will allow them to perform better in the future.   
 
This research is therefore about strategy in the sense of structures and 
processes rather than a consideration of individual strategies themselves.  
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What the research is intended to discover are the ways in which Local 
Authorities are responding to the challenges they face at an organisational 
level rather than considering the actual responses to environmental 
conditions that they may have to respond to. 
 
This is why the title of the study is “An Exploration of Strategic 
Turnaround in English Local Authorities”.  The exploration is in itself a 
journey into the mechanics of strategy formulation, choice and 
implementation.  Initially this raises a series of potential questions. What 
structural issues need to be considered?  What processes need to be in 
place to gather and interpret information to aid the strategic decision 
making process?  Who informs strategic choice and how are the important 
decisions regarding strategic direction and choice going to be made?  
What mechanisms need to be in place to enable selected strategies to be 
implemented and monitored effectively?  How will performance be 
measured and fed back into the strategic arena?  These are just some of 
the questions that it is hoped will be answered along the way and have 
been used to formulate the main research questions of this project which 
are given in the next section. 
 
This research will use the outcomes of the CPA process as a start point to 
identify local authorities that are poorly performing by this measure.  It 
will then go on to determine the responses that have been made within 




This research will not provide a critical analysis of the CPA process itself as 
this would require a doctoral thesis of its own.  However, issues raised 
regarding the CPA as an instrument for measuring success will be 
considered along the way as and when they arise. 
 
This proposal will cover a number of key issues relevant to the research to 
be undertaken.  At this stage the discussion provides an overview of the 
issues to be considered.  The remaining documents to be submitted as 
part of the DBA itself will give more detail and a critical evaluation of the 
issues that will be raised. 
 
Reflections on the Choice of Topic 
 
I have worked in, been trained by and now deliver training within the 
public services, and local government in particular, for the best part of 20 
years.  It is no surprise therefore that I should choose Local Government 
as the ‘laboratory’ within which to undertake this research.  The Local 
Government arena also provides a degree of comfort as the process of 
undertaking doctoral research is daunting task itself.  My thinking behind 
choosing the topic is therefore not only linked to a desire to find out more 
about the sector in which I have worked for most of my working life, but 
also to give me the scope to learn about the process of research without 
having to take in and learn about a new sector. 
 
As an accountant, I suppose there is a widespread view of being a grey, 
boring professional obsessed with spreadsheets.  The traditional view of 
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accountants by the public at large could be linked to the methodological 
positivist standpoint, associated as it is with calculating and proving 
evidence by way of financial analysis.  My experience of accounting as a 
career has been thankfully somewhat different.  Most of my working life, 
both in teaching and in practice, has actually been focused around the 
more human aspects of accounting – those of motivation and the 
behaviour of individuals along side the development of strategic 
information that informs the direction of organisations and measures their 
achievements.  It is this background that has led me to look at the 
strategic nature of local authorities. 
 
As to the development of the research area itself, this has been a 
somewhat iterative and frustrating process.  The research proposal is 
undoubtedly the most important aspect of the research process.  If the 
proposal itself is not developed correctly then a number of disastrous 
consequences can arise leading to stress, a loss of direction and ultimately 
failure to complete (Fisher, 2004).  
 
The choice of topic was borne out of an experience of and interest in the 
impact that the CPA was having on the strategic responses of local 
authorities.  Initially I wanted to consider whether the CPA itself was 
shaping strategy within local authorities.  It quickly became apparent that 
the answer to this was most likely yes given the impact that negative CPA 
scores have on both the finances and the external perception of those 
local authorities. This was borne out in some of the associated literature 
(see later). Clearly asking questions of the influence of CPA was not going 
8 
 
to last the course of a doctoral thesis and a different approach to the 
study would be required. 
 
I wanted to retain a relationship to CPA in the study and the next step 
was to come up with an approach that would identify excellent authorities 
and establish what made them so good.  I discussed this with supervisors 
and colleagues and what became apparent was that gaining access to 
these organisations could well prove problematic.  At first this may seem 
strange as surely organisations that are performing well would want their 
excellence revealing to the world at large?  However, a number of 
potential access issues were identified.  What if excellent authorities were 
merely excellent because they told the right story rather than did the right 
thing?  What if excellent authorities had aspects that were in decline and 
would prove sensitive if exposed?  What if a study into excellent 
authorities exposed weaknesses that were not known about?  These 
issues, or at least the risk of them occurring, could all lead to problems 
with gaining and sustaining access during the research project. 
 
What was becoming clear was that I needed to adopt an approach to the 
research that allowed me to sustain the study over the course of the 
programme.   Fisher (2004) provides advice on selecting and refining the 
research area.  I was confident that the research area was one that was 
both interesting to me and relevant (as I have described above).  It was 
also durable, Local Government is not likely to disappear in the 
foreseeable future at least.  The topic had been deemed adequate by my 
supervisors and I would be ale to resource the research.   The most 
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important aspect that I had to resolve was that of access and this was 
clearly going to be related to the framing of the research question.  I did 
not quite follow the steps outlined by Fisher (2004) in his six-stage 
approach to choosing a topic exactly, but most of them were covered in 
some shape of from along the way. 
 
This process of refining the research question has lead me to identifying 
failing/improving authorities and trying to establish what they are doing to 
put things right.  This has a number of benefits for the research.  Firstly 
access should be easier as authorities that are improving are more likely 
to want this promoting to the world at large.  Also, my researching of the 
process may in some way lead to benefits for the organisations 
themselves both from internal and external experiences.  Another benefit 
for the sector generally is that by focusing on improving authorities there 
may well be better examples of best practice or innovation arising from 
the needs of adversity – necessity is the mother of invention. 
 
In reaching this point I feel that I now have the basis of a sustainable, 
interesting and useful research project.  Getting to this stage, though 
frustrating at times, has helped me to understand better both the area 
that I am researching but also the flexible nature of research as a process.  
The need to adapt and change in response to constructive criticism and 
challenge I have found useful over the course of this process and I will 





Overview of the Document 
 
This document will go on to consider the following: 
• The Research Questions 
• A brief introduction to Local Government 
• An Overview of the CPA process 
• An insight into current literature in this area of research and the 
development of an initial conceptual framework 
• An outline plan of the remaining documents  





The Research Questions 
 
The objective of this research project is to establish the nature of strategic 
turnaround in the English Local Government Sector and its conversion into 
sustainable strategic practices.   
 
In order to achieve this objective the following initial research questions 
have been established: 
 
1. What have been stakeholder perceptions to the CPA trigger for the 
need for turnaround within English Local Authorities? 
 
2. What approaches to strategic turnaround are being adopted by 
English Local Authorities? 
 
3. Has strategic turnaround been implemented effectively? 
 
4. Are the approaches to turnaround strategy transferable into 
sustainable structures and processes? 
 
5. To what extent can models of strategy and strategic turnaround in 
the private sector be translated into the English Local Government 
arena? 
 
The research questions will be developed further following the completion 




The research to be undertaken in relation to the remaining documents will 
be structured to answer the above the questions.  Documents 3 and 4 will 
focus on the first two research questions and questions 3, 4 and 5 will be 
considered in Document 5. 
 
In addition to the formal research questions mentioned above, Document 









Local Government is important, complex and costly (Worrall et al 1998, 
Flynn and Talbot 1996).  It forms the delivery vehicle for many of the 
public services that are provided at a local level eg Education, Social Care 
Transportation.  It is a sector worthy of study due to the significant impact 
it has on peoples lives in terms of service provision and the financial 
impact it has on taxpayers both in the form of national and local taxation. 
 
In summary, Local Government in England and Wales employs over 
2.1million people and spends over £70 billion a year (around 25% of 
public spending) of which about one quarter is funded from local taxation.  
There are over 21,000 elected members serving 410 local authorities. 
 
Managing a local authority at a corporate and strategic level is a complex 
process that must meet the needs of a wide range of stakeholder groups 
including Central Government, Elected Members, the public and officers of 
the council themselves.  The sector will clearly make an interesting field 
within which to study the processes strategic management, especially 
where organisations are operating under a turnaround regime. 
 
Some of the reasons for this strategic complexity are as follows: 
• Local Councils provide a wide range of functions over a wide range 
of structures.  In the UK, this mixed provision means that not all 
services are provided by each type of local authority. 
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• Funding is through a mixture of Central Government grant, local 
taxation and, to a lesser extent, fees and charges.  Each funding 
method has its own set of rules and regulations. 
• There is a duality of management whereby directly employed 
officials carry out the wishes of publicly Elected Members.  At the 
political level the cyclical nature of the election system means that 
power can shift periodically bringing with it a new out look and a 
new set of policies and priorities.  At the Officer level, local councils 
are staffed by a range of professional disciplines such as teachers, 
social workers, engineers and environmental health workers on the 
front line with accountants, lawyers, IT professionals and 
administrators in the ‘back office’. 
 
Looking more widely, the strategic management of local government has 
been significantly influenced by central government control in the form of 
various regulation and intervention mechanisms since the early 1970s 
(Wallis and Dollery, 2005).  Examples of these mechanisms include Local 
Management of Schools, CCT, changes to funding regimes (Capping etc) 
and more recently the requirement to undergo best value reviews, CPA 
inspections and develop a plethora of Strategic Plans (Local Strategic 
Partnerships, Local Area Agreements, Local Transport Plans, Waste 
Strategies etc etc).  Managing strategically within local government 
therefore implies a need to incorporate the needs of a wider ‘structural’ 





Comprehensive Performance Assessment  
 
The Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) process was 
introduced in 2002 and is the process by which the Audit Commission 
carries out its duty under section 99 of the Local Government Act 2003 to 
independently monitor and report on the performance of Local 
Government (Audit Commission 2006).  Since its introduction in 2002, the 
CPA has evolved in response to changes in the operational and regulatory 
environment, rising public expectations and the performance of Local 
Government itself (Audit Commission 2006).   
 
As stated earlier, it will not be within the scope of this research to critique 
the CPA process itself.  However, it will be useful at his stage to outline 
some of the key features of CPA.  These features will be explored further 
in the literature review and subsequent documents. 
 
An outline of the CPA process for Single Tier and Unitary Authorities 
(which differs slightly for District Councils) is given below and has been 
taken directly from the Audit Commission own document “CPA – The 
Harder Test” (2006).  The CPA incorporates 4 different elements that are 
combined to determine an overall performance score for an authority.  For 
Single Tier and County Councils this scoring results in the award of a 
number of stars relating to the relative performance of the council; 4 
Stars being the best award and 0 Stars being the worst.  The resulting 
scores are published in the form of a report for each authority and in 
comparative tables on the Audit Commissions web site. 
16 
 
Figure 1: Single tier and County Council Framework for 2006 (Source: 
Audit Commission 2006) 
 
The CPA is a rolling programme that incorporates a range of annual and 
periodic reviews for each of the four elements.  It is therefore possible to 
track the performance of authorities over time since the implementation of 
the CPA process.  This will be useful when identifying changes in 
performance over time and will be of particular use in Document 4. 
 
Importantly, the CPA will be undergoing a further transformation at some 
stage in the future.  The Government’s White Paper on Local Government  
(2006) includes a proposed revision to the existing regime.  This change 
should not have a significant impact on this study and in fact it will be 




An Overview of the Relevant Literature 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the main areas of literature that 
will need to be reviewed in order to undertake the study.  The main 
literature review provides the focus for Document 2 and it is here that a 
more robust conceptual framework will also be developed. 
 
At this stage it is necessary only to highlight the key issue that will need 
to be studied and to establish the key themes that are likely to arise from 
the review. 
 
To start this process I have developed an initial conceptual framework to 
help scope the literature to be covered.   











The main focus of the study is to explore strategic turnaround in English 
Local Authorities.  This focus will provide the basis of establishing a body 
of relevant literature that will help in understanding the topic.  However, 
as this is a relatively specialised field of study, it is recognised that the 
research will have to draw on other related bodies of literature. 
 
The initial conceptual framework above highlights the broad areas of 
literature that will be relevant to the study and how they will be related to 
the main focus of local government turnaround.  It is envisaged at this 
stage that the more general literature relating to on the one hand Public 
Sector Management and Strategy and on the other Strategic Management 
and Turnaround will need to be interpreted through the use of other 
theories related to Corporate Governance (eg Agency Theory, Stakeholder 
Theory) and also Actor Network Theory (ANT). 
 
Taking the main headings identified in the conceptual framework as the 
start point, what follows is an expansion of the main sub themes within 
each broader category. 
 
Local Government Turnaround 
 
This area has been identified as the key body of literature that will 
contribute towards the research to be undertaken.  Not only that, but the 
research itself will also add to the wider understanding of local authority 





Literature in this area is understandably sparse given the focused nature 
of the research topic.  However, over the years there have been some 
reviews of the performance and turnaround within local government and 
the public services/not for profit sector that can be usefully used as a start 
point for the literature review. 
 
Often, comparisons are made between the reasons and responses to 
turnaround in the public and private sectors (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004, 
Walshe et al 2004).  Such comparisons look to identify whether the 
reasons for failure in the private sector can be transferred into the public 
services and whether there is any similarity in the approaches that can be 
adopted between the sectors.  This consideration will form a significant 
part of Document 5 and is reflected in research question 5.  The 
conclusions to date in this area usually centre around a recognition of a 
number of factors: 
• Identifying poorly performing organisations is equally important in 
the public and private sectors 
• How to identify poor performance in the public sector is more 
complex than in the private sector due to the existence of multiple 
stakeholder objectives rather than the blunt instrument of profit as 
a measure of return on investment 
• Responses to turnaround can be usefully learned from the private 
sector in order to ensure lasting recovery (Paton and Mordaunt 




• In the public services, strategic responses have to be adapted 
rather than adopted from the private sector as cultural, structural, 
funding and performance measurement criteria differ between the 
sectors 
 
Some of the literature focuses on the actual triggers and responses to 
strategic turnaround within local government although there is very little 
on this.  Turner et al (2004) consider the results of a study of 10 English 
Local Authorities who have started to implement a turnaround strategy.  
The early findings of what is in fact a longer-term review indicate that 
councils were slow to recognise the need for turnaround and this had to 
be instigated by external intervention (in the form of the Audit 
Commission).  Furthermore, their initial conclusions centre around the 
need to measure success not in terms of compliance with this external 
impetus but in terms of genuine ownership of the resultant change 
programme.  This will be a key aspect of this research project as it links 
into the adoption of a sustainable and successful strategic management 
process and is reflected research questions 3 and 4. 
 
Other studies focus on the role of Leadership in successful organisation 
turnaround.  Joyce (2004) and Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) 
concentrate on the role that leaders and management boards can have 
throughout the turnaround process.  Not surprisingly these studies identify 
that appropriate leadership is critical to turnaround situations.  However 
they also highlight that the role of leadership is more complex than in 
other the sectors due to the needs to balance a wide range of stakeholder 
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engagement and overcome significant cultural and structural barriers, 
especially balancing the tensions between political and administrative 
visions of success.  This often results in responses that run counter to the 
received wisdom of leadership in turnaround situations.  The success of 
turnaround in these is not yet apparent due to the timescales involved. 
 
Finally in this section it is appropriate to consider the literature that exists 
around the CPA process itself.  In some of the above studies the CPA has 
been used as the main trigger for identifying the need for turnaround.  
This supports the approach to be adopted in this study of using the 
ongoing CPA record as a means of identifying appropriate councils to 
study.  However the views expressed around the CPA process are not 
always favourable.  Game (2006) adopts a critical approach to the CPA 
mechanism itself and is therefore useful to show the flip side of the 
rhetoric on CPA put forward by the UK Government and the Audit 
Commission.  Two aspects emerge from the study however, one of which 
is a cautionary tale and the other a positive impact.  Firstly Snakes and 
Ladders (but mostly ladders) is used as an analogy for describing the 
seaming continuous improvement of councils over the years under CPA.  
This is considered to be unrealistic and is as much to do with the scoring 
methodology as actual improvements in the councils themselves.  With all 
councils potentially heading for excellent status, this prompted a change 
to the CPA methodology (‘The Harder Test’) to push councils further down 
the performance ladder (snakes?).  Secondly, those councils identified a 
poorly performing do seem to be making improvements not only against 
the scoring methodology but also in terms of internalising the responses 
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to change rather than just playing the game.  Despite the potential 
negative slant portrayed by Game overall the article helps to justify the 
use of CPA as a way of identifying councils to study. 
 
Public Sector Management and Strategy 
 
The next nearest body of literature to a discrete study of Local 
Government Turnaround is the topic of Public Sector Management and 
Strategy.  This is a useful body of literature as although there are some 
differences, Local Government shares many similarities in terms of 
objectives, context, culture and structure with other parts of the public 
and not for profit sectors. 
 
This broad section of literature considers, in part, the specific nature of 
Local Government Strategy setting and the relationship between the 
political and administrative processes (Dereli 2003, Worrall et al 1998, 
Wallis and Dollery 2005).  This issue is also reflected in the wider 
literature exploring strategic relationships between central government 
and the administrative bodies/agencies of service delivery within for 
example the NHS and other government departments. 
 
It will therefore be a useful source of reference when establishing 
responses to turnaround but also more widely the implementation of 




Worrall et al (1998) consider that the terms ‘strategy’, ‘strategic planning’ 
and ‘ strategic management’ are well used terms within the public sector 
arena.  However they conclude that there is no common interpretation as 
to what being strategic means in the local government context, especially 
when it comes to implementation.  This is an issue that will be explored 
during this research as to whether a common interpretation appears to 
lead to the sustainability of effective strategy making. 
 
There is also a growing body of literature relating to financial and 
performance measurement and control.  While this topic will not be 
considered in depth within the study it is clearly relevant to the 
consideration of both turnaround and strategic responses for any 
organisation.  Some of the literature makes strong links between 
performance measurement, stakeholder expectations and the formulation 
of strategy (McAdam et al 2005, Adcroft and Willis 2005, Radnor and 
McGuire 2004).  Again there will be important linkages back to the 
identification of the need for turnaround and the impact such 
environmental influences will have on the resulting strategy formation. 
 
In terms of strategic planning generally there is discussion within the 
literature of the different approaches and models that can be adapted 
from the private sector (Eskildsen et al 2004, Worrall et al 1998, Joyce 
2001, Pollitt 2003, Johnson and Scholes et al 2001). This again forms a 
key tenet of this study that will explore the effectiveness of translating 
models between the sectors.  The message from the literature is clear; 
yes private sector models are useful, but tread with caution they are not 
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always readily adaptable.  Some models associated with strategic 
management are therefore often re-modelled and adapted to the public 
sector context- the Boston Consulting Group portfolio matrix being one 
example, stakeholder mapping processes being another. 
 
A further and critical set of literature relates to the actual formulation of 
strategy itself.  This is key to understanding how public sector 
organisations manage themselves strategically and relate to both their 
internal and external environments.  Some writers in this area suggest 
that strategy setting is often seen within the sector as being an enforced 
choice rather than an embedded process (Collier et al in Johnson and 
Scholes (ed) 2001).  This results in strategies that are both reactive and 
short term rather than holistic and sustainable.  This is serves to illustrate 
the unique control environment within which the public sector works and 
may in deed be a necessary factor in responding effectively to the 
external environment.  Other writers suggest that better organisations 
have developed a way of managing that allows ‘reactions’ to be absorbed 
but which is not purely reactive (Worrall et al 1998).  It will be useful to 
explore this dimension within the research and this will be done through 
documents 2 to 5. 
 
Another related area is that of New Public Management (NPM).  This has 
been an international phenomenon over the past 15 years or so and has 
seen a movement from rigid bureaucratic management within the public 
services to one that is more concerned with disaggregation, competition 
and incentivisation (Dunleavy and Margetts 2000 in Pollitt 2003).  Many of 
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the characteristics of NPM could be termed discrete strategies in their own 
right, for example the use of the private sector to deliver services.  Other 
aspects however have more of a bearing on the process of strategic 
management and thus turnaround.  Such issues as focusing on outcomes, 
performance measurement frameworks, organisational structures and 
consumer needs all transfer into the strategic arena.  As such, the 
backdrop of NPM will provide an element of context to the research to be 
undertaken. 
  
Strategic Management and Turnaround 
 
Within the initial conceptual framework, this is probably the body of 
literature that is most widely published.  This literature relates to general 
concepts of strategy, management and turnaround within the private 
sector arena.  Many of the key models of strategy have been developed 
for the private sector and there are a significant number of texts and 
academic articles to consider.  As has been mentioned above, the key task 
here will be to identify theories which have relevance to the public sector 
and this literature will be used to gain a better understanding of the core 
models that are often referred to in the Public Sector literature discussed 
previously.  Mintzberg, Porter, Quinn, Ansoff, Hamel and Prahald are some 
of the ‘big guns’ when it comes to considering organisational strategy. 
 
Strategy is defined over again in the literature, sometimes as a process, 
sometimes as a series of actions, sometimes as a plan, sometime as an 
outcome.  The literature review in Document 2 will consider more widely 
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the meaning of strategy in this broader context.  Clearly the work of 
Mintzberg (1994 in Johnson and Scholes 2002) will be important here in 
evaluating the relevance of intended and emergent strategies on local 
government turnaround.  Other strategic concerns are offered up by other 
authors;  Core Competencies (Pralahad and Hamel 1990) and Leverage 
(Hamel and Prahald 1993), Competitive Advantage (Porter 1985), Culture 
(Shein 1985), Organisational Learning (Senge 1991).  Such issues can be 
found in any leading strategy text books, in this case Johnson and Scholes 
2002 and Thompson and Martin 2005.  These aspects amongst others will 
be considered in the literature review and examples of transferability will 
be considered through the primary research. 
 
Linked closely to strategic management is the concept of turnaround.   
Within the private sector, failure is often identified through falling profits, 
loss of liquidity and falling market share (Slatter 1984).  Such issues are 
not wholly relevant to Local Government due to its financial structure.  
However, this is not to say that the literature on private sector turnaround 
is not relevant.  Indeed, the symptoms behind failure may well be similar 
and worth comparative investigation.  Also, the responses for the 
organisation at a structural level may also be similar.  Much of the 
literature focuses on staged approaches that can be observed within 
organisations (see for example Slatter 1984).  This will be expanded upon 
within the literature review to develop a framework against which activity 




A final area on turnaround to consider is that of recognition and 
acceptance.  Before organisations can move forward they must surely 
need to identify and accept that they have a problem.  This does not 
appear to be covered within the literature so clearly further investigation 
is needed within the literature review itself.  This will also form part of the 
primary research especially with documents 3 and 5. 
 
Corporate Governance and ANT 
 
At this stage of the research it is envisaged that theories related to 
corporate governance and ANT will prove invaluable as the lense through 
which an understanding of the transference of models and theories from 
one sector to another can be seen. 
 
As such, the research project will consider the application of other theories 
such as Agency Theory (Friedman 1962, Brenner and Cochran 1991), 
Stakeholder Theory (Freeman 1984, Brenner and Cochran 1991, Miles 
1987, Key 1999), and the use of the Garbage Can (Cohen et al 1972).  
One further theory recognised at this stage is that of Actor Network 
Theory (ANT).  Aspects of ANT will be explored in terms of the networks of 
actors and actants that exist both at a human and non-human level within 
the research.  Of particular interest is the use of the concept of translation 
within ANT.  This has been referred to on various occasions throughout 
this document and it is hoped that an understanding of translation from 
the ANT perspective will aid understanding of the transferability of 
concepts across sectors. 
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The Documents and Methodological Issues 
 
Document 2 – The Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
Document 2 will establish a critical review of the literature relevant to the 
topic.  An outline of the literature available has been considered earlier in 
this document and this will be developed further in Document 2.   
 
Demonstrating a critical awareness of the available literature is an 
important consideration of any research exercise (Gill and Johnson 1991).  
To be critical, the literature review will need to demonstrate the 
arguments put forward in support of and against the findings of the 
literature in question.  This will also need to reflect my own assessment in 
addition to that of others (Fisher 2004). 
 
As has already been seen an initial conceptual framework has been 
established identifying both the main bodies of literature to be studied, 
but also recognising that there is a degree of inter-dependence between 
them.  This will be taken further within Document 2 in order that the 
structure of the subsequent research can be more effectively managed.  
This follows a structured rather than a grounded approach to the research 
process (Fisher 2004), as is required within the DBA framework itself.  
However, this will be revisited in Document 5 when the initial conceptual 
framework will be reviewed and updated on a grounded basis.  This 
progression of the conceptual framework is necessary both to aid the 
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structure of Document 5 but also as a means for identifying and framing 
further research that could be undertaken subsequent to this study. 
 
Document 3 – The Case Study 
 
The purpose of Document 3 is to undertake a piece of ethnographic or 
case study based research.  The proposal for Document 3 is that it will 
take the form of a longitudinal case study of two or three local authorities 
that are performing poorly against the CPA criteria and as a result have 
moved into a turnaround situation.   The longitudinal study will extend 
throughout the research and be revisited in final thesis (Document 5). 
 
The initial focus for document 3 will be to answer the first two research 
questions 
• What have been stakeholder perceptions to the CPA trigger for the 
need for turnaround within English Local Authorities? 
 
• What approaches to strategic turnaround are being adopted by 
English Local Authorities? 
 
The longitudinal nature of the study will not become apparent until it is 
revisited in Document 5. 
 
The planned approach to tackling the case study is as follows: 
• Map historically the CPA scores of English local authorities to 
determine movements in performance over time 
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• Identify a target group of Local Authorities who are likely to be in a 
turnaround situation 
• Select a small group of authorities that are agreeable to being the 
focus of the case studies in this document 
• Develop the case research for each of the local authorities selected 
• Compare the experiences of the case authorities and look for 
similarities and differences in approach 
 
The detailed methodological issues will be considered further within 
Document 3 itself.  At this stage it is necessary to identify the main 
research methods to be adopted to carry out the research.   The case 
study approach is beneficial as it allows an indepth knowledge of the case 
or related cases to be studied (Robson 1993 in Saunders et al 2000).  It is 
intended that a mix of interviews and focus groups with relevant internal 
and external stakeholders will be undertaken (eg staff, members, senior 
officers, audit commission and office of regional government).  At this 
stage it is not intended to use questionnaires as a means of gathering 
data although this may be included at a later stage. 
 
Detailed questions will be established as a result of the critical literature 
review in Document 2.  However, initial thoughts on the main lines of 
enquiry to be used within the case study are as follows: 
• What have been identified as the key reasons for ‘failure’? 
• What are/were internal attitudes to need for turnaround (Politicians, 
Senior Officer, Staff)? 
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• What are/were external attitudes to need for turnaround (Audit 
Commission, Office of Regional Government)? 
• What was the process for identifying change was necessary? 
• What change processes were/are being introduced and why? 
• What have been the roles of Leadership, Change Agents and 
Political engagement? 
• Is it planned to use models from other sectors? – translation – ANT 
• Has the sustainability of the turnaround been considered? 




Document 4 – Quantitative Research 
 
Document 4 represents an quantitative study and like document 3 will 
also be targeted at answering research questions 1 and 2 although from a 
wider perspective.  Whereas the case study will allow a deeper 
understanding of the issues within a couple of organisations, the purpose 
of the research in document 4 is to gain a broad understanding of the 
types of approach being adopted by local authorities nationally. 
 
The empirical research will take the form of two inter-related studies.  The 
first will be an analysis of CPA data that exists in the public domain.  The 
information to be considered will include the tracking of CPA scores for all 
English Local Authorities over the life of the CPA process.  In addition to 
this those organisations that have shown improvement will be further 
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examined using the reports published by external bodies related to the 
CPA process.  This will give an external view of the main reasons for 
improvement and how things are changing over time. 
 
It is intended that there will be a second part to the empirical research 
which will be the development of a questionnaire to be targeted at a 
selected group local authorities who have clearly achieved a positive 
transformation in performance.  It is initially intended that this group will 
be kept small enough to be able to manage the response rate to the 
questionnaire which is notoriously difficult to predict (Saunders et al 
2000).  At this stage of the planning process it is uncertain whether there 
will be enough time available to develop this second part of the study 
within Document 4.  This is viewed to be an important part of the research 
and there is scope within the project to consider this second aspect in 
Document 5 should the need arise. 
  
Again detailed questions will be developed following completion of the 
critical literature review.  At this stage the following types of questions 
have been identified as useful ways of answering the research question: 
 
• What are/were the perceptions of the CPA within the councils and 
have these affected reactions to the need for turnaround? 
• What were the initial reactions to earlier CPA scores? 
• How easily was the need for turnaround recognised and accepted? 




• What models have been used to support the turnaround process 
and were issues of translation/transferability encountered? 
• To what extent have catalysts been used – consultants, change 
agents, external/internal parties? 
• What have been the costs and investment associated with the 
turnaround strategy? 
• Over what timescales was turnaround planned and delivered? 
• Could discrete phases of turnaround be recognised? 
• What benefits were identified and have these been achieved? 
• What issues of organisational capacity and capability were 
encountered? 
• How were issues of prioritisation dealt with during the various 
phases of turnaround? 
• How have leadership and political engagement contributed to initial 
failure and subsequent success? 
 
Document 5 – The Thesis 
 
Document 5 is the final thesis of the research project and will represent 
both a synthesis of the themes identified in documents 3 and 4 as well as 
answering the remaining research questions 3, 4 and 5 that are given 
below: 
 




• Are the approaches to turnaround strategy transferable into 
sustainable structures and processes? 
 
• To what extent can models of strategy and strategic turnaround in 
the private sector be translated into the English Local Government 
arena? 
 
This document will revisit the longitudinal study of the case authorities 
that began in Document 3 and will seek to assess whether turnaround has 
been effective in each respective authority and whether the changes 
brought about are likely to be sustainable. 
 
The findings of Document 4 will be compared to those of the case 
authorities to see if there are any aspects of best practice that can be 
adopted within the case authorities. 
 
The results of the empirical work in Document 4 will also highlight those 
authorities that have consistently performed well.  It is intended to review 
the CPA reports of these authorities and also visit and interview a small 
number to establish what lessons can be learnt that could benefit 
turnaround authorities looking to sustain their improvement. 
 
It is in this document that consideration of translation will be undertaken 
using ANT and other appropriate models.  It is intended to establish an 
overview of strategic management within local government resulting from 
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the need to turnaround strategic practices and then sustain effective 
strategic mechanisms and processes. 
 
This document will also provide an opportunity to update the literature in 
the subject area and revise the conceptual framework to a more grounded 
approach. 
 
The timing of this document will also mean that account may need to be 
taken of changes within the Local Government arena.  Most notably these 
would be the introduction of the Local Government White Paper, the 









Outline of the Main Research Issues and Intended Outcomes  
 
The main research issues that need to be addressed with regards to this 
study are those of access and ethics. 
 
Access is of particular importance to the longitudinal study in Documents 
3 and 5 in order that appropriate case materials can be developed.  
Access will be required from suitable local authorities as well as 
representatives from external stakeholders such as the Audit Commission 
and Central Government. 
 
At this stage tentative access requirements have been discussed with two 
local authorities who are known to be facing a turnaround situation and 
the response has been initially positive.  A third organisation has also 
been identified with which the researcher already has some contacts at a 
strategic level.  The researcher has a strong network within the sector 
including local authorities, regulators and professional bodies and it is 
intended to use this networks secure appropriate access. 
 
Ethical issues will clearly focus around the need to respect the 
confidentiality of the organisations involved in the case study analysis and 
the anonymity of the individual participants.  Part of the access 
negotiation process will involve assurances to host organisations that 
confidentiality and anonymity will be upheld through informed consent 
(Saunders et al 2000: 134).  With regard to the study of CPA data sets, 
this represents publicly available information so the issue of confidentiality 
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will be less relevant, although as with the case material any observations 
will be dealt with objectively (Saunders et al 2000: 135, Fisher 2004: 56).  
A further issue to consider will be the impact that this research could have 
on access issues for the wider research community.  This is an active area 
for research and as such the researcher will conduct himself in a way so 
as not jeopardise other research projects.  
 
Intended Outcomes - Who Will Be Interested In This Research? 
 
The table below highlights those parties most likely to benefit from this 
research study.  Some of the reasons why I wish to study this topic have 
been referred to in earlier parts of the document so are not repeated here. 
 
Interested Party Nature of Interest 
The Researcher I am interested in this research for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, as an academic I am 
interested in furthering my research capacity 
and ability.  The DBA is an ideal vehicle for 
pursuing this and the reflective journal will be 
the document where progress on this front is 
reviewed.    Secondly, as a lecturer in Public 
Sector finance, strategy and management, I 
am interested in studying organisations from 
within the sector and am particularly fascinated 
by the nature of decision making and the 
changing nature of the sector itself.  Local 
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Authorities provide an excellent vehicle to 
study this.   
The Academic 
Community 
It is hoped that this research will be of benefit 
to the wider academic community not only 
through a better understanding of the 
conceptualisation and reaction to turnaround 
strategies within local authorities but also 
through a better understanding of how strategy 
is formulated and implemented within public 
sector organisations.  A further aim of the 
research will be to produce a series of papers 
for either publication or presentation at 
conferences either within the academic 





A number of public sector and local authority 
related bodies will be interested in the 
outcomes of the research.  These include 
Central Government and the department for 
Communities and Local Government in 
particular, The Local Government Association, 
The IDeA, The Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy, and of course the 
Audit Commission.  Apart from the traditional 
academic community, there are a number of 
independent training organisations that 
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specialise in training, development and 
consultancy within either the public sector 
generally or Local Authorities in particular.  
These organisations will also find the results of 
the research useful.  It is hoped to approach 
some of the above interested parties for 
funding for some aspects of the research. 
Managers and 
Organisations 
Whilst much of the research will be focused 
from the viewpoint of the local authorities 
forming the case study, it is hoped that the 
principle findings of the research, and the 
development of a methodology for studying 
this area will also be of use to other local 
authorities.  The potential for further research 




Given the nature of the study within the public 
sector, there is a high degree of relevance for 
policy makers and regulatory bodies.  Again 
this is a possible group where funding for the 
research could be sought, or follow up research 
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The purpose of this document is to undertake a critical review of the literature of, and 
surrounding, the topic of strategic turnaround in UK Local Government.  The review will 
first consider the development of strategy and strategic management as an academic field 
of study and then consider the specific topic of strategic turnaround and how this is related 
to the main field of strategic management.  Many of the theories relating to strategic 
management, and in part strategic turnaround, originate from the United States (US) and 
the Private Sector in particular, therefore the review will also consider the specific nature 
of local government in relation to the private sector and identify areas of overlap and 
conflict as well as possibilities for the transference and translation of strategic theories and 
concepts into the local government sector. 
 
Within this broad framework, a number of other issues will be considered and reviewed in 
order to develop a conceptual framework that can be used to frame the research questions 
and methodological approaches that will underpin the Doctoral research.  These other 
issues include leadership and performance measurement.  Needless to say, the original 
overview of the literature outlined in the research proposal, though useful, only offered a 
guide to appropriate literature.  The literature on which this document is based revealed 
many complexities that had not been foreseen at the research proposal stage.  Therefore, 
new disciplines such as leadership are now included whereas some aspects of the original 
proposal are removed, such as actor network.  To paraphrase Mintzberg (1978), it appears 






Of Strategy, Strategic and Management – Definitions 
 
Before considering the components of strategic turnaround, it is necessary to establish the 
meaning of strategy in the organisational sense.  In order to be able to conceptualise how, 
if at all, organisations can effectively turnaround strategically, what strategy actually 
means (or ‘a’ strategy or being strategic) needs to be established.  In one sense, defining 
strategy is a relatively easy process.  The word itself originates from the Greek strategos 
and literally means the “art of the general” (Snow and Hambrick 1980 p5271).  This 
military context conjures up meanings of battles and warfare and represents a potentially 
aggressive standpoint.  Such an association sits well with other terms used in the business 
world; “cut and thrust”, “taking no prisoners”, and “blood on the carpet” for example.  
However, is this really the meaning that ‘strategy’ conveys in the modern world of 
business, or, for the purposes of this study, the public services and Local Government in 
particular?  James (1984) suggested that to be successful, organisations needed to adopt 
conflict orientated ‘end-game’ strategies that reflected the combative nature of the 1980’s 
market place.  Nearly a decade later, Kay (1993) countered this view by suggesting that 
business success usually depends on adding value in yourself rather than destroying it in 
others and that fighting against overwhelming odds may be a necessary military strategy, 
but is not sensible in business where the financial risks are high but can be avoided and 
hedged against.   In the public sector, the concept of adding value (rather than destroying 
it) has its roots back in the 1980s and the rise of the value for money approach to public 
services (Joyce 1999, Rhodes 1988, Wilson and Game 2006).  Fighting against the odds 
however is perhaps something that public sector bodies feel they are constantly dealing 
with due to the imposed nature of many of the decisions they face (Collier et al 2001). 
 
 A study of strategy forms the mainstay of MBA programmes across the world (Porter 
1998).  The translation of the word strategy to the world of business was promoted by the 
academics of the Harvard Business School in the 1950s and was used to represent a 
‘normative model’ for integrating numerous complex decisions (Snow and Hambrick 1980, 
Ansoff 1988).  Interestingly, the term strategy was not co-opted as a field of study until 
                                   
1 see also Hart 1967, Bracker 1980, in Whittington 1993 
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much later.  Even in the mid 1970s, policy was used to describe the plans of an 
organisation where nowadays the word strategy is used.  Management Policy (Mintzberg 
1977) and Business Policy (Porter 1978) are the terms used to describe top-level business 
decision making, with strategic decisions and strategy formulation being subsets of the 
policy discipline. More recently, strategy has become a field of study in its own right with 
‘policy’, in various forms, being used as a phrase to describe how strategies are enacted 
and achieved within organisations (Porter 1998, Cummins and Wilson 2003).  How does 
this Greek translation help in understanding strategy in the organisational context?  Only 
partially it would appear, although it does provide a start point for the journey of 
understanding. 
 
Academics generally adopt a common approach to defining the term strategy, at least 
initially, as some kind of plan, set in advance to achieve a desired outcome.  This approach 
to defining strategy paraphrases Chandler (1962) and appears in numerous texts 
(Mintzberg 1978, Snow and Hambrick 1980, Johnson and Scholes 2002, Thompson and 
Martin 2005) and at least offers some simplicity that can be identified with on a personal 
level, a strategy for life for example.  However, life is never that simple, and since its 
adoption by the US academics a number of approaches to defining strategy have been 
forthcoming.  These will be dealt with in more detail later, for now it would be useful to 
identify the different uses of the word strategy and its contexts. 
 
To start with there is the singular use of the word strategy as in “developing a strategy”, 
or “the strategy”.  This would be used to infer the plan approach advocated by Chandler 
and can be said to identify a particular ‘thing’ or object of strategy.  Next there is the use 
of the word strategy on its own, with no ‘a’ or ‘the’.  What is ‘strategy’ as opposed to what 
is ‘a strategy’?  Here there appear to be multiple meanings and uses.  Strategy is used on 
the one hand as a pluralistic noun, as the combined individual strategies of the 
organisation and even the document that contains the strategy or as an adjective used to 
describe what the organisation’s intensions are.  Strategy is also used as a verb to indicate 
that something called strategy is being done or, taken even further, to include the process 
of strategy development as well as an academic field of study.  Further complications arise 
with the use of the word ‘strategic’.  Something is strategic if it displays certain qualities.  
If it is important, complex, big, expensive and has significant implications for example.  
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Clearly strategic issues are linked to strategy and vice versa, confusingly the two phrases 
are often used together (see Hertzberg 1977, page 96 and similarly Hofer 1980 who uses 
the term operating strategies).  It is the use of the word strategic that seems to offer the 
key to understanding the weight that strategy is given within the organisational context.  
It appears that because things that are strategic covey a sense of size and importance, so 
writers on strategy afford it the same gravitas.  Porter (1979, 1980, 1981, 1996, 1998) 
considers strategy to be the development of a broad business formula for how a business 
is going to compete.  To Porter, strategy is about an organisation positioning itself within 
its industry in such a way to enable its goals to be met by a series of policies.  For Ansoff 
(1988, 1991) strategy is similarly about the posture of the organisation within its industry 
and how it prioritises resources to achieve the best potential.  Both approaches result from 
an analytical approach based on case study research within a range of organisations and 
industries.  This approach to understanding strategy, and strategy formulation, is 
essentially scientific and positivist in nature and has resulted in what are termed 
prescriptive approaches to strategy formulation (Ansoff 1988, Mintzberg 1998).  Such 
prescriptive views are based on earlier research by Learned, Christiansen, Andrews and 
Guth (1969)  (the LCAG model) who identified four key elements of effective strategy 
formulation.  This early model became the cornerstone of many of the theoretical 
developments in the field of strategy and we can see the basic DNA of such models as 
SWOT, Environmental Analysis, Resource Audit and Stakeholder Analysis. 
 




Company Strengths and 
Weakness 
 





expectations and norms 
 




The LGCA model was born out of the Industrial Organisation school of management 
research of the 1950s and 1960s (Porter 1981).  Porter adopted aspects of this school in 
the 1980s as he developed his theories around positioning and competitive strategies.  
This was based on the Industrial Organisational paradigm that Industry Structure dictates 
Conduct (or strategy) within the industry, which in terms impacts upon the relative 
Performance of both the industry and the firms within it (Porter 1981).  Ansoff (1988) 
draws a distinction between 3 different levels or classes of decision making within 
organisations.  Operational (realizing profit maximisation), Administrative (organising 
resources to maximise profit) and Strategic (decisions about optimising a firms profit 
potential).  The focus of Operational decisions is on the day to day, Administrative is about 
structures, prioritising resources and accountability and Strategic is concerned with 
positioning the organisation within its market place or industry.  Strategic decision- making 
in this sense again relates back to the importance of industry structure within the 
industrial organisation paradigm and “the relation between the firm and its environment” 
(Ansoff 1988 p24).  As will be seen later, the impact of the environmental context of local 
government is equally important on the conduct and performance of local authorities. 
 
So a strategy is not now merely just a plan, but it is an important plan about important 
things.  It is the plan of the organisation itself, its direction and its future. Or is it? 
Mintzberg (1972, 1978); Mintzberg and Waters (1982, 1984, 1985), Mintzberg et al 
(1986), Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), Mintzberg and Westley (1992), Brunet Mintzberg 
and Waters (1986) introduce and sustain, over the next two decades, the concept that 
strategies can and do emerge from the organisation rather than develop as a planned 
rational approach to strategic design.  This view is predicated on Mintzberg’s earlier work 
with a number of organisations.  In Mintzberg’s view, strategy should be seen not as a 
plan to do in the future (inferring as it does a set of work that must have been done prior 
to the future and the plan’s implementation) but as a ‘pattern in a stream of decisions’ 
(Mintzberg and Walters 1985 p257).  This pattern comes together over time to represent 
the strategy of the organisation.  As an alternative to prescriptive views of strategy 
formulation, Mintzberg’s approach takes a descriptive approach to the study of strategy 
formulation (Ansoff 1988, Mintzberg 1998).  Such an approach seeks to explain what 
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actually happens within organisations rather than attempting to prescribe what should 
happen. 
 
This debate between strategy formation as either a series of planned events that have 
arisen through a rational strategy design process and strategies as things that should be 
allowed to emerge from organisations, became something of a standoff between the two 
schools of thought during the 1980s and 1990s.  Both Schools concur at one level as to 
what the strategy of the organisation represents, that is that it is the thing that establishes 
the direction of the organisation and what it is capable of achieving and that it is about 
matching the resources of the organisation to its environment.  Where differences in 
thinking emerge surround the ways in which strategies are formulated by organisations.  
On the one hand strategy formulation is seen as a series of rational processes (the 
strategy tool-kit) that scans the environment, compares to the current position, re-
positions the organisation and then implements structures, investments, processes and 
plans to enable the desired position to be achieved.  Alternatively, there is the view that 
strategies are emergent rather than planned within organisations.  In this case, strategies 
are classified as Intended, Deliberate, Realised, Un-realised and Emergent (Mintzberg 
1985).  If an intended strategy is realised then it is a Deliberate Strategy and could 
conceivably have been the result of a deliberately designed and planned process.  
However, planned strategies also result in unrealised (or failed) strategies ie the 
organisation does not achieve what it set out to.  Therefore the time, effort and resources 
that went into planning the strategy were wasted.  Conversely, there are also successful 
strategies that do not result from any formal planning, but rather emerge from a series of 
patterns of consistencies within the organisation that when taken together shape an 
organisation’s future. 
 
Mintzberg (1985) identifies that deliberate (or planned) and emergent strategies lie at the 
opposite ends of a continuum of strategy formulation, with neither being likely to be seen 
in practice due to the number of unlikely dependent variables that exist.  Intentional 
strategies are too inflexible for unknown futures (Stacey, 1993). It is important to 
recognise therefore that Mintzberg does not actually preclude or ignore the role of planned 
approaches to deliberate strategy formulation within organisations but rather posts two 
significant health warnings.  Firstly, that plans may not be realised and secondly, that to 
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focus solely on planned strategy formulation and to structure an organisation accordingly, 
means that organisations may miss the opportunity to develop emergent strategies over 
time.  In reality, Mintzberg concludes, organisational strategies are most likely to develop 
from a mix of deliberate and emergent processes, and “would expect to find tendencies in 
the direction of deliberate and emergent strategies rather than perfect forms of either” 
(Mintzberg, 1985 page 260).  It is important therefore to recognise the usefulness of 
emergent strategy formulation, and the same is true in ensuring that organisations are 
structured appropriately to allow this to happen.  This theme is permeated through the 
subsequent literature and manifests itself in concepts such as the learning organisation 
(Senge 1990a) and Moss Kanter’s (1983) architecture of culture and strategic change.  
Moss Kanter’s work with over 100 American corporations identified 5 forces affecting 
strategic change. Departures from tradition represent internal opportunities to create new 
ideas, often by accident, crisis or galvanising events are external forces acting on the 
organisation that prompt change responses, strategic decisions are taken by the leadership 
of the organisation often co-joining the two earlier forces, Individual prime movers push 
change through to conclusion and finally action vehicles represent the practical structures 
and initiatives that convert conceptual strategic ideas into workable deliverables at the 




What is it that makes strategy and strategic decision making different from the run of the 
mill decision making that goes on within organisations?  Numerous decisions are made 
within organisations every day and by a variety of different people at all levels of the 
organisation. Many of these decisions are operating or administrative decisions (Ansoff 
1988, Porter 1996) and deal with the day to operations of the organisation.  Operational 
decisions are important to organisational success, as is operational efficiency (Porter 
1996), however, they are to do primarily with the internal workings of the organisation.  
Strategic decisions on the other hand are concerned with external rather than internal 
problems (Ansoff 1988).  Mintzberg (1987) goes further in delineating strategy.  He 
identifies five potential definitions for strategy that are used within the growing literature 
of strategic management.  These represent five approaches to viewing strategy as a plan, 
a ploy, a pattern, a position and a perspective.  Even though each definition offers a 
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different outlook on what strategy can mean, each view of strategy works within its own 
context, and it is the context within which it is employed that is important.  In working 
with these definitions, Mintzberg is coming from a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, 
perspective.  In this sense he is trying to explain what is observed within organisations, 
rather than saying what must happen.  He concludes that it is possible for the different 
definitions of strategy to be working at the same time within organisations, depending on 
the viewpoint of the observer.  While recognising that the definitions can compete with 
each other for acceptability, it is also necessary to recognise (importantly to Mintzberg) 
that they compliment each other as well.  To Mintzberg strategies are in fact social 
constructs, and as such whatever definition is placed on strategy it should be recognised 
that, whether the definition is right or wrong, strategies represent how organisations (in 
themselves social constructs), and the people within them, view themselves.  Mintzberg’s 
typology is inclusive of other writers’ ideas.  By including strategy as a plan he is accepting 
the work of Ansoff and similarly, by including ploys and positioning he is recognising the 
contribution of Porter.  This is something that he develops further in later work where he 
identifies 10 strategic schools and again sees the potential for elements of each to co-
exist.  This reconciliation is similarly born out in the writings of both Ansoff (1988) and 
Porter (1998) and the literature becomes settled on a position that recognises the 
contributions of both the prescriptive and descriptive approaches to researching strategy. 
 
Quinn (1980 in Mintzberg et al 2003 p 10) defines strategy as  
 
“a pattern or plan that integrates an organisation’s major goals, policies and action 
sequences into a cohesive whole.   A well formulated strategy helps to marshal and 
allocate an organisation’s resources into a unique and viable posture based on its relative 
internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment and 
contingent moves by intelligent opponents.” 
 
Once again strategy is seen as sitting at the top of the tree integrating goals, policies and 
action sequences.  In this sense, strategy is about pulling things together and a definite 
hierarchy of organisational decision making is put forward.  Quinn also differentiates 
between strategies and tactics, with tactics operating at a lower level than strategy, 
although this is contingent on the position within the organisational hierarchy – the 
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marketing director’s strategy may be the chief executive’s tactics.  Significantly, Quinn 
introduces the notion that strategies can be viewed either a priori (to guide action) or a 
posteriori (resulting from actual behaviour).  This is the same as Mintzberg’s identification 
of intended and realised strategies, with emergent strategies also being seen as a 
posteriori.  In Quinn’s view, the a priori/ a posteriori distinction gives importance to 
whether strategy identification is established through reviewing the written formal 
strategic documents of organisations or through observing the emerging stream of 
decisions that result in a widely held understanding of what the strategy is.  In a 
comparative review of writings on military/diplomatic and business strategy evaluation, 
Quinn proposes a set of criteria for evaluating a good strategy.  Working on the premise 
that the complexity of external factors and the uniqueness of the strategic situation mean 
that just because a strategy was successful does not mean that it was good, the following 
critical factors should be present.  Clear decisive objectives, maintaining the initiative, the 
concentration of superior power, flexibility of capabilities and manoeuvrability, co-
ordinated and committed leadership, surprise and security.  The competitive nature of 
such criteria is self-evident and the translation of this set of criteria into a public sector 
setting may be problematic.  However, with the exception of surprise, the presence of the 
other criteria may be something that could be seen within successful local government 
strategy making.  Quinn also identifies that successful strategies from the 
military/diplomatic context have four dimensions.  Firstly they contain and encompass the 
major goals, polices and action sequences of the organisation – if strategy is about overall 
direction, goal development must be integral to its formulation.  Secondly, a few key 
concepts and thrusts help to shape effective strategies.  This is because, thirdly, strategy 
deals with the unknowable and unpredictable and finally in large complex organisations 
strategies (or tactics) will need co-ordinating across all levels of the organisation.  The 
sheer scale of the strategy task, and the organisational and environmental concerns 
attached to it, some of which may be temporary, means that it would not be possible, or 
practicable to develop a detailed and comprehensive set of firm strategies for the 
organisation to follow. 
  
The Emergence of the Strategic Discipline 
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Mintzberg (with Ahsltrad and Lampel 1998 and with Lampel 1999), take a historical look at 
the development of strategic management and identify 10 schools of thought that are 
grouped into the two broad approaches of prescriptive schools, telling what to do, and 
descriptive schools, describing what happens.  In this review, the development of strategic 
management as a field of study is examined by evaluating the standpoints of the different 
academics.  It offers a useful insight not only into the chronology of strategic literature, 
but also in trying to develop a typology of strategic thinking and management systems 
(Ansoff 1980) across an often confusingly broad spectrum.  The main schools identified 
range from the prescriptive Design, Planning and Positioning Schools to the more 
descriptive Entrepreneurial, Cognitive, Learning, Power, Cultural, Environmental and 
Configuration schools.  While the approach adopted by Mintzberg can, and has, been 
contested (see Ansoff 1991 and Mintzberg 1991) it does at least offer a more inclusive 
approach to the study of strategy development, concluding that the different schools all 
have a relevance depending on the stage of organisational development and also 
fundamentally recognising the complex nature of strategy formation. 
 
“ Dealing with all this complexity in one process may seem overwhelming.  But that is the 
nature of the beast.  Strategy formation is judgemental designing, intuitive visioning, and 
emergent learning; it is about transformation as well as perpetuation; it must involve 
individual cognition and social interaction, cooperative as well as conflictive; it has to 
include analysing before and programming after as well as negotiating during; and all this 
must be in response to what may be a demanding environment. Try to omit any of this, 
and watch what happens!”  
 
In this statement, Mintzberg and Lampel (1999, in Mintzberg et al 2003 p28) bring 
together what have up until this point been conflicting schools of thought, the prescriptive 
based on ‘scientific’ models of organisational strategy making and the descriptive, though 
again based on observation, but recognising that strategies can emerge rather than be 
prescribed. 
 
It is important to recognise that Mintzberg has been a major critic of the pseudo-scientific 
ways that the design, planning and positioning schools have promoted a singularly 
structured approach to solving the problem strategy formulation.  This to some extent 
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prejudices his position in drawing this typology together, especially as he places his own 
thinking within the typology.  Interestingly, Mintzberg positions himself within the 
Configuration School, which has a ‘superior’ feel to it, or certainly in the way that it is 
described.  It is inclusive, integrative and practice based, it is also the school that seeks to 
combine and recognise elements of the other schools and, surprisingly, also includes a 
prescriptive element, for example Chandler.  Mintzberg’s earlier work on strategy alone 
would certainly have placed him within the descriptive Learning School, based as it is on 
emerging processes.   
 
The identification of different schools, exhibiting as they do different traits and 
presuppositions about how strategies are formulated, will be useful to this Doctoral study.  
Such a typology represents a useful framework for exploring the reactions to the need for 
strategic change within the organisations to be studied.  At a higher level exploring 
whether the turnaround has followed a prescriptive methodology such as the design or 
planning schools, or whether the strategy was more learning/emergent or power or 
configuration based would be both interesting and useful to understand.  Similarly it would 
be useful to explore whether Mintzberg et al’s assertion that some of the schools could 
represent stages in the strategy formation process holds true in the local government 
arena, away from the more traditional private sector environments within which the 
various theories were promulgated. 
 
Examining Strategy - Methodological Issues 
 
Given the different schools of thought and the shear nature of the ‘strategy beast’ 
(Mintzberg 1998), it is important for researches to be aware of which aspects of strategy 
they are viewing at any one time in order to adopt appropriate methodological standpoints 
for research.  Snow and Hambrick (1980) offer some advice to researchers in overcoming 
theoretical and methodological problems.  The advice is based on the experience of their 
own research with around 200 organisations and they identify problems associated with 
four main approaches to undertaking research into strategy Investigator Inference, Self 
Typing, External Assessment and Objective Indicators. Each approach has its own 
strengths and weaknesses when used independently, but when use in conjunction with 
each other (some or all), the authors maintain that they can converge to portray a 
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particular strategy for the organisation, not dissimilar from the concept of triangulation 
(Saunders et al 2000) or if taken a stage further, could possibly expose a plurality of 
perspectives (Fisher 2004). Investigator inference relies on the researcher assessing the 
organisation’s strategy and could be employed in the production of case studies.  This 
approach has a number of potential strengths, namely it enables a holistic account to be 
given that can be adaptable and a basis for grounded theory (Fisher 2004), also it allows 
the development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single “case”’ (Robson 1993) 
and is therefore a potentially rich source of evidence (Morris and Wood 1991).  There is 
also the scope for generalisation, although this can be contested (Watson 1994 and Yin 
1994). However, the approach also suffers from the potential weaknesses of case study 
research such as a loss of representativeness, either through researcher bias or bias in the 
information gathered, the potential for reflexivity and also a danger of lack of ‘science’ by 
just telling a story (Fisher 2004).   Self Typing uses the organisation’s top managers and 
allows them to ‘characterize’ the organisation’s strategy.  While this has the advantage of 
utilising the group of people within the organisation that largely determine the 
organisations strategy, it may be that this is only the intended, or espoused strategy, and 
not the realised strategy.  Also the approach requires managers to position the 
organisation’s strategy against a set of pre-determined strategy descriptors (eg defender, 
prospector, analyser or reactor (Miles and Snow 1978)). Manager’s perceptions of what 
strategy is do not always match that of the researcher (for example managers tend to 
express strategy in terms of intentions rather than realised strategies (Hambrick 1979, 
Quinn 1980)) and also managers resist attempts to classify their organisation, thinking it 
to be unique.  Finally conflicting results can be received from the different managers 
participating, which can lead to doubts over the fallibility of the measurement approach 
(Bourgeois 1978).  External Assessment uses the ratings of those external to the 
organisation (such as competitors or industry analysts etc).  While this is a useful source of 
independent information, external parties may not have knowledge of the current strategy 
or its development.  Also the results of Self typing and external assessment can, not 
surprisingly, give rise to conflicting results.  Snow and Hambrick’s advice is to err on the 
side of self typing because it comes from within the organisation.  One clear parallel with 
local government is the role of the Audit Commission as a source of external evidence.  
Part of their role is to evaluate both self assessment and stakeholder survey information so 
their view is often based in itself on a combination of self typing and external assessment 
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evidence.  The Audit Commission may therefore represent a stronger source of external 
evidence than those sources used in the private sector.  Finally, Objective Indicators can 
be used in attempt to measure an organisation’s strategy. While such measures do not 
rely on perceptions, pure objective measures are often difficult to find in the private 
sector. In the public sector however a number of strategy documents exist as public 
documents for local Authorities and these would provide a useful source of objective 
measurement.  The problem again would be distinguishing whether the strategies are 
intended or realised. 
 
Mintzberg (1979b) also shares experiences on undertaking research into strategy 
formulation.  The approach advocated stems form Mintzberg’s descriptive ideological 
position when it comes to strategy research.  Seven key principles are presented as a 
research typology that has underpinned the various research projects undertaken.  These 
are as follows, to be as purely descriptive as possible, to rely on simple methodologies, to 
be as purely inductive as possible while at the same time systematic, to measure the 
research in real organisational terms, support systematic data with anecdotal data and 




Within the initial conceptual framework outlined in Document 1, the literature on strategic 
turnaround was identified as being a key body of literature for this study.   In this section a 
review of the nature of strategic turnaround will be undertaken in order to identify a 
working definition that will be used throughout this study.  The review will also to identify 
the main aspects of strategic turnaround and these are then developed further in the rest 
of the document. 
 
Defining Strategic Turnaround 
 
Having examined the nature of strategy and strategic decision making, what is strategic 
turnaround?  At first glance, defining the term should be relatively straightforward.  It does 
after all have a fairly intuitive feel to it; it’s important and it’s about changing direction.  
However, after reviewing the literature opinion is divided on how strategic turnaround 
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could, or should, be achieved (Harker and Sharma 2000).  Hambrick and Schecter (1983) 
refer to the abundance of folklore around the subject of strategic turnaround, but that 
there is scant information or systematic evidence of how turnaround can be achieved.  This 
part of the review seeks to establish for the purposes of this study a workable definition of 
strategic turnaround that can be developed into a public sector application.  It is important 
to identify at this stage that as with strategy, the vast majority of literature in this field is 
focused on the private sector.  As such, definitions of organisational failure are tied in with 
the business need to generate profits and satisfy shareholders in order to survive.  This 
focus within the private sector has been increasing since the early 1980s due to the need 
for organisations to be appropriately responsive to changes in their market places.  
Globalisation, advances in technology and the cost of capital (Hambrick and Schecter 
1983), increasingly competitive and complex business environments (Landrum et al 2000) 
and the increasing number of bankruptcies (Francis and Desai 2005) are examples of the 
reasons traditionally put forward for this increase in interest and awareness. 
 
Despite the relative newness of the subject area, it is interesting to note that there has 
been a historical study of the work of Henri Fayol and his contribution to the strategic 
turnaround of the integrated steel-producing firm of Commentry, Fourchambault and 
Decazeville in 1888 (Wren 2001). 
 
One of the definitions available comes from Pandit (2000), who defines turnaround as the 
actions taken to bring about a recovery in a failing organisation.  Also, turnaround has 
been defined as decline followed by performance improvement (Schendel et al 1976, 
Robbins and Pearce 1992) or as ‘a process that takes a company from a situation of poor 
performance to a situation of good sustained performance’ (Brandes and Brege 1993, 
p186).  Comparing these three approaches to defining turnaround, it can be seen that 
there is a certain degree of commonality between them.  All three suggest that things get 
better for the organisation after a period of decline.  Two specifically mention performance 
improvement while the other implies it.  All three also include a degree of subjectivity 
around what constitutes failing, declining and poor/good performance.  Also however, 
there are some differences.  One definition describes actions and another describes 
processes and in the third it is just about getting better (how is not specified).  This 
implies that a range of approaches to achieving turnaround is possible.  Also, only one of 
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the definitions refers to sustainability.  It could be argued that, by the very nature of 
turnaround, it is implied in the other two, however, sustainability would appear to be an 
important aspect of organisational turnaround, otherwise why bother?  Finally, two of the 
definitions extend the issue of subjectivity to the scale of improvement itself.  For 
example, what does recovery mean?  In one very major sense, this could be just going 
back to the level of performance achieved before decline set in – which might not have 
been very good in the first place and could have been a factor that contributed to the 
original decline.  Neither does ‘performance improvement’ convey a sense of scale.  
Performance may have improved, but the organisation still might not be performing very 
well.  Only the Brandes and Brege definition seeks to capture a sense of good or poor in 
relation to the performance of the organisation.  As has been said above, these terms are 
in of themselves subjective but at least there presence indicates a measure of either how 
much performance has improved, or perhaps needs to improve. 
 
Improvement is present in all three definitions and is also prominently represented in the 
literature. Most writers point to a sense of organisational decline or failure as a pre-curser 
to the need to turnaround.  Indeed overcoming failure is where most of the writing in this 
field is focused (Khandwalla 1983, Hambrick and Schecter 1983, Harker 1996, Wren 2001, 
Francis and Desai 2005, Filatotchev and Toms 2006).  Where the literature diverges is with 
regard to how the need for turnaround is identified and, more significantly, the way in 
which turnaround occurs.  However, despite these different classifications of turnaround 
and how to achieve it, the literature is mainly focussed on improving on poor performance.  
As such, Brandes and Brege definition is workable as a general, or overarching, definition 
for the purposes of this study, concerned as it is with strategic turnaround in English local 
government, and its sustainability. 
 
Hofer (1980), in a study of 12 American companies in different industries ranging from the 
automotive industry to the electronic industry, identifies the need to differentiate between 
strategic turnaround situations and operational turnaround situations.  Hofer’s study, and 
his earlier work with Schendel (1978), represents an important base reference within the 
literature with a number of subsequent studies referring to it  (Porter 1981, Hambrick and 
Schecter 1983, Khandwalla 1983, Mintzberg and Westley 1992, Hart and Banbury 1994, 
Harker 1996, Harker and Sharma 1999, Fracis and Desai 2005, Filatotchev and Toms 
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2006).  Hofer defines strategic turnaround as either those situations that result in an 
organisation changing its strategy for dealing with its existing business or those where an 
organisation chooses to operate in a new business or businesses.  Overall this would be 
termed the business level strategy.  Operating strategies on the other hand do not require 
a change in the business level strategy but rather focus on increasing revenues, 
decreasing costs, decreasing assets or a combination of effort.  This is similar in some 
ways to Ansoff’s (1988) distinction between operational, administrative and strategic 
decision making seen earlier.  Hofer recognises that in practice the difference between 
strategic and operating turnarounds is in fact blurred and in some cases, organisations 
may need to adopt a different strategic position in order to successfully employ operational 
turnaround strategies such as asset reduction.  In essence, Hofer is drawing a distinction 
between short term and long term actions to achieve turnaround, and this is largely drawn 
from the work of Schendel et al who studied the decline and turnaround of 54 companies 
that competed in 17 different industrial sectors and 40 different industries.  Importantly, 
Hofer uses the framework developed by Schendel et al’s study to argue that it is important 
that organisations first recognise the causes of organisational decline in order to select the 
appropriate turnaround position, whether strategic or operational.  In Hofer’s study, he 
identified that of the 12 organisations reviewed, those that were unsuccessful (i.e. went 
into liquidation) adopted the incorrect turnaround position for the circumstances they were 
facing.  Actually, where failure ultimately occurred, this was primarily due to management 
selecting an operating turnaround when a strategic turnaround was required.  However, 
failure did not occur when management attempted a strategic turnaround when an 
operating turnaround was indicated. 
 
Another finding from Hofer’s study is that management seldom selected a strategic 
turnaround position, preferring instead to adopt an operating turnaround position or 
voluntary liquidation (thereby eliminating losses).  The reasons for this are not clear from 
Hofer’s study although he does postulate that this may be because of the lack of strategic 
windows whereby an organisation actually has the capacity or opportunity to affect a 
strategic shift in position.  Of course, it could also be because organisations prefer to adopt 
familiar solutions to new problems (Cyert and March 1963, Cohen et al 1972,and Snow 
and Hambrick 1980) 
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Hofer’s study is based in the private sector and focuses heavily on financial performance 
(i.e. profitability) as the benchmark against which success and failure is measured, and 
also in identifying the symptoms and root causes of organisational decline.  This study is 
built on a foundation of accounting measures (Altman 1968, Beaver 1966 and Wilcox 1971 
and 1973) that can be used to predict organisational failure and be used as targets for 
improved performance.  However, despite such measures not being wholly transferable to 
the public sector setting, some of the key findings of Hofer’s study may well be relevant 
when framing the research of documents 3, 4 and 5.  These are, which type of response is 
required, strategic or operational, based on an analysis of the organisations decline? Is it 
worthwhile effecting a turnaround at all i.e. does the organisation have the capability, 
capacity and resources to undertake a successful turnaround?, is there an appropriate 
‘Strategic Window’ whereby a shift in strategic position can be enacted by the 
organisation, rather than just relying on cost cutting measures? 
 
Another important distinction to draw is to determine whether an apparent change in 
organisational strategy witnessed is actually strategic adjustment rather than strategic 
change.  Many organisations prefer to apply familiar solutions to new problems (Cyert and 
March 1963).  Snow and Hambrick (1980) argue that where organisations use these 
familiar responses, they are actually adjusting rather than changing their strategy.  This is 
related to findings in other studies where the causes of organisational decline themselves 
have been as a result management overlaying past successes onto current problems, 
sometimes referred to as over learning  (Starbuck et al 1978) with other evidence 
suggesting that a key factor why companies failed to turnaround was that managers relied 
on well know recipes from within (Harker 1996).  Moss Kanter (1983) refers to this as the 
roast pig syndrome. Alternatively management may adopt the wrong approach to 
managing the change within the organisation (Hedge 1982).  Change can be seen to occur 
within organisations as distinct episodes or events predicated by some change in either the 
internal environment (eg changes in personnel) or external environment (eg changes in 
technology). Turnaround is one such change, or episode, in an organisation’s lifecycle 
(Mintzberg and Walters 1992) that tends to be depicted as a relatively rapid, highly 
deliberate and centrally directed change, whether this is operating or strategic turnaround 
(Hofer 1980).   Revitalisation on the other hand, traditionally follows a gentler pace of 
change but results in a more embedded change that ‘infuses the organisation rather than 
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being infiltrated from the top’ (Mintzberg and Walters 1992 p 47).  The distinction between 
turnaround and revitalisation is a mix of criticality and timescale, scale and urgency.  In 
the private sector, the importance of the financial liquidity to the firm increases the need 
for rapid responses and therefore the more autocratic approaches associated with 
turnaround situations.  The downside to this is that the opportunities for organisational 
learning and the embedding of a new and sustainable culture and structure may be lost 
due to the speed of change.  The quick wins offered by Retrenchment (Boyne 2004) or 
operational turnaround (Hofer 1980) may take the pressure off the long-term 
requirements for organisational change across all levels of the organisation and its 
strategies (Mintzberg and Walters 1992). In the longer term therefore, to achieve a 
sustained turnaround position that addresses the causes of the original failure, it would be 
necessary to ensure that turnaround is driven by inducted learning (Mintzberg and Walters 




Separating Strategic Turnaround from Strategic Management 
 
This review of the literature started by exploring the nature of strategic decision making 
within organisations.  Having now considered strategic turnaround, where does it sit in 
relation to general theories and schools of thought on Strategy? 
 
General Strategy is concerned with organisations matching resources to their 
environments (Prahalad and Thomas 1977).  This is often seen in the organisational 
development of planned approaches to strategy (SWOT, environmental analysis, resources 
audit etc) (Chandler 1962, Ansoff 1988, 1991, Porter 1981, 1986,1988) or through 
emergent strategies (Mintzberg 1978, 1987, 1990, Quinn 1977, 1978).   In the normal 
course of events, organisations are using strategy either to get ahead or stay ahead.  In 
turnaround situations organisations are faced with a put up or shut up situation. The 
organisation has already gone into decline and is faced with the need to either change or 
die (Pandit 2000, Khandwalla 1983, Hambrick and Schecter 1983, Harker 1996, Wren 
2001, Francis and Desai 2005, Filatotchev and Toms 2006).  Such organisations are often 
referred to as being sick organisations or ill organisations (Khandwalla 1983) or in decline 
or crisis (Mordaunt and Cornforth 2004).  Often, organisations facing turnaround are 
characterised by poor leadership, poor strategic systems, failing culture and the need to 
make things worse before they get better. Such organisations experience a period of 
retrenchment before recovery, which in itself can lead to low morale and the loss of skills 
as people exit organisation and a lack of stakeholder confidence (shareholders, customers, 
financiers, government etc).  Organisations may also experience constraints over finances 
– both long term and short-term finance – including day-to-day turnover (Filatotchev and 
Toms 2006).  Also constrained is cost side of finance equation – fixed costs can represent 
straight jacket prohibiting ability to achieve the benefits offered by retrenchment 
efficiencies.  
 
If organisations were good at strategy, either deliberate or emergent, then they would not 
be in a turnaround situation.  Even shifts in the external environment cannot be fully 
blamed for failure if strategy is defined as matching resources to environments.  However, 
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‘failing’ can have positives and lead to galvanising events (Moss Kanter 1983), resulting in 
a change in leadership, or leadership approach, and the introduction of new and more 
inclusive styles of management which release potential from within the organisation.  Also, 
new staff entering the organisation bring new ideas, networks and abilities that can result 
in changes to organisational culture.  Organisations in turnaround situations are therefore 
unique from their non-failing peers as they are starting from a different base.  Whereas 
the strategic focus in the normal course of events is to ensure continued performance, and 
even improved performance, in failing organisations, possibly in shock, there is a need not 
only to think strategically about the ongoing direction of the organisation but also how to 
deal with the organisational and process changes that will be required to achieve and then 
sustain turnaround. 
 
The Process of Strategic Turnaround 
 
Many studies in turnaround ultimately focus on the process of how turnaround is achieved.  
The studies themselves tend to produce normative models and are generally positivist in 
nature in that they attempt to deliver a workable model of turnaround.  Despite this, the 
studies have either a quantitative focus (Schendal et al 1976, Hofer 1980, Hambrick and 
Schecter 1983, Khandwalla 1983) or have been qualitatively based (Prahalad and Thomas 
1977, Starbuck et al 1978, Hedge 1982). 
 
Robbins and Pearce (1992) identify two distinct stages in successful turnaround situations.  
First there is a period of Retrenchment, where by the organisation seeks efficiencies 
through downsizing, de-layering and focusing on product lines i.e. operational turnaround 
(Hofer 1980). This generates the cash and capacity required to sustain the organisation in 
the short term. This is then followed by a longer-term period of Recovery, which will 
include new market entries, mergers, product developments etc, namely strategic 
turnaround (Hofer 1980).  Such an approach is recognised throughout the literature but at 
various points adapted and added to.  (Filatotchev and Toms 2006), bring in an additional 
stage of Realignment prior retrenchment.  This realignment brings together the strategic 
expectations of the internal and external stakeholders, managers and investors, at an 
early stage to manage expectations appropriately throughout the turnaround process 
(views on profitability and return may need to be changed in the short term) and also to 
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establish whether the organisation has the facility, owning to external and governance 
constraints, to enter the retrenchment phase.  Asset sales are not always discretionary, 
even in the private sector, and governance arrangements may prevent downsizing and de-
layering.  In the Public Sector where are assets are both public goods, held in perpetuity 
and often have no alternative use (CIPFA 1989, CIPFA and LASAAC 1993, Deakin 1999), 
the scope for retrenchment is also limited. Even schemes relating to the transfer of 
ownership and the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) take many years to become reality and 
are therefore a long term solution rather than a short term gain (HM Treasury 1999, HM 
Treasury 2003, Pitt et al 2006, Trim 2001).  Overlaid on top of this is that operational 
efficiency may be difficult to establish in the short term as it will be constrained by terms 
of employment, the costs of redundancy and political unacceptability of job losses and is 
more often than not tied into the requirements of increased automation and the use of 
informational technology both on the front line (eg care workers scheduling) and in the 
back office (eg Call centres).  Such technological responses would take time and resources 
to implement that sit outside the retrenchment timeframe.  Francis and Desai (2005) 
identify that while retrenchment is observable in a significant number of successful 
turnarounds, it is not a necessary requirement. In a study of private sector organisations, 
around 20% of organisations did not adopt retrenchment as part of the turnaround 
strategy.  There is scope for more research on the need and impact of retrenchment on 
the turnaround process (Barker et al 1998, Castrogiovanni and Burton 2000, Francis and 
Desai 2005). 
 
Khandwalla (1983) explored the turnaround experience in mismanaged complex 
organisations in India.  Complex organisations were defined as those characterised as 
having multiple objectives and domains, extensive internal differentiation, functional and 
role specialisation and a multiplicity of rules, procedures, operating modes and cultures 
(Etzioni 1961, Hall 1963, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).  Such complexity is relevant to the 
UK local government context of this study (Joyce 2001, 2004). The Khandwalla study, 
based on a mix of 9 public and private organisations, identifies 13 ‘ingredients’ for 
successful turnaround.  These ingredients focus on the recruitment of a powerful change 
agent at a high level within the organisation who through dramatic credibility building is 
able to mobilise the organisation around a series of clear-cut goals.  The role of the change 
agent is key to developing a sharing and open culture within the organisation and building 
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(re-building) links to external stakeholders and audiences.  Also key is the restructuring of 
the organisation to both free up resources and improve coordination and communication 
channels.  Also apparent from the research is that a participative style of management 
worked better than ‘terror tactics’ and mass layoffs.  In essence the change agent is a key 
player in allowing the organisation itself and the people within it to reinvent themselves.  
The change agent is therefore a facilitator that allows change to occur both internally, 
while freeing up the pressure of external relationships.  While suggesting a type of 
structured approach to the change, the role of the change agent also incorporates 
elements of emergent strategies (Mintzberg and Walters 1985) and the aspects of the 
enrolment and commitment to organisational visions within a learning organisation (Senge 
1990a). The study is based in India and may therefore lack applicability in the UK context, 
however it does deal with public sector organisations and so the findings may be 
comparable.  Also, the study only has rich information (Fisher 2004) regarding 2 
organisations, so the findings are skewed.  Although Khandwalla does look for evidence of 
the research findings in the other organisations, the general applicability of the 
‘ingredients’ model cannot be wholly relied upon. 
 
Taking a different approach, Harker (1996) focuses on the role that marketing can play in 
organisational turnaround.  The marketing focus seems to be more based on the journal it 
is published in (Marketing Intelligence and Planning) than the findings of the study itself. 
Taking a longitudinal grounded theory approach to the experiences of 4 engineering 
companies over a 14 year timeframe, Harker identifies a ‘Destiny Development’ framework 
consisting of 7 elements.  The framework identifies a strong role for a visible chief 
executive in ‘opening up’ the organisation and empowering all hierarchical levels to explore 
and develop the organisation’s strategy, while at the same time building new external 
relationships.  The study is longitudinal over a period of 14 years, although comparable 
company information published in the article only relates to 4 years.  The study employed 
both Quantitative and Qualitative elements and the companies were chosen following an 
analytical review of financial data and company records.  
 
Aspects of Strategic Turnaround 
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A number of studies have identified that situational factors can have an impact on 
turnaround outcomes (Francis and Desai 2005, Landrum et al 2000, Wren 2001). 
Situational factors include organisational size and environmental factors such as industry 
growth and competition as well as government regulations and stakeholder expectations. 
Such external factors could have as much of an impact on successful turnaround as 
management action, either positive or negative, and to a certain extent this could be to do 
with luck and timing (Wren 2001).  Situational factors cannot only be a potential cause of 
decline but can also constrain recovery (Pfeffer and Salanick 1978). A significant factor for 
private sector organisations has been identified as the environment’s capacity to 
accommodate firms, or environmental munificence (Dess and Beard 1984).  Such a factor 
would not be directly relevant to Local Government, given its statutory role, however could 
be translated to the Local Government arena when considering the various restructuring 
that has gone on in the sector in recent times (Wilson and Game 2006).  Two other 
environmental categories identified by Dess and Beard (1984) are dynamism and 
complexity.  These are more generic concepts and as such their effect may be witnessed 
within the local government arena.  Cognition (Francis and Desai 2005, Turner and 
Whiteman 2005) is another situational al aspect that can impact upon both decline and 
recovery.  This is related to the extent to which the managers within an organisation are 
aware of the extent, or scale, of performance decline and the rapidity of the onset of 
decline. Two schools of thought prevail with regard to scale. On the one hand 
organisations in crisis will be more likely to take the necessary steps to achieve 
performance recovery (Keisler and Sproull 1982, Joyce 2001) whereas on the other hand, 
if the scale of decline is great, organisations will not have the sufficient capability or 
capacity to recover (Pearce and Robbins 1993, Robbins and Pearce 1992) and will 
therefore need external support and assistance if they are to survive.  This approach is 
applicable to Local Government turnaround and could be seen in resultant central 
Government engagement with failing councils (Turner and Whiteman 2005).    
 
Francis and Desai (2005) studied the turnaround of 97 firms within the United States 
commercial machinery and computer equipment sector.  The sample was from a database 
of returned financial information using the key measures of Return on Investment and 
Negative Net income.  Turnaround was measured by comparing these relative measures 
over a three year period.  The analysis included tracking independent variables of 
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organisational inputs and outputs such as assets, asset utilisation, expenses and income 
looking for both the scale and rate of decline in the trigger indicators and also in the 
retrenchment indicators during recovery.  A major finding of this study was how factors of 
decline impact upon recovery.  For example, if erosion of resources is severe and rapid 
firms will have more difficulty recovering, with severity playing a greater impact than 
suddenness.  Size is a factor that can mitigate against this as larger organisations will find 
it easier to buffer the impacts of decline by utilising slack resources (retrenchment) and 
retained earnings.  In the short term it may be seen that larger organisations are able to 
put off the need to turnaround by tinkering at the edges of their capacity.  However, it was 
also evident that larger organisations were more tied into rigid structures and cultures that 
were more difficult to change and resulted in less long-term flexibility. In relation to UK 
local government, clearly the study is based on US Manufacturing forms and as such the 
contexts themselves may not be wholly transferable.  Despite this, there is the potential to 
explore whether councils have used accumulated balances and budgetary slack to stave off 
the need for turnaround before crisis sets in.  Also, Councils are bureaucratic organisations 
that are notably slow to change structurally and culturally (Joyce 2001, Rhodes 1988, 
Wilson and Game 2006).  As such they share the characteristics of the larger organisations 
in the Francis and Desai study.  A further line of investigation in this Doctoral study 
therefore is the extent to which such situational factors play a part in both the causes of 





Local Government in Context 
 
Considering the history and development of the UK local government system is an 
important part of this doctoral study.  Local government represents a unique environment 
with its own rules, regulations, structures and funding arrangements (Wilson and Game 
2006).  The formal structure of Local Government seen today can trace its statutory 
origins back to the mid 19th Century with the 1832 Electoral Reform Act, the 1834 Poor 
Law Reform and, significantly, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act (Chandler 2007).  This 
latter act in particular allowed for the establishment of nationally uniform legislation for 
specific types of local authority.  Prior to this there had always been a system of local 
governance dating back to Roman times that had evolved and developed into a system of 
County, Borough and Parish governance focused primarily around wealthy land owners and 
in part subsidised by the national government.  The Electoral Reform and Municipal 
Corporations Acts were born out of philosophical debates between centralised control over 
utility and the need for local democracy, the former contributed to by Jeremy Bentham and 
the latter by Joshua Smith (Chandler 2007).  In the end, the Municipal Corporations Act 
created the ability to establish local councils made up of elected local representatives and 
it is the provisions of this act, subsequently amended in the 1888 Local Government Act 
that established 62 County Councils and 61 Borough councils (Wilson and Game 2006).  
These Acts provided the basis for the development of local government structure 
throughout the 20th century until the 2000 Local Government Act, which amended some 
of the structures of local government into what exists today. This historical perspective is 
important to consider as the nature of local government today has been shaped by its long 
history (Stewart 2000, Wilson and Game 2006) and many of the structures and 
relationships that have built up during this time, although in themselves social constructs, 
provide the backdrop within which strategic change must be considered.  Local 
government has had a long history of providing locally elected government separate from 
the central control of parliament.  It is the election of local councillors that is one of the 
defining characteristics of local government (Rhodes 1988, Stewart 2000) and separates it 
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not only from the private sector, but also other domains within the public sector (Rhodes 
1988, Leach 2006, Pratchett 2004). 
 
Wilson and Game (2006 p 93) define local Government today as a “semi-independent, 
politically decentralised, multifunctional body created by and exercising responsibilities 
conferred by Parliament”.  This definition retains much of the 18th century identity of local 
government, the only main difference being the reference to semi-independent.  This 
semi-independence has developed over successive decades since the mid 1960s when 
restructuring of local authority services began to take place and the creation of the two tier 
model of local government with Non-metropolitan County and District councils emerged 
(Chandler 2007, Rhodes 1988, Wilson and Game 2006).  Successive governments, of 
whatever persuasion, have since this time periodically reviewed the structure of local 
government and the relationships it has with central parliament.  This has seen the 
introduction of Unitary Authorities (replacing the two tier system in some areas), regional 
government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (although not England due to the 
failed North East referendum of 2004), changes to the control over capital and revenue 
funding arrangements through the 1980s and up to the present day and the introduction 
of revised executive functions in the form of mayoral, leader and/or cabinet models 
(Chandler 2007, Wilson and Game 2006).  The significant aspect of central parliamentary 
control exerted over local government is in the funding and performance management 
arrangements of the sector.  Local authorities are funded through a mix of central grants, 
the non-domestic rates and the locally raised council tax.  In 2005-06, the proportion of 
locally collected tax was 22%, the balance of funding being out of the control of local 
government, set as it is centrally and therefore influenced by the direction of central 
government rather than local government policy (Wilson and Game 2006).  The presence 
of such external financial control, limits the ability of local government to raise additional 
funds and therefore its flexibility to respond to strategic challenges, often resulting in 
claims from local authorities themselves that Council Taxes will have to rise 
disproportionately to inflation due to a less than beneficial grant settlement (Guardian 
Unlimited, 2007).  The performance measurement system currently in place is the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) introduced in 2001 and undertaken by the 
Audit Commission (Game 2006, Wilson and Game 2006) and places considerable weight 
on corporate performance (Leach 2007).  Specific aspects of the CPA are referred to 
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throughout this review but suffice to say here that the audit commission play a significant 
role in identifying failing councils which ultimately can result in management intervention 
and relatively less freedom and flexibility to manage, especially with regard to finance 
(Game 2006, Jas and Sketcher 2005, Turner and Whiteman 2005, Wilson and Game 
2006).   Working against this, has been the emergence more recently of new localism 
(Coafee 2005).  Coafee recognises the inevitable conflict that will arise between the 
emergence of new localism and the centralism that exists in terms of the underlying power 
and accountability constructs.  The variety of service provision at the local level makes it 
difficult to apply simple rule based solutions but instead requires an effective response 
from the service user, who presumably need to first be included in the process.  This view 
is echoed by Corrigan and Joyce (1997) who advocate a greater role for the public in policy 
generation, supported by public managers who, being the implementers of policy, are 
better placed to develop it.  This challenge requires the officers of the local authority to 
work with both citizens and politicians to develop appropriate policy in the local area, with 
the politicians themselves becoming the directors of the administrative apparatus 
(Corrigan and Joyce 1997). 
 
Local Authorities are complex organisations (Worral et al 1998).  They provide 
multifunctional, and to an extent unrelated, services to the general public for example in 
the form of education, highways and planning, and also to the neediest members of 
society, for example council housing and social care.  Historically, as complexity increased 
and so to the need for specialists to be employed to carry out service functions, there was 
an increase in the professionalisation of services and service management (Ball et al 2000, 
Chandler 2006, Coafee 2005, Ryan and Walsh 2004). Placed around this is an additional 
professional support structure consisting of accountants, lawyers, human resource 
managers and those who administer the political support functions.   The extent of this 
professionalisation has resulted in an emphasis of association by local government staff 
with their own professional grouping rather than the organisation they work for.  This 
identity can extend within the departments that employees work for and also nationally 
across their wider professional grouping into other organisations (Rhodes 1988).  This 
complexity of structure, power and professionalisation make it difficult to manage the 
strategic process (Whittington and Stacey 1994, Worral et al 1998).  Overlaid with this are 
the changes that were implemented generally across the whole of the public sector in an 
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attempt to modernise the management of the sector through the introduction of private 
sector management techniques (Cochrane 1993, Dereli 2003, Diamond and Liddle 2005, 
Flynn and Talbot 1996, Pollitt 2003, Worral et al 1998).  Such changes included New Public 
Management (NPM), the creation of executive agencies, the introduction of internal 
markets as well as compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) and league tables (Barlow 
1996, Pidd 2005, Pollitt 2003, Wilson and Game 2006).  Many of these changes were 
designed to make the public services, and therefore also local government, consider the 
very nature of how and why services were provided.  This is sometimes referred to as 
Steering and not Rowing (Barlow and Rober 1996, Osborne and Gaebler 1993) meaning 
that public sector organisations should not automatically provide services directly 
themselves, but should enable services to be provided by the best means possible, 
whether this includes the private sector or voluntary sectors as the service delivery 
vehicle.  The advent of NPM has been an international phenomenon over the past 20 years 
or so and has seen a movement from rigid bureaucratic management within the public 
services to one that is more concerned with disaggregation, competition and 
incentivisation (Dunleavy and Margetts 2000 in Pollitt 2003).  Many of the characteristics 
of NPM could be termed discrete strategies in their own right, for example the use of the 
private sector to deliver services.  Other aspects however have more of a bearing on the 
process of strategic management and thus turnaround.  Such issues as focusing on 
outcomes, performance measurement frameworks, organisational structures and 
consumer need, all transfer into the strategic arena.  As does the complexity arising out of 
the increasing need to use partnering and multi-agency working to deliver effective 
services (Wilson and Game 2006) 
 
Strategy in the Public Sector 
 
The nearest body of literature to a discrete study of strategy in Local Government is the 
literature of Public Sector Management and Strategy (Diamond and Liddle 2005, Joyce 
2001).  This is a useful body of literature as although there are some differences within the 
sector, Local Government shares many similarities in terms of objectives, context, culture 
and structure with other parts of the public and not for profit sectors.  There have also 
been some studies into strategy making within UK Local Government ranging from the 
development of conceptual frameworks from existing literature (Worrell et al 1998) to 
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studies of particular local authorities (Dereli 2003, Joyce 2004).  This literature will 
therefore be a useful source of reference when establishing responses to turnaround but 
also more widely the implementation of sustainable strategic processes. 
 
Worrall et al (1998) consider that the terms ‘strategy’, ‘strategic planning’ and ‘ strategic 
management’ are well used concepts within the public sector arena.  However, they 
conclude that there is no common interpretation as to what being strategic means in the 
local government context, especially when it comes to implementation.  This is echoed in 
the wider public sector context by Diamond and Liddle (2004) and Joyce (2001).  There is 
common agreement that although written strategy documents exist, these do not, and 
should not, necessarily be taken to be the definitive strategy of the organisation 
concerned.  The literature is mainly taken up with the uniqueness of the public sector and 
the specific demands this makes on strategy making processes, especially those derived 
from the private sector (Diamond and Liddle 2005, Dereli 2003, Flynn and Talbot 1996, 
Joyce 2001, Stevens and McGowan 1983, Worrell et al 1998).  It is interesting, that 
despite the scarcity of the literature in either the public sector or local government arenas, 
what there is covers a range of dates from the mid 1980s to the present day.  The various 
studies reveal a number of common themes.  The first is that there is variation in the 
application of strategy making across the sector.  There is evidence that some 
organisations claim to have a strategic planning process, although this is not necessarily 
being enacted in practice whereas in other cases strategies are clearly evident, although 
no formal strategic documents are in evidence (Alford 2001, Flynn and Talbot 1996, 
Worrell et al 1998).   There is also the consistent view that the traditional rational planning 
models, espoused in the 1980s in particular, are not appropriate vehicles for undertaking 
strategy in the complex world of the public sector and local government in particular 
(Diamond and Liddle 2005, Worrell et al 1998).  Moreover, there is a need for flexibility in 
the strategic planning process due to the changing demands of new legislation, structures, 
funding and the needs of citizens and employees. 
 
There is also a need to be adaptive in the application of strategic tools used in the 
development of strategy, especially with regard to local government.  Ashton (2001) 
highlights the difference between public and private value constructs as being a key 
determinate in the development of strategic models within the public sector.  Private value 
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is output based, whereas public value is outcome based.  The prioritisation of resources 
within the public sector will need to be focussed therefore on maximising public value while 
minimising input costs.  Public value also represents a wider and more complex range of 
stakeholder groups and interests than in the private sector and therefore, environmental 
and stakeholder analysis tools become automatically more complex both to undertake and 
to interpret. 
 
Worrell et al (1998) undertook a survey of the public and private sector literature available 
at the time in order to develop a model of strategic processes within local government.  
The review of the literature is comprehensive, although the model produced is not based 
on their formal research within the sector and as such only provides a guide to the type of 
constructs they may usefully be employed.  A number of key factors are seen as important 
when interpreting strategic processes within local government.  Of particular importance is 
to recognise the need to incorporate the politicised nature of the sector, not only in terms 
of national Politics, or organisational politics (with a small ‘p’), but also establishing an 
approach to strategy that includes the local politicians, or members rather than the 
historical tendency for strategy making to be seen as the domain of senior management.  
This is seen as a way of strengthening member and political involvement within the overall 
management of an authority, and also later appears as a key line of enquiry within the 
CPA Framework (Audit Commission 2006).  The inter-relationship of strategic roles 
between elected members and senior officers, particularly the Chief Executive Officer, is 
also a key finding of Dereli’s 2003 study of four district/borough councils and referred to 
by Joyce (2001).  Another key issue arising from Worrall et al is the need for strategies to 
incorporate the prioritisation of resources within the organisation rather than maintaining 
the status quo, again this is reflected in the CPA framework.  The focus on prioritisation 
leads to a conclusion of the importance of the relationship between the strategy process 
and the resource allocation process, primarily the budget setting process, within the 
organisation.  The conclusion of the Worrall et al study is that local government 
organisations progress through evolutionary stages of strategic thinking, namely from 
muddling through, recognising that this is not appropriate for the environmental 
complexity to a period of scientific management, which can be too constraining, to a period 
of learning and finally progressing to the incorporation of ‘soft strategy’ (Worrall et al 
1988, p 475) which is made up of both planned and emergent approaches to strategy 
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formulation.  The review also concludes that identifying a single strategy within a local 
authority is unlikely and alternatively strategies represent a series of overlapping ‘spheres 
within spheres’ at the personal, sectional, departmental, cross department and 
organisational levels (p 479).  This is predicated by a strategy development process that 
includes bottom up and top down approaches, as well as facility for both designed and 
emergent strategies. Strategy does not need constant reformulation, but rather is a 
framework for continuing problem solving, not the problem solving itself (Rumelt 1980).  
As such, there is a need for public sector organisations to move away from the rational 
planning approach of strategy formulation (Alford 2001) and develop a way of managing 
that allows ‘reactions’ to be absorbed but which is not purely reactive (Worrall et al 1998).   
 
Dereli (2003) undertook interviews with 4 chief executive officers of district and borough 
councils in order to establish a snapshot of perceptions of the importance of strategy for 
smaller local authorities.  The study is focussed on gaining information about the opinions 
of the CEOs at that time and therefore is not necessarily generalisable across other 
organisations or through time.  However, the study does identify some useful constructs 
that existed within the minds of the CEOs.  Firstly, the CEOs saw their role as very much 
about leading rather than dictating the strategy of the organisation.  This involved 
inclusion of members and officers within the strategy making process with members 
providing the link between the community and the organisation (Corrigan and Joyce 
1997).   Also there was a need to co-ordinate the various strategic documents that local 
authorities are required to produce, such as the Community Strategy and the Local 
Strategic Partnership agreement (and following Worrall et al (1998) the budgeting and 
resource plans), and to incorporate these within the strategy making process rather than 
allowing them to drive the process. 
 
Flynn and Talbot (1996) undertook a survey of 600 local authority senior managers in an 
attempt to ascertain the patterns of strategic planning activity.  The research is dated now 
as it deals in part with the compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) pressure that local 
authorities were under at that time.  Also as a survey it contains population validity but is 
constrained through the interpretation of both the surveyed and the surveyor.  However, 
some aspects of the study are useful in understanding the nature of fragmentation within 
the sector and the levels of strategic planning activity undertaken.  The fragmentation 
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aspect relates closely to the development of spheres within spheres identified by Worral et 
al (1998) and also the potential application of Mintzberg’s (1984) power configurations.  
Various external and internal factors, such as the decentralisation of power, specific 
funding constraints and external legislation, contribute towards the potential for plans to 
be short-term rather long term in nature thereby creating an obstacle to rational strategic 
planning. It is unclear within the article what strategic planning exactly represents, 
however the references back to the regimes of the 1960s and 1970s would suggest that 
the approach has more to do with large scale rational planning approaches, rather than the 
more emergent and/or flexible approaches identified in later decades.  The survey reveals 
the type of strategic planning tools used within the sector with SWOT and Cost Benefit 
Analysis used in over 50% of respondents.  This is supported by the extensive use of 
Service Level Agreements and, Corporate Plans and Mission Statements. The age of the 
study places much emphasis on the impact of new public management approaches and 
marketisation and in particular the structural and procedural impact of CCT.  The focus of 
local government activity has now shifted to a more partnership based approach, both 
internally and externally to the organisation, (Diamond and Liddle 2005, Wilson and Game 
2006).  The processes evident in the 1990s may not therefore be relevant to modern local 
government circumstances.  However the findings of the study can be used in two ways in 
this research.  Firstly to establish whether legacy processes left over from the 1990s 
regime have contributed to the decline of failing authorities and secondly to establish 
whether there are any similarities, and therefore potential continuity that can be taken 
from the 1990s. 
 
A further set of literature relates to the process of strategy formulation within the sector.  
This is key to understanding how public sector organisations manage themselves 
strategically and relate to both their internal and external environments.   Collier et al 
(2001) used the responses from over 6000 questionnaires completed by managers in both 
the public and private sectors to identify how managers perceived the process of strategy 
formulation within their organisations.  The study used a conceptual framework in which 
strategy is formulated across 6 dimensions; planning, command, incremental, political, 
cultural and enforced choice.  Two main problems were experienced in the study when 
comparing the results of the public and private sectors.  Firstly, the respondents from the 
public sector were more senior than the respondents in the private sector.  Given that 
 36
managers within organisations may have a different perspective as to what the strategy of 
the organisation represents and how it was formulated (Hambrick 1979, Worrall et al 
1998), the original data was manipulated through regression analysis and rank-adjusted 
means to improve comparability.  Secondly, the public sector managers scored the 
enforced choice dimension so highly that it overwhelmed the differences in the other 
dimensions between the two sectors.  It is interesting that within the analysis for the 
public sector organisations there was a significantly higher perception of enforced choice 
within the local government group than within the other sector areas. The findings of the 
study showed that the public sector organisations placed significant emphasis on the 
enforced change dimension, potentially reflecting its statutory nature and the impact of 
central policy decisions.  Within the private sector there was much greater emphasis on 
the role of the leader, or leadership, in formulating strategy with enforced choice being the 
least common.  Both sectors had similar scores for planning based and incremental based 
approaches although for both the planning dimension was low, perhaps reflecting that the 
emergent strategy (Mintzberg et al 1988) is at play within the sectors.  The size of the 
study and its scientific nature, would suggest that the analysis is at least reliable as a 
source of data for analysis, certainly in terms of population validity (Saunders et al 2000).  
However, the survey was questionnaire based and self reported and therefore there is the 
potential that managers could either misinterpret the questions, or potentially give 
answers reflecting a perceived rather than actual position. The study suggests that 
strategy setting is often seen within the sector as being an enforced choice rather than an 
embedded process this could result in strategies that are both reactive and short term 




There is a growing body of literature relating to performance measurement and control 
within the public sector.  As with other academic subjects, much of the research and many 
of the models put forward originate in the private sector.  However, there is an increasing 
amount of research being done on the applicability of such private sector approaches and 
the relevance of transference or translation into the public sector.   McAdam et al (2005) 
talk of the problems of applying a contorted private sector reality that does not represent 
the interests and needs of public sector stakeholders.  Some of the literature makes strong 
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links between performance measurement, stakeholder expectations and the formulation of 
strategy (McAdam et al 2005, Adcroft and Willis 2005, Radnor and McGuire 2004) while 
other literature is focussed on measuring the performance of the day-to-day operations of 
the organisation.  There is some overlap between the two topics but, for the purposes of 
this Doctoral study, this review will focus on the former aspect. 
 
There is also a distinction between performance measurement systems and performance 
management systems (Radnor and McGuire 2004).  The former are concerned with the 
actual measurement process and would include setting targets, gathering information, 
producing comparisons and presenting results. Performance management on the other 
hand is the holistic, inclusive and strategic process that performance measurement (an 
administrative system) informs.   Performance management on the other hand is about 
training, team work, dialogue, management style, attitudes, shared visions, employee 
involvement, multi-competence, incentives and rewards (Lebas 1995).  To be valuable to 
organisations performance management systems should add value as they represent an 
overhead that diverts resources away from the front line (Radnor and McGuire 2004).  
Such diversions could include cash, time and expertise.  Furthermore where there is 
information overload, managers often ignore the output of performance management 
systems, which makes them ineffective especially where these are used in an 
uncoordinated manner to meet perceived performance needs (Radnor and Lovell 2003).  
Given the strategic nature of this doctoral study, it will be necessary to consider 
performance management rather than performance measurement. 
 
The IDeA & PMMI (date???????) identify that the literature on performance measurement 
breaks down into three main categories; Strategic Based, dealing with strategy 
implementation and challenging assumptions, Communication Based, dealing with 
benchmarking (Bowerman et al 2002), position checking and communicating direction and 
Motivational Based measures dealing with evaluating and rewarding behaviour and 
encouraging improvement and learning.  This typology indicates that performance needs to 
be managed across different levels of organisational hierarchy and functionality. Where 
organisations are not facing turnaround, it is likely that the focus of strategic management 
will be on the strategic category of performance measurement.  However, for organisations 
facing turnaround the need to address all categories of performance measure could be 
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seen to hold strategic significance.  The absence of, or breakdown in, any one of the 
categories could have led to the decline in performance and may well constrain recovery. 
Leadership, vision, communication and participation are all seen as necessary aspects of 
successful turnaround (Joyce 2004)  
 
A popular model of performance management is Kaplan and Norton’s balanced scorecard 
approach (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton 1992, 1993, 1996, 2000, Wisniewski and Olafsson 
2004), which moves away from purely financial measurement to the use of a mix of 
financial and non-financial measures linked to the organisations strategy (Kloot 1999).  
Radnor and McGuire (2005) studied the application of the BSC within a Regional Health 
Authority. The research followed the introduction of the concept of the BSC within the 
health authority across a number of organisations including primary care trusts, hospital 
trusts and the local council.  The study used focus groups attended by 46 employees of the 
various organisations including chief executive officers, clinicians and general and specialist 
managers.  The findings of the study showed that while there was widespread acceptance 
of the usefulness of the model in terms of its potential for joining up strategic performance 
management, there was little enthusiasm to adopt the BSC, not necessarily due to any 
perceived weaknesses, but due to pressures of time and a lack of appropriate information.  
However, this was contrasted by research by Wisniewski and Olafsson (2004), who 
witnessed a genuine acceptance by the public sector organisations studied of scorecard 
process as one that adds value to the strategic and service planning process.  Adopting the 
Public Services Productivity Panel (PSPP) (2000) performance management framework as 
a conceptual framework within which to study, Radnor and McGuire also studied the use of 
performance reward systems within a large government department.  The results of both 
studies showed weaknesses in the application of the of the PSPP framework. The PSPP 
framework identified a hierarchy of components required for successful performance 
management, bold aspiration supported by a coherent set of performance measures and 
demanding targets are in turn underpinned by clear accountability and a rigorous 
performance review. To work effectively the whole framework is built on the requirement 
for meaningful reinforcement by management.  The Radnor and McGuire studies identified 
that this framework broke down in practice for the following reasons. Firstly in the public 
sector administrators are often supplanted for managers and leaders.  This means that 
bold aspirations and the communication and development of visions (Senge 1990a) are 
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often missing.  Also there was evidence that the balanced scorecard approach came to be 
adopted as a diagnostic rather than an interactive tool and it attracted little ownership 
among participants.  As such there was a strong sense of working the system rather than 
strategic management.  Low levels of performance review and no understanding of target 
baselines meant that the measures devised were neither robust nor believed in, which in 
turn contributed to the lack of ownership (Harris 2006).  To be effective at a strategic 
level, the conclusion from this study is that the management and leadership of the 
organisation should visibly support the performance management framework and that it 
should be based on a coherent strategy built from a good understanding of the 
organisation and its environment.  This requires a clear understanding of stakeholder’s 
requirements of the organisation. 
 
McAdam et al (2005) examined the ways in which public sector organisations could 
address multiple stakeholder complexity into the performance management process.  The 
study used questionnaire responses from 700 respondents to explore the issues involved 
in developing and applying performance management approaches within a large UK public 
sector department.  The questionnaire responses were then used as a basis for further 
ethnographic study using semi-structured interviews and focus groups.  The study 
reviewed the conceptual application of a number of performance management tools 
including the BSC (Kaplan and Norton 1996), the performance prism (Neely et al 2000, 
Neely et al 2001, Neely et al 2002) and the public sector scorecard (Moulin 2002).  The 
important finding of the study was that stakeholders were important throughout the whole 
strategic process, as organisational success is dependent on satisfying them.  Therefore 
performance management systems need to be built on such stakeholder needs and 
expectations.  The study showed that to be successful, performance management systems 
needed to first identify a typology of stakeholder groups relevant to the organisation, 
which are grouped by similar needs.  Secondly, the development of performance measures 
for each stakeholder group need to recognise the unique needs of each grouping rather 
than try to treat them as a composite group.  Stakeholder complexity in this sense 
requires the establishment of strategy maps, through models such as the BSC, linking key 
performance indicators to the needs of stakeholders (Greiling 2006, Wilcox and Bourne 
2002, Wisniewski and Olafsson 2004).  This requires the acceptance of strategic ambiguity  
rather than excessive objectivity (Hurst 1997) within the process which is often difficult to 
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achieve.  Attempts to homogenise stakeholders can put the organisation out of line with 
key stakeholder needs. Such an approach would ultimately lead to poor performance or 
even failure on the part of the organisation.  An understanding of potential stakeholder 
requirements and the processes organisations use to gather them will therefore be 
important for this doctoral study. 
 
For private sector organisations, a critical stakeholder group represents the owners, 
shareholders of financiers of the business. Their main performance measure is return on 
investment and, resulting from this, the main performance trigger to invoke organisational 
turnaround is when the finances of the organisation hit a level of criticality such that it is 
no longer able to survive as a viable organisation.  In many cases this is referred to in 
terms of declining profitability, although it is actually the result of the reduced liquidity of 
the organisation measured in cash terms (Hofer 1980, Drury 2004).  Private sector 
companies exist primarily to increase the wealth of their owners (Sloman 1999), usually 
shareholders, by generating sufficient net income from operations to allow for the 
distribution of a dividend, or in other cases drawings.  The capital structure of such 
privately owned organisations also includes borrowings, the repayment of which represents 
a further drain on net income (Brealy and Myers 1996, Drury 2004).  In order to achieve 
their economic objectives, private organisations seek a combination of short run or long 
run strategies that could include sales maximisation and/or growth and merger activity 
(Sloman 1999, Porter 1981).  In some sense therefore identifying the need for turnaround 
in private sector organisations is a relatively simple task triggered by the need to avoid a 
catastrophic reduction in the organisations cash resources, or liquidity.  This is often 
identified through the use of accounting ratios or through the application of tools such as 
Altman’s Z Score which factors a combination of ratios and can be used to provide an 
indication as to whether the organisation faces financial distress (Calandro 2007). 
 
Private sector organisations are tied into the market structures within which they operate 
and the financial performance of such organisations is impacted upon by the inter 
relationship of its internal cost structure and the perceived value price relationship of the 
consumers within the market place (Porter 1981 and 1988, Ansoff 1988). This is perhaps 
an oversimplification of the economic theory of the firm, but to all intense and purposes it 
provides us with the heart of the environment within which private sector organisations 
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operate.  Drawing together aspects of the economic theory of the firm (Sloman 1999) and 
the ways in which organisations interact with their market places (Porter 1981, 1998, 
Alford 2001), the following model summarises the tensions present in the private sector 
market place. 
 
Figure 4  Self-Regulating Private Marketplace 
 
What the model at Fig 1 attempts to simplify is the self-regulating nature of the private 
market place.  If production volumes or production costs are too high in relation to income 
then the firm will have a deficit of expenditure over income and be unable to survive in the 
long run.  Similarly, if the quality of goods and services is below that perceived by the 
consumer at the price offered, then reductions in demand are likely to force price 
reductions and income may then not meet the costs of production.  Various other 
interpretations could also be made from the model, all of which would point to the 
reduction in operating liquidity of the firm and therefore the threat of bankruptcy.  It is this 
crisis point that ultimately forces the organisation to consider entering a period of 
turnaround.  In essence, the private sector model described above deals with the issues of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness through the conversion of inputs into outputs, and 











performance within the sector (Adcroft and Willis 2005).  Economy is about keeping costs 
low, efficiency is about turning inputs into outputs with as little wastage as possible, and 
effectiveness is concerned with delivering the organisation’s objectives.  In the private 
sector, these elements are to an extent self regulating in that if the organisation is neither 
economic nor efficient, it is unlikely to be effective in meeting its objective of maximising 
the owner’s wealth, or net income.  Therefore either action will be taken to redress the 
balance within the firm or its marketplace, or the owners will sell on or liquidate the 
business. 
 
Such self-regulation is not readily evident within local government.  Local Government is 
neither privately nor publicly owned.  It is a function of state tied, into a national statutory 
framework (which is actually several distinct systems (Rhodes 1988)) and funded, in the 
main, from local and national taxation (Wilson and Game 2006).  Although asset utilisation 
and measurement is important for local government (Pilcher 2005), consumers have little 
or no choice over the type, quantity and quality of the services they receive at a local level 
and, because they are funded from taxation, consumers do not pay for the services 
received at the point of consumption.  Also, local government exists partly, to remedy 
certain forms of market failure through the provision of public goods and also to promote 
equity within society (Alford 2001).  To some extent, many of the services provided by 
local government would simply not be provided by the private sector because they would 
not provide the appropriate financial rewards to the owners.  On the other side of the 
same coin, local government does not have the equivalent strategic freedom that private 
organisations have.  Strategic goals and financing levels are often determined politically, at 
either a national or local level, and such political decisions may not match the strategic 
needs of the organisation or society (Eskildsen et al 2004, Lane 1993). Similarly, financial 
resources are constrained within a maximum amount with local government not having the 
ability to enter new markets or increase market share to generate additional income 
streams.  
 
Organisations in the public sector do not fail in the same way that private sector 
organisations do as the state is not absolved from providing the service even if there is a 
decline in performance to unacceptable levels (Jas and Skelcher 2005, Levine 1978, 
Ranson and Stewart 1994).  The differences between the two sectors mean that it is more 
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problematic when measuring the performance of Local Government organisations (Bolton 
2004, Boyne 2004, Diamond and Liddle 2004, Jas and Skelcher 2005, Joyce 2001, Joyce 
2004, Mordaunt and Cornforth 2004, Paton and Mordaunt 2004, Turner et al 2004, Turner 
and Whiteman 2005, Walshe et al 2004 Wilson and Game 2006).  Firstly, how can it be 
established that a local authority is under performing, and secondly, after a period of 
change, how can it be established that it has improved? Between these two points in time, 
there is also the issue of internal organisational analysis that the organisation will need to 
go through to determine how to develop and introduce a turnaround strategy.  In terms of 
the measurement of performance, work has been developing on this since the 1980s 
(Adcroft and Willis 2005, Chandler 2007, Joyce 2001, Leach 2006, Martin 2002, Turner 
and Whiteman 2005, Wilson and Game 2006).  The Audit Commission developed 
frameworks that mimicked the private sector in order to improve public sector 
management, which at the time was deemed to be poor by the then Conservative National 
Government (Audit Commission 1988, Banham 1987, Adcroft and Willis 2005).  Successive 
changes in the Value for Money regime, as it was called and which itself attempted to link 
inputs to outputs through the measurement of economy, efficiency and effectiveness (or 
the 3 Es), led to the development of Best Value (Joyce 2001, Wilson and Game 2006) and 
the Corporate Performance Assessment (CPA) (Audit Commission 2006, Wilson and Game 
2006, Leach 2006) where value for money plays an important role in determining the 
overall CPA score of a local authority.  The development of these measures within the 
sector does not mean that measurement itself is easy.  The sector is still without the single 
objective measure of ‘profit’, or net income, and the political and multi-service nature of 
the local authorities means that there is an overlay of complexity and potential ambiguity 
not associated with profit maximisation (Jones 2005, Wilson and Game 2006).  Where as 
the prioritisation of resources in a private sector firm can usually be undertaken objectively 
in terms of the overall impact on the bottom line, in local government reprioritising 
resources may benefit one group of service users but disadvantage another (Pidd 2005).  
The resulting benefits and disadvantages may take a long time to materialise and will be 
judged at least in part subjectively.  This problem is exacerbated as not all local authorities 
are staring from the same base.  This includes external environmental conditions as well 
the internal resource base of the authority both in terms of physical assets and cognition, 
capability and capacity.  Such differences between authorities will also be manifest in the 
relative rates of improvement amongst authorities (Martin 2008). 
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Local Government Turnaround 
 
Literature in this area is understandably sparse given the focused nature of the research 
topic (Jas and Skelcher 2005).  Studies either review the available literature, or make 
initial attempts to understand the reasons for organisational decline.  Studies into the 
actual process of turnaround and recovery are extremely limited.  What is apparent 
however is a recent growth in interest in the subject area and this can most likely be 
attributed to the introduction of the CPA as a means of identifying poorly performing and, 
over time, improving organisations.  Snow and Hambrick (1980) identified a problem of 
transferability with moving from one industry to another potentially proving difficult for 
generalised models of strategy.  Clearly some of this will be as result of differences of 
culture, external environments, scale, organisational complexity and leadership amongst 
the other variables that exist strategically.  Usefully, Snow and Hambrick recognise that 
there is no simple solution to this problem, but that it is important to challenge the 
applicability of models and measurement tools according to the findings of a particular 
situation.  This will be especially so when looking at the primary research within the local 
government studies of documents 3, 4 and 5 where it is possible that organisational 
management have imported an approach from the private sector.  It will be important to 
identify the model being used and carefully consider the impact it has actually had rather 
than drawing wide broad assumptions.  Similarly with situational factors. 
 
Walshe et al (2004) reviewed the available literature in both the public and private sectors.  
Their review identifies a typically staged process to turnaround consisting of decline and 
crisis, triggers for change, recovery strategy formulation, retrenchment stabilisation and 
return to growth.  Boyne (2004), extending the work of Robbins and Pearce (1992), 
identified 3 potential responses to turnaround situations.  Replacement, where key 
members of leadership staff are replaced, Retrenchment, where short-term actions are 
taken to deal with immediate problems precipitating the crisis and renewal concerning the 
longer-term actions necessary to improve performance.  Walshe et al query whether this is 
completely transferable to the public sector and identify that alternative responses within 
the 3 Rs framework are likely to be seen due to the different political, governance and 
accountability arrangements within the sector. Boyne (2004) also identifies 3 phases in 
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response to intervention in the turnaround process, overcoming denial, retrenchment 
through action and finally the intervener exits when conditions are right to do so. 
 
An ongoing study, sponsored by the ODPM, has recently tracked the changes in 
performance of 15 local authorities that had been identified as poor in the 2002 CPA 
announcements.  This single study is important as it is the only one found within the 
literature that both has currency and whose scope is closely associated with this Doctoral 
research.  The ODPM study has formed the research material for three published articles, 
Jas and Skelcher (2005) Turner et al (2004) and Turner and Whiteman (2005).  Using a 
longitudinal case study approach, the research is based on tracking the turnaround, or 
otherwise of the councils over a three year period.  The two articles by Turner et al (2004) 
and Turner and Whiteman (2005) present the findings of the research at two points in time 
so will be taken together. The Jas and Skelcher article will be taken separately first.   
 
Jas and Skelcher (2005) undertook a theoretical and empirical analysis of performance 
failure and turnaround incorporating the early findings of the longitudinal study of 15 local 
authorities (Turner et al 2004).  The study examines poor performance rather than 
organisational failure in recognition that public sector organisations cannot take refuge in 
bankruptcy as their private sector counterparts can.  The CPA is used to identify poorly 
performing authorities and a case study methodology is employed using interviews with 
stakeholders both internal and external to the organisation, including elected members.  
The ongoing nature of the case study means that the conclusions of this paper are only 
developmental and would not necessarily convey any transferability across the sector.  The 
primary research has been interwoven with literature on both public and private 
turnarounds resulting in a number of propositions. The first of these is that the 
performance of local authorities, as with other organisations, will fluctuate over time 
alternating between periods of good and poor performance.  Where this fluctuation 
remains in control, the organisation can be said to be self- regulating, whereby triggers to 
change behaviour will be identified as the organisation starts to perform poorly.  Where 
the organisation does not have the capacity or capability to identify the need for corrective 
action, then such organisations will continually decline and the result will be a permanently 
failing organisation.  Such organisations may be characterised by an inability to recognise 
the need for change either through stress or threat rigidity (Straw 1981) and ultimately 
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resulting in information restriction and control constriction representing Burnes and 
Stalker’s (1961) mechanistic shift.  The problems leading to poor performance would 
therefore be internally created.  This may have been in response to a previous strategy of 
retrenchment to external forces, for example managing within reducing and limited 
resources (Bovaird and Davis 1999).  Another internal factor identified was the negative 
impact of the fallacy of success, where the leadership ignore the present reality and prefer 
to focus on the heuristics developed during a period of success.  Clearly, this can lead to a 
position where the organisation is out of touch with its external and internal environments.  
These aspects focus on the causes of poor performance.  The ability to turnaround the 
organisation will be dependent on other factors related to those that have resulted in the 
poor performance.  Where an organisation is unable to self regulate its performance, then 
a strong external intervention is required to motivate change.  This could be in the form of 
a poor CPA score, or ultimately intervention through the external appointment of a change 
agent.  Also, it is important to promote internal narratives that legitimise turnaround.  
These narratives should be placed in the future and not in the past, so that the stigma 
attached with failure can be left behind.  The propositions within the paper, although 
tentative, are interesting and are subsequently expanded in the subsequent research by 
Turner et al (2004) and Turner and Whiteman (2005). 
 
Turner et al (2004) focus on the role of intervention and persuasion in the turnaround of 
10 of the poorly performing councils where triggers and responses to turnaround are 
reviewed.  Turner and Whiteman (2005) continue this theme but this time based on 13 of 
the 15 councils.  The case study based research used a range of quantitative and 
qualitative data taken from interviews and documentary evidence.  The research employed 
a realistic evaluation methodology to determine the relationship between context, method 
and outcome.  The research offers up a useful framework for identifying the causes for 
failure of each authority over 5 contexts: political, organisational, managerial, cultural and 
external.  All of these focus on the internal reasons for failure, even the external context is 
related to the level of engagement and leadership of the councils rather than any distinct 
external reasons for failure.  This aspect could therefore be renamed external interfaces.  
Linked to the findings of Jas and Skelcher (2004), the reasons for failure were identified as 
being dependent upon the historical basis of where the council started from before decline 
set in.  This was found to be either through success breeding failure, otherwise known as 
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the success trap (March and Olsen 1995, Starbuck and Hedberg 1977) or because the 
council was already a permanently failing organisation (Meyer and Zucker 1989) mainly 
caused by organisational inertia (Shaw 1981).  The main finding of the research is that 
each council is different and as such bespoke methods for turnaround are advisable rather 
than a one size fits all approach.  A council’s history, culture, leadership and political 
make-up will all contribute to both the reasons for decline and the path, and timescale, to 
recovery. Government have powers to directly intervene if necessary in the recovery of 
failing councils.  Intervention has not been experienced by the majority of councils studied, 
instead there has been Government engagement with the councils to a lesser or greater 
extent depending on the specific circumstances.  Intervention is therefore not critical to 
turnaround, but rather a means of last resort should the council be unable to sort itself 
out.  Engagement by the Government with the council was however evident through a 
variety of means.  In some cases there was the mandatory appointment of a lead official 
to liase with and guide the authority, in others it was facilitating the voluntary use of 
mentoring for senior officials.  These engagement methods are temporary and can be 
removed or reduced as performance improves.  A change in leader appears to have a 
significant impact on both the success and speed of turnaround.  This is a factor found 
elsewhere in the literature on turnaround in both the public and private sectors (Boyne 
2004, Robbins and Pearce 1992) although not necessarily in all cases as some studies 
have found leadership itself to be important, but not necessarily a change in leadership 
(Paton and Mordaunt 2004).  Significantly, the study found that councils that were 
successful in turnaround, i.e. those that improved from being poor, had three key 
characteristics.  Cognition, recognising the need to turnaround, Capability, the necessary 
skill set and a narrative that recognises change, and Capacity, the managerial and political 
technologies for its implementation.  Councils lacking in one or some of these 
characteristics experienced slow starts and/or stalled or failed turnarounds.  Approaches 
that heighten the presence of these characteristics within the organisation are therefore 
seen to be important.  Finally, the review concludes that there is a need to consider the 
sustainability of turnaround beyond the short term.  It is in this area that the main 
criticism of the studies can be levelled as neither these two studies, nor the Jas and 
Skelcher studies examine the processes and structures that have been put in place to 
promote the turnaround.  Turner and Whiteman recognise the need to consider 
sustainability, particularly in relation to the costs of turnaround, both financial and 
 48
personal to the organisation, the risk that the process of turnaround is seen as a box 
ticking exercise rather than changing the fabric of the organisation, resource fatigue 
arising for the intensity of the turnaround process and finally maintaining and adapting the 
skill sets, which are themselves related to sustaining the cognitive, capability and capacity 
characteristics. 
 
Paton and Mordaunt (2004) identify a number of themes emerging from the literature that 
typify approaches to turnaround. The creation of vicious circles of decline preceding 
turnaround as poor management practices and reducing resource positions accentuate the 
problems associated with decline, for example through the loss of key staff, falling moral 
and stress rigidity.  Retrenchment and Renewal are associated with periods of stabilisation 
and recovery.  Often organisations display a sense of duality during the turnaround 
process with successful turnarounds being associated with a twin track approach – old 
blood and new blood combined, negative approaches such as cut backs run concurrently 
with positive approaches such as creating new missions, investments and enthusiasm, as 
well as the centralisation of financial control while decentralising other aspects to maximise 
involvement.  Paton and Mordaunt (2004) consider the turnaround situations of 4 public 
sector organisations: a council, a health care trust, a charity and a school.  The research is 
case study based, retrospectively and so is able to identify the outcomes of the turnaround 
process, usually a problem given the timescales required for longitudinal studies. Their 
studies revealed comparable evidence with the experience of private sector organisations.  
For example the twin track approach was strong in those cases of successful turnaround, 
the challenge here is promoting the positive aspects of the change over the negative ones.  
Also there was the notion of retrenchment and renewal although this was more manifest in 
quickly changing the culture of the management teams to enable longer-term programme 
of change to be enacted.  The study also found a difference in the nature of the trigger for 
change.  In many public contexts the expectation is that the trigger will be externally 
driven.  However, in two of the case studies the trigger for change was identified 
internally, both of which resulted in successful turnaround.  Leadership also emerged as an 
important symbol in the turnaround process.  Leadership, not as directing and controlling 
strategy, but in the sense of something being done and creating a sense of optimism.  
Finally, Paton and Mordaunt offer advice on issues that should be considered in future work 
on turnaround in public sector organisations.  Firstly to avoid the risk of trivialising the 
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concept of turnaround and focussing on addressing the deep seated problems that have 
given rise to the organisational failure, secondly to avoid reductionism and recognise the 
complexity of the political, stakeholder and cultural value assumptions within the 
organisation, and finally to balance the need for quick wins with the longer term need for 
sustainable change.  This conflicts with research from the private sector that advocates the 
simplification of confusing complexity within the environment when faced the need to 
rejuvenate the organisation (Baden-Fuller and Stoppard 1994).  It is possible that a 
combination of both approaches is workable.  Recognising the complexity in establishing 
stakeholder needs, but then adopting simplifying processes to enable the process of 





Leadership has been identified as an important aspect of successful turnaround.   A limited 
amount of literature has been found on leadership within public sector organisations 
although some of this is specific to local government turnaround.  Joyce (2004) and 
Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) concentrate on the role that leaders and management 
boards can have throughout the turnaround process.  Not surprisingly these studies 
identify that appropriate leadership is critical to turnaround situations.  However, they also 
highlight that the role of leadership is more complex than in other the sectors due to the 
needs to balance a wide range of stakeholder engagement and overcome significant 
cultural and structural barriers, especially balancing the tensions between political and 
administrative visions of success (Entwislte et al 2005).  This often results in responses 
that run counter to the received wisdom of leadership in turnaround situations. 
 
Mintzberg (1984) developed a typology to assist in understanding the potential interplay 
between external and internal systems of power and the impact this could have on 
organisational life cycles. Combining the work of Blau and Scott (1962) on external 
influences and Etzioni (1961) on internal influences, Mintzberg identifies five likely power 
configurations that organisations may adopt depending on the relationship between 
external and internal coalitions or power groups (See fig 1).  
 
Figure 5  Basic Configurations of Power (Mintzberg 1984) 
 





















Mintzberg argued that the expected power configuration would be determined by the mix 
of external and internal coalitions and that over its lifecycle an organisation could be 
expected to experience transition between configurations as its external and internal 
coalitions evolved.  This is depicted in fig 2 below.   
 





This model was based on private sector constructs and as such may not be wholly 
applicable to a local government context.  It is also based on the research of others and is 
dated in the 1960s. However, some similarities can be drawn with local government.  
Firstly, local government exhibits bureaucratic internal structures (Joyce 2001) and is in 
part dominated by its main external stakeholder, the Government, through legislation, 
funding and performance criteria eg CPA.  Secondly, it could be argued that local 
government organisations can display a mix of internal coalitions simultaneously, for 
example a Professionalised Bureaucracy (Rhodes 1988).  The presence of a strong political 
leader or chief executive officer may also overlay this with a Personalised Coalition, and it 
is clear that some aspects of local government are Ideologically based (the public service 
ethic for example (Rhodes 1988, Wilson and Game 2006)) and politically based.  It is not 
unlikely therefore that rather than a local authority experiencing a lifecycle of transition, it 
may exhibit all of the power configurations at the same time.  From a leadership 
perspective this increases the complexity of the leadership task and may have contributed 












Harker and Sharma (2000) undertook a study into Leader behaviour in four organisations 
faced with the need to turnaround.  They examined the role of strong leadership to the 
success of organisational turnaround posing the question ‘does leadership matter?’  This 
was done by examining how the process was managed, the role of the leader themselves, 
and the impact of different leadership roles experienced by successful or unsuccessful 
turnarounds.  Their findings indicated that leadership was an important factor in those 
organisations that implemented a successful turnaround.  Three key concepts arose from 
the study that distinguished the successful from the unsuccessful.  There were critical 
differences in the ways organisational leaders developed and applied industry “wisdom”, 
undertook “destiny development” and finally the way in which “organisational 
enhancements” were developed and implemented.  The role of leadership in the successful 
cases was more inclusive of others and adopted a contingency-based approach within the 
organisation (Fiedler 1967). 
 
In another study, these views were contrasted by Landrum et al (2000).  Here, the 
authors compared the charismatic leader approach to turnaround situations involving 
team-based approaches.  The study reviewed relevant literature and concluded that while 
there is evidence to suggest that charismatic leaders can be a force for good within 
turnaround situations (positive), it is not necessarily so.  Some charismatic leaders can 
display a  ‘dark side’ (Howell and Avolli 1992) and lead organisations into negative 
outcomes.  Hitler is held up as an example of such ‘unethical charismatic’ leadership.  
While this may seem an extreme comparison, it is not too difficult to make the transition 
to a failing organisational context with the need for recovery at all costs.  Management 
boards may well be seduced into recruiting a charismatic leader, as this appears to be the 
received wisdom.  While this is not necessarily a bad thing per se, the organisation is 
taking a risk that it may be lead over to the ‘dark side’.  Landrum et al (2000) conclude by 
developing a number of propositions; team based change will be longer lasting, teams can 
be effective when power and/or culture does not emphasise a charismatic leader, self 
managed teams can block the ‘dark side’ effects of charismatic leadership and finally, 
teams can enhance the efforts of a positive charismatic leader.  These propositions suggest 
that team based approaches to strategic leadership can also be effective either as an 
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alternative to Leadership based approaches, or in tandem with a strong leader a view 
supported by Moore (1995) following studies of the way in which US public sector bodies 
can create value.   The Collective intuition possible within a management team and the 
potential for constructive conflict are other potential benefits of a team based approach 
(Eisenhardt KM 1999). 
 
This poses the question as to the nature and importance of leadership itself.  Is leadership 
a role carried out by an individual or is it a more general term that can be embodied in a 
team of people. Also does this cross over to a relationship between having a single leader 
supported by a management team.  In essence, the Landler et al and Harker and Sharman 
studies draw similar conclusions despite seemingly offering different viewpoints.  The 
contingency approaches witnessed in successful organisational turnaround in the Harker 
and Sharman study drew heavily on the situational factors (Francis and Desai 2005, Wren 
2001) present within the organisations and there was evidence of success being driven by 
the top leadership encouraging strong leadership through the organisational hierarchy.  
Landler et al accept this in their propositions but essentially offer a health warning about 
vesting too much faith in a charismatic leader.  Despite the Landler et al study being 
literature based rather than undertaking primary research, perhaps the solution lies in 
linking a strong figurehead to an effective management team. 
 
Joyce (2004) reviewed the potential role of the leader in local authority turnaround 
situations.  This research brought together both previous academic thinking on the role of 
leadership and the results of a case study into the experiences of a single local authority 
chief executive in a turnaround situation. The nature of the research has a number of 
strengths and weaknesses.  Firstly, the use of the case study approach enabled rich 
information on the experience of leading turnaround to be revealed.  However, this is only 
one experience and the results will be personal to the individual concerned.  Secondly, the 
review of academic literature is useful in framing the wider context and findings associated 
with turnaround leadership.  However, such a review can only ever be partial and also is 
prone to the problem of bias within the interpretation of results both by the primary 
researchers and the secondary researcher.  Despite these strengths and weaknesses the 
article offers up some useful insights into the potential role of leadership in a local 
authority turnaround situation. Firstly, the importance of vision to the leadership role.  
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Senge (1990a) identifies that creating and sustaining a vision is an important aspect of 
organisational success.  The role of visioning does not lie necessarily with the leader but 
rather it is the leader’s role to ensure that visions can be created, expanded and 
communicated across the organisation. Senge identifies that Leaders visions are personal 
visions and are not automatically shared by others.  The leader must be willing to share 
these personal visions and ask, “will you follow me?”.  Creative strategies rarely emerge 
from an annual planning ritual, which at best can only expect to result in incremental 
change, based as it is on last year’s strategy.  The shared vision is not therefore something 
that be spread in a top down fashion.  Such an approach is likely to lead to apathy and 
grudging compliance rather than enrolment and ultimately commitment to the vision.  
Often the shared vision of an organisation comes from the bottom up.  To create a shared 
vision that matches the requirement of strategy, leaders must be prepared to allow their 
vision to be shared widely and then to be developed from the bottom up.  Senge also 
points out that organisations can adopt negative and positive visions.  Negative visions 
constrain change and growth as they are built on fear and often convey a message of 
powerlessness that diverts resources away from creativity.  Negative visions can only ever 
be short term, as they will only survive as long as the perceived threat exists.  Positive 
visions are based more on establishing what the organisation wants to do rather than what 
it has to do.  They are aspirational and as such allow for creativity within the shared 
visioning process.  Finally Senge identifies creative tension as being an important and 
necessary factor of successful shared visions.  The leader should be prepared to be both 
challenged and adaptable during the visioning process, and should be ensuring that the 
vision is constantly checked against the realities of both the internal and external 
environments.  This process of visioning is evident in the Joyce case study.  The new Chief 
Executive spent time getting to know the organisation and its local environment.  Through 
doing this, a personal vision was created which was then allowed to grow and spread 
through the involvement of the elected members who ultimately took ownership of the 
vision (Hamel and Prahalad 1989).  The role of elected members is identified as being 
important in this case, reflecting the findings of other studies. Another role identified for 
leadership was having strategic capacity. ‘Leadership is about deciding what to do, 
management is about deciding how to do it’ (Joyce 2004 p 239).  The importance of 
leading on different fronts is emphasised, reinforcing both the enormity of the strategic 
beast (Mintzberg et al 1998) and the need for twin tracked approaches to turnaround 
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(Paton and Mordaunt 2004), and that to ensure that all bases are covered the leader 
needs to be determined and driven and have energy and resilience.  This is particularly so 
because resistance to change and the denial that change is required are factors that need 
to be overcome through the realignment, retrenchment and renewal phases of turnaround 
(Filatotchev and Toms 2006).  Joyce concludes with 3 findings from the research.  Effective 
leaders also manage  (Tushman et al 1986). Leadership cannot be constrained to visioning 
and strategising in turnaround situations but must also pay attention to planning, 
controlling and managing performance.  Also effective leaders cannot be detached from 
their everyday surroundings, but should know their organisations and pay attention to 
details.  Finally, effective leaders need to handle resistance and conflict whether this is at 
the political level of the organisation, the senior management team or with the rank and 
file of the organisations employees. 
 
Parry (1999) considered the role of adaptability in local government turnaround leadership.  
The study used grounded theory to develop case material for 3 city councils in the US on 
the basis of interviews with 36 people.  The case material has the ability to achieve rich 
data and interestingly, and unusually, the researcher used the interviewees as observers 
of leadership behaviour within the study rather than the researcher observing leadership 
directly.  The key findings of the study were 3 fold.  Firstly, leaders were often unsure as 
to their role in the turnaround.  This seems surprising and is perhaps more representative 
of the follower’s views rather than the leaders themselves, and a potential weakness of the 
study’s methodology. Secondly, both leaders and followers exhibited a lack of clarity about 
the changing organisational environment and finally that adaptability in both leaders and 
followers was found to be a key attribute of successful turnaround. It is the 
interrelatedness between clarity and adaptability that is important in overcoming the 
uncertainty and confusion that can arise in leaders and followers experiencing a change 
situation.  The role of the Leader is to ensure that there develops a social process of 
enhancing adaptability through face-to-face communication, mentoring and also giving all 
staff leadership opportunities during the change at every possible opportunity.  Such an 




Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
 
Finally in this section it is appropriate to consider the literature that exists around the CPA 
process itself. The Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) process was introduced 
in 2002 and is the process by which the Audit Commission carries out its duty under 
section 99 of the Local Government Act 2003 to independently monitor and report on the 
performance of Local Government (Audit Commission 2006).  Since its introduction in 
2002, the CPA has evolved in response to changes in the operational and regulatory 
environment, rising public expectations and the performance of Local Government itself 
(Audit Commission 2006).  It is not within the scope of this research to critique the CPA 
process itself.  However, it will be useful at his stage to outline some of the key features of 
CPA.  The CPA incorporates 4 different elements that are combined to determine an overall 
performance score for an authority holistically (Grace 2005).   The resulting scores are 
published in the form of a report for each authority and in comparative tables on the Audit 
Commissions web site.  The CPA is a rolling programme that incorporates a range of 
annual and periodic reviews for each of the four elements.  It is therefore possible to track 
the performance of authorities over time since the implementation of the CPA process.   
 
Importantly, the CPA will be undergoing a further transformation at some stage in the 
future.  The Government’s White Paper on Local Government  (2006) includes a proposed 
revision to the existing regime.  This change should not have a significant impact on this 
study and in fact it will be interesting to observe reactions at the strategic level to the 
revised process. 
 
In some of the above studies the CPA has been used as the main trigger for identifying the 
need for turnaround.  This supports the approach to be adopted in this study of using the 
ongoing CPA record as a means of identifying appropriate councils to study.  However the 
views expressed around the CPA process are not always favourable.  Game (2006) adopts 
a critical approach to the CPA mechanism itself and is therefore useful to show the flip side 
of the rhetoric on CPA put forward by the UK Government and the Audit Commission.  Two 
aspects emerge from the study however, one of which is a cautionary tale and the other a 
positive impact.  Firstly Snakes and Ladders (but mostly ladders) is used as an analogy for 
describing the seaming continuous improvement of councils over the years under CPA.  
This is considered to be unrealistic and is as much to do with changes to the scoring 
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methodology as actual improvements in the councils themselves.  With all councils 
potentially heading for excellent status, this prompted a change to the CPA methodology 
(‘The Harder Test’ Audit Commission (2006)) to push councils further down the 
performance ladder.  Secondly, those councils identified as poorly performing do seem to 
be making improvements not only against the scoring methodology but also in terms of 
internalising the responses to change rather than just playing the game.  Despite the 
potential negative slant portrayed by Game overall the article helps to justify the use of 








A major finding of the literature review is that despite a number of studies into 
organisational turnaround within the public and private sectors, there has been no specific 
research into the sustainability of turnaround strategies within Local Government.   
Sustainability would seem to be a reasonable expectation of any approach to turnaround; 
otherwise there seems little point in bothering to turn the organisation around at all.  
Sustainability in relation to turnaround will now become a key focus of this study. 
 
Turnaround is defined as a process that takes an organisation from a situation of poor 
performance to a situation of good sustained performance (Brandes and Brege 1993).  The 
difference between an organisation facing turnaround and one that is not is that of 
performance criticality.   Performance triggers will vary between sectors, but organisations 
can be said to have hit criticality when their performance is below that demanded by the 
main stakeholder groups.  Poor and good performance will be measured according to the 
Local Government CPA Framework (Audit Commission 2006).  Despite its flaws (Game 
2006), this is the recognised comprehensive measure of corporate performance within the 
sector.  Sustainability is taken to represent improved or improving performance over a 
period of at least 5 years.  No one local authority is the same as another and as such this 
study will not focus only on speedy and significant improvements in performance.  It will 
be equally valid to explore the reasons for gradual improvement, especially as this may 
have a bearing on overall sustainability (Mintzberg and Walters 1992).  
 
Many of the underlining theories and concepts of strategic management could be expected 
to be found in strategic approaches to turnaround.  If strategy is about matching the 
resources of an organisation to its environment, both planned and emergent strategy 
formulation may be observed, as could elements of the prescriptive and design schools 
(Mintzberg et al 1998).  Turnaround represents a specific episode in an organisation’s 
lifecycle and requires a specific response. Once the turnaround process is complete 
however, the organisation will need to ensure that its process of strategy formulation has 
evolved to avoid slipping back into a poorly performing position (Mintzberg and Walters 
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1992).  Turnaround is therefore a subset of strategy formulation and as such both fields 
must be considered when examining sustainability.  Even though decisions can be classed 
as operating, administrative and strategic, in turnaround situations, where the organisation 
is in crisis, dealing with operating and administrative infrastructures takes on a strategic 
mantel. 
 
There is debate as to whether the reasons for poor performance and responses for 
recovery are transferable between public and private sectors (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004, 
Walshe et al 2004).  Key findings indicate that identifying poorly performing organisations 
is equally important in the public and private sectors but how to identify poor performance 
in the public sector is more complex than in the private sector due to the existence of 
multiple stakeholder objectives rather than the blunt instrument of profit.  Responses to 
turnaround can be usefully learned from the private sector in order to ensure lasting 
recovery (Paton and Mordaunt 2004).  However, in the public sector strategic responses 
have to be adapted rather than adopted from the private sector as cultural, structural, 
funding and performance measurement criteria differ. 
 
Causes of decline in organisations can also stifle the sustainability of turnaround.  
Significant to this is the leadership of the organisation and the underlying approaches to 
strategy formulation.  The three Cs of Cognition, Capability and Capacity and the 
recognition of strategic ambiguity are important aspects of leading within the sector as is 
the relationship between senior officers and elected members.  A number of factors can 
impact upon appropriate leadership including over-learning, the fallacy of success and 
threat or stress rigidity.  Overcoming these aspects requires a more inclusive approach to 
strategy formulation throughout the organisation and the recognition that stakeholder 
requirements are multiple and conflicting rather than homogenous.  Retrenchment is a 
potential though not necessary aspect of turnaround, which can create space for 
turnaround to occur, but also stifle opportunities for sustainability.  Similarly, replacement 
(with a new leader) may be a useful way of breaking ties with the past, but could also lead 





A literature review forms part of structured approach to research (Fisher 2004) and 
represents the combined wisdom on important aspects that are relevant to the research 
topic, which can then be used to determine a conceptual framework to study during the 
primary research.  The alternative approach to research is grounded theory, where the 
conceptual framework emerges from the primary research itself.  The benefit of using the 
former approach is that the research project can be undertaken in a structured way, 
focusing on areas of importance and creating linkages between existing bodies of 
knowledge.  However, the weakness of this structured approach is that it can restrict the 
scope for identifying new theories and concepts that may emerge from the study (Fisher 
2004).  In many ways this has parallels with the viewpoint offered by Mintzberg on 
strategy formulation in his discussion of planned and emergent strategies.  Concepts are 
the building blocks of models and theories and are chosen to be useful rather than correct 
(Watson in Fisher 2004 p 101).  In the context of this research, a literature review and 
initial conceptual framework is a requirement of the DBA.  Therefore, to an extent the 
researcher is constrained by being unable to adopt a purely grounded approach.  This is 
not to say that grounded theory will not emerge as part of this doctoral study, but it is for 
the researcher to recognise this constraint as the research progresses.  At this stage 
however, the literature reviewed to date will be incorporated into an initial conceptual 
framework based on the main findings of the review. 
 
The review has found there to be a number of bodies of literature relevant to the field of 
study.  These are represented in the diagram below as a series of overlapping spheres.  
The spheres are not to scale, but do attempt to represent a sense of scale within each of 




Figure 7 Conceptual Fields of Study 
 
By way of contextualisation, it is important to clarify the following positions that are being 
adopted by the researcher in respect to the topic.  Firstly the environmental aspects of 
Local Government and the external Performance Management framework are considered 
to be constants within the study of local government turnaround.  This is because they 
cannot be influenced by local government itself, and especially by a particular local 
government organisation.   They represent the external environment within which local 
government operates and it is the way in which the processes of leadership, strategy 
development and turnaround interact with them that is of interest to this study.  Secondly, 
a significant element missing from the literature of both public and private sector 
turnaround is that of sustainability.  Therefore, how local authorities can achieve 
sustainable turnaround will be the main focus of the research throughout the remainder of 
this Doctoral study.  And finally, two possible outcomes will result from an attempted 
turnaround.  Either the turnaround will be sustainable, meaning that the organisation will 
maintain improved performance into the future, or the turnaround will be flawed, meaning 
that the organisation will either fail to improve or return to failing position.  Within each 
field of study criteria have been identified that could be examined in the study of 
sustainable local government turnaround.  For each criteria a series of ‘either-or’ 
statements have been constructed from the findings of the literature review and graded as 















table below therefore focuses on the aspects of Leadership, Strategy Formulation (both 
Public and Private Sector) and Strategic Turnaround and how these can contribute towards 
a sustained recovery for failing Local Authorities. 
 
Figure 8 Aspects of Sustainable Turnaround 
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The Conceptual framework for the study is presented below.  This identifies that it is 
expected that a combination of the negative aspects of Leadership, Strategy and 
Turnaround will lead to flawed turnaround whereas a combination of positive aspects will 
lead to sustained turnaround.  At this stage of the study it is not possible to predict the 
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exact combination of factors that will lead to either a flawed or sustained outcome, nor 
whether on balance the positive or negative aspects can outweigh each other despite the 
presence of both. 
 





















The objective of this research project is to establish the nature of strategic turnaround in 
the English Local Government Sector and its conversion into sustainable strategic 
practices.   
 
In order to achieve this objective the following research questions have been established: 
 
1. What have been stakeholder perceptions to the CPA trigger for the need for 
turnaround within English Local Authorities? 
 
2. What approaches to strategic turnaround are being adopted by English Local 
Authorities? 
 
3. How has/is the leadership of the organisation impacting upon the turnaround of 
the organisation 
 
4. Has strategic turnaround been implemented effectively? 
 
5. Has strategic turnaround delivered improved performance? 
 
6. Are the approaches to turnaround strategy transferable into sustainable structures 
and processes? 
 
7. To what extent can models of strategy and strategic turnaround in the private 
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This document adopts a critical realism perspective to undertake a qualitative 
study of the potential causes of poor performance in failing English local 
authorities during the period 2002 to 2009.  The study is part of a wider doctoral 
thesis examining the sustainability of turnaround strategies within those 
authorities that were either poorly performing or failing under the UK 
Government’s national Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) framework 
that existed between 2002 and 2009.   
 
The Doctorate of Business Administration (DBA) to which this study contributes is 
part of a structured programme offered by Nottingham Business School.  Under 
the DBA programme a series of studies are required including a literature review, 
a qualitative analysis, a quantitative analysis and a final thesis.  A literature 
review of the nature of strategic turnaround in local government has already been 
undertaken, as has a quantitative analysis of the publicly available CPA data set.  
This latter piece of work focussed on two main aspects of the research.  Firstly, it 
examined relationships within the CPA data in order to identify potential causes of 
poor performance and likely reasons for subsequent performance improvement.  
Secondly, and more importantly for this study, the quantitative analysis was also 
used to identify those organisations that exhibited sustained turnaround 
characteristics, which might then usefully be subjected to qualitative analysis.  
 
The objective of this study is to establish potential underlying causes of poor 
performance within local authorities deemed to have been failing at the start of 
the CPA process in 2002 but that subsequently achieved sustained improved 
performance at the end of the regime in 2009.  To do this, an analysis is 
undertaken of key informant interviews with senior staff working within three of 
those organisations identified by the quantitative study and the senior 
government lead official during the CPA regime.  This analysis seeks to establish 
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the background to why change was required and any significant events that 
occurred leading up to the initial CPA announcement.  It also gauges the internal 
organisational response to the announcement that the organisations were 
deemed to be poorly performing.  These organisations will also be revisited as 
part of the ongoing research for the final thesis (Document 5) in order to 
establish how performance improvement was achieved and the degree to which 
this is sustainable, particularly in light of the current economic climate.   
 
The three local authorities used in this study offer a mix of district and unitary 
councils. Interviews were held with a range of staff, namely a Chief Executive, A 
Director of Finance and Resources and a Finance and Transformation Manager.  A 
fourth interview was held with the person who was the senior government lead 
official during the CPA regime with responsibility for ensuring performance 
improvement occurred within failing local authorities.  This interview helped to 
provide background information to the CPA recovery process and identified a 
number of generic causes of poor performance and organisational responses. 
 
Sustained strategic turnaround has been defined in previous documents as ”‘a 
process that takes an organisation from a situation of poor performance to a 
situation of good sustained performance’”(Brandes and Brege 1993, p186).  This 
definition will continue to be used in this document and throughout the remainder 
of the study. 
 
Research Objective and Research Questions 
 
The objective of this study is to establish through qualitative analysis potential 
reasons for poor performance in local authorities at the start of the CPA regime.  
This will be undertaken from two perspectives; the internal and external 
perspectives.  For the purposes of this study, the internal perspective is that 
relating to the organisations, in this case key informant interviews within local 
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authorities, and the external perspective is that relating to the regulatory regime 
of the CPA, the interview with the government lead official. Clearly, there is the 
potential for bias in both of the perspectives.  The local authority interviewees 
may be partisan towards their own organisations and the government lead official 
may similarly wish to champion the cause of the CPA, being involved in its 
development and operation.  All interviewees may also be looking through the 
lens of hindsight.  Never the less, it will be useful for the purposes of the study to 
examine and compare these two perspectives and the access granted to the 
interviewees provides a valuable insight into what the state of play was at the 
start of the CPA process. 
 
The external perspective will be considered first and will be based on the 
Government Lead Official’s perception of the underlying causes of poor 
performance across all local authorities at the start of the CPA process. Secondly 
the internal perspective will be considered for each of the three local authorities. 
This will provide potential reasons for failure specific to each authority.  The 
analysis will then go onto consider any similarities and differences in findings both 
within the internal perspective and also between the internal and external 
perspectives. The specific research questions to be answered are as follows: 
 
1. What were the potential underlying causes of poor performance from the 
external perspective? (Analysis on pages 28 to 53) 
2. What were the potential underlying causes of poor performance from the 
internal perspective? (Analysis on pages 54 to 68) 
3. Are there any similarities or differences in these potential underlying 
causes within the internal perspective and between the internal and 
external perspectives? (Analysis on pages 54 to 68) 
4. What broad themes emerge as the potential reasons for underlying poor 
performance? (Conclusions on pages 73 to 79) 
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Background to Local Government Performance Measurement 
 
Local government represents a unique environment with its own rules, 
regulations, structures and funding arrangements (Wilson and Game 2006).  The 
formal structure of Local Government seen today can trace its statutory origins 
back to the mid 19th Century with the 1832 Electoral Reform Act, the 1834 Poor 
Law Reform and, significantly, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act (Chandler 
2007).  It is perhaps the election of local councillors that is one of the defining 
characteristics of local government (Rhodes 1988, Stewart 2000) and separates it 
not only from the private sector, but also other domains within the public sector 
(Rhodes 1988, Leach 2006, Pratchett 2004).  Wilson and Game (2006 p 93) 
define local Government today as a “semi-independent, politically decentralised, 
multifunctional body created by and exercising responsibilities conferred by 
Parliament”.   
 
Local Authorities are complex organisations (Worral et al 1998).  They provide 
multifunctional, and to an extent unrelated, services to the general public for 
example in the form of education, highways and planning, and also to the 
neediest members of society, for example council housing and social care. This 
complexity of structure, linked to the locus of power within the sector and, over 
time, the development of professionalisation, make it difficult to manage the 
strategic process (Whittington and Stacey 1994, Worral et al 1998).  Overlaid 
with this are the modernisation changes implemented generally across the public 
sector in an attempt to improve the management of the sector through the 
introduction of private sector management techniques (Cochrane 1993, Dereli 
2003, Diamond and Liddle 2005, Flynn and Talbot 1996, Pollitt 2003, Worral et al 
1998).  Such changes included New Public Management (NPM), the creation of 
executive agencies, the introduction of internal markets as well as compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT) and league tables (Barlow and Rober 1996, Pidd 
2005, Pollitt 2003, Wilson and Game 2006).  Many of these changes were 
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designed to make the public services, and therefore also local government, 
consider the very nature of how and why services were provided.  This is 
sometimes referred to as Steering and not Rowing (Barlow and Rober 1996, 
Osborne and Gaebler 1993) meaning that public sector organisations should not 
automatically provide services directly themselves, but should enable services to 
be provided by the best means possible, whether this includes the private sector 
or voluntary sectors as the service delivery vehicle.    
 
The Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) was introduced in 2001 to 
overcome weaknesses in the Best Value regime that had been introduced by the 
1998 White Paper and enshrined in the 1999 Local Government (Best Value) Act.  
CPA is the process by which the Audit Commission carried out its duty under 
Section 99 of the Local Government Act 2003 to independently monitor, report 
and specifically categorize local authorities according to their performance (Audit 
Commission 2006).  CPA involved a review of a local authority’s performance, 
resulting in the publication of scores, and supporting reports, to show the relative 
performance of authorities nationally. These reviews involved a combination of 
inspection by the Audit Commission and peer assessment as well as the 
evaluation of National Key Performance Indicators and reports by other 
independent inspectorates such as OFSTED, Commission for Social Care 
Inspection (CSCI) and the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate. The CPA was 
comprehensive, in that reviews covered all aspects of a local authority’s functions 
including service provision, the use of resources and corporate strategic and 
management processes.  
 
The CPA was in operation for seven years between April 2002 and March 2009.   
The Government’s White Paper on Local Government (2006) proposed a 
significant overhaul to the nature and scope of the regime, which resulted in the 
introduction of the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) regime from April 
2009 onwards.  Under CAA, performance was planned to be assessed over all 
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public bodies in a sub-regional area (for example a County Council Area) and, 
with some modifications, the main attributes of the CPA inspection and 
performance assessment regime were to be applied to all tiers of local 
government, fire and police authorities and the National Health Service. The 
incoming coalition government in 2010 disbanded the CAA regime before the first 
inspections were announced, and at the time of writing it is unclear what, if any, 
replacement regime will be introduced.  In the mean time, some aspects of the 
CPA regime remain, for example the auditor’s judgement on use of resources and 
the various service inspection scores. 
 
There is a limited but growing body of literature available on local government 
turnaround and the CPA in particular.  Local government comes under scrutiny 
from the public and central government due to the requirements of accountability 
and stewardship under which, by its very nature, it necessarily has to operate. 
Accountability here does not just refer to the political electoral accountability 
enjoyed by local politicians (elected members), although this is clearly one aspect 
of it.  Nor does it only relate to the Political, Legal, Bureaucratic and professional 
accountability vested on local authority officials (Behn 2001, in Pollitt 2003). For 
local government organisations, governance relates closely to stewardship and 
accountability.  Stewardship is bound up in the need to safeguard public assets 
and tax revenues, whereas accountability relates to the need to provide evidence 
that services have been delivered appropriately to local needs, while maximising 
the benefits that can be derived from the available resources.  From this it can be 
seen that stewardship, as a distinct aspect of governance and scrutiny, is a 
subset of accountability (Henley et al 1993).  It is this emphasis on 
accountability, in a complex operating and political environment that does not 
encompass a natural market mechanism, linked to the complex needs of those 
that local government are accountable to, that led, over time, to the development 
of a range of performance measurement approaches (Pollitt 2003). Such public 
Audit and inspection regimes have grown up as a 4th Arm of government (Grace, 
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2006) in order to provide a governance framework within which the requirements 
of accountability, stewardship and public need can be monitored and controlled.  
There are strong reasons to claim therefore that these inspection regimes are 
socially constructed, rather than having a traditional scientific basis. 
 
It is important to note however that the introduction of the Best Value and CPA 
regimes were not the first time performance within local government had been 
assessed.  For example, there have been inspection bodies for Schools and the 
Police for a number of years, predating the introduction of VFM.  Similarly, 
funding and inspection bodies had drawn distinctions between good and poorly 
performing authorities in the distribution of capacity building funds and with 
regards to freedoms and flexibilities over financial control and decision making.  
The CPA sought to amalgamate these disparate probity and service based 
regimes into a single comprehensive assessment for the first time, enabling local 





This chapter will consider the methodological issues related to this phase of the 
research study.  As highlighted earlier, this study is part of wider research into 
the nature of sustained strategic turnaround in those English local authorities that 
have shown a sustained improvement from a position of performing poorly under 
the CPA regime.  Other components of this overall study include a literature 
review establishing a conceptual framework and also a quantitative analysis of 
the CPA dataset, establishing potential key lines of enquiry for document 5 and, 
importantly for this part of the study, identifying appropriate local authorities that 




It is important for the researcher to establish the methodological foundations of 
the study to be undertaken.  Methodology is the broad term given to the study of 
methods used during research (Fisher 2004, Gill and Johnson 1991, Jankowicz 
2005).  Before considering the methods and techniques to be employed within 
the research, it is first necessary to establish the methodological framework 
within which the study needs to take place.  It is also important for the 
researcher to consider their own epistemological position in order to establish 
what kinds of knowledge are likely to be considered legitimate and adequate for 
the study being undertaken. 
 
The structure of the DBA requires this phase of the research to adopt a 
qualitative approach.  This means in essence moving away from the hard ‘facts 
and figures’ examined in the quantitative study, and instead getting to grips with 
the people involved in the turnaround of their organisations.  Pinning down the 
methodological position of a study, though important can be tricky due to the 
variety of texts and writings on social research, which can attribute conflicting 
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and/or ambiguous meanings.  Figure 1 identifies the transition from epistemology 
to individual research methods.  Identifying methods for this study was relatively 
straightforward.  It is a qualitative study and such would tend to use qualitative 
data collection method such as interviews.  What is less straightforward, and 
more relevant to the methodological position is how the data collected should be 
analysed and interpreted.   Figures 2 and 3 give further information on possible 
research paradigms or research philosophies.   
 
 
Figure 1 – The transition from epistemology to research methods 
Source: Gray (2004) p16 – (Adapted from Crotty, 1988) 
 
What these different representations portray is the potential array of approaches 
that could be adopted by the researcher.  Choosing the right approach is 
fundamental to the validity of the subsequent findings (Gray 2004), however 







































Hubeman 1994) and as such the quest for a simple, one size fits all approach is 
difficult to achieve in practice.  A comparison of the main approaches shows that 
the positivist/constructivist ends of the philosophical continuum are not 
appropriate to this study. 
 
Figure 2 – Four main research paradigms and their assumptions 
 
 
Source: Sobh and Perry 2006 p 1195 (Adapted from Perry et al (1999), which 
itself was based on Guba and Lincoln (1994)) 
 
The single truth advocated by positivism is neither relevant nor measurable in the 
context of social research; the social world differs from the physical world as it 
contains too much unknown complexity to be able to identify and model one 
version of it.  Similarly the possible multiple realities arising from constructivist 
research are not helpful to the objectives of this study, while useful in studying 
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individual cases, this approach does not easily allow the construction of a 
generalised reality.  Neither approach therefore can satisfactorily be used to 
assess the underlying causes of poor local authority performance.  The former 
because in attempting to generalise through reduction, it ignores the wider 
contexts and complexities within which social interaction takes place, the latter 
because the recognition of multiple internal realities does not allow for 
generalisations (ie the underlying causes of poor performance) to be made.  
 
Figure 3 – Comparing philosophical positions 
 
Source: Stiles (2003) p 266 - based on references given in the table. 
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Some middle ground is therefore needed, not only for the purposes of the study 
but also for the researcher’s own methodological position.  Of the options 
available (see figures 1, 2 and 3), realism is the most relevant to both this part of 
the study, and the wider thesis. Realism recognises that there is an ‘out there’ 
reality in a similar way to positivism but contrary to constructivism.  However, it 
departs from positivism in that proponents of realism assert that a universal view 
of that external reality cannot be pinned down and proven.  Through a realism 
approach, findings can only give a partial view of the external reality and there is 
recognition that this partiality may not fully recognise the complexities and 
changes within it (Jupp 2006, Bhaskar 1979).  Realism therefore is not reliant on 
deduction and hypothesis testing in the same scientific way that positivism tries 
to describe the world. Rather, it advocates a multi-method approach to research 
with triangulation of methods and sources playing a large part in the analysis and 
interpretation of findings.  It also supports the use of qualitative techniques to 
develop rich data which positivism often ignores (Sobh and Perry 2006, Stiles 
2003). This study uses qualitative data to attempt to draw generalisable 
conclusions about the underlying causes of poor performance, on the basis that 
organisational performance can be measured in terms of some sense of external 
reality.  The case study organisations have been chosen based on previous 
quantitative analysis and a significant literature review has also been undertaken. 
 
To further expand on the underlying methodology of the study, and to explain the 
author’s methodological position, it is necessary to consider further the concept of 
realism.  Three main strands of realism are discussed in the literature namely 
empiricism, idealism and critical realism.  It is perhaps an oversimplification to 
say that empiricism leans towards a more positivistic view of realism and idealism 
a more constructivist view.  However, some empiricists do accept that observed 
empirical irregularities could be used to establish causal laws and idealists can 
make use of social constructs to offer up interpretivist accounts (Jupp 2006).  
Critical realism recognises that the observed view of reality is transient, partial 
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and in essence is situation dependent. The observance of structures and 
mechanisms needs to recognise this and generalisations, while possible, need to 
be understood within a “time/space” (Jupp 2006 p 256) context.  What this 
means is that the researcher must recognise that there are multiple and complex 
variables at play within observed situations and these are dependent on the 
contexts, actors and structures in place at that point of time and location.  While 
it is possible to generalise through comparison and reduction, conclusions must 
recognise that observations are governed by the above constraints. The realism 
approach sits well with the researcher’s view of reality and with hindsight reflects 
the way in which the research has been conceived and undertaken to date.  The 
researcher believes that there is a reality ‘out there’, but that in the social world 
this cannot be seen or proved.  The complex variability of actors structures, 
cultures, constructs and interpretations mean that findings offer the potential to 
generalise about the external reality, but that this will change over time and in 
different situations.  The body of literature available offers useful insight into the 
reality of strategic turnaround but is time/space and situation dependent and 
therefore can only offer assistance in interpreting the current findings, rather 
than establishing grand or unified theories.  
 
Initially it was intended that this part of the study would be ethnographic in 
nature.  However, as the research study has developed, it has become clear that 
the objectives of the study would be to determine the “story” of an organisation’s 
transition, as told by a key informant within the organisation.  As such, the focus 
of the study falls short of ethnographic research, which would require a wider 
range of participants to be included to enable a more focussed study of culture 
over a longer timeframe (Gray 2004, Bryman and Bell 2003, Jankowicz 2005, 
Fisher 2004).  In terms of classifying the research further, the research in this 
part of the study is largely inductive but falls short of a grounded theory approach 
as this would have required greater immersion in the case study organisations. 
Inductive approaches collect rich data (or thick data) from the research 
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participants. Theories emerge from the data, which can then be compared with 
other theories and/or literature related to the field of study.  It might be argued 
that as a literature review has already been undertaken, hypotheses could be 
developed and tested under a hypothetical –deductive approach more closely 
linked to either the positivist or empiricist perspectives.  However, the literature 
is not to be used for such a purpose in this part of the study, but will be useful in 
gaining familiarity with terminology which is helpful in giving the researcher 
credibility in interview situations, especially with the senior officials interviewed. 
It also forms part of the triangulation at the end of the study to see if findings 
witnessed in the interviews are also represented in the literature. 
 
Bryman and Bell (2003, p 293) identify a number of pre-occupations held by 
qualitative researchers that are useful to consider in relation to this study.  
Firstly, they suggest that many qualitative researchers attempt to view the 
events considered and the social world through the eyes of the research subjects 
in order to recognise that the subjects of the study – the people- are capable of 
interpreting the world around them. Given the objectives of this study, ie to 
establish the reasons for poor performance and the approach to turnaround, this 
aspect was not a major concern in the way that it would have been for a longer 
term, more in depth, ethnographic study. Also, it does not sit comfortably with 
the critical realism approach adopted. Secondly, the potential for there to be an 
emphasis on description and context is relevant to this study although not in its 
widest, ethnographic, sense. There will be some drawing out of a limited amount 
of such descriptions and contexts, where they are relevant to the study but, 
because the study centres around four one off interviews rather than an in depth 
ethnography, a great deal of detail and context is not currently known about the 
organisations studied.  It is intended that this will be developed into a more fuller 
account within the final thesis.  What is more relevant however is the tendency to 
emphasise process within the research findings.  At the heart of this study lies the 
investigation of the processes of both reaching a point of poor or failing 
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performance and then moving to a position of improved performance.  This, 
therefore, is where the main “pre-occupation” will be evident in the analysis of 
the four interviews and also relates well to the critical realism approach, which 
focuses on understanding structures and mechanisms taking place within the 




To meet the objectives of this part of the research, four key informant interviews 
(Jankowicz 2005) have been undertaken with senior officials employed by three 
of the turnaround local authorities identified in document 4, and also with the 
government’s lead official during the CPA process.  The advantage of using the 
key informant approach is that participants are not selected randomly, but based 
on their idiosyncratic expertise in a particular area (hence the usefulness of the 
literature in understanding key terms referred to above). 
 
The interviewees worked for different organisations and held posts at different 
tiers within those organisations.  One was a Chief Executive, a second was a 
Director of Finance and Resources and the third was an Assistant Director 
responsible for Transformation within the organisation.  The remaining interview 
was undertaken with the lead official for the government during the CPA process 
who held the position of Director of Local Government Practice and was a senior 
civil servant. The purpose of the interviews was to establish the reasons for the 
poor performance experienced by the organisations and the immediate reactions 
to the initial announcement under CPA.  Other data has been captured during the 
interviews regarding the way in which the organisations’ management acted to 
turn around and improve performance, including the up to date organisational 
position post CPA, looking forward into the age of austerity.  This data will not be 
used until the final thesis. 
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The interviews with the employees of the local authorities were semi-structured 
and loosely managed.  The aim was to encourage the interviewees to tell the 
story of their own organisation’s experience.  Interviews lasted approximately 2 
hours each, providing a rich source of data for the study.  Interviews were 
recorded to free up the interviewer to steer the discussion where required and 
also ask pertinent follow-up questions at appropriate points during the interviews.  
By and large the interviews were free flowing, with only minor prompts required 
to ensure that the maximum information was captured during the interviews.  
The interviews were then transcribed for later analysis.  The transcription process 
took a lot longer than expected, with each two-hour interview taking between 2 
and 3 days to complete.  Each transcript was around 15,000 words in length, 
which also meant that the analysis process took a long time.  This was surprising, 
as I had entered this document thinking that it would be relatively 
straightforward, at least compared to the quantitative analysis undertaken in 
document 4, which was quite challenging.  However, a large amount of 
interesting and useful data was captured in the interviews, which has proved 
invaluable for the study. 
 
Despite the interview dates being planned and scheduled into interviewees’ 
diaries well in advance of the interviews, they were put back on a number of 
occasions due to interviewee work commitments and pressures that arose, and in 
one case illness. This was frustrating as it disrupted the flow of the research and 
resulted in the analysis phase running into heavy periods of workload for the 
researcher. 
 
The objectives of the study were to establish the key reasons behind poor 
performance and identify the key events that occurred within the organisations at 
the time of the first CPA inspection.  Epistemologically, this is viewed as the start 
point for the process of strategic turnaround and recovery and as such, the study 
is more to do with establishing the process the organisation went through and 
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less to do with understanding the perception of the issues through the eyes of the 
interviewees.  This means that the epistemology of the study is focussed on 
establishing what happened, rather than attaching meanings to what happened 
from the interviewee’s perspective.  Hence, the critical realism nature of the 
study means that traditional ethnographic methods of data capture and analysis 
are not required in their fullest extent.  Conversation and discourse analysis are 
not undertaken in their truest sense, but rather the “conversations” of the 
interviews have been analysed to identify themes that occurred both before and 
during the initial phase of CPA.  These themes have been analysed and discussed 
later in the document and crossed matched to see if any themes have emerged 
across all organisations (the internal perspective).  Clearly this requires some 
degree of interpretation on behalf of both the interviewee and the interviewer.  
What the different interviewees consider important to raise may differ due to 
their own perceptions, position with the organisation and the degree of 
information they held at the time. Furthermore, the study is historical, and as 
such hindsight may play a part in the interviewees’ understanding and perception 
of events that occurred.  Also, the interviewer will attach meaning to statements 
and experiences mentioned based on their own background, and experience.  The 
difficulty of recognising these various social constructs is problematic, but it is 
envisaged that even though different language and emphasis may have been 
used by each of the interviewees, some degree of commonality of meaning will be 
identifiable where it occurs. It is the job of the researcher to try and make sense 
of such shared meanings, while at the same time recognising that this 
understanding can only ever be partial and as such any conclusions drawn need 
to recognise this. 
 
The interview with the government lead official (the external perspective) was 
more structured than those of the local authority employees.  The method 
employed here was the repertory grid (Jankowicz 2005) which is a semi-
structured interview technique that allows the interviewee to identify a number of 
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elements associated with/important to a particular topic, compare them and come 
up with a range of perceptions against which the elements can be scored.  For 
example how could one or more elements be regarded as similar or different from 
the others.  In this way the interviewee’s personal understanding can be elicited 
from the interview directly, rather than being guided/constrained by the 
interviewer’s understanding of the topic.  The process of undertaking the 
repertory grid approach is discussed in detail in the analysis section and referred 
to in the appendices.  The main difference from the local authority interviews is 
that no prompts were used to guide the interview.  The semi-structured nature of 
the interview hinged on going through the process of developing the repertory 
grid. 
 
Selection of Interviewees 
 
As a start point for establishing where interviews could most advantageously be 
undertaken, reference was made to the output of Document 4.  This document 
undertook quantitative analysis of the national CPA data set and identified a 
number of organisations that had, over the course of the CPA time frame, 
displayed sustained turnaround characteristics.  Of those organisations identified, 
three were known to the researcher in terms of having existing contacts through 
a number of different networks.  As it transpires, these three organisations were 
useful ones to consider for the study.  One (Council A) was the first organisation 
to achieve a significant turnaround in performance, from Weak to Excellent, a 
second (Council B) also moved from weak to excellent over the 7 years of CPA 
and appeared as an “interesting” organisation in each of the three timescales 
used for analysis in document 4 and the third (Council C), though not as prolific 
in its turnaround had never the less made some improvement of a sustained 
nature from weak to good over the same timeframe. Rather than just focussing 
on the stories of the councils themselves, it was also felt to be of use to capture 
data on the national picture and, so to speak, from the other side of the fence.  
 23
As such a further interview was undertaken with one of the government’s lead 
officials from the CPA regime.  This provides a useful point of comparison against 
the perhaps more partisan views of the officers from the organisations 
themselves.  
 
Despite the fact that all interviewees were selected partly due to expediency, ie 
access could easily be gained because of relationships through existing contact 
networks, each interviewee also displayed a number of desirable factors that had 
been considered useful when selecting interviewees. Firstly each held a senior 
position within the organisations they worked for, including the government’s lead 
official. One was a chief executive, the second a director of finance and resources 
and the third an assistant director responsible for transformation.  As such they 
would have experience of dealing with the turnaround process across the 
organisation, rather than only seeing a limited aspect of it.  Secondly, they had 
all been employed by their organisations for a long time and, significantly, 
throughout the CPA time period.  This also included the lead official who had 
previously been a local authority chief executive, but had been seconded across 
to the government before CPA had been introduced to undertake the recovery of 
some previously identified failing local authorities. He had been a significant 
player in the development of the CPA regime itself and its subsequent roll out in 
2002.  The interviewees were therefore selected as key informants (Jankowicz 
2005) who would be able to provide an overview of the processes and critical 
events that occurred within their host organisations. A pen picture of each of the 
interviewees is given below.  The names of each interviewee and their 
organisations have been removed to provide anonymity. This is because even 
though the CPA data is freely and publicly available on the audit commission web 
site, the interviews would be dealing with some potentially sensitive internal 
issues relating to the host organisations. As such some of the responses in the 
interviews and stories given should not be traceable directly to the organisation 
concerned.  Also, unavoidably, some of the responses represent the views of the 
 24
interviewees themselves and in order to gain as much access as possible, 
assurances were given before commencing the interviews that interviewees 
anonymity would be given. 
 
The Government Lead Official (GLO) 
 
The GLO had previously been a local authority chief executive but was co-opted 
into central government to assist with the peer review and turnaround of failing 
local authorities under the Best value regime that predated CPA.  Subsequently, 
the GLO became one of a number of GLOs operating under the CPA regime and 
was responsible for overseeing the interventions and turnaround of failing local 
authorities.  The GLO personally had an involvement in 11 CPA interventions, all 
of which were successfully turned around.  The GLO was enthusiastic about the 
CPA regime, the turnaround process and the subsequent improvements in local 
authority performance. 
 
The Chief Executive (CEO) – Council A 
 
The CEO has worked for the local authority for almost 36 years.  At the time of 
the first CPA announcement the CEO held the position of Director of Finance, in 
itself a very senior role.  During the intervening period, the CEO has been 
promoted a number of times.  First to Director of Resources, then Deputy Chief 
Executive, followed by Acting Chief Executive and finally CEO.  The CEO exuded 







The Director of Finance (DoF) – Council B 
 
The DoF has been employed by the organisation for a number of years (“since 
Adam was a lad”) and has been DoF since 1999.  In 2002 the DoF also took on 
responsibility for e-Government and IT with a focus on outcomes and 
transformation. 
 
The Finance and Transformation Manager – Council C 
 
Finance Manager and Transformation Manager for Directorate of Prosperity and 
Planning, linking financial management to the deliverable outcomes that would 
result from transformation including service delivery, asset restructuring and 
organisational configuration.   They had been involved with the organisation prior 





In any research study it is not possible to generalise a particular finding to a 
wider population based on the evidence from one source alone.  This is 
particularly true of qualitative research, which is often concerned with interpreting 
the views of interview respondents.  Triangulation is therefore employed whereby 
findings from two or more independent sources or techniques are compared 
(Saunders etc al, 2000). Where a common theme emerges, then the case for 
generalisation improves, something of importance to critical realism. Ideally, 
triangulation should utilise a range of different research approaches (Gray 2004, 
Bryman and Bell 2003, Jankowicz 2005) eg qualitative and quantitative methods.  
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However, as this is of necessity a qualitative study the scope for triangulation is 
partially reduced.  Never the less, within the realism basis of the research it is 
possible to give the opportunity for at least some triangulation through, for 
example, comparison within the internal perspective, between the internal and 
external perspectives and also through the use of two research methods namely 
interviews and the repertory grid.  As such, triangulation will be used within the 
analysis of the research findings in order to identify the presence of broad themes 
for underlying poor local authority performance, and indeed this is in part 
reflected in the research questions for this study.  
 
Ethical and Access Issues 
 
Research ethics concerns the appropriateness of the researcher’s behaviour in 
relation to the subjects of the research project, or those who are affected by it 
(Saunders et al, 2000).  The principal of research ethics is that the researcher 
should take all reasonable steps to ensure that harm does not befall those 
involved in the research (Fisher 2004, Bryman and Bell 2003).  It extends to 
individuals and organisations, either directly or indirectly, associated with the 
study and includes aspects such as professional reputation, safety and reasonable 
care. 
 
Diener and Crandell (1978) identified four main areas of concern regarding 
research ethics; Harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of 
privacy and whether deception is involved.  With regard to harm to participants, 
this could take a number of forms, not just physical harm.  The easiest way to 
attempt to overcome harm is to anonymize the research participants and their 
organisations and this has been done as far as is possible in this research project, 
especially with regard to the local authority participants.  However, it is not 
always possible offer total anonymity (Bryman and Bell, 2003) as the participants 
may hold a unique position that is easily identifiable to the informed reader.  This 
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is less of a concern for the local authority participants but more obviously an 
issue for the GLO.  Despite this, the identity of the GLO was kept anonymous and 
as part of the informed consent process (see later) he was informed at the 
interview of the potential for identification and was comfortable with this. 
 
Informed consent is the process whereby prospective research participants are 
given as much background information as possible about the study to enable 
them to make an informed decision as to whether to be involved or not (Bryman 
and Bell 2003). Through this process, it is assumed that as long as sufficient 
information is given to participants, if they agree to be involved they have 
already taken into account the potential issues of harm referred to above. 
Informed consent was particularly important in this study as the researcher was 
using an existing personal network of practitioners.  As such there could be the 
scope to abuse this relationship, either intentionally or unintentionally, if a proper 
process of consent was not followed.  To this end, when each of the research 
participants were invited to be involved in the study, the objectives and context 
of the study were set out at this initial stage both on the phone and in a follow up 
email.  Furthermore, the objectives and context of the study were clarified at the 
start of each interview.  A further aspect was to allow participants to go “off the 
record” if they were discussing issues that were of a sensitive nature and they did 
not want mentioning in the study. Such issues, which were few, were logged in 
the interview notes and excluded from the analysis.  The interviews were 
recorded and as such interviewees were also asked their consent to be recorded 
on the proviso that the recorder could be switched off at any time.  In practice 
this only needed to be done twice, both cases due to the research participant 
taking phone calls unrelated to the research topic. Each interviewee was also 
asked if their organisation were happy for them to be involved. 
 
The final two aspects of invasion of privacy and deception are not wholly relevant 
to this study.  All information around the performance of the organisations 
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involved is in the public domain and the objectives of the study were overtly set 
out during the process of informed consent. As has been said above, anonymity 
was granted in the writing up of the findings and this also extended to the 
interview transcripts.  Finally, the research is not deceptive in nature and there 
was no intention of limiting the research participant’s understanding of the 
research.  Indeed such an approach would have been counter productive. 
 
Finally with regards to research ethics, the DBA project as a whole has been 
subjected to the University’s ethical approval process. 
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THE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
The Government Lead Official (GLO) 
 
The nature of the interview with the GLO differed from the interviews with local 
authority officers in a number of ways.  The main difference was that whereas for 
the local authorities, the objective of the interview was to allow the officers to tell 
the story of their organisation, the GLO did not deal with one organisation but 
multiple organisations that had been categorised as poor and were therefore in 
need of intervention.  A further difference is that whereas the local authority 
interviews were dealing with organisations that had subsequently improved, the 
GLO was talking about all organisations that were in the poor category, 
irrespective as to whether they had subsequently achieved a turnaround 
situation. Also, throughout the process of CPA, the GLO would have had more 
time to consider the underlying causes of poor performance and to compare and 
contrast them across all organisations. It was expected therefore that a certain 
degree of high level categorisation was already likely to have taken place in the 
GLO’s mind and as such these needed to be teased out during the time limit of 
the interview, rather than focussing on one or two issues in depth.   
 
A method was therefore required that would allow such categories to be brought 
out, but also potentially to challenge the GLO’s already held views about what 
they were.  The method chosen was that of the repertory grid.  Under this 
approach the interviewee is invited to identify a number of issues relevant to the 
objectives of the study, in this case causes of poor performance amongst failing 
local authorities. These issues are referred to as elements.   The preparation of 
the repertory grid then requires each of these elements to be compared with each 
other in triplets to identify what makes two of them similar and one of them 
different.  By doing this a scale of difference can be identified between two 
extremes, in simple terms an example would be that an issue directly causes poor 
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performance or has no effect at all.  As these differences/similarities are 
essentially constructed by the interviewee, they are referred to as constructs.  
The basic approach to the repertory grid is to identify 10 elements and then 10 
constructs and then to score each of the constructs on a scale of one to 10 
against each of the elements.  The completed repertory grid is given at the end of 
this section. 
 
Using the repertory grid proved problematic in some regards in that there was 
insufficient time to complete the grid in the first interview.  It was therefore 
necessary to go back at a later date and finish the grid. However, having the 
focus of the grid preparation as a goal of the interview helped to cover a range of 
issues relevant to the objectives of the study, and in that regard alone it was a 
useful tool to employ. 
 
Another area where the nature of this interview differed from the others was the 
close proximity that the GLO had to the CPA process itself.   The GLO had 
previously been a chief executive in a local authority and pre CPA had been 
seconded into the government to help improve the performance of a number of 
local authorities that had been deemed to be poorly performing or failing.  
Subsequent to this the GLO was involved in the development, roll out and 
revision of the CPA regime.  Two issues emerge from this. The first is the 
potential for rhetoric and favourable bias towards the CPA as a mechanism for 
determining performance.  It has been argued in previous documents, that the 
underlying merits or otherwise of the CPA are not a fundamental objective of this 
study, rather the CPA is to be used as the measurement tool against which, 
generally, a local authority can be deemed to have been at one point in time 
performing poorly and at another point of time improved.  Whilst there were 
undoubtedly some statements made during the interview that could be said to be 
rhetorical, they were not substantial and did not really have a bearing on the 
objective of the interview.  As such they do not need to be mentioned further.  
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The second issue related to this close proximity is that the GLO did tend to have 
an emphasis on the process of CPA.  Some of this was actually quite useful in 
helping to get the general picture of what was happening nationally to failing local 
authorities before and during the CPA regime.  It was also helpful to gain an 
overview of the way the intervention process was undertaken for failing local 
authorities and this will be the focus of the first part of the analysis of this 
interview. 
 
Despite (or perhaps in light of) the health warnings referred to above, the GLO 
was an enthusiastic participant in the research and was able to give a useful and 
informative account of the underlying causes of poor performance.  As a footnote 
to this interview, the GLO will be interviewed again for the final thesis, this time 
focussing on the strategies employed by local authorities to improve 
performance.  It is again intended to use the repertory grid for this purpose, 
which will hopefully prove easier to manage second time around. 
 
The first part of the analysis of the interview focuses on the process of identifying 
poorly performing local authorities and the intervention process employed by the 
government.  Identifying poorly performing councils arose from the audit, 
evaluation and subsequent publishing of a local authority’s relative performance 
as part the CPA regime introduced in 2002.  The detailed background and 
operation of the CPA regime has already been covered in previous documents and 
will not be repeated here.   The outcome of the annual CPA inspection was a 
corporate assessment score on a five-point scale between Poor and Excellent 
(later converted to star ratings, but on a similar 5 point scale).  A Poor local 
authority would become the focus of attention of the Secretary of State, 
Government Ministers and the Government Lead Officials.  Intervention did not 
happen automatically, but rather the GLOs assessed the underlying reasons for 
poor performance and whether the local authority’s leadership had the “will and 
the where with all” (GLO) to get themselves out of the problems they were in.  
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The GLOs would recommend a course of action to the Secretary of State who 
would then have the ultimate say in whether an intervention was carried out and 
what the extent of the intervention needed to be.  There were no formally 
prescribed levels of intervention, but each case was treated on its own merit with 
the level of intervention ranging from a full support programme, including an 
interim chief executive and management team, to guidance and support and/or 
management and leadership capacity building.  Interestingly there was a budget 
to help support the intervention process, which varied between £11m and £38m a 
year.  This financial support was managed under an overarching rule that it would 
not be allocated to reward previous failures.  As such poorly performing local 
authorities could not expect to have money thrown at them to resolve their 
problems, but would only receive funding when they had demonstrated that they 
had put in place actions and strategies to help improve their poor performance.  
The GLO explained that this was a different approach to that employed under 
previous arrangements, where one transgressing local authority had been funded 
additionally to the tune of £25m per year for the 4 to 5 years preceding CPA, and 
had still managed to be categorised as poor in the first year of CPA inspections.  
As part of the intervention process, lead officials were appointed to oversee the 
improvement of a poorly performing local authority; one for each local authority.  
These lead officials were drawn from a variety of sources including local authority 
chief executives and also the private sector.  Perhaps in a typically partisan way 
(or perhaps it is my own belief in the public sector that has picked it up) the GLO 
explained that the better lead officials were those with an understanding of local 
authority management (whether from the public or private sector).  Those lead 
officials drawn exclusively from the private sector were not successful in the 
intervention process and were subsequently replaced.  There was also a process 
of peer evaluation amongst lead officials and quarterly reporting on performance 
to the Secretary of State. Provision existed to remove lead officials if they failed 
to get a local authority out of intervention (and this happened on a number of 
occasions) or to swap lead officials around if they were not “getting on” with the 
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local authority concerned.  An example of this which was given was where a lead 
official had a background in a certain service area, but that this service are was 
the only one not performing poorly within the organisation.  As such, the senior 
officers in the other service areas did not take that lead official seriously. 
 
The remaining analysis of this interview focuses on the identification of the 
underlying causes of poor performance within local authorities.  The results of the 
interview are presented in a structured way over ten broad categories.  However, 
a number of points need to be made about this presentation.  Firstly, the process 
of undertaking the repertory grid helped considerably with both structuring the 
analysis and providing a focus within the timeframe. Through arriving at the 10 
elements of the grid, the interviewee and the interviewer were able to clarify the 
meaning of each element and group together elements that had similar 
meanings.  This evolved throughout the interview with at times the need to 
revisit earlier themes as discussion on another topic took place.  Secondly, no 
single element was the single cause of poor performance, rather it was a 
collection of causes. This is discussed in part in the analysis below but is 
important to remember as an overarching consideration when interpreting the 
findings.  The mix of elements would differ between local authorities rather than 
some or all of the being relevant.  Also these multiple causes would impact on 
each other making it difficult for the organisation to either recognise it was poorly 
performing and or to successfully implement a recovery strategy.   The following 
quotation from the GLO interview illustrates this point. 
 
“There were always multiple causes and characteristics of failure that tended to 
reinforce each other and therefore organisations couldn’t, if you like, organically 
or naturally get better. If there wasn’t this critical mass of failures, then the 
internal and external tools and techniques that were available for them to get 




Finally, ten elements are presented because that was the number of elements 
required by the repertory grid.  As will be seen, some of these elements are 
closely related and could perhaps have been joined together as single elements.  
However, it is considered that there is sufficient differentiation between them to 
treat them as separate elements and perhaps more importantly, the GLO 
considered them to be separate.  The ten elements to emerge are shown in figure 
4 below and are discussed in detail in the following sections.  There is some 
interrelatedness between all of the elements, but some elements are more closely 
related than others.  These are represented on the chart by the same segment 
shading. 
 
Figure 4 – The 10 elements contributing to poor performance 
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In the remainder of this section, the 10 elements are explained from the GLO’s 
perspective as they emerged from the interview.  The elements, and the later 
constructs, were developed by the GLO based on his experience during the CPA 
period.  The comments in double quotations (“ “) are taken directly from the GLO 
interview. 
 
Multiple and major failings in service performance 
 
A major contributory factor to poor performance was the presence of multiple and 
major failings within the local authorities service areas.  These relate to the 
services provided e.g. Housing, Education, Transport etc, rather than being a 
factor of general strategic leadership and management, which are referred to 
below.  These failings manifested themselves in poor individual service scores 
recorded in the CPA, and were a product of independent inspections by bodies 
such as Ofsted for Education and schools etc.  No single service score would 
contribute to poor performance over all, instead there had to be multiple service 
failures.  Also these needed to be in the bigger services as these carried a higher 
weighting in the overall CPA scoring mechanism.  What was apparent was that 
the mix of poor service scores was different across local authorities. 
 
The next two elements are closely related and will be dealt with in turn. 
 
A lack of corporate capacity and capability 
 
This element lead to organisation failure as there was both insufficient corporate 
resources (capacity) and an inability to deploy them appropriately (capability). 
When asked whether these should be treated separately, the GLO said that such 
a discussion had been had many times between GLOs during the CPA period. The 
consensus of these discussions was that the two are so inextricably linked in 
failing organisations that they do need to be taken together.  Even though they 
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can be taken together, the main reason for failure appeared to be due to 
capability.  The following illustrates this, 
 
“There is a difference between (having) a lack of capacity and resources…what I 
am referring to here is the lack of capability.  Even if they had the resources, 
putting them together coherently, knowing what was effective and managing 




“Its all about capability.  Having political and/or managerial capability to be able 
to see what they can do about it realistically, to be credible to their local 
community”. 
 
Examples given elsewhere illustrate that a lack of resources was not necessarily 
the root cause of the problems, although clearly this could contribute to them 
arising.  What was more significant was a lack of capability to marshal those 
resources, limited or otherwise, into effective organisational service delivery over 
the long term. 
 
Lack of strategic leadership skills 
 
Lack of strategic leadership skills differs from the capability and capacity issues 
referred to above in that it is more focussed on the skills and abilities of the 
senior officers and elected members as well as the ongoing officer/member 
relationship in leading and managing the local authority. 
 
“You undoubtedly needed effective political leadership and undoubtedly needed 
effective managerial leadership.  But, you also needed awareness of managerial 
issues if you are a political leader, and getting out of these situations, and equally 
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you needed to be sensitively aware of the political situation if you were a chief 
executive or a manager”. 
 
“What you tended to have was a combination of poor political/managerial 
leadership and a poor relationship between the two of them to get you into a 
significantly failing situation”. 
 
There was also a distinction made between the required leadership roles for both 
politicians and managers.  It is the lack of these attributes that contributed to 
poor organisational performance.  Political leadership required a coherence in 
strategic decision making for example, 
 
“Coherence of strategy, mobilisation of decision making, effective engagement of 
key stakeholders, coherence of narrative basically. You have to have a single 
political voice and have to have a strategy {sic} to get decisions made effectively 
that support that strategy and implement that strategy.  And that’s all about 
political leadership and often that has to be cross party”. 
 
“The lack of these things would cause all sorts of incoherent strategy and poor 
decision making.  Options and appraisals were approved when they were 
contradictory to officer’s advice.  Incoherent with each other”. 
 
Managerial leadership on the other hand required the following, 
 
“Oh that’s easy, translating strategies, coherent or otherwise, into operational 
delivery of services”. 
 
And linked to the insularity element, 
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“It also helps if managers know and are aware of what constitutes good or 
excellent service” 
 
Related to this and the point above on capability, the following quote identifies a 
lack of understanding by managers of the strategic process and context within 
which they were operating. 
 
“They tended not to look objectively at service delivery, but look at subjective 
opinions in key politicians. “ If its alright for the leader its alright for me and 
anybody else”.  But they also need to know what is good management 
strategically so you can combine a set objectives, and a set of service objectives, 
into a coherent strategy that relate appropriately to the community’s needs and 
expectations as well as the political strategy of the democratic elected members”. 
 
The point here is that in failing local authorities, managers just did not have this 
skill set. 
 
Finally in this section an interesting point to emerge was whether the leadership 
was incompetent or deliberately divisive. 
 
“So in failing authorities you always had two groups, this became less so after 
CPA was introduced, but prior to CPA you always had historically two groups of 
failing authorities.  Those group of authorities that were basically incompetent in 
what they did and therefore were under-performing, and those group of 
authorities who were led by politicians who were ideologically opposed to some of 






“I have tended to lump the governance thing as not having the right political 
skills, but….. deploying those leadership skills in a malicious way, in an 
oppositional way… there were some poor authorities that had very good leaders 
who decided they were opposed to everything the government was doing and 
therefore they were going to use their considerable skills to go against it”. 
 
These points illustrate that in some cases leadership was poor because it lacked 
the necessary skills and/or capabilities.  In other cases however, the leadership 
may have been strong but was leading the organisation, in the government’s 
eyes at least, in the wrong direction.  It is interesting to note the inference that 
after CPA this reduced, and perhaps indicates that CPA as a mechanism for 
reform, was successful in bringing local authority leadership into a common focus. 
 
The next two elements are also closely related, whereby the leadership and 
management deny that a problem exists and operate in an isolated way with a 
lack of self-awareness. 
 
Denial of the problem 
 
Denial that the organisation faced a problem was an interesting but not 
unexpected area to arise.  The main level at which denial occurred was at the 
political leadership level within the organisation and this could relate to denial 
within the majority party, but also required the opposition party to at least 
acknowledge that there was a problem.  Denial manifested itself through the 
leadership thinking that their organisation’s circumstances were in some way a 
special case and that the inspectors and/or auditors did not appreciate this.  For 
example the problems existed due to a localised demographic need, or because of 
under funding from the central government. To an extent, this is also linked to 
the capability and capacity and strategic leadership elements, as there was 
reluctance amongst some leaders to read and interpret the inspection reports 
realistically and consistently.  
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“At the start of CPA the majority of the people {sic} in the bottom category 
denied they had a problem, and the answer was the auditors didn’t know what 
they were doing or talking about.  If they only knew they would realise they 
either were not bad, or what they were bad at wasn’t important to our 
population, and yet they denied there was a problem”. 
 
Denial that a problem existed manifested itself in a lack of co-operation with the 
intervention teams and even in some cases legal challenge against the CPA ruling 
in the early years of the CPA regime, although non-of these were upheld.  This 
denial, or failure to recognise that there was a problem, is most closely linked 
with the CPA announcement but would also have been an underlying contributory 
factor to the failing nature of the organisation.  In this way it is linked to the next 
point of insularity and a lack of self-awareness. 
 
Insularity and a lack of self-awareness 
 
This element emerged as one of the underlying causes of organisational failure. It 
is typified by the leadership (both political and managerial) of the organisation 
failing to look outside the organisational boundary to the wider environment, and 
this could include both the national and local environments.  This sense of 
insularity would typify organisations that are constantly looking in on themselves 





“There was an authority I went to who did not know the Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA) existed and have never been to the Local 
Government Association conference and therefore weren’t aware of what the level 




“There was a noticeable higher proportion of authorities who {sic} had built up 
cultures that allowed them to operate with a silo mentality and thought that 
outside the organisation, people didn’t understand them or the problems they 
faced”. 
 
In some cases this sense of insularity may have been due to geography 
 
“There was also a slight propensity for geographically marginalized authorities to 
be that way, so North East Lincs, Hull in districts, in the South West ones, Torbay 
on the south coast.  If you think of those, they are quite isolated”.   
 
In other cases the insularity may have been a result of feeling constantly under 
pressure, reinforcing a propensity to look internally rather than externally. 
 
“In London it tended to be authorities like Lambeth and Hackney which were 
historically under constant criticism that tended to be isolationist”. 
 
The following point demonstrates the overlap with some of the other elements, 
(in this case capacity and resources),  
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“(the lack of self awareness) could be capacity and/or capability.  An awful lot of 
authorities said, “if the government would only give us the money, we could do 
all this because we are brilliant and we are popular”, but no they couldn’t” 
 
This point illustrates how the lack of self-awareness (we are brilliant and popular) 
is linked to a lack of understanding as to why the problems exist, ie blaming a 
lack of funding.  This is further related to the following point, which shows that a 
lack of available finance wasn’t always the root cause. 
 
“There were people {sic} who could afford to raise a yield on rate relatively easily 
who were in problems.  So it wasn’t ability to raise money because you had some 
pretty affluent, good asset based authorities that were in the poor position”. 
 
Under this element, it was also evident that there was a lack of willingness to 
engage with any form of bench marking or comparative analysis, which is strange 
given that it was one of the explicit requirements of Best Value regime that 
preceded CPA.  When asked whether there was evidence of local authorities 
comparing themselves to others either intuitively or experientially, 
 
“Good ones do both of those things. They know it in the first place, they bring it 
in from elsewhere.  They bench mark either to good practice elsewhere, against 
established typologies and commonly agreed frameworks and they go looking for 
triangulated evidence of that good or excellent practice.  Poorer managers tended 
to rely on themselves intuitively knowing things and tended to measure it against 
historical performance….. and they tended not to look objectively at service 
delivery, but look at subjective opinions of key politicians.  “If its alright for the 





Poor external collaboration 
 
A further element identified by the GLO as leading to poor performance was the 
degree to which local authorities engaged with external collaboration.  At one 
level this could be linked to the insularity referred to above and a lack of bench 
marking against other organisations.  However, for this element the emphasis is 
on working with other organisations to plan and deliver services.  Poorly 
performing local authorities had failed to engage appropriately with this element, 
or had not engaged at all.  Another aspect of this would be a lack of recognition 
that local government needs to work within the framework established by 
national government. 
 
“Increasingly, you are delivering local services in collaboration with other services 
delivering at a local level, Police, Health etc”. 
 
“You also have to manage the expectations and co-ordinate your objectives with 
local public service deliverers in other parts of the public sector such as health 
and criminal justice”.  
 
And when asked whether poor local authorities were able to cope with this, 
 
“I would say that there was no authority in the poor category that wasn’t either 
not very good at it, or didn’t recognise it”. 
 
Despite this clear indication that recognising and engaging with collaboration in 
an appropriate way, and to an appropriate standard, was a failing amongst local 
authorities in the poor category, there were some difficulties in assessing this, 
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mainly because local authorities could appear to their partners as being good 
organisations, when other evidence was suggesting otherwise. 
 
“What we found with external collaborations was some people {sic} had very 
benign collaborations even though they were very poor themselves”. 
 
The word benign here is used in the sense that there was no friction between the 
collaborators.  This is due in part to the perception of the local authority held by 
the collaborator, which could be both good or bad and out of sync with the 
underlying performance.  For example 
 
“You had some councils that were providing an absolute gold standard service, 
but for whatever reason had had a falling out with their key stakeholders who 
told you that they were absolutely rubbish”. 
 
Whereas, at the other end of the scale 
 
“(some) councils would get good satisfaction levels from their population and 
good reports from key strategic partners, despite, when you measured them 
objectively against other councils, despite them providing a very poor service”. 
 
And linked to this point, 
 
“Their external collaborators thought the council were doing a good job and they 
were friendly towards them, despite the council doing a lousy job, because their 
expectation of the council was so low”. 
 
Clearly this aspect of perception, may also reflect on the ability of the partner 




Poor stakeholder management 
 
Very closely linked to collaboration, is stakeholder engagement.  In particular, in 
poor authorities there was a lack of willingness to engage with stakeholders either 
at all or appropriately.  Stakeholders would include the public, government, other 
public and private sector organisations and even the press.  In part this lack of 
ability to engage with stakeholders was perhaps a factor of previous regimes. 
 
“you have to remember until the 1999 Act, authorities were being increasingly 
encouraged to work in an individual way within their geographic boundaries and 
within the remit set by central government ….so their collaborative working or 
partnership working had contracted, hadn’t disappeared, but had significantly 
contracted for a number of years.  The skills, abilities and capacities needed to do 
that had diminished over those years.  Suddenly as time went on in CPA, there 
was a need for more and more collaboration, more and more partnership work, 
and therefore a different set of leadership and managerial skills.  There is no 
doubt that over this time, all of the under performing authorities either didn’t 
appreciate the need for these skills or were unable to deploy them”. 
 
In particular the examples of stakeholders given were at a high, strategic, level 
including MPs, MEPs, Chief Constable and Chairs of Police and Health Authorities.  
This indicates that the problem of stakeholder engagement rested at the top of 
the organisation and not necessarily lower down.  This may in some respects 
account for the relatively favourable perception offered by collaborating 
organisations, where stakeholder engagement was perhaps occurring 




Abnormal factors, incidents and events 
 
One element unrelated to the others in some respects, is the contribution that 
abnormal factors, incidents and events had on organisational failure.  
Understanding the impact such factors had on organisational failure was 
interesting, as they did not themselves lead to failure, nor were they necessarily 
symptomatic of the failure, as the other elements referred to in this section were.  
They did however, on the one hand exacerbate the underlying problems the 
organisation faced; effectively shining a light on them, and on the other hand 
make it even more difficult for the organisation to get itself out of trouble before 
going into failure; they were an added distraction, a step too far.  Examples of 
such abnormal situations are given below. 
 
“In one county council, the leader of the county council dropped dead in the 
middle of the inspection and a couple of months after the chief executive had left 
the organisation” 
 
In essence this left the organisation without either political or managerial 
leadership and would also, given the circumstances, have been in a kind of 
traumatic shock.  In other cases, the abnormal event was due to external factors, 
in large part coming from central government.  For example, 
 
“The government changed its policy on house building and the council was 
expected to provide the highest pro rata number of houses at the highest rate of 
anywhere in the country, when previously house building had been stable.  So 
that suddenly gave it an enormous challenge”. 
 
“In one case, knowing the authority was under performing and taking a defensive 
reaction, central government departments started issuing formal directions to the 
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council which would include huge changes to service budgets.  At the time we 
intervened, central government departments were issuing directives to that 
authority on the basis of one every three days”. 
 
Other examples included financial disasters occurring such as a PFI scheme going 
“belly up” and a major project being poorly specified resulting in millions of 
pounds of losses, constant political changes and in some cases “elements of 
illegalities going on”.  
 
Clearly it is difficult to distinguish whether these were causes of, symptoms of or 
just contributory factors to organisational failure.  However when asked whether 
without these abnormal triggers the authority would have been regarded as poor 
the response was, 
 
“The authority would have been regarded as under performing and definitely in 
the poor category”. 
 
The final two elements are related as they both deal with resources; financial and 
non-financial. 
 
Poor prioritisation of resources 
 
The prioritisation of resources differs from financial performance, as it is 
concerned with the distribution of resources across the organisation to meet 
priorities and needs.  Financial performance is concerned with how the financial 
resources are managed; did the council under over spend? Did it access all 
available funding etc?  Prioritisation is to do with how the financial resources are 
used and put into service delivery.  Poor prioritisation would also be related to 
having a lack of coherent strategies referred to in earlier sections.  Without 
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coherent strategies, resources cannot be deployed effectively.  This in turn would 
impact upon corporate capacity.  So again the elements display linkages. 
 
In some cases, local authorities were under performing due to poor prioritisation, 
rather than having a lack of available finance. This may have manifested itself in 
the short term as a financial problem (linked to financial performance in the next 
section), but essentially there wasn’t an underlying financial problem. For 
example, 
 
“Were there authorities where you could go in and say, Ok, you have a cash flow 
problem, but you haven’t got a medium term financial crisis and you certainly 
don’t have a long term strategic financial problem? Yes there were many of 
those”. 
 
And following on from this, 
 
“Those authorities were the ones where you needed to go in and get the 
politicians heading in the same direction and stop inefficient resources, inefficient 
services swallowing large amounts of the authority’s money and redistribute them 
around” 
 
In other cases, local authorities had simply not tied in their strategic aspirations 
with the level of funding available to them. 
 
“The greatest example of where this failed is an authority where its strategic 
plan, its corporate plan and its community strategy, all had community safety and 
anti-social behaviour as its number one priority.  If you looked at its budget, it 
had the lowest expenditure on community safety than anybody in its CIPFA 
category (a national comparator)”. 
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Comparing the before and after budgets of this local authority between the years 
that these new policy areas were brought in showed that “it had increased the 
amount of money spent in these areas by not one iota”. Furthermore, failing local 
authorities had a mismatch between their discretionary spending and their 
priorities; put simply, they just did not move funding from low priority areas to 
high priority areas, despite have the discretion to do this and their strategic plans 
indicating that there had been a shifting of priorities, or new priorities introduced. 
 
Poor financial performance 
 
The poor financial performance element focuses on whether local authorities had 
financial problems rather than whether they were allocating their resources 
efficiently and effectively.  Surprisingly there was very little evidence that local 
authorities had got themselves into a financial mess which resulted in them 
receiving a poor score. However, in some cases it was a factor and this is linked 
to some of the other elements. One local authority got hit with an additional 
£7million bill when a PFI deal went bust. Others had difficulty raising money and 
had poor reserves.  These issues on their own do not necessarily mean that there 
was poor financial management.  However, they are indicators of it.  A PFI deal 
going bust is an unfortunate event and would not necessarily be the fault of the 
local authority.  Not to see it coming, or to have not put measures in place to 
either prevent it or provide a contingency against it would however suggest a lack 
of financial foresight.  Similarly to have difficulty raising money, perhaps due to 
local economic or demographic conditions, is not the fault of the local authority.  
However, poor financial management would be to not recognise this in the 
financial plans and reflect this in the achievability of strategic priorities.  The 
potential here is that a local authority will overspend by aspiring to deliver too 
much.  Unfortunately, this issue was discussed towards the end of the interview 
and while it seemed to be relevant to include it as an element, there was not time 
to pursue some of the financial performance issues further 
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The Repertory Grid 
 
Before undertaking the interview, the repertory grid approach was explained to 
the interviewee. A copy of the explanation is given as Appendix B. The analysis of 
the repertory grid is shown in Appendix C.  The GLO was then asked to develop 
appropriate constructs arising from the elements.  Development of the constructs 
was undertaken by matching triplets of elements and asking the GLO to establish 
which two were similar in some way and which one was different.  This 
established 10 constructs that were used as scales (1 to 5) on which to compare 
their relative relevance to each of the elements.  Ten constructs is the widely 
recognised suitable number for analysis purposes and the development of each 
was the by-product of a useful discussion of the different elements. 
 
The limit on the number of constructs clearly also limits the range of analysis that 
can be undertaken, and no doubt further constructs could have been developed.  
However, the range of constructs identified is considered suitable for the 





Figure 5 – The repertory grid constructs 
 
1 end of the scale   5 end of the scale 
1 Multiple and complex issues involved   Simple issues involved 
2 Difficult to quality assure (complex sources of info)   
Easy to quality assure 
(available evidence) 
3 Prevents/Inhibits 
recovery   
Promotes/contributes to 
recovery 
4 Outside organisational control   
Within organisational 
control 
5 Long term solutions 
necessary   
Short term solutions 
possible 
6 Problems are unique to individual organisations   
Problems are generic 
across organisations 










9 Multiple and complex 
responses required   Simple responses required 
10 Intransigent Organisation   Continually changing organisation 
 
 
There a number of ways in which a repertory grid can be analysed varying from a 
simple review of the constructs identified to more complex statistical analysis 
using computer packages (Fisher 2004, Gray 2004, Jankowicz 2005).  As has 
already been discussed in the methodology section, this aspect of the research is 
designed to find out what happened during the CPA regime, rather than analysing 
the belief systems of the individuals interviewed.  In keeping with this 
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epistemology, the analysis of the grid is relatively straightforward and focuses on 
the relative weighting given to the different elements/constructs through the 
scoring mechanism. The frequency of extreme scores (1 and 5) are identified 
initially, and this is supported by a further analysis of the frequency distribution of 
all scores as well as the mode and median scores.  As the data is ordinal in 
nature, the mean cannot be calculated (Bryman and Bell 2003). 
 
Analysis of the Repertory Grid 
 
Looking horizontally across the repertory grid constructs in Appendix C highlights 
the relative difference between each of the elements in terms of the respective 
construct scales.  Some attempt has been made in presenting the information to 
show the construct scales on the basis of their possible impact on poor 
performance with 1 having a high impact and 5 potentially having a low impact. 
As this to a certain extent represents only subjective divisions, it cannot be used 
to any great extent to add a further level of analysis, but it does help to give a 
degree of structure. It is interesting to note therefore that constructs 1, 2, 6 and 
9 have a wide spread of scores from 1 to 5 indicating that overall these were not, 
on their own, major driving forces behind poor performance.  For example 
whether the issues were ‘simple’ or ‘multiple and complex’ in itself did not lead to 
poor performance. A similar picture emerges with the ease of quality assurance, 
whether problems were unique or generic or whether multiple or complex 
responses were required.  Alternatively, a number of elements scored more 
towards the lower end of three of the construct scales. These are constructs 3, 7 
and 10 and highlight issues that could have by their nature contributed to poor 
performance.  So for example the majority of the elements tended to be those 
that were more likely to prevent recovery and also were linked to organisations 
having had a history of intransigence to change.  To a lesser extent they tended 
to be multi-disciplinary in nature.  The final way of looking across the constructs 
is to identify where elements appeared at the higher end of the scale and these 
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were constructs 4, 5 and 8.  These are perhaps the most interesting as they tend 
to be things that the organisation could itself control but which in the view of the 
GLO, were contributors to poor performance.  So for example the majority of 
elements tended to be those that were within an organisation’s control, where 
short term solutions were possible and where the organisation had a direct 
control over the outcomes (rather than relying on partnering relationships).  This 
analysis of the constructs could be considered to be identifying poor 
organisational leadership and management as the issues identified could have 
been dealt with to avoid the onset of poor performance. 
 
The next way to analyse the grid responses is to look down each element.  This is 
also illuminating and elaborates on the nature of each element and the factors 
that may have contributed to being a reason for poor performance.  There is 
some evident repetition of issues from the construct analysis above so this 
section will focus on the significant issues arising.  A lack of corporate capacity 
and capability was regarded as a multiple and complex issue, difficult to quality 
assure and tended to be multi-disciplinary in nature. Furthermore, it tended to 
prevent recovery rather than promote it, required complex responses and was 
symptomatic of an intransigent organisation.  However, using construct 8, the 
organisation would have had a degree of control over the outcomes, suggesting it 
was not externally driven. Similarly, a lack of strategic leadership skills is also 
related to intransigence and could be multidisciplinary in nature, but was 
potentially a relatively simple issue to resolve.  Abnormal factors tended to be 
outside the organisations control and required long term solutions.  They also 
tended to be organisational specific.  Denial was again linked to intransigence and 
was multidisciplinary but was potentially a quick win that could be addressed as it 
was simple to resolve and quality assure, required quick and simple responses 
and was under the direct control of the organisation itself (or the management 
and leadership).  Much the same can be said of insularity. Poor collaboration and 
stakeholder management tended to score in the middle of the scale indicating no 
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extremes, which was surprising given the emphasis placed on it by the GLO in the 
interview.  Multiple and major service failings tended to be complex in nature and 
response, but though generic, in the view of the GLO were within an 
organisation’s control.  Financial and resource prioritisation issues tended to be 
simple and generic, and were again within an organisation’s control to get right. 
 
The main issues that arise form this analysis is the extent to which the problems 
and factors leading to poor organisational performance could to a large extent be 
considered to be within an organisation’s control and as such could have been 






The Local Authorities 
 
In this section the responses of the local authority interviewees are considered.  
For the structure of the document, the results of the interviews are taken 
together on a themed basis rather than on an individual interview basis, and, 
where appropriate, the findings are also linked to the 10 elements established by 
the GLO.  This method of presentation was selected as it avoids a significant 
amount of repetition in writing up the interviews individually, instead allowing 
common themes to be discussed across all interviews. 
 
The research approach used was inductive, and as such the interviews were 
allowed to flow in a reasonably unstructured way in order to enable rich data to 
be captured. Ex-post analysis was then undertaken both across the three local 
authority interviews and against the 10 elements identified by the GLO.  The 
interviews were semi-structured, and prompts were identified and listed before 
the interview to help it keep on track within the time available.  A copy of the 
purpose of the interview and the prompts were given to interviewees at the start 
of the interview, (see Appendix A).  Due to the storytelling nature of the 
interviews, the prompts were not used religiously, but rather a view was taken 
during the interview as to whether or not they were required.  Often the prompts 
were not used extensively and as such not all of the issues raised by them were 
covered in the interviews.  However, there was more than sufficient data 
gathered to provide some useful and interesting comparisons both between the 
individual local authority experiences (the internal perspective) and, ex-post, with 
the issues raised by the GLO (the external perspective).  The organisations are 
identified as Council A, Council B and Council C, as discussed in the methodology 




The first stage in analysing the local authority interviews was a comparison 
between the three interviews themselves.    This was done by analysing the 
interview transcripts for broad themes that emerged across the three interviews.  
These broad themes have been used to structure this part of the analysis section.  
They are not presented in any order of perceived importance but rather as the 
themes emerged out of the analysis.   
 
The second part of the analysis was to compare ex-post the findings of the local 
authority interviews with those from the GLO interview.  Where statements made 
by the local authority interviewees are related to the 10 elements, there is a 
discussion in the analysis as to whether the responses are broadly supportive, or 
not, of the existence of the elements as causes of poor performance.  To achieve 
this, the local authority interviews were therefore also partly analysed using a 
grid containing the 10 elements identified by the GLO. A separate record was also 
maintained of issues raised in the interviews that did not fit with the element 
analysis.  Not all elements identified by the GLO are discussed below, and those 
elements that are discussed are done so at varying length, as dictated by the 
interviewee responses.   
 
It should be noted that the analysis of the local authority interviews shows that 
there were a mix of issues that contributed to poor performance and that the mix 
and the severity of the causes varied between organisations based on their 
individual circumstances.  This is broadly supportive of the view expressed early 
on by the GLO that there were multiple causes and characteristics of failure.  It 
also ties in with the complex nature of local authorities (Worrell et al 1998) and 
the unique governance arrangements that exist (Rhodes 1988, Stewart 2000).    
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The Problem of Leadership 
 
The focus on leadership was an interesting aspect to emerge across all three local 
authorities, even though the issues arising were different in each case. In 
particular, this focussed the locus of leadership in with regards to the CEO and 
Lead Member, as well as the relationship between them.  The issues varied from 
there being a too close relationship between the political leader and the CEO 
(Council B), to one where the two didn’t get on well (Council A), to another where 
the management team was so large that leadership could not be undertaken 
effectively (Council C).   
 
For one organisation, immediately prior to CPA, they were “led by a fire-fighter, 
commonly know as Red Adair” (Council B).  Interestingly, this was the CEO role 
and not the political leadership role, and it was considered to be a situation that 
suited the elected members at the time. “If there was a problem, the members 
would say, “sort it out” and the Chief would sort it out”.  So in this instance the 
leadership role was coming from the CEO, or from managerial leadership rather 
than political leadership. The impression given was the CEO was left to get things 
sorted, using the elected leader to rubber stamp decisions.  The problems 
experienced by this organisation were considered by the interviewee to come 
from there being too cosy a relationship between the officers and members 
generally, and also there being a very close and longstanding relationship 
between the leader and the CEO.  This resulted in the organisation being jointly 
led, but not in a positive way, with the relationship being described as a “cabal, to 
keep the organisation where it was”.  In this organisation, there was a change in 
the political leader due to “the four year rule [of tenure]” and this triggered a 
change to the formerly cosy relationship. Following a peer review exercise (see 
below), the incumbent CEO was removed and a new one brought in who was 




In Council A, leadership was described as being “dysfunctional”, typified by a 
political leader and CEO that “didn’t get on at all”. In fact, within the senior 
management team at that time strong allegiances had been formed, with some of 
the senior managers supporting the political leader, and others the CEO. The 
“relationship problems” as they were described, between the political and 
managerial leadership were so bad that one of the senior management team 
members left prior to CPA inspection, knowing that the CPA was likely to be 
weak, and didn’t want to be associated with it.  “He was only xx (age withheld) 
and he wasn’t taking his pension or anything.  He’d had enough”.   
 
Interestingly, despite the presence of what was considered a strong political 
leader of long standing, the CPA inspection criticised Council A for being officer 
led.  This was because the remaining elected members, outside of the elected 
leader, were described as disengaged. 
 
In the third organisation (Council C), problems stemmed from the sheer size of 
the management team. There was a large management team (around 40) (this 
was the same in at least one of the other local authorities as well (Council A)), 
leadership came from the CEO, but decision making was “to an extent chaotic” 
because of the large team of managers all having a direct line into the CEO.  
 
“Management was complex, very much matrix style, where people just reported 
in all over the place. The management structure used to be drawn into bubbles”.  
 
This led to relationship problems.  “The power struggles were quite bad and it 
was whoever’s face fitted at that point in time”.    
 
As such there was no sense of overarching corporate governance, making it 
difficult to plan effectively, indeed no corporate plan existed.  At the time of the 
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first CPA inspection, the interviewee was working as a Head of Finance and their 
job was made difficult due to this lack of governance because “managers would 
be running straight to the Chief Exec if you said something they didn’t like”.  In 
this organisation there was also little engagement from the elected members and 
there was no pre-emptive strike (see below), nor was there any change to the 
leadership either prior to, or in the early years of CPA.  This to an extent 
hampered the recognition of, and solution to, the problem of poor performance, 
which did not start to occur until the third and fourth years of CPA. 
 
This discussion on leadership illustrates a number of aspects also identified in the 
elements by the GLO.  Firstly, political and managerial leadership failings (Behn 
2001, in Pollitt 2003) were both present to some extent in all three organisations.  
However, the overriding sense that comes through regarding the main focus of 
organisational leadership is that it came from the CEO, albeit in one case through 
a close relationship with the elected leader.  The elected members were 
apparently disengaged from the strategic leadership process, leaving this to the 
officers resulting in a lack of appropriate governance (Pollitt 2003, Grace 2006).  
The fire fighting and disjointed nature of the officer leadership in at least two of 
the organisations also exposed weaknesses in the leadership skills of the 
management teams and CEOs, ultimately, in one case at least, directly leading to 
the removal of the CEO.  Furthermore, the relationship aspect of the leadership 
element identified by the GLO also comes through as an underlying issue in the 
case studies.  In some cases this is represented by a lack of understanding of the 
respective roles, particularly from the elected members, and in others there 
appears to have been a complete relationship breakdown between elected leader 
and CEO. 
 
This ineffective leadership, both officer and member, came through as the 
overriding reason behind the poor organisational performance as it had allowed 
the other symptoms, discussed below, to emerge and fester. 
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“It wasn’t government funding or anything of that nature…(or)…issues that were 
coming from the public.  It wasn’t that. Internally we needed to improve. We’d 
got poor corporate management. We’d got a lack of strategic direction”.   
 
The Pre-emptive Strike  
 
In two of the councils peer/self assessment exercises took place prior to CPA.  In 
both cases this was instigated by second tier management and below rather than 
being driven by the elected leader and/or CEO.  This has been described as a pre-
emptive strike, but as will be seen the approach adopted and outcomes achieved 
were markedly different. 
 
In Council B, the IDeA (Improvement and Development Agency) was invited to 
come into the council and undertake a Peer Review exercise prior to the first CPA 
inspection.  This was because a number of middle ranking senior officers were 
concerned that organisational performance and moral were poor and that a 
number of key strategic processes were missing, eg there being no corporate plan 
in place, single issue leadership and a general lack of confidence.  This exercise of 
“holding up a mirror” to the organisation was a useful but “pretty painful process, 
as at the end of the day we got a report that was pretty damning”.  Ultimately 
this led to the removal of the CEO prior to the first actual CPA inspection, possibly 
contributing to an ‘improved’ initial CPA score of ‘weak’.   
 
In Council A, a self assessment based on the CPA key lines of enquiry was 
undertaken 6 months prior to the CPA assessment itself, again at the instigation 
of the some of the middle ranking senior officers within the organisation. 
Following the self-assessment, the local authority awarded itself a score of fair, 
which was the middle category of CPA.  In actual fact, the council subsequently 
recorded a score of “weak” in its first CPA inspection, one category below that 
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which it had self-assessed at.  No action was taken in between the self-
assessment and the actual CPA inspection, with the “fair” score considered a 
reasonable place to be starting out from.  
 
What is interesting is the contrast between the two organisational approaches. 
Firstly, one review was undertaken by external peers and the other undertaken 
internally by the “extended management team”, which included the heads of 
service.  This demonstrates a number of the elements identified through the GLO 
interview including a contrast between the level of potential insularity within the 
two organisations as well as the presence of denial.  
 
In Council B there was enough self-awareness of the situation in some quarters to 
instigate the peer review in the first place, thereby showing a lack of insularity 
and a willingness to look outside the organisation.  However, this was driven from 
the middle ranks of the organisation, there still being a lack of self-awareness at 
the higher levels.  This translated into leadership denial when the IDeA’s poor 
result was reported.  The IDeA were regarded by the leadership as “just a bunch 
of amateurs, they don’t know what they’re doing”.  In Council A, a lack of self-
awareness linked to both insularity and denial is typified by the internal nature of 
the review and its findings being a whole category below the subsequent actual 
CPA score.  In this organisation, the sense was that the ‘mock’ CPA review had 
been done as a reasonable part of the process, rather than being done to “hold 
up a mirror” as in the first organisation.  
 
In both organisations however, it is interesting that despite the presence of 
strong and dysfunctional leadership at the top, managers lower down the 
organisation were still able to bring about the pre-emptive reviews in the first 
place, which runs counter to some of the literature around capability and capacity 
(Turner et al 2004, Turner and Whiteman, 2005) and permanently failing 
organosations (Jas and Skelcher, 2005) 
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CPA as a Catalyst for overcoming Denial? 
 
It was clearly apparent from the interviews with the local authorities that CPA 
acted as a catalyst for improvement in all three organisations, although to 
differing degrees.  In Council B, the pre-emptive strike had led to the 
replacement of the CEO one year prior to the formal CPA inspection.  A lot of 
work had been done during the intervening 12 months to try and correct the 
organisation, yet the initial CPA result was still “weak”.  In Council A, there was 
denial that there was a problem prior to the CPA inspection. In both 
organisations, for different reasons, the response to the announcement was one 
of shock and surprise.  For instance,  
 
“The initial view of the cabinet and the corporate management team was aghast”  
(Council B) 
 
and similarly,  
 
“it was a quite difficult meeting because, I have to say, our members didn’t 




“the organisation was shocked by the CPA result.  There was a sense of shock, 
there was a sense of shame, a sense of disbelief” (Council B).   
 
However, the poor performance identified by the CPA inspections allowed there to 
be a focus on improvement which was put to good use by the organisational 
leadership, in both cases, resulting ultimately in new leadership appointments.  In 
Council A, CPA was described as a “catalyst” for change.   In Council B, the CPA 
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regime was an enabling force for the newly appointed CEO, helping to provide the 
focus needed for change to occur.  
 
“From the [new] CEO’s perspective it was the best thing that could have 
happened because it rallied the troops in a way that nothing else could have 
done”.  (Council B) 
 
And again, “the initial trigger was the CPA score.  After that it was about self-
awareness and where we wanted to be. Once we’d started on this journey of 
improvement it became infectious”. 
 
Councils A and B were able to use the poor CPA score as a galvanising event 
(Moss-Kanter, 1983) to un-freeze the organisation (Lewin, 1947) and set about 
trying to change things.  These two aspects are interesting in there own right, but 
what was also evident was the pride and enthusiasm conveyed by the 
interviewees regarding the ownership that the staff, management and members 
within the organisation felt they had in both wanting to improve and being able to 
achieve it.  This sense of pride had not existed prior to CPA. 
 
Conversely for Council C, the CPA regime did not act as the direct or only trigger 
for improvement.  The organisation remained weak during the early years of CPA 
and only started to improve part way through the process following a change in 
political leadership who then removed the incumbent CEO and, after a period with 
an interim, appointed a new permanent CEO.  This is discussed further in a later 
section.  However, what was evident from this interview was that despite the 
time delay, without the CPA acting as an external threat to the organisation, 
change was unlikely to have occurred in the way that it did. 
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Organisational Outlook and Governance 
 
The first thing to say briefly in this section is that all three organisations were run 
by longstanding Labour administrations.  This is merely an observation of the 
three organisations studied and not necessarily an underlying reason for poor 
performance as some Labour administrations also ran good and excellent 
performing local authorities throughout the CPA regime (Murphy, Greenhalgh and 
Jones 2011).  What is more interesting is that two Council’s, A and B, were 
described as having been at the time of CPA traditional, old school Labour by the 
interviewees, where-as Council C is described as being entrepreneurial in outlook. 
 
Taking the local authority described as entrepreneurial first, what was different 
about this organisation was that prior to CPA the leadership had set out to create 
an organisation focussed on customer service and flexibility.  This had resulted in 
a matrix style organisational structure and an outlook that, at least within the 
upper echelons of the management team, sought to improve conditions for local 
people.  It had even embarked upon a leadership development programme for 
young “leadership talent” within the organisation, which was referred to as 
“capacity building”.  However, what became apparent from the interview was that 
there was a perceived lack of corporate skills and abilities, structures and 
processes to carry it out this ambition.  Three times in the interview this was 
referred to as a lack of “organisational maturity”.  There was no sense of 
governance within the organisation making it difficult for it to gel, with an 
apparent lack of boundaries and rules for officers to work within.    The CEO was 
described as not valuing the input that the professions (finance, audit and back 
office) could have to decision-making.  These services had been marginalized and 
held no power or respect within the organisation. This led to decisions being 
taken on the whim of the service directors, in audience with the CEO, rather than 
being properly thought through in line with the organisation’s strategic direction.  
The organisation was described as being “maverick” and the period of the early 
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years of CPA were referred to as “crazy times”.  The emphasis on lack of 
organisational maturity by the interviewee, gives the sense of an organisation 
that was setting itself laudable objectives, but which would never be able to 
achieve them due to the ineffective way in which it was structured, controlled and 
managed. 
 
For the councils described as old-school labour (Councils A and B), leadership 
played out very differently in the two organisations despite the elected Leaders of 
both organisations at the time of CPA being long standing elected officials with a 
history of militancy.  In one organisation there was a cosy relationship between 
the two fulcrums of leadership (elected leader and CEO), but in the other there 
was a sense of all out war.  In both organisations, views of the external needs of 
the populous tended to be tied up in the view that “we (the elected members) 
know best”, and this was to some extent mirrored by the officers as well.   
 
For Councils A and B, the organisational outlook was also “old fashioned”.  There 
was little or no awareness of the need to work with other public service providers 
to set standards and deliver services.  Working in partnership for Council B was 
seen as an anathema, something that had been tried in the past but which had 
not worked and was therefore not to be countenanced again.  
 
Much of the success in turnaround for Councils A and B was based on improved 
and innovative approaches to partnership working and the use of information 
technology (IT) to underpin both front line and support service activities.  When 
asked if such approaches would have been adopted in the years leading up to 
CPA, there was an unequivocal no from both organisations.  What came through 
from Councils A and B, in contrast to that of Council C, was that there was a lack 
of ambition at the time of CPA to go beyond the traditional ways of working and 
service delivery.  However, there was a similarity in that all three organisations 
could be said to have displayed organisational immaturity.  The first has been 
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dealt with in the previous section, in that it lacked the organisational capacity and 
capability to carry out its ambitions.  With the latter two, the lack of maturity 
allowed the organisations to stagnate rather than develop and grow in line with 
their wider environmental requirements, both at a local and governmental level. 
 
This lack of maturity in all three organisations seemed to stem in each case from 
a lack of suitable governance, resulting in each falling short of the basic 
requirements needed to anchor an organisation within its environmental needs.  
In the eyes of the respective interviewees at least, all three organisations lacked 
what were regarded as the fundamental building blocks to effective governance; 
namely strategic/corporate planning mechanisms and performance management 
systems.  None of the three organisations produced a corporate plan at the time 
of CPA.  This is surprising, as it would seem to be a basic requirement of any 
organisation that it knows where it is going and this is usually encapsulated 
within a corporate plan.  Also, local authorities are required to produce a number 
of annual plans as part of their legal duty to provide best value.  Never-the- less, 
each organisation was criticised under the first CPA inspection for not having a 
corporate plan in place.   
 
Similarly, there were no performance management systems used by the 
organisations to assess their own performance.  Budget monitoring took place, as 
did the reporting of national KPIs, but these were not translated into effective 
internal performance monitoring systems.  Indeed, according to the interviewees, 
such systems appear to have been regarded in some organisational quarters as 
unnecessary bureaucracy, rather than being seen as a way of contributing to 
organisational performance.  Also, in two of the organisations there was a 
traditionally bureaucratic organisational structure, which, despite the size of the 
corporate management teams at the time, still tended to be highly centralised 
with little or no delegation.  This manifested itself variously in “a lack of trust”, 
“micro-management” and a “silo mentality”.  Decision-making seems to have 
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been based on at best partial and chaotic information and at worst was focussed 
on maintaining the status quo and not “rocking the boat”. 
 
This discussion of the three organisations so far, shows a number of the elements 
identified by the GLO.  The lack of maturity evident in all three is symptomatic of 
a lack of corporate capability and capacity, ineffective leadership styles, denial 
and insularity.  The lack of performance measurement systems is also 
symptomatic of service failure, as not knowing how a service is performing would 
be a major contributory factor to it performing badly, or at least not performing 
as well as it could do.  Much of this is tied up in the organisations having poor, or 
inadequate, organisational structures.  Structural organisational responses to 
poor performance occurred post CPA in all three organisations but at different 
times and for different reasons.  In Council A, the CEO and elected Leader were 
removed from the organisation but not as a direct result of the initial CPA 
inspection.  However, as they were removed for serious flaws in senior leadership 
competence, this probably contributed to the underlying poor performance of that 
organisation.  In Council B, the CEO was removed prior to CPA as a result of a 
peer assessment exercise (see above).  In Council C the incumbent leadership at 
the time of the first CPA inspection (officer and member) stayed on until after the 
local elections one year after the first CPA score was announced. This particular 
issue can be linked to the abnormal factors referred to earlier, related as it was to 
looming local elections that were going to be impacted upon by boundary changes 
meaning that the then ruling party new it would not be the ruling party after the 
elections.  This resulted in a “maverick, gung-ho approach from the members” in 
Council C, effectively delaying the possibility for performance improvement.  In all 
three organisations, it was not until changes for whatever reason had come about 
at the top of the organisations, that restructuring and the introduction of 





From the above discussion identifying a lack of governance within the 
organisations, it is perhaps not surprising that the interviews also brought out a 
sense that each organisation displayed a total lack of organisational awareness 
and understanding.  This aspect is to some extent difficult to pin down, as 
organisations are of course not thinking, living beings in their own right, but are 
rather a collection of people and individuals that together make up what might be 
termed the organisations consciousness.  For an organisation to understand itself, 
is actually to say that the people working within the organisation understand how 
it works, its good points, its failings and where perhaps it sits in relation to its 
peers (if indeed an organisation can be said to have peers).  For the purposes of 
this study, and this section in particular, it is a question of who within the 
organisation was aware of the organisational failings and what information was 
being gathered to assess how the organisation was performing.   
 
As has already been discussed above, there was clearly a lack of self-awareness 
in all three organisations at quite high levels within the leadership. Furthermore, 
the normal corporate governance practices of strategic planning and performance 
management were absent, and this was probably symptomatic of a lack of self-
awareness.  Related to these aspects, a number of other factors were identified in 
the interviews, which it is worth discussing further here.  The two main areas of 
commonality that came out of the interviews were those of customer satisfaction 
and staff satisfaction.  None of the organisations were actively undertaking 
customer satisfaction surveys at the time of the initial CPA inspections and as 
such each lacked any understanding as to how they were perceived by their 
service users.  In this sense, “customer satisfaction” is being used as a term put 
forward independently by each of the interviews when referring to feedback 
gathered from service users, council taxpayers and the local business community.  
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It is clear from the interviews that customer satisfaction surveys are now seen by 
all three organisations as a valuable source of feedback both in terms of 
organisational performance ie ‘how well are we doing?’ but also in terms of 
identifying what services should be provided by the local authority and to what 
intensity and standard ie ‘what should we be doing?’.  As such it is now seen as 
both a planning system and a feedback system.  At the time of the original CPA 
inspection however, it was not undertaken at all.  This is an example of insularity, 
and also could have been borne out of the “we know best” mentality discussed 
earlier.  However, it could also have been due to a fearfulness of what might have 
been discovered, both in terms of how badly the organisation was perceived by 
its service users, and also in terms of the potential consequences for change that 
could have resulted from undertaking such consultation exercises.  This was not 
developed further in the interviews, but is something that can be returned to later 
in Document 5.    
 
In a similar way, staff satisfaction surveys were also not carried in out in two of 
the three organisations, and for these the same comments can be made as for 
the lack of customer satisfaction surveys.  In Council A, staff satisfaction surveys 
were undertaken around the time of the first CPA inspection and the discussion 
on this was quite illuminating.  Two key points arose from the interview.  Firstly, 
that there was a general understanding from the interviewee that at the time of 
the CPA inspection, staff were embarrassed to work for the organisation, and 
indeed “were so embarrassed to be associated with the organisation that they 
used to sneak out the back door”.  The second point is that when the first staff 
satisfaction survey was undertaken, the results were so poor that the then chief 
executive refused to publish them.  In part, this potentially demonstrates a sense 
of shock and embarrassment at the results, each of which could be associated 
with denial. However, failing to publish the results would also send a negative 
message to the staff. Either that the results were so poor that the council must 
by association be a poor employer, or that the management and leadership of the 
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organisation were simply not interested in the outcome of the survey, and 
nothing would come of it.  Later surveys have shown improvements in staff 
satisfaction and have needless to say been published.  Clearly staff satisfaction 
surveys are only one way of engaging with staff and are essentially a data 
gathering exercise. It was apparent from the interviews that other methods of 
engaging with staff, workshops, bulletins, roadshows etc were also not used at 
the time of the first CPA inspection and as such this wider ability to engage with 
staff and communicate in more than one direction was lost. 
 
The lack organisational understanding discussed here also links closely to the GLO 
elements of poor stakeholder management and poor external collaborations.  
Neither the internal nor external stakeholders were effectively engaged with by 
the local authorities prior to CPA resulting in decision-making that was apparently 
divorced from the organisational environment. 
 
 
Dealing with the money 
 
All of the interviewees had held finance related positions within their 
organisations and it is perhaps for this reason that financial management was 
referred to in all three cases.  The aspects discussed in this section relate closely 
to the elements of poor prioritisation and poor financial management identified by 
the GLO, but also link in with other elements such as lack of capability and 
capacity, poor leadership and to an extent insularity.  Two main issues arose from 
the interviews with regard to financial management; financial planning and 
financial control.   
 
Financial planning was referred to in all three organisations as something that 
wasn’t done very effectively at the time of the first CPA inspection.  In two 
organisations there were similar but opposing reasons behind the lack of financial 
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planning.  They were similar in that they both demonstrated a poor ability to 
prioritise financial resources effectively.  However, the symptoms displayed were 
quite different.   
 
In Council A, financial reserves had been accumulated over the years so that at 
the time of the first CPA inspection they were equivalent to one years revenue 
spend.  This means that money was essentially sat idle, rather than being used to 
provide services.  Although local authority finance is a complicated area, the 
impression given in the interview was clearly that in the past, either council tax 
levels had been set too high, or the level of service had been too low to generate 
such year on year surpluses.  In either event, the impact on the local community 
was negative due to poor financial management.  In Council B, council taxes had 
always been set low, mainly as an ideological requirement of the incumbent 
administration.  While there is nothing necessarily wrong with this as a number of 
local authorities aim for low council taxes as a strategic priority, in this case there 
was no consideration of the impact this approach had on service delivery.  The 
council also suffered historically from a low government grant settlement and as 
such its strategy for setting low council taxes effectively starved it of resources.  
This was combined with an inability to prioritise resources within the organisation.  
“the members will tell you what their priorities are until the cows come home, but 
ask the Leader to set out what the main priorities are and he turns his mobile off 
for a month”.   
 
In both these organisations, changes in financial management have subsequently 
been made.  The large reserves of Council A have now been used as part of the 
transformation of the organisation.  As the interviewee said, “needless to say, I 
have now spent the lot”.  Conversely in Council B, successive council tax rises 
have allowed for a balancing of the budget and the creation of a transformation 
reserve for targeted investment in improved services.  Both of the interviewees 
also admitted that historically the organisations had been very poor at tapping 
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into alternative sources of funding.  Such sources would include grants on offer 
either for general improvements or specific purposes, and often require or result 
in collaborative working with other parts of the public sector.  The interviewee 
from Council B described the organisation as now being “more confident at 
applying for funds” than it has in t the early years of CPA.  
 
For Council A, a stark illustration of the problems it faced is given in the following 
example. 
 
“I went to a business transformation meeting and all the other councils in the 
county were there because we had an e-government partnership that had 
secured £2m worth of funding.  Every half an hour that passed in the meeting my 
jaw dropped another half an inch because it was quite obvious that everybody 
else had been meeting for an awful long time and they’d been talking around 
things about customer care and customer access and e-government … because e-
government really drove the transformation of local authorities within the early 
2000s ... and we hadn’t participated………………and I came back and I said to the 
Leader “we’re in trouble with this”.  Everybody else had bought a customer 
relationship management system and they’d had it bought through the e-
government money.  We just said “nah… not really bothered about doing that” 
and at the 31st March the then local government minister said you will do this as 
of right, you will do this by law”. 
 
Through a lack of engagement with this important aspect of transformation, the 
organisation had missed out on the opportunity to get government funding for 
what became a compulsory requirement and therefore had to fund the project 
itself.  Not only is this aspect related to poor financial management, but it is also 
reveals a degree of insularity and lack of corporate capability.  In relation to the 
above point, the interviewee went on to say. 
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“We had an e-government champion, and whoever appointed them had got a 
sense of humour as they couldn’t even switch a computer on.  Its not that you 
need to know.. how to switch it on and work it,  but you need to know the 
capacity of technology and what it will do for your organisation and I don’t think 
they did”.  
 
In Council C, poor financial management was typified by a total lack of control 
both in assigning resources and in controlling them.  Decisions on spending were 
taken without the necessary regard to for appropriate financial process and the 
views of the Director of Finance were not taken into account in decision making.  
As mentioned previously, the professions had effectively been cut out of decision-
making. This was nothing to do with the abilities of the Director of Finance, “he’s 
still in post under the new regime and doing a very good job”, but was more a 
function of the chaotic management structure under the then CEO.  Furthermore, 
there was a tendency to overspend service budgets within this organisation, 
without regard to the potential overall financial position.  This aspect was not 








This chapter summarises the main findings that emerged from the four interviews 
undertaken as part of this research.  The findings are grouped together according 
to common themes, rather than taken on an interview-by-interview basis.  The 
themes identified are as follows: 
 
• Theme 1 – Resources; the problem or the solution? 
• Theme 2 – Leadership; wrong type, wrong direction or just wrong? 
• Theme 3 – Not knowing; head in the sand, arrogance or ignorance? 
• Theme 4 – The role of middle management; seeing it coming 
• Theme 5 – Abnormal Circumstance; Cause or Effect? 
• Theme 6 – The CPA; Trigger, or Carrot and Stick?  
 
An initial attempt to link the findings back to the literature review is also 
undertaken although this will be explored further in the final thesis.  To assist 
with this the conceptual framework for the literature review (Aspects of Strategic 
Turnaround) is given in Appendix D. As this part of the research focuses on 
interpreting what were perceived by the interviewees to be the underlying 
reasons for poor performance, the conceptual framework is not wholly applicable 
dealing as it does with the full turnaround cycle.  However, in the sense that 
recognising failure is ‘ground zero’ of the turnaround process, it is a useful start 
point for interpreting the findings of the interviews ex-post (inductively) against 
established theories. The shaded boxes in Appendix D represent those aspects of 
the conceptual framework/literature that are thought to have been reflected in 
the interviews.   
 
The main issue with writing the conclusions is where to start.  A number of 
findings were observed from the data collected in the interviews and it has been 
possible to group these findings together to give an account of the situation 
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facing the organisations at the start of the CPA process.  The findings are not 
treated in order of importance, as all are equally useful observations.  What is 
more striking is that the stories told by the three interviewees in the local 
authorities, and that of the government lead official, did display a high degree of 
commonality.  The number of organisations observed is small at only three, and 
even though the GLO had a wider experience of both the process of CPA and the 
range of organisations, this additional contribution is limited as it is only the 
viewpoint of one individual – other GLOs may have had different experiences and 
perspectives, which may have resulted in a different set of findings being 
developed.  
 
Never the less, the four interviews did show a degree of commonality in many 
respects that can be taken as a measure of triangulation, and hence ecological 
validity, from which generalisation can be made.  Indeed, of the three 
organisations examined, Councils A and B showed similar traits internally, and to 
an extent mirrored what had been identified externally by the GLO, whereas 
Council C followed a different journey.  Despite this, even Council C shared, at a 
basic level, some of the same perceived flaws experienced by the other two. It is 
also important to recognise that all of the interviewees were addressing the wider 
issue of strategic turnaround and as such the observations made here could only 
be said to be generalisable to other turnaround organisations.  Those 
organisations that remained relatively poorly performing, or those where 
performance declined, may have offered up alternate accounts of what was 
perceived to lie behind poor performance.  It would be interesting as part of a 






Theme 1 – Resources; the problem or the solution? 
 
A useful starting point is the observation that a lack of resources was not held to 
be the main problem facing the organisations as a reason for poor performance, 
although it was often included in the discourse of such organisations prior to CPA.  
What came across from the interviews was a sense that at the start of the CPA 
process the rhetoric from local authorities “justifying” poor organisational 
performance, was that an appropriate additional injection of resources would 
have allowed them to be better organisations.  With the benefit of hindsight 
however, the local authority interviewees now recognised that this was not the 
main problem, nor one that could not be easily overcome. Indeed, for one 
organisation the financial problem encountered was that resources had been 
squirreled over the years, rather than employed in improving services.  
 
The repertory grid findings indicated that from the GLO’s perspective, finance was 
very much within an organisations’ control to manage and prioritise and this was 
essentially a simple process. The need to reprioritise resources, and also 
recognise that financial constraints were part of the environment that needed to 
be managed, came across as being a failing arising from poor strategic 
management and leadership which, if dealt with properly, could be overcome 
quite simply.    
 
In this theme therefore there was a high degree of independent triangulation 
from both within and between the internal and external perspectives that a lack 
of resources was not the cause of organisational poor performance.  Rather it was 
the ineffective use of resources available, and their deployment through other 




Theme 2 – Leadership; wrong type, wrong direction or just wrong? 
 
The main theme arising here is that the strategic leadership of the organisations 
that were failing appeared to play a significant part in contributing towards poor 
performance in the first place. The sense conveyed in theme 1 that an 
organisation’s problems were of its management’s own making, and was 
something that could be managed out of, was also reflected in non-financial 
issues such as a lack of organisational and environmental awareness and a lack of 
stakeholder engagement. Such processes were typically under the organisational 
management’s own control but were let down by lack of strategic leadership and 
management skills which included a lack of appropriate capability and capacity, 
something also borne out by the literature (Turner et al 2004, Turner and 
Whiteman 2005).   
 
Two of the three organisations studied were typified by traditional and long-
standing approaches to leadership resulting in an intransigence to change.  Even 
the one organisation that sought to be at the “leading edge” found itself to be 
overstretched, without the necessary strategic capability and leadership abilities 
to manage these aspirations.   
 
Common to all four interviews, was the inherent lack of any process that could be 
construed as strategic planning at the start of the CPA regime.  This absence 
resulted in organisations missing out on the wider picture of both opportunities 
(eg funding and partnering) and threats (at the extreme even including a 
perception that if ignored, the CPA would at some point go away), and was rooted 
in a “we know best” attitude.   
 
Furthermore, the relationship between CEO and Elected Leader was key and could 
be equally problematic if too cosy or if too adversarial, as this diverted focus 
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away from a strategic organisational awareness.  This extended to respective 
expectations of the management team (officers) and elected members, with 
members being presented as being disengaged from the leadership and 
management of the organisation and organisations being described as officer led 
rather than member led, a key finding from the literature (Joyce 2001, 2004, 
Mordaunt and Cornforth 2004).   
 
Another term often used in the local authority interviews was “dysfunctional”, 
relating both to management/member relationships and structures, as well as the 
interface between the organisation and its partners and /or key stakeholders eg 
Government, other public bodies and service users. This also links to a lack of 
leadership adaptability (Parry 1999). Dysfunctional Leadership can be seen as a 
generic term encompassing many of the elements arising from the GLO interview. 
 
Theme 3 – Not knowing; head in the sand, arrogance or ignorance? 
 
This may seem an oversimplification and, to some extent, an obvious observation 
to make.  However, it is significant that it was not recognised by the top 
leadership of the organisations at the time of the initial CPA inspections that the 
organisations were poorly performing, but only ex-post.  This is also symptomatic 
of many of the problems asserted by the GLO and cuts across other elements 
raised in that particular interview such as insularity and denial, as well as poor 
collaborations and stakeholder management.  It also mirrors one of the key 
findings in the literature review that failing local authorities lacked the cognition 
to recognise there was a problem in the first place and as such were unable to set 
about correcting it (Turner et al 2004, Turner and Whiteman 2005). 
 
Linked to this aspect was the lack of any engagement with organisational 
stakeholders, whether these were external or internal.  Customer and staff 
satisfaction surveys as a way of gathering feedback were scarcely used, and 
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rarely reported on.  Prior to CPA, such surveys were dismissed and not highly 
regarded. It can be speculated that this may have been due to a sense of fear by 
organisational leadership that the findings would burst the bubble that nothing 
was wrong, or maybe the endemic insularity commonly portrayed meant they did 
not even appear on the radar of those in charge.  Whatever the reasons, the lack 
of use resulted in a corresponding lack of organisational awareness as to what 
could be improved and how.  Similarly, organisational leadership was reported as 
being confused, chaotic and complex and in any event dysfunctional or 
inappropriate and there was a strong sense of their being a lack of willingness to 
look to other organisations/partnerships for ideas.  It was also apparent that 
leadership, flawed though it was, operated in a top down, exclusive fashion 
symptomatic of a “we know best” attitude.  This kind of entrenchment was 
described by Meyer and Zucker (1989) as permanently failing and as 
organisational inertia by Shaw (1981) and is typical in the literature of poorly 
performing organisations. 
 
Theme 4 – The role of middle management; seeing it coming 
 
Interestingly, the interviews with local authorities identified that there was an 
awareness that strategic management problems existed by those lower down the 
managerial (officer) ranks, prompting what have been described as pre-emptive 
strikes prior to the initial CPA inspections to raise awareness and lay the 
groundwork for changes that needed to be made.  This finding adapts and builds 
on the theory that organisations can be classified as permanently failing, as 
identified by Jas and Skelcher (2005) and discussed in the literature review 
(document 2).  However, the findings of this research suggest that internal 
organisational behaviour is perhaps more complex and that “permanently failing” 
as a label probably applies more to the top organisational leadership rather than 
the latent potential that exists within the organisation – ie people need to be 
given a voice and opportunity to apply themselves and/or develop and grow, a 
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finding also identified by Paton and Mordaunt (2004). The CPA regime through 
identifying poorly performing organisations, and by implication organisational 
leadership, appears to have allowed this internal latent potential to emerge from 
within the organisations.  It will be interesting to see if this is borne out in the 
analysis of turnaround processes in the final thesis.   
 
Theme 5 – Abnormal Circumstance; Cause or Effect? 
 
An issue raised by the GLO which did not appear in the literature review and 
conceptual framework was that of abnormal circumstances.  The local authority 
interviews demonstrated that these were often present at the time of the first 
CPA inspection, but it is difficult to speculate as to whether these were on their 
own the route causes of poor performance.  Such circumstances may have 
contributed to the paucity of strategic leadership or could have been brought on 
by the lack of capability.  Furthermore, the presence of such abnormal 
circumstances took up time and resources to solve within the organisation and 
were a distraction that made it difficult for recognition that there was an 
underlying bigger problem.  Similarly, they could also have exacerbated denial 
and intransigence through overloading. 
 
Linked to this is the finding from the local authority and GLO interviews that poor 
performance was often linked to there being multiple failings occurring within the 
organisation. Again, cause and effect is difficult to judge at this stage.  Were 
these multiple failings caused by the paucity of leadership, or did effective 




Theme 6 – The CPA; Trigger, or Carrot and Stick? 
 
Another finding of the research was that the CPA process was specifically referred 
to as a “trigger” by the local authority interviewees, without which subsequent 
change would not have occurred. The term trigger was used in the sense of a 
catalyst for change; both to recognise that there was a problem in the first place 
and then to go on and do something about it.  The CPA was particularly useful it 
seems in identifying that the organisation was poorly performing, overcoming 
internal denial to this revelation, as well as providing a trigger to work more 
collaboratively and to bring out the latent potential referred to in theme 4.  Denial 
was referred to in all four of the interviews as were issues regarding insularity.  It 
could be inferred from this that organisational leadership did not have the where-
with-all to look outside the traditional approaches they had employed. In the 
literature this cuts across the ideas of the success fallacy (Jas and Skelcher 2005) 
as well as stress/threat rigidity (Shaw 1981).   
 
In summary, a number of key findings have resulted from the inductive 
qualitative analysis including the development of ten elements that contributed to 
poor performance from the GLO’s perspective and a further 6 themes from the 
local authority interviews.  These findings have, in some respects, shown some 
similarity to the findings of the literature review and also across and within the 
external and internal perspectives analysed through the GLO and local authority 
interviews respectively.  From a critical realism perspective therefore, some 
generalisations can be made about the possible causes of poor performance in 
turnaround local authorities.   
 
Poor strategic leadership capability and capacity, an insular approach to problem 
solving and a “we know best” top down approach to management significantly 
undermined organisational ability to recognise poor performance and take steps 
to correct it. This was typified by chaotic and dysfunctional management 
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structures and poor stakeholder awareness and management. The CPA regime 
acted as a trigger for overcoming both the lack of organisational self awareness 
and denial, although there appeared to be some awareness lower down 
organisational management structures that all was not well.  Also poor 
organisations were typified by a lack of elected member engagement in strategic 
leadership.  Finance, or lack of it, was not an underlying cause of poor 
performance but rather it was the inability to prioritise resources effectively, due 
to the impact of this poor strategic capability that contributed to poor 
performance. Finally, it is striking that although external pressures clearly 
contributed to the state of affairs, the underlying problems were largely under the 
control of the organisational management.  If these underlying leadership and 
management problems had been resolved earlier, then not only would 
organisations potentially have not been regarded as poorly performing, but also 








DBA - Document 3 
 





For use with Senior officials within turnaround councils. 
 
At this stage (Doc 3) the interviews are focused on officers only. Elected 




The general purpose of the interview is to gather evidence from senior officers 
on the strategic turnaround process and its sustainability.  The findings will be 
linked back to the conceptual framework from the literature and the findings of 
document 4 on specific councils with further research being undertaken into the 
inspection reports of each council. 
 
The interview is semi-structured and is intended to be as free flowing as possible 
at this stage to allow the official to tell the story of their council’s turnaround. 
 
The general structure is based as follows: 
 
Pre-CPA inspection – (reasons, announcement, reaction,)- 15 minutes 
During the turnaround – (what and how and when) – 30 minutes 
Post-final inspection – (announcement, reaction, current environment)- 15 
Minutes 
 




Interviews will be confidential 
 
Interviews will be recorded if acceptable to the interviewee 
 
 
While the interviews are intended to be free flowing and story telling, the 
following prompts have been devised to give the story a beginning, middle and 
end and to manage the time available. 
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Pre-Initial CPA Announcement 
 
• What were the main causes of poor performance 
o As per the CPA inspection 
o As viewed from within the council 
  
• Prior to the announcement did the council perceive itself to be poorly 
performing? 
o Was there a different view between officers and members 
  
• In the period leading up to the inspection how would you describe the stability of 
the council 
o Political control 
o Officer/member relations 
o Leadership (where did this come from?) 
  
• Did the CPA act as the trigger for improvement and if so why? 
  




o Leadership  
 
During Turnaround Process 
 
•  To what extent was intervention used throughout the turnaround process 
 
• Was the level of intervention supportive/useful/inhibitive? 
  
• How easy was it for the council to come to terms with the need to turnaround 
o Timescale 
o Key players 
o Denial v Ownership 
  
• What were the key milestones/critical incidents that stood out for you during 
the turnaround process (linked to point below) 
 
• What strategic processes were changed or introduced to bring about the 
required turnaround (spend time on this aspect as it covers a lot of ground) 
  
• How did the outlook of the council change when deciding to turnaround 
 
• Who do you feel led the turnaround process (individual or group)  
 
• How would you describe this leadership approach 
 
 
• Which of the following words would you associate with the turnaround process 
(could be extremes or a mix of both): 
o Operational or strategic 
o Retrenchment or renewal 
o Replacement or realignment 
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o Permanently failing or self correcting 
o External trigger or internal trigger 
o Singularity of approach or duality of approach 
o Box ticking or embedded change 
o Intervention or engagement 
o Turnaround or revitalisation 
o Internal causes or external causes 
  
 
• To what extent were the changes you have made targeted at sustainable 
improvement 
 
• To what extent did you face/overcome issues of strategic capability and capacity 
  
Post-Final CPA Announcement 





• Environmental changes have occurred since the revised assessment, 
what are the key strategic challenges now facing the council?  
 
 
• Following the revised assessment, to what extent will the changes you have 
made to the running of the council support or inhibit your ability to respond 




Are you willing to be involved in the interviews for the final part of the 
study which is intended to review specific case study councils in more 
depth? 
 
What animal and car would you use to describe the nature of the council: 
• Pre-initial announcement 
• During turnaround process 
• Post-final announcement 
 





Using the repertory grid to undertake a semi-structured interview of 
a “key informant”  
(adapted from Jankowicz 2005) 
 
 
The repertory grid is semi-structured interview technique that allows the 
interviewee to identify a range of elements associated with/important to a 
particular topic, compare them and come up with a range of perceptions 
against which the elements can be scored, for example how could one or 
more elements be regarded as similar or different from the others.  In this 
way the interviewee’s own personal understanding can be elicited from 
the interview directly, rather than being guided/constrained by the 
interviewer’s own understanding of the topic.  
 
Once identified, the elements may be interpreted in groups of three as a 
sequential triadic. 
 
The process involves four stages: 
 
• Agree the subject matter under discussion – The Topic 
• Identify a range of components relevant to the topic – The Elements 
• Identify opinions/view points relevant to the elements 
• The rating of elements on constructs 
 
The first part of the interview requires the production of the repertory grid 
itself.  In the second part of the interview, the grid will be used to score the 
various aspects under consideration. 
 
The Topic is contributing factors to sustainable turnaround in failing 
local authorities using CPA as the measure of relative weak performance 
versus excellent performance 
 
The Elements should be those aspects/issues/processes etc that contributed 
to improved and sustained performance.  They may also be reasons 
for/causes of underlying poor performance.  They do not have to be 
homogenous to all situations and could relate to one, some or all situations.  
A wide range of elements can be used (for example 10 and above) 
 
Three elements will then be compared in turn, identifying what makes two of 
them similar and the third different.  This can be in any order within the 
three elements.  We then need to agree on a form of words that shows the 
opposite ends of this similarity. A simple example would be extremely 
effective versus extremely non-effective.  This will then be used as a rating 
scale against which all elements will be measured in the second part of the 
interview.  
 
Once all elements have been dealt with in this a way and a range of 
viewpoints have been identified, each element will be assessed against 
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1 Multiple and complex issues involved 1 5 2 5 3 2 2 1 4 5 Simple issues involved 2 3 1 1 3 5 2.5
2 Difficult to quality assure (complex sources of info) 1 1 2 5 2 2 4 1 4 5
Easy to quality assure 
(available evidence) 3 3 0 2 2 1 2
3 Prevents/Inhibits 
recovery 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 1 2 3
Promotes/contributes to 
recovery 2 3 5 0 0 3 2.5
4 Outside organisational 
control 3 4 1 4 5 3 4 5 5 5
Within organisational 
control 1 0 2 3 4 5 4
5 Long term solutions 
necessary 3 4 1 5 4 3 4 3 4 3
Short term solutions 
possible 1 0 4 4 1 3 3.5
6 Problems are unique to individual organisations 3 4 1 2 2 4 2 5 5 4
Problems are generic 
across organisations 1 3 1 3 2 4 3.5
7 Multi-disciplinary issue (matrix) 1 1 4 1 3 3 3 2 2 5
Single professional 
discipline (silos) 3 2 3 1 1 1 2.5
8
Multiple and several 
authority and 
responsibility
4 5 3 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 Direct/individual control 
over outcomes
0 0 2 5 3 4 4
9 Multiple and complex 
responses required 2 2 2 5 5 4 3 1 3 4
Simple responses 
required 1 3 2 2 2 2 3
10 Intransigent Organisation 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 2 3 Continually changing 
organisation 2 4 4 0 0 2 2
REPARATORY GRID - CAUSES OF POOR LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE
Frequency




Aspects of Strategic Turnaround (From Document 2) 
LEADERSHIP APPROACH STRATEGIC APPROACH TURNAROUND APPROACH 
 










Polarised Holistic Retrenchment Renewal 












































Incremental Prioritisation Intervention Engagement 
Dictatorship Facilitating 
 
Enforced Owned Turnaround Revitalisation 
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This study undertakes a quantitative analysis of the available data surrounding the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) of English Local Authorities in order to 
identify possible turnaround characteristics within those authorities that were identified 
as either poorly performing or failing.  This document forms part of a wider Doctoral 
study into sustained turnaround in English Local Government and will contribute 
towards the development of a final thesis of the key issues that can affect and promote 
sustained turnaround within the sector. 
 
The Doctorate of Business Administration (DBA) to which this study contributes is part 
of a structured programme offered by Nottingham Business School.  Under the DBA 
programme a series of studies are required including a structured analysis, a 
quantitative analysis and a final thesis.  Ordinarily, the qualitative analysis is scheduled 
to take place before the structured analysis.  In this case however it has been decided 
that it will be more beneficial to the whole project to undertake the structured analysis 
first.  The main reason for this is that the overall purpose of the DBA study is to 
examine a number of case study organisations that have exhibited sustained 
turnaround characteristics under the CPA regime in order to establish the underlying 
reasons for this. A large dataset exists within the Audit Commission of publicly 
available data, tracking the performance of every English local authority under CPA.  It 
would make sense therefore to analyse this data set first, before undertaking the in 
depth case studies, which will themselves be more qualitative in nature.  The benefits 
of undertaking the structured analysis first are deemed to be as follows: 
 
• A greater understanding of the CPA process, and its development/changes over 




• A greater understanding of the scope, range, types and nature of turnaround 
within local government can be established  
 
• Trends in the data set can be used to identify potential areas/phenomena to 
examine further in the case studies 
 
• Suitable organisations can be identified within which the case studies can take 
place 
 
This study will use publicly available information to compile a dataset upon which 
analysis will be undertaken.  The analysis itself will be tiered on three levels, drilling 
down from the high-level headline analysis to a more detailed analysis of 
interesting organisations that meet the scope and requirements of this study.  The 




• A high level analysis of the main trends within the Audit Commission CPA 
dataset and the identification of local authorities displaying turnaround 
characteristics 
 
• A more detailed analysis of the relationships existing within the data sets for 
those groups of local authorities exhibiting turnaround characteristics  
 
• Specific analysis of individual local authorities that display turnaround 
characteristics  
 
The document will refer to the literature review undertaken previously in Document 2 
and update this where appropriate.  It will also discuss the methodological issues 
 6 
 
associated with undertaking this particular research study and consider the 
development of the CPA regime over its seven- year life and any impacts this may 
have on the methodological approach to this study. 
 
With regard to the methodology of the research study, it has been necessary to 
undertake a historical analysis of changes to the various CPA frameworks applied by 
the Audit Commission over the life of CPA.  This has been done by reviewing the 
published framework documents and the Scores and Analysis reports published by the 
Audit Commission as well as undertaking a number of interviews with the Director of 
Local Government Practice (a senior civil servant), who was in post during the full 
lifecycle of the CPA.  This will be explained later in the document. 
 
The objectives of this study are to undertake a structured analysis on the CPA datasets 
of the Audit Commission between 2002 and 2008 in order to establish: 
 
• A range of local authorities exhibiting turnaround characteristics under the 
CPA framework that could form the basis of a future qualitative study into  
the processes of turnaround within English local authorities; and 
 
• A range of lines of enquiry that could be used to form the basis of the 
qualitative analysis referred to above. 
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Background to Local Government Performance Measurement 
 
Local government represents a unique environment with its own rules, regulations, 
structures and funding arrangements (Wilson and Game 2006).  The formal structure 
of Local Government seen today can trace its statutory origins back to the mid 19th 
Century with the 1832 Electoral Reform Act, the 1834 Poor Law Reform and, 
significantly, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act (Chandler 2007).  It is perhaps the 
election of local councillors that is one of the defining characteristics of local 
government (Rhodes 1988, Stewart 2000) and separates it not only from the private 
sector, but also other domains within the public sector (Rhodes 1988, Leach 2006, 
Pratchett 2004).  Wilson and Game (2006 p 93) define local Government today as a 
“semi-independent, politically decentralised, multifunctional body created by and 
exercising responsibilities conferred by Parliament”.   
 
Local authorities are complex organisations (Worral et al 1998).  They provide 
multifunctional, and to an extent unrelated, services to the general public for example 
in the form of education, highways and planning, and also to the neediest members of 
society, for example council housing and social care. This complexity of structure, 
linked to the locus of power within the sector and, over time, the development of 
professionalisation, make it difficult to manage the strategic process (Whittington and 
Stacey 1994, Worral et al 1998).  Overlaid with this are the modernisation changes 
implemented generally across the public sector in an attempt to improve the 
management of the sector through the introduction of private sector management 
techniques (Cochrane 1993, Dereli 2003, Diamond and Liddle 2005, Flynn and Talbot 
1996, Pollitt 2003, Worral et al 1998).  Such changes included New Public Management 
(NPM), the creation of executive agencies, the introduction of internal markets as well 
as compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) and league tables (Barlow and Rober 1996, 
Pidd 2005, Pollitt 2003, Wilson and Game 2006).  Many of these changes were 
designed to make the public services, and therefore also local government, consider 
 8 
 
the very nature of how and why services were provided.  This is sometimes referred to 
as Steering and not Rowing (Barlow and Rober 1996, Osborne and Gaebler 1993), 
meaning that public sector organisations should not automatically provide services 
directly themselves, but should enable services to be provided by the best means 
possible, whether this includes the private sector or voluntary sectors as the service 
delivery vehicle.    
 
The Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) was introduced in 2001 to build on 
the Best Value regime that had been introduced by the 1998 White Paper and 
enshrined in the 1999 Local Government (Best Value) Act.  CPA is the process by which 
the Audit Commission carried out its duty under Section 99 of the Local Government 
Act 2003 to independently monitor, report and specifically categorize local authorities 
according to their performance (Audit Commission 2006).  CPA involved a review of 
local authority performance, resulting in the publication of scores, and supporting 
reports, to show the relative performance of authorities nationally. These reviews 
involved a combination of inspection by the Audit Commission, peer assessment as 
well as the evaluation of National Key Performance Indicators and reports by other 
independent inspectorates that exist to provide assurances on public service provision 
in key service areas such as OFSTED, the Commission for Social Care Inspection 
(CSCI) and the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate. The CPA was considered comprehensive in 
that reviews covered all aspects of a local authority’s functions including service 
provision, corporate strategic and management processes and the use of resources. 
Interestingly, the introduction of the CPA framework and assessments required no 
primary legislation as it developed out of the Best Value requirements enshrined in the 
Local Government Act 1999.  However, following a number of legal challenges from 
some quarters contending that the CPA framework was outside the scope of the 1999 
Act, it was retrospectively made the subject of primary legislation and is covered by 
the Local Government Act 2003 (Grace 2006).  Following its introduction, the CPA 
evolved in response to changes in the operational and regulatory environment, rising 
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public expectations and the performance of Local Government itself (Audit Commission 
2006).  The way in which the CPA methodology evolved over time will be considered 
later in the document, as will the impact this will have on the research design of the 
quantitative analysis. 
 
The CPA was in operation for seven years between April 2002 and March 2009.   The 
Government’s White Paper on Local Government (2006) proposed a significant 
overhaul to the nature and scope of the regime and this has resulted in the 
introduction of the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) regime from April 2009 
onwards.  Under CAA, performance will be assessed over all public bodies in a sub-
regional area (for example a County Council Area) and, with some modifications, the 
main attributes of the CPA inspection and performance assessment regime will be 
applied to all tiers of Local Government, Fire and Police Authorities and the National 
Health Service. This change should not have a significant impact on this study but it 
will be interesting to observe reactions at the strategic level to the revised process in 
the next document. 
 
There is limited literature available on local government turnaround and the CPA in 
particular.  Consequently the detailed quantitative analysis to be undertaken by this 
study is unique within the literature, which gives weight to the timeliness of 
undertaking it.  Much of the published data comes from the Audit Commission in the 
form of the annual summary reports at a national level of the results of the CPA 
findings and, in 2009, the ‘Final Score’ (Audit Commission, 2009), which provided a 
summary of the main outcomes of the CPA scoring and categorisation regime between 
2001 and 2009.  This is backed up over the seven years of CPA by the individual 
Annual Inspection Reports (generic term – they have been called a variety of things) 
and service inspection scores, published by the Audit Commission and the other 
independent inspectorates in the key service areas. It is intended that these inspection 
reports will be used in the final thesis of the DBA.  There is no published detailed 
 10 
 
analysis of individual council performance over the seven year period of CPA, nor as to 
whether any conclusions can be drawn from the published data as to the main reasons 
for performance improvement, or otherwise.  This study will therefore examine the 
published information to establish which, if any, councils have been able to achieve 
improved performance and whether there is any evidence of the underlying reasons for 
this. 
 
Local government comes under scrutiny from the public and central government due to 
the requirements of accountability and stewardship under which, by its very nature, it 
necessarily has to operate. Accountability here does not just refer to the political 
electoral accountability enjoyed by local politicians (elected members), although this is 
clearly one aspect of it.  Nor does it only relate to the Political, Legal, Bureaucratic and 
professional accountability vested on local authority officials (Behn 2001, in Pollitt 
2003). For local government organisations, stewardship is bound up in the need to 
safeguard public assets and tax revenues.  Whereas accountability relates to the need 
to provide evidence that services have been delivered as appropriate to local needs 
while maximising the benefits that can be derived from the available resources.  From 
this it can be seen that stewardship, as a distinct aspect of scrutiny, is in fact a subset 
of accountability (Henley et al 1993). External inspection regimes have traditionally 
been the main mechanism through which judgements are made about local 
government performance with regard to accountability and stewardship and in the 
main this has been exercised by the Audit Commission, either directly through the 
District Audit function, or under contract through the major Accounting and Audit 
firms. However, as will be seen later, these traditional audits have focussed primarily 
on the stewardship aspects, rather than those of accountability. 
 
A further complication of public accountability and stewardship is that the competing 
and possibly conflicting demands, wants and desires of ‘the public’ make it difficult to 
establish benchmarks against which performance can be suitably measured.  The 
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public are made up of overlapping groups of citizens that can be described separately 
and independently as voters, taxpayers and service users.  The first potential problem 
is that there is a disconnect between these three aspects.  Service users may not be 
taxpayers and some taxpayers may only use a small proportion of the services 
available.  Furthermore, while voters may be both taxpayers and service users, they 
may not actually exercise their right to vote.  A second issue is that the behaviour and 
or expectations of the public under each of the three categories may provide conflicting 
viewpoints.  As taxpayers, the public may wish to have a reduced tax burden, 
therefore reducing the money available to spend on service provision.  As service 
users, the public may expect to have high standard services available as and when 
they wish to use them, thereby pushing up the potential cost of such services.  As 
voters, the public, should they exercise their right to vote, may vote according to 
political preferences based on cultural or family relationships, rather than on the basis 
of election manifestos or past organisational performance. Overlaid on top of this is the 
accountability of local government to national government in terms of service delivery 
and value for money requirements.  Thus results in public servants having multiple 
accountabilities (Liddle 2007). Norman (2003) (in Liddle 2007) asserts that 
accountability consists of four components, namely the assignment of responsibility, an 
obligation to answer for those responsibilities, the measurement of performance and 
the possibility of sanctions or rewards.  Furthermore, it involves answering the 
following questions: 
 
• Outputs: What has been achieved with resources allocated? 
 
• Ownership: Is a department (or part of the government/organisation) well 
placed to meet the demands placed on it now and in future? 
 
• Strategic alignment and collective interests: Are the goals consistent with the 
government’s strategic goals? 
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• Contribution to outcomes: How well is the organisation doing in contributing to 
better outcomes? (Norman, 2003; 144, in Liddle 2007). 
 
It is this emphasis on accountability, in a complex operating and political environment , 
which does not operate within a natural market mechanism, linked to the complex 
needs of those that local government are accountable to, that led, over time, to the 
development of a range of performance measurement approaches (Pollitt 2003). Such 
public Audit and Inspection regimes have grown up as a 4th Arm of government (Grace, 
2006) in order to provide a governance framework within which the requirements of 
accountability, stewardship and public need can be monitored and controlled.  To 
counter this interpretation, Liddle (2007) offers an alternative view of inspection within 
the sector, seeing it as a means of regulation, whereby the central government is able 
to control, through apparent independent inspectorates, the direction of local state 
agencies such as local government.  Whichever view is taken, there are strong reasons 
to claim that these inspection regimes are socially constructed, either in relation to 
accountably and stewardship or regulation, rather than having a traditional scientific 
basis (see methodology section for further discussion). 
 
According to Grace (2006), the development of CPA, and its predecessor Best Value, 
can be seen as a drive by Central Government to improve upon the traditional probity 
based external inspection regimes that existed pre 1997. Indeed it has been suggested 
by some observers that the key role of this type of external review is to support 
leaders in making change happen (Byatt and Lyons, 2001). While local government 
had for many years been subject to the Value for Money (VFM) regime which had been 
developed to address both the accountability and stewardship aspects referred to 
previously, this has been variously criticized for focusing too much on money and not 
enough on value.  VFM emphasised the need to consider inputs, outputs and outcomes 
through the review of economy, efficiency and effectiveness within local government.  
However, invariably the focus was on the quantitative aspects of inputs and outputs 
 13 
 
(economy and efficiency) rather than the more qualitative aspects of effectiveness and 
outcomes (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000). In part this may have been a result of the 
timing of the introduction of the VFM initiative in the early 1980s, aligned as it was to 
the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering which itself focused on achieving 
the lowest cost for pre-defined outputs, rather than on outcomes achieved.  While still 
maintaining the need to achieve value for money, especially with regard to the 
increasingly robust use of resources theme over the life of CPA (which has been carried 
over into the CAA regime), initially Best Value and more recently the CPA regime 
sought to compliment the traditional probity focused aspects of inspection with a need 
to drive up continual improvements in public service delivery.  Grace (2006), describes 
this as moving from traditional assurance based measures of performance to a scrutiny 
regime based on assurance and improvement and views CPA as a holistic measure of 
performance that forms an opinion by combining the service scores of a local authority 
(measured through the external inspections of OFSTED and CSCI for example)  with its 
corporate performance. Furthermore, the biggest gains from the external inspection 
regime are likely to be felt where current organisational effectives is already weak 
(Grace, 2006), further highlighting the potential for overall improvement.  The Table 1 
below highlights the main areas into which improvement has developed over firstly the 
Best Value regime, and secondly the CPA and more latterly the CAA regimes.  The 
improvement areas identified by Grace tie into the CPA regime requirements for 




Table 1: Assurance and Improvement Scrutiny Aspects (Source: Grace 2006) 
 
 Assurance Improvement 
Money and 
Probity 
Accounts and Stewardship meet 
Audit and Accounts Regulation and 
Standards 
Better financial management and 
use of resources 
Local 
Services 
Services meet standards and are 
delivered efficiently and are VFM 
Better and more customer 
responsive services, aiming for 
higher standards 
Local Bodies Governance arrangements meet 
established standards 
More effective performance and 
management 
Partnerships Partnership relationships and 
governance are functioning 
properly 
Better partnership working leading 
to better service delivery outcomes 
Local Areas Services are appropriate for local 
needs 
A better quality of life is achieved 
through more effective ‘joining-up’ 
and a focus on priority issues 
needing an area-based treatment 
 
It is important to note however that the introduction of the Best Value and CPA 
regimes did not represent the first time performance within local government had been 
assessed.  For example, there have been inspection bodies for Schools and the Police 
for a number of years, predating the introduction of VFM.  Similarly, funding and 
inspection bodies had drawn distinctions between good and poorly performing 
authorities in the distribution of capacity building funds and with regards to freedoms 
and flexibilities over financial control and decision making.  The CPA sought to 
amalgamate these disparate probity and service based regimes into a single 
comprehensive assessment for the first time, enabling local authority performance to 





This chapter will consider the methodological issues related to this phase of the 
research study.  As highlighted earlier in this document, this study is part of wider 
research into the nature of sustained strategic turnaround in those English local 
authorities that have shown a sustained improvement from a position of performing 
poorly under the CPA regime.  Other components of this overall DBA study will include 
a qualitative study of a small number of local authorities exhibiting interesting aspects 
of strategic turnaround (document 3) and finally a thesis on the nature of strategic 
turnaround itself (document 5).  These future documents will include a methodology 
section relevant to the particular needs of those studies and it is expected that they 
will be more ethnographic (Fisher 2004, Gill and Johnson 1991, Jankowicz 2005, 
Saunders et al 2000) in nature than this study, which is quantitative in nature.  This 
chapter will therefore consider the methodological framework to be employed and 
explain and justify the extensive use of secondary data within the research.  
 
The Methodological Perspective of the Study 
 
It is important for the researcher to establish the methodological foundations of the 
study to be undertaken.  A discussion of the specific research methods used in the 
study will be expanded upon in the analysis section of this document.  What will be 
discussed here is the methodological underpinning of the study. 
Methodology is the broad term given to the study of methods used during research 
(Fisher 2004, Gill and Johnson 1991, Jankowicz 2005).  Before considering the 
methods and techniques to be employed within the research, it is first necessary to 




Firstly, it is important for the researcher to consider their own epistemological position 
in order to establish what kinds of knowledge are likely to be considered legitimate and 
adequate for the study being undertaken.  
 
This study is quantitative in nature.  It is common for quantitative methods to be 
applied under a positivist paradigm resulting in hypothetico-deductive research 
methods (Fisher 2004, Gill and Johnson 1991, Jankowicz 2005, Gray 2005).  However, 
positivism does not hold exclusivity over the use of quantitative analysis and despite 
interpretivist methodologies largely drawing on the interpretation of phenomena 
established through qualitative methods such as interviews, the outputs of quantitative 
analysis in themselves represent observable phenomena which can be evaluated within 
an interpretivist epistemology (Fisher 2004, Gill and Johnson 1991, Jankowicz 2005, 
Gray 2005). This is particularly relevant to the analysis of the CPA dataset as, 
fundamentally, the overall score that a local authority achieves is a judgement based 
on a set of guiding principles that are socially constructed.  Indeed, as will be seen, 
this final judgement is based on the accumulation of evidence from other independent 
bodies, peer assessment and to a certain extent self-assessment all of which are 
themselves socially constructed.  This study will therefore undertake quantitative 
analysis on the CPA data set in order to “illuminate” (Fisher 2004 p54) potential 
relationships that exist between the outputs of the socially constructed CPA 
methodology.  To further explain the reason for this it is important to understand the 
positioning of this aspect of the research within the overall research framework of the 
study. 
 
If we accept that research is about finding out about things (Fisher 2004) and that in 
order to do this individuals go through a process of learning (Gill and Johnson 1991), 
then the process of research can be related to the experiential learning cycle attributed 














Figure 10: Assurance and Improvement Scrutiny Aspects 
 
It is necessary to view the whole of this study in relation to the experiential learning 
cycle.  Having worked in local government for some years, the researcher has an 
awareness of the CPA process but only limited practical experience.  For the purposes 
of undertaking this study therefore the researcher was starting from a low base in 
terms of the subject matter. It is anticipated that through undertaking this study a 
greater understanding of the strategic processes at work within local government can 
be gained and that this can be explored further within the final thesis.  In relation to 
the learning cycle therefore, this part of the total study will be exploratory (Fisher 
2004) and as such part of an inductive analysis framework resulting in observations 
and reflections arising from the analysis which can then be used to form abstract 
concepts and generalisations, rather than universal truths.  This study will therefore 
result in the generation of grounded theory based on the observations of the analysis, 
rather than looking for evidence of existing theories identified in the literature review. 
Depending on the findings of this study, these concepts and generalisations may then 
be tested deductively in the later documents (Gill and Johnson 1991).  Indeed it is 
expected that the final thesis in particular will provide a distillation of the findings of 
documents 2, 3 and 4 and that this will then be used to establish concepts that can be 
tested through further primary research. 
Concrete Experiences 
 









Important to the development of this study’s methodology has been the consideration 
of social construction (Gergen 2007, Bryman and Bell 2003, Fisher 2004, Jankowicz 
2005).  A social construct is a hypothesis that people use to make sense of the world 
(Fisher 2004). The CPA evaluation process for local government, would appear on the 
face of it to be quasi-scientific methodology based as it is on the accumulation of data 
about an organisation’s performance from which an overall score of performance is 
established (see next section). The Audit Commission developed the CPA methodology 
and it was the Audit Commission that undertook the analysis and evaluation of local 
authorities.  Such an audit body is not only required to be independent from the 
subject organisations they are auditing, but also objective in their analysis and 
evaluation.  It would be tempting therefore to adopt a positivist standpoint, as 
establishing a performance score appears dependent upon the dispassionate 
observation of facts that can be analysed in terms of variables resulting in 
generalisable truths as to the relative performance of organisations and how they can 
be improved. However, the CPA framework can itself be seen to be a social construct 
based on a socially agreed understanding (hypothesis) of what constitutes good or bad 
performance and how performance can be improved.  This in turn is informed by the 
constructs of accountability, stewardship and the needs and wants of the public at 
large. The CPA methodology makes a number of key assumptions about what 
constitutes good performance and how performance can be measured across a scale of 
achievement.  Who is to say that these are the right measures of performance and the 
measurement scale is graduated in the correct proportions?  At a different point in 
time, with a different national government or with different societal norms and beliefs 
or economic performance, the CPA framework may have developed in a totally 
different way, or may not have been developed at all.  To some extent this is reflected 
in the CPA framework itself.  Not only has it adapted over time to national policy 
changes, but also it has been developed and amended in consultation with the local 
authorities themselves.  CPA replaced a previous system of performance measurement 
called Best Value and has itself now been replaced with the Corporate Area Assessment 
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framework.  As an analysis tool therefore the CPA cannot be deemed to be perfect and 
therefore cannot be expected to yield a universal truth.  Therefore a positivist position 
cannot be taken for this study.  Rather, the CPA regime represented socially 
constructed beliefs about local authority performance at a point in time and as such the 
performance scores can only be evaluated from an interpretivist theoretical 
perspective.  Interpretivism is itself closely linked to the constructivism epistemology 
(Gray 2005, Jankowicz 2005). This epistemological approach to research legitimises 
the value of individual beliefs, focuses on socially agreed understanding rather than 
searching for truths and facilitates monitoring of personal, social and situational factors 
that may lead to bias and unreliability (Jankowicz 2005).  Under a constructivist 
epistemology, meaning is constructed and not discovered and actors may construct 
their own meanings from the same phenomenon.  The literature is somewhat confusing 
as to whether constructivism is the epistemology and interpretivism is the theoretical 
perspective or vice versa (see Grey 2005 and Jankowicz 2005 and Geregn 2007).  
However, whichever way round they are taken, the emphasis for the researcher is the 
same in that the positivist view of what constitutes knowledge cannot be taken.  
Instead of deduction and empirical analysis being used to formulate a universal truth, 
the researcher must be aware of the reflexivity of their own interpretation on the 
research findings.  Given the socially constructed nature of the CPA data, it is only 
appropriate to understand the findings of this analysis from an interpretivist 
perspective.  This subsequently informs the specific research process and methods to 





Having established the overall methodological perspective of the study, this can then 
be used to develop appropriate research methods to undertake the study.  An analysis 
will be undertaken of the existing CPA datasets over the life of CPA.  This will be 
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quantitative in nature but the results will be evaluated from an interpretivist 
perspective through induction rather than hypothetical-deduction. The detailed 
description of the methods employed will be explained within the analysis section 
itself; however, an overview will be given here. 
 
Before the analysis could be undertaken, a greater understanding of the CPA 
framework was required in order that the data could be both aggregated and analysed 
appropriately and then interpreted.  A detailed discussion of the development and 
changes to the CPA framework is given in the next section of the document. 
 
The CPA datasets were imported into a spreadsheet in order to perform analysis on the 
data.  This analysis was undertaken at three levels.  Firstly a high level analysis was 
undertaken to categorise all of the local authorities according to their relative 
performance.  This required the creation of a scoring framework that put the CPA 
scores of the different methodologies on a common basis to allow comparisons to be 
undertaken.  This high level analysis also identified the relative movements in CPA 
scores over the time period and enabled a number of local authorities displaying 
potential turnaround characteristics to be identified.  This was done by applying rules 
to the CPA scores based on the definition of a turnaround organisation identified in the 
literature review (document 2). 
 
The second level of analysis was performed on the groups of potential turnaround local 
authorities identified above.  This analysis attempted to establish whether any 
relationship existed between the movements in the CPA score and the movements in 
the sub-elements that had been used to build up the overall CPA score.  The purpose 
of this analysis was to establish whether or not any sub-elements showed a strong 
correlation to the improvement in CPA score to provide evidence that could be taken 
forward for investigation to the next stage of the study in document 3.  Because the 
CPA data is ordinal (or ranked) date, this analysis was undertaken using the Spearman 
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Rank Correlation Coefficient (Spearman rho). In order to interpret the findings of the 
Spearman rho calculations, a rule needed to be established as to what was to be taken 
as a significant relationship.  This level of analysis is referred to as the Grouped 
Analysis. 
 
The third level of analysis was undertaken at an individual local authority level for 
those identified as being potential turnaround organisations and used the CPA dataset 
to establish whether or not any of the CPA sub-elements contributed to the 
improvement in CPA score. Again the Spearman rho was used to establish any 
potential correlations.  This analysis differed from the grouped analysis in that if 
focused on each local authority separately and therefore approached the analysis from 
a different perspective.  Frequency distributions were then used to establish whether 
there were any common factors between local authorities.  This level of analysis is 
referred to as the Individual Analysis. 
 
The analysis section is therefore structured as follows: 
 
• A high level analysis of the main trends within the Audit Commission CPA 
dataset and the identification of local authorities displaying turnaround 
characteristics 
• A more detailed analysis of the relationships existing within the data sets for 
those groups of local authorities exhibiting turnaround characteristics  
• Specific analysis of individual local authorities that display turnaround 
characteristics 
 
The CPA datasets represent secondary data and the methodological considerations 







This study will make use of an existing dataset that has been complied by the Audit 
Commission over a seven year time period.  The study will therefore be using 
secondary data (Jankowicz 2005, Saunders et al 2000, Fisher 2004) on which to 
undertake the research. As will be seen later, this secondary data will be interpreted 
using a scoring grid developed by the researcher and suitable for the purposes of this 
research study.  It will be this scoring grid, a source of primary data (Jankowicz 2005, 
Saunders et al 2000), which will be used to interpret the findings of the research. In 
addition, the research will be undertaken on the whole population of local authority 
CPA data available therefore overcoming the need to employ sample based research 
techniques and giving a potential degree of stability to the research findings. However, 
at this stage of the project there will be no further development of primary quantitative 
data through the use of questionnaires etc although such approaches may be used in 
subsequent documents where relevant. The use of secondary data brings with it many 
advantages over primary data but also has some disadvantages.  Saunders et al 
(2000) and Bryman and Bell (2003) highlight a number of advantages and 
disadvantages of using secondary data. These will now be discussed in the context of 
the research project. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of using secondary data 
 
The Audit Commission CPA data set meets all the potential advantages of using 
secondary data.  It is readily available via the internet from the Audit Commission 
website and as such it saves time in collecting the data and instead the researcher’s 
time can be better spend on analysing the data.  Similarly, the data itself can be 
considered to be of a high quality, coming as it does from the Audit Commission, a 
independent national audit body experienced in both the collection and appraisal and 
reporting of performance data. It is also unobtrusive, reducing the need to access the 
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information from within organisations themselves.  This also overcomes some of the 
problems of potential researcher reflexivity (Gill and Johnson 1991) as the researcher 
is totally independent from both the data collection and the organisations concerned.  
The dataset covers a period of seven years and provides data for the vast majority of 
local government organisations within the target population.  As such, this provides the 
basis for a comparative longitudinal study for the duration of the CPA lifecycle.  There 
is also the scope to undertake sub-set analysis, which due to the methodological 
changes to the CPA framework will be a key pat of this study.  All the information is 
publicly available and therefore there are no issues of sensitivity or confidentiality to be 
overcome and access to the information is freely available, so there is no financial cost.  
Finally, the re-analysing of secondary data may lead to unforeseen discoveries.  Some 
summarised analysis has already been done at a national level by the Audit 
Commission, but this has not been extended into the issues surrounding organisational 
turnaround in specific organisations.  It is hoped therefore that while the potential 
outcomes of this research are symmetrical, ie whether or not evidence can be found 
for turnaround is equally valid (Saunders et al 2000), there is the potential at least for 
identifying some hitherto unknown elements of strategic turnaround. 
 
The disadvantages associated with using secondary data are largely not relevant to the 
Audit Commission CPA data set.  The most cited problem of using secondary data is 
that it may have been collected for a different purpose, which does not match the 
current researcher’s need (Fisher 2004, Gill and Johnson 1991, Mintzberg 1973 (in Gill 
and Johnson 1991), Saunders et al 2000).  This can lead to a number of potential 
problems including constraints on the potential analysis and an unbalanced 
interpretation of findings.  This is also linked to a further disadvantage that 
aggregations and definitions may be unsuitable. The strength of the CPA data set is 
that it provides the only national comparative measure of local authority performance 
and as such is the appropriate start point for identifying organisations that have moved 
from poor performance to a turnaround position.  Furthermore, the Audit Commission 
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themselves can be regarded as an ‘eminent’ source of secondary data (Jankowicz 
2005).  As an audit body they are bound by rules of independence and are by 
necessity thorough and experienced in the development of the methodologies they 
employ across the public sector.  In addition, the methodologies used to compile the 
CPA data set have been developed following full consultation with the local authorities 
being assessed and a number of revisions were made between the consultation and 
final versions of the CPA methodologies (Audit Commission 2002, 2003).  With regards 
to the aggregation of data and comparisons across organisations, the CPA data set also 
has the strength that despite there being methodological revisions throughout the life 
of CPA, at any one point in time the methodology was employed consistently.  Finally, 
there is an alignment with the aims of this research project and the reasons why the 
CPA was introduced, namely the continuous improvement of local authority 
performance.  As such, the CPA data set can legitimately be used to assess 
improvements in local authority performance and thus strategic turnaround. 
 
Even though the disadvantages often associated with the use of secondary data can be 
seen to be of little significance, there is one aspect that will need to be addressed by 
this research project.  In order to both strengthen the case for using the CPA dataset 
and also provide a means for its analysis later in the study, it will be necessary to have 
a full understanding of the methodological development of the various CPA 
frameworks.  This will be dealt with more fully in the next section of the document, but 
in summary it will be necessary to be mindful that while generalisations on 
improvement will be possible from the dataset across all local authorities and over the 
lifecycle of CPA, detailed and meaningful analysis can only be undertaken within the 
different organisational subgroups of Single Tier and County Councils (STCC) and 
District Councils.  Furthermore, within these subgroups the major updating of the CPA 
methodology that occurred between 2005 and 2006 means that analysis will need to 
be carefully interpreted both before and after the updating and more importantly when 




Many of the concerns expressed in the literature about using secondary data for 
analysis purposes relate to the use of official statistics produced by government 
departments (Bryman and Bell 2003).  There is the potential therefore that this could 
have a bearing on this study.  In particular, concerns are expressed regarding the 
reliability and validity of such data. Reliability issues arise when the definitions and 
policies applied to the phenomena to be analysed change over time.  These issues 
have been discussed briefly above and in more detail in the next section. Validity 
issues arise in that it may be tempting to draw inferences about the relationships 
between data in the dataset, when in fact other phenomena not captured by the 
dataset have been responsible.  This issue can be dealt with in two ways by this study.  
Firstly, the CPA dataset is self-contained and as such any improvements identified in 
local authority performance will be as a direct result of the individual components of 
the CPA scoring regime.  It would therefore be valid to undertake an analysis of these 
components in order to determine any potential relationships.  Secondly, this study is 
exploratory (Fisher 2004, Saunders et al 2000) in nature and will be used to inform the 
later qualitative analysis document and the final thesis. As such, there will be scope to 











The CPA Data Sets 
 
The datasets used in this analysis have been taken from an external source and have 
therefore not been developed by the researcher. For this reason it is important to have 
a clear understanding of the way in which the data was collected, the parameters 
under which it was collected and the variables and judgements that were undertaken 
by the Audit Commission when arriving at the score for each local authority.  Although 
the CPA data is considered to have been supported by a robust methodology of 
collection, its interpretation is to some degree subjective being a composite of a 
number of different assessment approaches including service performance indicators, 
corporate assessments and the direction of travel statement, and being a judgement of 
performance rather than a direct measure.  Added to this, the performance regime was 
changed over the seven year period and therefore it will be important to be able to 
track these changes in order that their impact on the resulting analysis can be 
assessed and accounted for. This section of the document will therefore set out the 
CPA methodology employed by the Audit Commission in arriving at the scores for both 
Single Tier and County Councils (STCC) and District Councils and track those changes 
that impacted upon the scoring regime. 
 
In summary, it will be seen that the CPA methodologies can be broadly broken down 
into two main types with two main phases each, creating an analysis framework of four 





 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Single Tier and County 
Councils (STCC) 
2002 to 2004 
Original Regime 
2005 to 2008 
“The Harder Test” 
District Councils 2003 to 2005 
Original Regime 
2006 to 2008 
Revised Framework 
Figure 11: The Four CPA Data Frames of Analysis 
 
Single Tier and County Councils 
 
The first CPA assessment framework type relates to Single Tier and County Councils 
(STCC).   These organisations represent local authorities of four types;  
• County Councils 
• London Boroughs 
• Metropolitan Boroughs 
• Unitary Authorities 
 
Before examining the CPA methodology for this group, it is important to define what 
these organisations represent.  The London Boroughs, Metropolitan Boroughs and 
Unitary Authorities are called Single Tier or “all purpose” Authorities as they provide 
the full range of Local Authority Services in their geographic area.  For these types of 
local authority there is therefore a common set of services delivered and assessed 
under the CPA, namely: 
 
• Education 
• Children’s Social Care 
• Adult Social Care 




• Libraries and Leisure 
• Benefits services  
 
County Councils operate slightly differently in that they are part of a two-tier structure 
for the provision of local authority services along with the District Councils.  While 
County Councils have traditionally had a strategic role in managing service provision 
within the county boundary, local authority services are split in terms of responsibility 
and provision between the County Councils and the District Councils at this sub-
regional level.  The services provided by District Councils are dealt with in a separate 
section of this chapter.  Unlike the other STCC group members, the County Councils do 




• Children’s Social Care 
• Adult Social Care 
• Environmental Services 
• Libraries and Leisure 
 
This has identified therefore the first point of difference when analysing the scores of 
the STCC group, in that the judgement for County Councils is based only on 5 Service 
Scores rather than the 7 Service Scores used for the single tier authorities. 
 
Despite this difference in services provided, the STCC group were assessed using a 
common CPA framework which was issued in 2002 following a consultation period 
during the summer of that year.  This initial framework document represents the start 
point of the CPA process and even though consultation occurred, the Audit Commission 
recognised at the outset that CPA would be an evolving process and that revisions to 
the framework could be expected year on year.  Common to both the single tier 
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authorities and the county councils within the CPA scoring regime is the Use of 
Resources score, which will be explained later. 
 
The Initial CPA Methodology for STCC (2002-2004) 
 
In the introduction to the 2002 CPA framework the Audit Commission state that “the 
best councils already use processes similar to CPA to deliver improved services” (Audit 
Commission 2002, p2).  This compliments the view of Grace (2006) in that the biggest 
gains from the external inspection regime are likely to be felt where current 
organisational effectiveness is already weak.  The CPA framework built on the 
requirement of Best Value to help local authorities provide better services to their 
communities and was introduced to make these improvements comprehensive and 
universal.  As well as being able to identify those councils that were very good at this, 
the framework was introduced to help local authorities who wanted to improve but had 
capability or capacity issues, those who had difficulty in judging their own performance 
as well as identifying those where intervention would be required to protect services to 
local communities (Audit Commission 2002). 
 
The initial framework used by the Audit Commission is set out below in Figure 3.  The 
key aspects of this framework are that it combines the outputs of a number of separate 
performance assessment exercises to arrive at an overall judgement for the local 
authority.  Initially, the overall judgement scores were categorised over 5 areas of 











Figure 12: Initial STCC CPA Framework (Source: Audit Commission - 2006a) 
 
Initially two broad areas were used to form the overall judgement for an authority. 
Firstly, there was the core service performance (Education, Social Care etc), which at 
this stage included the use of resources. Secondly, there was the corporate 
assessment, which measured a local authority’s overall ability to improve. The 
elements within each of these broad areas were given a score between 1 and 4 and 
weighted accordingly within the CPA methodology (see below). The core service 
assessments used as their base the outcomes of already existing external inspections 
for the council (for education this was the Ofsted inspection, for social care it was the 
star rating awarded by the Department of Health).  These external assessments were 
complemented by performance against national performance indicators and an 
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assessment by the Government of a local authority’s plan in each area (eg the local 
transport plan). It should be noted that for social care, the children and adult 
assessments were averaged to give an overall score in the initial assessment.  At this 
initial stage the use of resources assessment was based on the annual audit and 
inspection of the local authority and its performance against national performance 
indicators.  In later methodologies the use of resources would be given more weight 
and additional performance criteria would be introduced.  The ability of the council to 
improve was assessed partly through a self-assessment process, which was then 
followed up by an external corporate assessment undertaken by an auditor, inspector 
and ‘peer’ officers and councillors.  The ability of a council to improve was assessed 










• Future Plans 
 
The overall scoring methodology of the various elements is given in figure xx below 
and shows that there was a weighting applied to certain core services, education and 
social care receiving the highest weighting of 4, environment and housing a weighting 
of 2 and the remaining services (including use of resources) a weighting of 1.  
Similarly, in the Ability to Improve assessment, a higher weighting was given to 
Achievement (3) and Investment (2), with the remaining elements having a weighting 
of 1.  The scoring methodology was then used to produce a combined core services 
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score and a combined ability to improve score which taken together would be used to 




Figure 13: The 2002 CPA Scoring Methodology for STCC (Source: Audit 
Commission - 2006a) 
 
Finally, there were 3 rules that were applied to limit a local authority’s ability to gain a 
high score, if they were clearly not performing well in the significant core services.  In 
order to achieve a score of excellent, a council must score a pre-weighted score of at 
least 3 in Education, Social care and Financial Standing (use of resources) as well as 
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achieving a score of at least 2 on all other core services.  To achieve a judgement of 
fair or above, the local authority needed to be have a pre-weighted score of at least 2 
in the core services of Education, Social care and Financial Standing. 
 
Changes to the CPA Methodology between 2003-2004 
 
Between 2003 and 2004 there was no significant change to the overall CPA assessment 
framework methodology for STCCs (Audit Commission 2003).  However, there was the 
introduction of some additional rules governing whether a council could move category, 
or improve on its previous judgement. To move up a category was not simply a case of 
improving performance within the original scoring criteria. While it was not impossible 
to move up category following the original inspections in 2002, the additional rules 
were designed to make sure that only local authorities that could clearly demonstrate 
improvement either in their core services or their ability to improve (or both) were 
allowed to move up a category.  It was however, relatively easy to be able to slip down 
a category with a simple reduction in score against the 2002 criteria being sufficient for 
this to occur. 
 
To move up a category, a local authority would need to achieve the original core 
service thresholds identified above and also improve their weighted core service score 
by at least 3.  On top of this, to move into the excellent category a council would also 
need to demonstrate a proportionate increase in its corporate assessment score i.e. it 
would need to be re-assessed.  Further rules were put in place around when a council 
could apply to have a further corporate assessment undertaken after demonstrating 
improved core service performance.  Where councils had previously achieved a score of 
2 on their corporate assessment they would need to achieve a revised score of at least 
36 to move up a category (ie into category 3 or above), more than half way up the 
category 3 scale.  Finally, councils achieving a score of 3 on their core services, would 
need to achieve a score of 40 on their corporate assessment to move into the excellent 
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category.   Special rules also applied to councils in the poor category (the worst 
category) and movement was dependent upon improvement against an agreed 
recovery plan, with corporate assessments triggered by the Government Monitoring 
Board chaired by the lead official appointed by the Secretary of State.  
 
The revised STCC Methodology “The Harder Test” 2005 
 
In 2004 the Audit Commission began an extensive consultation on proposed changes 
to the CPA framework following a timescale for revision of the process that it had set 
out in previous guidance (Audit Commission 2003, 2004a).  This resulted in the 
publication of “CPA-The Harder Test” (Audit Commission, 2005a), which made some 
significant changes to the CPA methodology designed, as the title suggests, to ratchet 
up the need for continual improvement within local government. 
 
The revised framework is outlined below in Figure 5 and a number of changes from the 
original methodology can be identified. 
 
• The move to a star system rather than a rating system 
• Three component parts; retaining the Services Scores and Corporate 
Assessment and introducing the Use of Resources 
• A revision to the service categories and classification into level 1 and level 2 
services 
• A more compact Corporate Assessment framework – removing focus, 





Figure 14: Revised STCC CPA Framework – The Harder Test (Source: Audit 
Commission - 2005a) 
 
The move to awarding stars rather than a rating is a fairly minor change and does not 
in itself have an impact on the quantitative analysis of this study.  There are still five 
categories (zero star to four star) and these equate to the previous rating system of 
poor to excellent: 
 
0 Star - Poor 
1 Star - Weak 
2 Star - Fair 
3 Star - Good 
4 Star - Excellent 
 
What is more significant to this analysis is the scoring methodology resulting in the 
overall star judgement for a council.  This will be covered later in the chapter. 
 
The introduction of the use of resources as a specific element of the scoring regime 
represented a change in the CPA methodology.  It moved away from more traditional 
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financial auditor judgements of financial reporting and internal control and “raised the 
bar” (Audit Commission 2005a, p12) to include demonstrable and measurable 
improvements in the way value for money was planned, assessed and delivered within 
the council including the use of non-financial resources.  In part, this emphasis on 
value for money reflected the introduction of the Gershon efficiency targets and was 
also a natural progression from the previous Best Value regime that had been in place 
pre 2002. 
 
The revision of the service categories also reflected changes in the structure of local 
government and brought the framework into line with the introduction of the Children’s 
Act that required each authority to appoint a Director of Children’s Services and Lead 
Member.  Children’s services, previously dealt with under the Education and Social 
Care services categories, were now amalgamated into Children and Young People.  The 
remaining adult social care service made up the remaining level 1 service.  The 
designation of Level 1 mirrors previously higher weighting these services attracted in 
the original framework.  Of the level 2 services, the previous Library and Leisure 
category was renamed as Culture and the Fire and Rescue services were given a 
separate category to reflect the different ways in which Fire and Rescue Services were 
structured nationally.  
 
The contraction of the corporate assessment criteria was a result of lessons learned 
from both the previous CPA experience and also evidence gained from pathfinder 
councils in 2004 (Audit Commission 2005a). In essence, the contraction represents a 
more focussed approach to the core facets of corporate management. 
 
The harder test scoring criteria are given in Figure 6 below and this shows how the 
various scoring elements were brought together to arrive at the overall judgement for 
a council – its star rating.  The weighting factors of the previous framework have been 
removed and replaced instead with a set of rules.  Within these rules some weighting 
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clearly still exists between the level 1 and level 2 services, but this is limited to 
providing a crude hurdle to differentiate council’s ability to get into a higher star 
category. 
 
Figure 15:  STCC Scoring Criteria – The Harder Test (Source: Audit 
Commission 2005a) 
 
Behind the overall scoring methodology sat further separate rules based methodologies 
for Corporate Assessments and the Use of Resources. These are summarised in Figure 
7 below.  Both methodologies applied a four score rating system for each element, 







Figure 16: Corporate Assessment and Use of Resources Scoring (Source: Audit 
Commission 2005a) 
 
The service scores were also awarded out of 4 for each service.  These scores were 
again based on existing external inspections from agencies such as Ofsted or 
undertaken by the Audit Commission themselves.  The impact of national performance 
indicators was again also taken into account when arriving at the service score.  In a 
departure from the previous CPA methodology, the service scores were not added 
together to give a weighted total score.  Instead, the absolute score was applied to the 




Changes to the Revised Methodology 2006 - 2008 
 
The main changes introduced in 2006 were as follows: 
• The introduction of the Direction of Travel Statement – not part of the scoring 
regime though 








District councils were subject to a separate CPA regime and lagged behind the 
introduction of CPA for STCCs due to the number of district councils involved (238) 
requiring the rolling out of CPA in a number of tranches.  As such the scores for district 
councils were published in 2003/04.  Similar to STCCs, the District Council regime was 
updated but this time in 2006. The reason for the different approach to district councils 
was due to their much smaller size and complexity (Audit Commission 2006a), which 
meant a less intensive approach could be applied.  Also, the district councils were 
covered by a disproportionately higher range of the national performance indicators, so 
the Audit Commission could rely more heavily on these rather than carrying out further 
inspections.  The two CPA methodologies for district councils will be described in detail 
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later in this section, but it is important to note at this stage that all district councils 
received an initial assessment between 2003/2004 but that from then on a re-
categorisation was only undertaken if the council requested it, and it could 
demonstrate significant evidence of improvement since the original assessment or 
where the audit commission identified evidence of a significant deterioration (Audit 
Commission, 2005b, 2006b). 
 
All 238 District councils were assessed under the original CPA framework between June 
2003 and December 2004.  District councils form part of the two-tier system of local 
government that operates in some parts of the country and was described in the 
earlier section on STCCs. The district councils provide local services such as housing, 
planning, leisure and recreation, waste collection, environmental health, revenue 
collection and housing and council tax benefits.  Most services and functions are 
common across district councils but, due to differences in their localities and the 
communities they serve, each council faces its own particular challenges.  This was 
recognised in the CPA methodology with its focus being on how successful each council 
was in meeting the needs of its local community (Audit Commission 2005b). 
 
The Original District Council Methodology 
 
It has not been as easy to identify the original CPA methodology for district councils as 
it was for STCCs.  It has been necessary to piece together the methodology from a 
number of related documents (Audit Commission 2004b, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b) and an 
interview with the former Director of Local Government Practice.  The framework used 
for the original assessments provided a single assessment of performance (the 
judgement) based on core service performance and a council’s ability to improve. As 
for STCCs, the judgement was made over five categories from poor to excellent and 
was the result of the combining of Audit Commission’s assessment of performance 
(using national PIs where appropriate) with the council’s own self assessment (and 
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possible discretionary peer assessment) and that of external agencies eg the Benefits 
Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) and external auditors.  These elements were combined into 
what was called the Corporate Assessment, which was split over 10 themes.  Each of 
the 10 themes was awarded an individual score between 1 and 4, where 1 was weak 
and 4 strong.  Each theme was also given a weighting, which was then used to 
combine the theme scores into the overall judgement.  The themes and their 
weightings are given in Figure 8 below and as can be seen, the highest weightings 
were given to achievement of quality and improvement followed by investment. 
 
 
Figure 17: Original District Council Theme Weightings (Source: Audit 
Commission 2004b) 
 
Unlike the STCCS, the district councils were not awarded separate service scores as 
part of the assessment process.  Instead, performance in three core service areas was 
assessed as part of the prioritisation and achievement themes.  The three core service 
areas were: 
 
• Public Space – measured through a diagnostic assessment of the strategic 
approach to the use of public space 
• Housing – measured either against the Decent Homes Standard or how well the 
council contributed to a balancing housing markets if it no longer directly 
managed its housing stock 




In addition, the financial management of the council was assessed by the external 
auditor and used to inform the overall assessment across a number of themes. 
 
The weighted theme scores were used to establish the overall judgement for the 
council using the categories shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 18: Original District Council Categories (Source: Audit Commission 
2004b) 
 
The core service and financial management elements were further combined into the 
framework through the introduction of a single rule that if any of these receive the 
lowest possible rating, then a council was unable achieve a judgement of excellent. 
 
Alongside the final judgement, the Audit Commission made an assessment of the 
direction of travel of the council within the report published for each council.  It should 
be noted that the direction of travel and the financial management elements were 
reported annually as part of the external audit report of the council, although this did 
not constitute a re-assessment.  Rather, it provided the evidence of deterioration 
referred to earlier that the Audit Commission would use to prompt a re-assessment.  
 
This framework remained in place without any amendments until the introduction of 




The Revised District Council Methodology 2006 
 
Following consultation during the early part of 2006, and a piloting process for an 
amended corporate assessment process, the Audit Commission issued the revised 
framework for district council CPA that would commence from 2006 onwards.  Unlike 
the STCCs CPA, there was no introduction of a harder test for re-categorisation of 
district councils.  Some changes were made to the methodology to keep it up to date 
with the national environment, but in order to ensure comparability with the 
2003/2004 assessments these reflected equivalent levels of performance.  Also, the 
judgement categories remained the same, rather than converting to star categories as 
they did under STCC CPA.  However, there were a number of changes made to the 
methodology and these will be explained in this section. 
 
Furthermore, the methodology used an exception reporting based re-categorisation 
process rather than the annual inspection and reporting enjoyed by STCCs.  This re-
categorisation process adopted a two-staged approach; stage 1, determined whether 
there was sufficient evidence for a category change through a regional Commission 
panel including peer review and stage 2, undertook a corporate assessment to 
determine whether a re-categorisation is warranted.  The revised framework is shown 





Figure 19: The Revised District Council Methodology (Source: Audit 
Commission 2006b) 
 
The main changes between the two methodologies can be summarised as follows: 
 
• The introduction of the Use of Resources Assessment 
• Separate assessment of core service areas, although still not formally scored 
• A revised corporate assessment with the number of themes reducing from ten 
to five 
 
The use of resources assessment comprised the same five themes as that for STCCS 
under the harder test framework and was reported annually.  Within this, the value for 
money theme was evaluated as the result of an initial self-assessment by district 
councils in 2005.  In subsequent years, the self-assessment would be undertaken 
annually only to reflect any significant changes. The value for money theme also now 
incorporated an assessment by the external auditor of the council’s annual efficiency 
statement. 
 
Service performance information was assessed through combining an analysis of 
national performance indicators with inspection scores resulting from both Audit 
Commission and BFI inspections of services.  The three broad areas of service 
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assessment remained the same namely, use of public space, housing and benefits. The 
main change from the previous methodology was that the service information was not 
used to inform the scores used in the revised corporate assessment.  Instead, this 
information was used to inform stage one of the re-categorisation process.  
 
If a council got through stage 1 of the re-categorisation process, the Corporate 
Assessment was used to give a revised judgement for the council.  The number of 
themes was reduced from 10 to 5 and each was assessed using a four point scoring 
system with 1 representing inadequate performance and 4 representing performing 
strongly.  Each theme was also given a weighting before the aggregation of the final 
judgement.  The revised categories and their weightings are given in Figure 11 below. 
 
Figure 20: Revised Corporate Assessment Weightings for District Councils 
(Source: Source Audit Commission 2006b) 
 
 
The revised categories were essentially a collapsed version of the previous 10 
categories and mirrori the revised corporate assessment categories for STCCs.  As 
such, the weightings reflect a similar desire for achievement by the council as reflected 
in the previous framework. 
 
Finally, the revised framework used an amended scoring grid to arrive at the final 
judgement.  The 5 categories remained the same, but given the changes in themes 
and their respective weightings, and in order to the retain comparability with the 
previous framework, the scoring bandwidths were also amended.  The revised required 




Figure 21: Revised Required Scores for District Councils (Source: Audit 
Commission 2006b) 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
From the above discussion it can be seen that the development over time of the 
various CPA methodologies will have an impact on the interpretation of the results of 
the analysis that follows in the subsequent sections.  Firstly, the STCCs and the District 
Councils will need to be treated as separate groupings and cannot be directly 
compared.  This is due to the different approaches adopted within the CPA 
methodologies and also the different ways and timings in which the data was 
published.  Secondly, for the STCCs the CPA methodology change in 2005 means that 
it would not be wholly appropriate to directly compare performance for years in 
different CPA methodology timeframes.  The analysis of STCCs will therefore provide 
comparative data over three timescales; 2002-2004, 2005-2008 and for information 
purposes 2002-2008.  Finally, the district council CPA methodology changes were 
relatively minor and as such allow a more direct comparison between the two 
methodologies to be undertaken.  This is beneficial, as due to the way in which the 
district council CPA inspections were undertaken and published, only two datasets are 




High Level Analysis  
 
Overview of CPA Performance Scores between 2002 and 2008 
 
Initially, an analysis of the CPA performance scores for all local authorities in England 
was undertaken for the whole of the CPA assessment period.  The purpose of this part 
of the analysis was to highlight any high level trends that could be identified from the 
basic data before going on to conduct further more detailed analysis.  It should be 
noted that as discussed earlier, the basic CPA data is ordinal data and as such there 
are limitations over the type of quantitative analysis that can be undertaken.  
However, some useful insights into the data set have been established non-the-less. 
 
The performance scores were analysed for all 149 Single Tier and County Councils 
(STCC) (the Isles of Scilly was excluded from the analysis, as a complete data set is 
not available) and all 238 District Councils between 2002 and 2008.  In order to carry 
out the analysis a scoring framework was established by assigning a number to each of 
the CPA assessment scores as follows: 
  
CPA Ranking Score Allocated 
Poor/ 0 Star 1 
Weak/ 1 Star 2 
Fair/ 2 Star 3 
Good/ 3 Star 4 
Excellent/ 4 Star 5 
 
The same numeric score has been used across each of the CPA methodology time 
periods following the argument developed earlier that even though there were changes 
to the methodology between years, the overall CPA ranking is broadly comparable. 
This scoring framework has been used throughout the whole of the remaining 
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quantitative analysis.  The scoring system developed here has put the CPA categories 
on the same numerical ranking, allowing comparison to be undertaken of relative 
performance over the CPA timeframe.  For example it is now possible to establish the 
movement in CPA score numerically between different points in time.  If a local 
authority started with a score of 1 (Poor or 0 star), and achieved a later score of 4 
(good or 4 star) then it will have moved up 3 CPA categories. These movements are 
used later in the analysis to establish local authorities displaying turnaround 
characteristics. The ranking applied as part of this analysis remains ordinal and as such 
suffers from the same constraints as the CPA data referred to above. 
 
In order to establish an overview of the spread of CPA scores across the CPA time 
period, it is possible to use both a frequency distribution and relative frequency 
distribution for each class of CPA score (Anderson et al 1990, Shah and Madden 2003). 
The frequency distribution and relative frequency distribution of the overall 
performance scores for the STCCs is shown in Table 2 below.  This is also represented 
graphically in figure 13. 
 
From the frequency distribution and the graph it can be seen that in general there was 
an improvement in the performance of STCC local authorities during the CPA period as 
measured by the CPA scoring regime.  Initially there were 13 (8.75%) local authorities 
that were poor and 21 (14.09%) that were weak.  By 2008 there were no poorly 
performing STCCs and only 4 (2.68%) that were categorised as weak.  It is not 
possible to use the mean as a descriptive indictor, nor the standard deviation as a 
measure of dispersion due to the ordinal nature of the data (Anderson et al 1990, Shah 
and Madden 2003).   
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Table 2: STCC CPA Score Frequencies 
CPA Score Frequency Table 
        
Score 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1 13 10 1 1 0 0 0 
  8.72% 6.71% 0.67% 0.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 21 18 14 8 5 2 4 
  14.09% 12.08% 9.40% 5.37% 3.36% 1.34% 2.68% 
3 40 39 33 31 23 22 26 
  26.85% 26.17% 22.15% 20.81% 15.44% 14.77% 17.45% 
4 53 56 60 70 71 67 57 
  35.57% 37.58% 40.27% 46.98% 47.65% 44.97% 38.26% 
5 22 26 41 39 50 58 62 
  14.77% 17.45% 27.52% 26.17% 33.56% 38.93% 41.61% 
  149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
(Note: Isles of Scilly excluded from analysis) 
 
STCC CPA Score Frequency Ditribution 2002 to 
2008
13 10
1 1 0 0 0
21
18







































However, the mode can be used for ordinal data as a measure of location (Anderson et 
al 1990). The modal score for STCCs was 4 for the first six years of CPA rising to 5 for 
the final year.  This indicates that throughout the CPA period, a significant proportion 
of STCCs were performing at a good (3 Star) or excellent (4 Star) level.   The 
frequency distribution for District Council CPA scores is shown in Table 3 below and 
graphically in Figure 14. 
Table 3: District Council CPA Score Frequencies 
 
CPA Score Frequency Table 
Score 2003-04 2008
1 8 1
  3.36% 0.42%
2 30 9
  12.61% 3.78%
3 87 76
  36.55% 31.93%
4 85 101
  35.71% 42.44%
5 28 51
  11.76% 21.43%
  238 238
  100.00% 100.00%
 
 
From the frequency distribution and the graph it can be seen that while the proportions 
of district councils regarded as poor or weak were initially lower than for STCCs at 
3.36% and 12.61% respectively, by the end of the CPA regime, there were higher 
proportions of district councils remaining either poor (1 council representing 0.42%), 
or weak (9 councils representing 3.78%).  The modal score for district councils was 3 
in the first year of assessment, rising to 4 in the final year, showing that overall 
performance for district councils was generally lower than for their STCC counterparts. 
 
 
The reducing proportions of both STCC and district councils falling into the poor 
and weak categories indicates that local authorities that would previously have 
been deemed to be failing must have improved somewhat and as such there is 


































Figure 23: District Council CPA Score Frequencies 
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The next stage of the high level analysis was to identify the trajectories of local 
authority performance scores over the CPA lifecycle. Due to the way in which the 
performance scores were published, it has only been possible to do this for the STCCs 
as district council scores were only published at the start and end of the CPA 
timeframe.  At this stage, it has not been necessary to separately analyse the two 
different scoring regimes between 2002-2004 and 2005-2008, although these 
demarcations have been identified in the analysis. 
 
The performance trajectory is the path that a local authority has followed in terms of 
the overall CPA assessment score.  For STCCs this analysis was done in two stages.  
Firstly on the whole of the data set and secondly on those local authorities identified as 
being in a potential turnaround situation.  For each stage of the analysis the 
trajectories of the local authorities were classified before being grouped and plotted on 
a range of graphs.  The most significant trajectory graphs are shown in the subsequent 
pages. 
 
In order to arrive at a trajectory for each local authority the scoring system was used 
to identify the movement in performance score between three points.   
 
Point 1 2002 to 2004  
Point 2 2004 to 2005 
Point 3 2005 to 2008 
 
These timescales represent the four significant dates in the CPA lifecycle.  Its 
introduction, the first framework, the second framework and the end of the process.  
Despite changes to the methodology, it is useful to identify the broad scoring between 




The scoring farmework was used to identify movements between rankings for each 
local authority. For example if a local authority’s score was poor (or 1) in 2002 and 
weak (or 2) in 2004.  It would have increased by +1.  If it rose to fair (or 3) in 2005 
then this would represent a further +1 and if it subsequently fell back to weak in 2008, 
it would then have reduced by –1.  Overall this local authority would have experienced 
an increase of CPA score of +1 between 2002 and 2008 (a net increase from poor to 
weak (or 1 to 2)). 
 
With regards to the overall high level analysis, which includes all local authorities 
whether they were failing or not, a total of 37 potential trajectories were identified for 
the 149 STCCs analysed.  For some of these only one council took that particular 
trajectory.  However, for others a number of councils followed the same trajectory.  
For analysis purposes, each trajectory was given a coded number between 1 and 37.  
Those trajectories displayed by more than 3 local authorities are shown in the graphs 
below.  It should be noted that while the trajectory may be the same for each local 
authority they may in fact have started from different points.  For example, the most 
common trajectory was number 8, which showed no improvement between each or 
any of the assessment points.  26 local authorities followed this trajectory, however, 
Thurrock Council started from a CPA score of 3, whereas Bath and North East 
Somerset started from a score of 4. 
 
Within the trajectories, shown in Figure 15 below, there are some interesting aspects, 
which may be of use to future researchers in this subject area.  For example, types 5 
and 7 actually show a reduction in performance that is not recovered from.  It would 
be interesting to establish the reasons for this as a total of 12 councils exhibited this 
trajectory.  Furthermore, trajectory types 9, 13, 22, 23 and 33, which account for 61 
local authorities all display different forms of improvement from the early starters who 
levelled off soon into the process (types 22 and 33), to those who took longer to start 
improving (types 13 and 23), and those who left it till the end (type 9).  Finally, there 
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are also those that showed some initial improvement before returning to a lower level 
of performance.  These are represented by types 17, 18 and 26.  Of these, type26 is 
most notable as it represents a two-category increase in performance initially followed 
by a two-category decline. Future research projects would be able to develop this 
analysis further to identify the potential impact of the change in CPA methodologies – 
to establish whether this helped or hinder the performance scores of the local 
authorities. 
Figure 24: STCC – General CPA Movement Curves 2002 to 2008  
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Detailed level Analysis on target populations – i.e. those displaying 
turnaround characteristics  
 
The next stage in the analysis was to examine the more detailed content of the CPA 
datasets in order to establish which local authorities, if any, displayed turnaround 
characteristics and whether there was any evidence within the data sets to suggest a 
relationship between the different sub-elements that had been used to formulate the 
overall CPA score.  The sub-elements of the CPA data sets have been described under 
the CPA Methodology section earlier in the document and these were different both 
between the STCC and district councils, and the different time periods of the CPA 
process meaning that the analysis itself has had to be undertaken across different CPA 
methodologies and time periods.  In this section, the analysis will establish whether or 
not any of these sub-elements played a part in contributing to poor or weak 
performance initially and then helped contribute to the improved performance in the 
local authorities identified. 
 
The first stage of this process was to identify those councils that could be described as 
having experienced turnaround during the period of CPA.  Due to the content of the 
CPA data sets this had to be done in a different way for STCC and District Councils and 
each type of local authority will be taken in turn. 
 
Single Tier and County Councils – Detailed Analysis 
 
In order to establish local authorities displaying turnaround characteristics, it was 
necessary to use spreadsheets to reorder the base Audit Commission data sets.  This 
was done over three time periods: 
 
• An overall analysis between 2002-2008 
• For the first CPA methodology between 2002-2004 
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• For the second CPA methodology between 2005-2008 
 
 A comparison between 2002 and 2008 is included in the analysis as it gives an 
overview of the complete CPA time period and therefore provides a useful insight 
despite the changes to the CPA methodology referred to in earlier sections of the 
document.   
 
In order to identify potential turnaround organisations two rules were established by 
which to undertake the analysis.  The rules were determined in accordance with the 
definition of a turnaround organisation put forward in the literature review, ‘a process 
that takes a company (or local authority) from a situation of poor performance to a 
situation of good sustained performance’ (Brandes and Brege 1993, p92). (Document 
2). The first rule was that for a local authority to be deemed to be exhibiting poor 
performance it must have initially scored poor or weak on the CPA framework. For it to 
have moved to a position of improved performance it must have moved up at least two 
categories into the fair category or good or excellent categories if it started with a 
score of poor, or have moved up 3 categories if it started out with weak.  Using these 
rules, 15 STCCs were initially as potential turnaround organisations.  
 
A single spreadsheet was complied for each of the above time periods by aggregating 
the information contained in each of the annual published data from the Audit 
Commission.  This involved cutting and pasting the data from the source documents 
into the spreadsheets and therefore to verify the accuracy of the data transfer, an 
‘audit’ was undertaken to cross check the data back to its source.  This revealed very 
few problems with the data transfer, the only real issue worthy of mention was that the 
descriptive name of the local authority in some cases was slightly different between 
years in the audit commission source data meaning that the data when copied over 




The spreadsheets contained all of the CPA data for each local authority for each of the 
years of the CPA process including the overall CPA score and the sub-element scores 
(eg Improvement, Education, Use of resources etc).  Using the scoring frame referred 
to earlier in the document, the CPA scores were recategorised as being 1,2,3,4 or 5 
depending on the original CPA classification to enable the analysis to be undertaken. 
Initially, some basic comparisons were undertaken on the spreadsheet data to identify 
the year- on- year movement between the various scores and the overall movement 
between the start and end point of the respective time period.  Using the rules 
established to identify potential turnaround local authorities described to earlier, it was 
then possible to re-order the data according to the relative CPA score and movement 
between years to identify those local authorities that would be analysed further. 
 
Having reordered the data it was then possible to focus on those local authorities 
displaying turnaround characteristics according to the rules identified above.  From this 
initial analysis, 15 local authorities were identified for the period 2002-2008, 11 
authorities for the period 2002-2004 and 11 authorities for the period 2005-2008.  It 
should be noted that on the whole the local authorities were different between the two 
time periods 2002-2004 and 2005-2008.  While there were some authorities that 
appeared in both the 2002-2008 and 2002-2004 and the 2002-2008 and 2005-2008 
lists, only two local authorities, Bury and Wakefield, appeared in all three lists.  The 
STCC local authorities identified as displaying turnaround characteristics are given in 
Table 4 below.  These local authorities will be used as the basis for identifying potential 
case study organisations for the qualitative analysis in document 3. 
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Table 4: STCC Local Authorities Displaying Turnaround Characteristics 
2002-2008 2002-2004 2005-2008 
   
  Barking & Dagenham 
Bedfordshire  Bedfordshire 
Bromley Bromley  
Bury Bury Bury 
Coventry Coventry  
Ealing   
East Sussex East Sussex  
Enfield   
Hackney  Hackney 
  Havering 
Islington Islington  
Kingston-upon-Hull  Kingston-upon-Hull 
Lambeth   
Merton  Merton 
  North East Lincolnshire 
North Tyneside North Tyneside  
  Sefton 
 South Tyneside  
 Southwark  
 Torbay  
Wakefield Wakefield Wakefield 
Waltham Forest  Waltham Forest 
 Windsor & Maidenhead  
 
Initially the performance trajectory was analysed for potential turnaround STCCs to 
establish whether any common trends emerged for the 2002-2008 timeframe.  These are 
shown in the performance trajectory graphs that follow in Figure 16.  As can be seen, a 
range of trajectories were followed by the turnaround local authorities and no common 
pathway emerged.  The trajectories were once again classified by type (A to J) and the 
most frequent types were trajectories C and J which each corresponded to 3 local 
authorities. The variety of trajectories followed, shows that there is no single route 
followed by the STCCs and as such the results of this part of the analysis concludes that a 
range of approaches and timescales were experienced by STCC and this will have been a 




Figure 25: STCC Turnaround Authority Improvement Curves 2002 to 2008 
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Analysis of Sub-Element Scores 
 
The next stage was to analyse the local authorities identified above according to the 
changes in sub-element score across the three timeframes.  This was only done for 
those local authorities displaying turnaround characteristics, as these are the only ones 
relevant to the focus of this study as identified earlier in the document.  This analysis 
sought to identify whether or not there were any relationships between the relative 
performance of the three groups of local authorities across the range of relevant sub-
elements for each local authority. In order to do this a measure of correlation needed 
to be established that could be used with ordinal data.  Usual methods of correlation 
are not appropriate for ordinal data as they are parametric measures and require the 
use of interval or ratio data (Anderson et al 1990, Shah and Madden 2003).  Ordinal 
data is ranked data and does not display an interval between observations that can be 
expressed as a fixed unit of measurement as for interval or ratio data. As it is 
inappropriate to compute means, variances and standard deviations for ordinal data, 
the normal rules of parametric methods break down.  While this limits the type and 
amount of analysis that can be performed on ordinal data, it is possible through the 
use of non-parametric methods to analyse it (Anderson et al 1990, Bryman and Bell 
2003, Shah and Madden 2003).  A suitable method of correlation that can be used on 
ordinal data is the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (rs) and referred to as the 
Spearman rho (Anderson et al 1990, Bryman and Bell 2003).  The formula for the 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient is as follows: 
 
rs = 1 - 6Σ di 2 
         n(n2 – 1) 
 
Where: 
n = the number of items or individuals being ranked 
Xi = the rank of item i with respect to one variable 
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Yi = the rank of item i with respect to a second variable 
di = Xi - Yi 
 
This method of correlation allows for the identification of a measure of association 
between two variables when the data is ordinal.  For the purposes of this analysis the 
correlation was performed to establish whether such an association existed within the 
data between the overall CPA score of a local authority (variable 1) and the individual 
sub-elements for a given year (variously treated as variable 2).  The correlation was 
performed for each sub-element in each year and separate analysis was performed for 
each of the three time periods referred to above.  The analysis was undertaken using 
the SPSS Statistical computer package and required the establishment of a number of 
databases within the package in order that the raw data could be imported from the 
spreadsheets referred to above. 
 
The Spearman rho was undertaken using bi-variate analysis and was used in two ways.  
Firstly, the analysis sought to establish whether there was any relationship between 
the CPA score variable and the sub-element variables for the full range of local 
authorities in each of the three time periods. This will be referred to as the grouped 
analysis.  Secondly, the analysis was undertaken to measure any relationship between 
the CPA score and the sub-elements for each individual local authority over the 
respective time period.  This will be referred to as the individual analysis. In both 
cases, the CPA sub-elements were used as described in discussion of the CPA 
methodology given earlier.  For the 2002–2008 time period, only a limited number of 
sub-elements could be used which are deemed to have general relevancy across the 





• Ability to Improve (Improvement) 




• Use of Resources 
 
For the other time periods the following sub elements were used. 
 
2002-2004 
• Ability to Improve (Improvement) 
• Education 
• Social Care – Adults 




• Libraries and Leisure 
• Use of Resources 
 
2005-2008 
• Ability to Improve (Improvement) – now called the corporate assessment 
• Children and Young People 





• Use of Resources 
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For 2005-2008 more detailed information was available across this time period for the 
Use of Resources score broken down by its own sub-elements.  This allowed the 
Spearman rho analysis to be undertaken for any relationship that may exist between 
the Use of Resources (variable 1) and the sub-elements (variously variable 2) as 
follows: 
 
2005-2008 Use of resources 
• Financial Reporting 
• Financial Management 
• Financial Standing 
• Internal Control 
• Value for Money 
 
The Spearman rho calculation gives a correlation coefficient that is the same in 
principle as the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient (Bryman and Bell 2003) and will give 
a value between –1 and +1.  A zero value indicates that there is no relationship 
between the two variables where-as a value of –1 or +1 indicates a perfect relationship 
between the two variables either negative or positive respectively.  When interpreting 
the strength of the relationship indicated by the correlation coefficients, the following 




Table 5: Rough guide to interpreting correlation coefficients (Source: 
Rowntree (1991:170) in Fisher 2004) 
 
Correlation Coefficient (+ or -) Strength of Relationship 
0.0 to 0.2 Negligible 
0.2 to 0.4 Weak 
0.4 to 0.7 Moderate 
0.7 to 0.9 Strong 
0.9 to 1.0 Very Strong 
 
Another useful tool in analysing the correlation coefficient is the coefficient of 
determination (r2). By squaring the correlation coefficient and multiplying by 100 to 
give a percentage, the resulting coefficient of determination expresses how much of 
the variation in one variable is due to the other variable (Bryman and Bell 2003). For 
example a Spearman rho of 0.2 would indicate a weak or negligible relationship in the 
table above and would result s in an r2 of 0.04 (4%) indicating that only 4% of the 
change in variable 1 is accounted for by variable 2.  This means that other variables 
have a greater impact in the change in variable 1. Conversely a Spearman rho of 0.7 
would indicate a strong relationship in the table above and give an r2 of 49% meaning 
that 51% of the change in variable 1 is not accounted for by variable 2. A Spearman 
rho of 0.708 gives an r2 of 50%. For the purposes of this analysis using the table above 
and the r2 as a guide, a Spearman rho of 7 or above will generally be taken as 
indicating a strong relationship between the variables.  As a secondary guide, 
Spearman rho between 0.6 and 0.7 will also be considered as a weaker but never the 
less moderate to strong indication that a relationship exists, especially if there are 
multiple variables within the analysis displaying this relationship.  This is not true 





Finally, it is important to note that the Spearman rho is a measure of correlation and 
will only identify the relative strength of any relationship that exists between the CAP 
score and the sub-elements.  It does not on its own represent a cause and effect 
relationship (Anderson et al 1990, Bryman and Bell 2003), but rather will be used as a 
start point for further investigation to e undertaken in the next stage of this DBA study 
(Document 3) 
 
The Grouped Analysis 
 
This part of the analysis sought to establish whether there was a relationship between 
the overall CPA score and the CPA sub-elements across all local authorities in a given 
time frame.  In this way, it would be possible to identify whether or not changes in a 
particular CPA sub–element, or sub-elements, had a potential impact on changes in the 
overall CPA score.  In this case the specific changes of interest would be whether an 
improvement in the CPA score correlated to an improvement in one or more of the sub 
elements over the respective time periods being examined. The analysis was 
structured so that all sub-elements were correlated to the CPA score for a given year 
across the three time frames. 
 
Within the analysis the variables are as follows; variable 1 is the CPA score in a given 
year and variable 2 is the sub-element score in a given year.  The hidden variable is 
the local authority across the respective local authority group (Anderson et al 1990, 
Bryman and Bell 2003). 
 
The results of this analysis are given in the Table 6 below.  Using the interpretation 
approach referred to above significant relationships are highlighted in yellow. It is 
important to note for this part of the analysis the impact of timing.  The local 
authorities selected for the analysis have been chosen because they demonstrated a 
low CPA score at the start of the time period and a relative high CPA score at the end 
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of the time period and as such the CPA scores are generally improving (increasing) in 
each successive year, and certainly will have increased by the end of the time period.  
As such, a strong positive correlation between the CPA score and the sub-elements in 
each successive year would indicate that as the CPA score increases/improves so does 
the sub-element score.  Conversely, a negative correlation would indicate that as the 
CPA increases the sub-element score decreases.   
 
It can be seen from the analysis that the ability to improve sub-element (IMP) was the 
only one to show a consistent, moderate to strong relationship to the CPA score 
throughout all eight years of CPA and across each of the three time frames.  The 
Spearman rho for ability to improve varies between positive 0.627 and 0.915 indicating 
that as the CPA score increased, so did the ability to improve score.  Therefore, this 
sub element is of interest to follow up in the next stage of the research.  Unfortunately, 
the detailed breakdown of the ability to improve score is not available form the 
published data so no further quantitative analysis can be performed at this stage.  
However, this aspect will be one that can be pursued in more depth through qualitative 
analysis in Document 3. 
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With the exception of Use of Resources, the remaining sub-elements appear to have 
little individual impact on the CPA score.  Many of the sub–element scores show a 
negligible or weak relationship to the CPA score.  In 2006 the Social Care – Adults and 
the Housing sub-elements gave a moderate to strong relationship but as this is only in 
one year it is difficult to draw an interpretation from this overall.  The only remaining 
sub-element of interest across the eight years of CPA is the Use of Resources score.  
While this does not show as consistently strong relationship as the ability to improve 
sub-element, it does never the less show a moderate positive relationship in four of the 
SINGLE TIER AND COUNTY COUNCILS
Grouped Correlations 2002-2008
CPA02 CPA02 IMP02 SCA02 HOU02 ENV02 BEN02 UOR02
Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .874** -.080 -.309 -.017 .000 .509
N = 15 CPA03 CPA03 IMP03 SCA03 HOU03 ENV03 BEN03 UOR03
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .867** -.121 -.276 -.069 -.013 .637*
CPA04 CPA04 IMP04 SCA04 HOU04 ENV04 BEN04 UOR04
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .569* .206 .179 .369 .185 .652**
CPA05 CPA05 IMP05 SCA05 HOU05 ENV05 BEN05 UOR05
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .915** -.050 .018 .052 .151 .395
CPA06 CPA06 IMP06 SCA06 HOU06 ENV06 BEN06 UOR06
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .746** .109 .074 .168 -.032 .392
CPA07 CPA07 IMP07 SCA07 HOU07 ENV07 BEN07 UOR07
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .387 .000 .221 .000 .000 .354
CPA08 CPA08 IMP08 SCA08 HOU08 ENV08 BEN08 UOR08
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .707** .387 .218 .000 -.018 .277
SINGLE TIER AND COUNTY COUNCILS
Grouped Correlations 2002-2004
Spearman's rho CPA02 CPA02 IMP02 ED02 SCA02 SCC02 ENV02 HOU02 BEN02 LL02 UOR02
N=11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .735* .082 .180 .128 .187 -.021 .137 .560 .625*
CPA03 CPA03 IMP03 ED03 SCA03 SCC03 ENV03 HOU03 BEN03 LL03 UOR03
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .743** .503 .039 .537 -.085 -.229 -.190 .354 .334
CPA04 CPA04 IMP04 ED04 SCA04 SCC04 ENV04 HOU04 BEN04 LL04 UOR04
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .809** -.036 .162 .067 .041 .214 -.089 .211 -.067
SINGLE TIER AND COUNTY COUNCILS
Grouped Correlations 2005-2008
Spearman's rho CPA05 CPA05 IMP05 CYP05 SCA05 HOU05 ENV05 CUL05 BEN05 UOR05
N = 11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .221 .332 .727* .630* .285 .299 .103 .334
CPA06 CPA06 IMP06 CYP06 SCA06 HOU06 ENV06 CUL06 BEN06 UOR06
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .690* .268 .134 -.129 .386 .039 .035 .690
CPA07 CPA07 IMP07 CYP07 SCA07 HOU07 ENV07 CUL07 BEN07 UOR07
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .627* .339 .000 .304 .000 .267 -.267 .391
CPA08 CPA08 IMP08 CYP08 SCA08 HOU08 ENV08 CUL08 BEN08 UOR08
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .724* . .472 .269 .000 .535 -.197 .561
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eight years across each time frame grouping. On a more detailed level, it is interesting 
to note that between 2002 and 2004, the use of resources score had a positive 
correlation of 0.625 in 2002 indicating that there was a moderate positive relationship 
with the poor CPA score, as such the use of resources score would also have been poor 
for the group of local authorities.  By 2004 however, the grouped use of resources 
relationship with the CPA score had become negligible, suggesting that the 
improvement in CPA score was more likely due to improvements in other sub-
elements.  Between 2005 and 2008 a different picture emerges, with the use of 
resources score having a moderate, or borderline moderate positive relationship to the 
CPA score, and therefore it too was improving over the time period.  This may be a 
factor of the change in emphasis given by the audit commission to use of resources in 
this second time period of CPA.  Indeed the re-categorisation of the use of resources 
into a level 1 assessment meant that local authorities would find it difficult to improve 
the overall CPA score if they had not improved their use of resources score.  As such, 
this relationship within the analysis may be a function of this change in CPA 
methodology, meaning that those local authorities selected in this part of the study 
would include a number who had managed to improve their use of resources score.  
This is another issue that will be followed up in the next stage of the research 
(document 3). 
 
Generally, it must be concluded that only the ability to improve score and, to a lesser 
extent, use of resources sore demonstrate what may be considered a potential 
relationship to the CPA score. The other sub-elements do not show a strong enough 
correlation to the CPA score to demonstrate that any relationship exists for them at the 
group level. 
 
Finally in this part of the analysis, detailed data is available within the CPA data 
sets for use of resources scores during the 2005-2008 time period (but not 
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2002-2004) giving the individual sub-elements used to make up the use of 
resources score.  Given the findings given above, further analysis was 
undertaken to establish whether there was any relationship at the grouped 
level between the 5 sub-elements that were used to make up the use of 
resources score.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 7.   
 








This analysis shows that in two years, two of the sub elements showed a 
perfect positive correlation to the use of resources score, internal control in 
2008 and financial management in 2006.  Indeed, over the 4 year period, all 
sub-elements showed at least a strong relationship to the use of resources 
score in at least one of the years. However, from this it can be only concluded 
that for the group of local authorities, no single sub-element contributed to the 
improvement in the use of resources score over the four-year period.  This will 
be examined further in the next section of this document and will also form 
part of the next stage research study (document 3). 
 
The Individual Analysis 
 
In this part of the analysis, each local authority is examined individually.  Each sub-
element is compared to the overall CPA score for each of the years relevant to the 
CORRELATION WITHIN UOR 2005 TO 2008
Spearman's rho UOR05 UOR05 FINR05 FINM05 FINS05 IC05 VFM05
N = 11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .348 .882** .304 .773** .548
UOR06 UOR06 FINR06 FINM06 FINS06 IC06 VFM06
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .798** 1.000** .100 .449 .828**
UOR07 UOR07 FINR07 FINM07 FINS07 IC07 VFM07
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .577 .389 .553 .241 .516
UOR08 UOR08 FINR08 FINM08 FINS08 IC08 VFM08
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .561 . .742** 1.000** .516
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respective time periods.  Again the Spearman rho is used as a measure of ranked 
correlation, and the rules regarding significance are the same as those applied in the 
previous section.  Furthermore, the analysis is again conducted over the three time 
periods of 2002-2008, 2002-2004 and 2005-2008.  The purpose of this part of the 
analysis is to look in more detail at any potential relationships that may exist within the 
data, but this time at an individual local authority level. At a grouped level, the 
previous section showed potential relationships for the ability to improve and use of 
resources scores, but could not conclude that a relationship existed for the other sub-
element scores for each group of local authorities.  The individual analysis here 
examines the data from a different perspective.  Each local authority is examined in 
turn across each of the CPA variables for all relevant years.  In this way, the analysis 
will show whether or not any potential relationships exist between the sub-elements at 
an individual local authority level.  Given the findings of the previous section on 
grouped data, it would be expected that each local authority is likely to display a 
different mix of variables that could present a strong relationship to CPA improvement.  
Again, it is important to point out that because for the local authorities being 
examined, CPA scores are improving over the time period, then a positive correlation 
will indicate a corresponding improvement in sub-element score and negative 
correlation a reduction in the sub-element score. 
 
Within this part of the analysis the variables are as follows; variable 1 is the CPA score 
for a local authority and variable 2 is the sub-element score in a local authority.  The 
hidden variable is the year across the respective time period (Anderson et al 1990, 
Bryman and Bell 2003). 
 
Due to the size of the tables involved, the results of this analysis are given in 
Appendices A, B and C at the end of the document.  Significant Spearman rho 
correlation coefficients (ie those greater than 0.6) are highlighted in yellow to give a 




The first part of the individual analysis looks at the time period between 2002 and 
2004 and the results are given in Appendix A.  The first striking outcome from the 
analysis is that for a number of the CPA sub-elements, a blank spearman rho 
correlation coefficient has been returned for many of the local authorities.  This relates 
to those CPA elements where the sub-element score was constant throughout he time 
period.  As such it will have no correlation to the increasing CPA score and hence the 
blank return. The next observation to make from the analysis is that for all of the local 
authorities, except East Sussex, a number of sub-elements have shown a strong to 
very strong correlation with the CPA score. Indeed, in some cases sub-elements have a 
perfect correlation of 1 showing that they are moving in direct relation to the CPA score 
improvement. As would be expected from the previous group analysis, there is no 
common pattern among the individual local authorities, other than the majority (7 out 
of the 11) showing a strong or very strong correlation between CPA score and ability to 
improve. Two local authorities have shown a strong or very strong correlation in the 
majority of the sub-elements (Islington and Bury with 6 and 7 out of 9 respectively), 
and a further two have shown a strong correlation in 5 out of 9 of the sub-elements 
(Southwark and Wakefield).  With regards to the sub-elements, the frequency of 
significant correlations is given in Table 8 below.  This shows that ability to improve 
appears most as a strong to very strong correlation (7 times), Social Care- Adults, 
Environment, Benefits and Use of Resources appear the second most frequently (6 





Table 8: Frequency of significant correlations by Local Authority – 2002-2004 
CPA Sub-Element Frequency (out of 11) 
Ability to Improve 7 
Social Care - Adults 6 
Environment 6 
Benefits 6 
Use of Resources 6 
Education 5 
Social Care- Children 4 
Housing 2 
Libraries and Leisure 2 
 
The second year group is the 2005 to 2008 time period and the results of this analysis 
are shown in Appendix B.  This analysis shows both the relationship between the CPA 
and the sub-elements and also, following on form the findings of the grouped analysis, 
the relationship between the Use of Resources Score and its sub-elements.  The Use of 
Resources analysis is on the right hand side of the table in Appendix B.  Once again, 
there is no clear common pattern of correlations across each of the local authorities 
and many local authorities display a strong or very strong correlation for a number of 
the sub-elements (the first row for each local authority in the table in the appendix).   
With regards to the sub-elements the frequency distribution of the significant 
correlations is given in Table 9 below.  This shows that once again ability to improve 
appears the most frequently at 9 times out of 11.  However, for this time period the 
use of resources sub-element also appears 9 times out of 11 with each of the other 
sub-elements being 6 or below. It also demonstrates that as the CPA score is 
increasing year on year, so must be the use of resources score. The increase in the 
frequency of use of resources from 6 to 9 between the two time periods mirrors the 
findings regarding this sub element in the grouped analysis section and re-affirms that 
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this sub-element is worth examining further in the next phase of the research project 
(document 3).   
 
Table 9: Frequency of significant correlations by Local Authority – 2005-2008 
 
CPA Sub-Element Frequency (out of 11) 
Ability to Improve 9 




Children and Young People 4 
Culture 4 
Social Care - Adults 2 
 
Taking the use of resources theme further, the analysis in Appendix B also shows the 
relationship between the sub-elements to the use of resource score.  This is the third 
row for each local authority in the table and is analysed in the five right hand columns.  
Again, yellow shading represents a significant correlation.  From the array of data, it 
can be seen that no common pattern of relationships exists across all f the local 
authorities for the use of resources sub–elements.  One local authority, Befordshire, 
shows a strong to very strong correlation for all of the sub-elements but the others 
again have individual patterns.  Once again the frequency distribution of significant 
correlations is given in Table 10 below and this provides a useful insight not revealed 
immediately by the array in the Appendix.   
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Table 10: Frequency of significant correlations for Use of Resources 2005-
2008 
Use of Resources Sub-Element Frequency (out of 11) 
Financial Management 8 
Financial Standing 7 
Internal Control 6 
Value for Money 5 
Financial Reporting 3 
 
The table also shows that Financial Reporting has the lowest frequency of strong 
correlations to an improving use of resources score.  This is perhaps not surprising 
given the audit scrutiny and national emphasis that there has been in over the years 
on the production of timely financial accounts for the organisation (Jones and 
Pendlebury, 2000).  What is more surprising is the high frequency attributed to 
financial management and financial standing. The two sub-elements that appear most 
frequently are Financial Management (8 times out of 11) and Financial Standing (7 
times out of 11).  It is these sub-elements that are showing the strongest relationship 
to the use of resources score, which is itself improving year on year (as shown earlier).  
These then are two specific areas that can be examined further as a line of enquiry in 
the next phase of the research. 
 
The District Councils 
 
The analysis of the district councils has been constrained by the availability of the data 
within the CPA data set. Because of the way in which the inspections were undertaken, 
and the subsequent reports were issued, there is only data available for the start of the 
process (2002/2003 for district councils) and the end of the process (2008).  Unlike 
STCC, there were no annual inspections, but rather district councils applied for a 




Using the same rules that were applied to the STCC, 24 district councils were identified 
as potential turnaround organisations.  The 24 local authorities identified are shown in 
Table 11 below along with their CPA score at the start and end of CPA and the 
movement in score.  As discussed previously in the document, the revised District 
Council CPA methodology established in 2006 did not make wholesale changes to the 
approach undertaken to scoring.  As such, it was not as critical to treat the two time 
periods differently as it was for STCCs. 
 
Table 11: District Councils displaying turnaround characteristics 
 
Council CPA 2002/03 CPA 2008 MOVEMENT 
Castle Point 1 4 3
Chester-Le-Street 1 4 3
Harlow 1 4 3
North Shropshire 1 4 3
Rossendale 1 4 3
Torridge 1 4 3
North East Derbyshire 2 5 3
Selby 2 5 3
Tunbridge Wells 2 5 3
Teesdale 1 3 2
Castle Morpeth 2 4 2
Congleton 2 4 2
Corby 2 4 2
East Lindsey 2 4 2
Mansfield 2 4 2
North Dorset 2 4 2
Nuneaton and Bedworth 2 4 2
Ribble Valley 2 4 2
Rochford 2 4 2
Shepway 2 4 2
Stratford-on-Avon 2 4 2
Watford 2 4 2
Weymouth 2 4 2
Wyre 2 4 2
 
A further limitation to data is that the detailed analysis of sub-elements can only be 








• Performance Management 
• Achievement 
 
The Use of resources scores were only added part way through the process and 
therefore cannot be used for comparing between the two points in time as they did not 
exist at the start of CPA for district councils. 
 
The analysis for the District Councils was also undertaken on a grouped and individual 
basis in the same way as for STCCs.  The results are given in Appendix D, E and F. 
Appendix D shows the grouped analysis for the district councils using the Spearman 
rho to calculate the correlation coefficient between the CPA score and the sub-elements 
for each district council.  Significant relationships are again highlighted in yellow.  The 
analysis in Appendix D shows that only one sub-element in one year showed a 
significant relationship to the CPA score and this was the Capacity score in first year.  
Other than that, very few of the other sub-element scores are higher than weak.  This 
shows that while all the sub-elements are positively correlated to the CPA Score at the 
start of the process, only the Capacity sub-element has any form of relationship in the 
data to the CPA score.  For the 2008 year, non of the sub-elements score more than 
0.490 and many are below 3.0 demonstrating that there was a weak relationship 
between CPA score and sub-element score in 2008.  There is no evidence that a rise in 
CPA score is matched by a strongly correlating sub-element score and as such the only 
conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that no one sub-element had 
contributed to the overall improvement in CPA score.  In fact, looking at the raw data 
by means of a time series chart, see Figure 17 below, it can be seen that generally, as 
the CPA score increases, the sub-element scores also increase.  Because the local 
authorities selected were chosen on the basis that their CPA score had gone up 
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significantly between the two time periods, the graphs show a definite uniform 
movement from bottom left to top right.  This would suggest a linear relationship 
between the variables over time, and as such the correlations would perhaps have 
been expected to have been stronger than they have come out at.  Never the less the 
spearman rho does on the whole show positive  
correlations between the CPA score and the sub-elements, even though the 
relationship can only be assessed as weak to moderate. 
 
Finally, the district council data has also been analysed by individual council and the 
results are shown in Appendix E and F.  The majority of spearman rhos are 1.00 which 
either means that many sub-elements for each local authority display a perfect positive 
correlation or the answer is skewed by the very low levels of data available for each 
sub-element.  Given the picture portrayed in the time series graphs above, it can be 
concluded that for poorly performing district councils to have improved, they must 
have made improvements across the range of CPA sub-elements.  This matches the 
conclusion of the grouped data analysis above. 
 
For District Councils, the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis are limited 
by the data available.  However, there does seem to be a common thread that no 
single sub-element was responsible for improvement in the overall CPA score and 
therefore improvement in a wide range of sub-elements is expected.  This will form the 




























Figure 26: Time Series Graphs for District Council CPA  



























This structured analysis has been undertaken on the CPA datasets of the Audit 
Commission between 2002 and 2008 in order to establish: 
 
• A range of local authorities exhibiting turnaround characteristics under the CPA 
framework that could form the basis of a future qualitative study into the 
processes of turnaround within English local authorities; 
• A range of lines of enquiry that could be used to form the basis of the 




It has been seen that the CPA framework, and the data provided by the audit 
commission, form the basis of a socially constructed view of local authority 
performance.  This means that with even though this part of the overall DBA study 
uses quantitative techniques, they have been undertaken within a wider Interpretivist 
methodology in line with the purposes of the study as a whole, rather than the 
traditional hypothetico-deductive approach often employed under a Positivist 
methodology.  Furthermore, the data itself is ordinal in nature meaning that it is not 
possible to undertake the full range of quantitative techniques such as hypothesis 
analysis and deduction.  As such, the analysis and subsequent interpretation of the 
analysis has been undertaken using non-parametric measures that can more 
appropriately be applied to ordinal data within an interpretivist, inductive framework. 
 
The analysis has used secondary data that has been restructured in order to perform 
various quantitative analyses to achieve the above objectives.  The secondary nature 
of the data raises certain methodological issues and it has been argued that given the 
source and nature of the data, these potential issues do not apply in the case of this 
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study and that the analysis conducted here is inline with the original purposes for 
which the data was collected; namely to asses the performance, and improvements in 
performance, of English local authorities.  In order to be able to use the audit 
commission datasets, it was further necessary to explore the way in which the data 
was collected and the meanings attached to the CPA data within the CPA 
methodological framework.  This has identified that in order to undertake the 
quantitative analysis, it was necessary to do this between two local authority groups 
and over two distinct timeframes. This raised a number of issues for the analysis.  
Firstly, the STCCs and the District Councils will need to be treated as separate 
groupings and cannot be directly compared due to the different approaches adopted 
within the CPA methodologies and the different ways and timings in which the data 
was published.  Secondly, for the STCCs the CPA methodology changed in 2005 and as 
such it is not wholly appropriate to directly compare performance for years in different 
CPA methodology timeframes.  The analysis of STCCs therefore provided comparative 
data over three timescales; 2002-2004, 2005-2008 and for information purposes 
2002-2008.  Finally, the district council CPA methodology changes were relatively 
minor and as such allow a more direct comparison between the two methodologies to 
be undertaken between data at the start of the CPA process (2003/04) and at the end 
(2008) in line with the only two datasets available for analysis for district councils.  
 
In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the analysis was undertaken at two 
levels.  Firstly, a high level analysis of all English local authority performance and 
secondly, a more detailed analysis of those local authorities displaying turnaround 
characteristics.  The detailed analysis was further subdivided between a grouped 




High Level Conclusions 
 
From the high level analysis, it can be seen that in general there was an improvement 
in the performance of STCC local authorities during the CPA period as measured by the 
CPA scoring regime.  Initially there were 13 (8.75%) local authorities that were poor 
and 21 (14.09%) that were weak.  By 2008 there were no poorly performing STCCs 
and only 4 (2.68%) that were categorised as weak.  The modal score for STCCs was 4 
for the first six years of CPA rising to 5 for the final year.  This indicates that 
throughout the CPA period, a significant proportion of STCCs were performing at a 
good (3 Star) or excellent (4 Star) level.  As such, performance as a whole can be said 
to have improved during the CPA time period, using the CPA framework as the 
performance measurement tool. 
 
The variety of trajectories identified for STCCs, shows that there is no single route 
followed by the STCCs and as such the results of this part of the analysis concludes 
that a range of approaches and timescales were experienced by STCC and this will 
have been a factor of local circumstances which can usefully be explored in the 
document 3 – the qualitative analysis. 
 
For district councils the analysis shows that while the proportions of district councils 
regarded as poor or weak were initially lower than for STCCs at 3.36% and 12.61% 
respectively, by the end of the CPA regime, there were higher proportions of district 
councils remaining either poor (1 council representing 0.42%), or weak (9 councils 
representing 3.78%).  The modal score for district councils was 3 in the first year of 
assessment, rising to 4 in the final year, showing that overall performance for district 
councils was generally lower than for their STCC counterparts. 
 
 
The reducing proportions of both STCC and district councils falling into the poor and 
weak categories indicates that local authorities that would previously have been 
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deemed to be failing must have improved somewhat as measured by the CPA 
framework and as such there is the potential to identify those that have achieved a 
turnaround position. 
 
As a result of the high level analysis, 24 district councils and, depending on the 
timeframe used, between 11 and 15 STCCs were identified as potential turnaround 
organisations that could be used as case studies in the next part of this DBA study and 
in the final thesis. 
 
The Detailed Analysis 
 
The detailed analysis used a scoring framework developed as part of this research to 
allow for the comparison of local authority performance between and within the various 
CPA timeframes.  The Analysis itself used the Spearman rho correlation of coefficient to 
establish whether or not any potential relationships existed within and between the 
CPA data directly comparing the overall local authority CPA scores and the various sub-
elements used to derive this score. The correlation scores do not directly show cause 
and effect relationships but merely the strength of any relationship that may exist.  As 
such, this analysis provides the start point for further qualitative analysis in document 
3 by providing lines of enquiry that will be worth exploring further in the qualitative 
analysis. 
 
Detailed Grouped Analysis Conclusions 
 
The detailed grouped analysis was undertaken for both STCCS and the district councils 
displaying turnaround characteristics. This analysis sought to establish whether there 
was any evidence to suggest a relationship between improvement in the overall CPA 
score and movements in the various sub-elements used to derive the CPA score. This 
analysis was taken across all of the potential turnaround local authorities identified 
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within each timeframe. From the detailed grouped analysis a number of conclusions 
were drawn. Firstly, the “ability to improve” sub-element showed strong relationship 
with overall CPA score improvement across all of the groups of local authorities 
analysed. Secondly, the “use of resources” sub-element showed a weaker relationship 
with CPA improvement, but was still strong enough to be of further interest. The other 
sub-elements did not show any overall strength of relationship at the grouped level but 
are considered further in the individual analysis below.   
 
The analysis showed that between 2002 and 2004, the “use of resources” score had a 
positive correlation of 0.625 in 2002 indicating that there was a moderate positive 
relationship with the poor CPA score, as such the “use of resources” score would also 
have been poor for the group of local authorities.  By 2004 however, the grouped “use 
of resources” relationship had become negligible, suggesting that the improvement in 
CPA score was more likely due to improvements in other sub-elements.  Between 2005 
and 2008 a different picture emerges, with the “use of resources” score having a 
moderate, or borderline moderate positive relationship to the CPA score, and therefore 
it too was improving over the time period.  This maybe a factor of the change in 
emphasis given by the audit commission to “use of resources” in this second time 
period of CPA.  Indeed the re-categorisation of the “use of resources” into a level 1 
assessment meant that local authorities would find it difficult to improve the overall 
CPA score if they had not improved their “use of resources” score.  As such, this 
relationship within the analysis may be a function of this change in CPA methodology, 
meaning that those local authorities selected in this part of the study would include a 
number who had managed to improve their “use of resources” score.  This is another 
issue that will be followed up in the next stage of the research (document 3). 
 
On a more detailed level, it was possible to analyse the use of resources sub-element  
further between 2005 and 2008.  This analysis shows that in two years, two of the sub 
elements showed a perfect positive correlation to the use of resources score, internal 
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control in 2008 and financial management in 2006.  Indeed, over the 4 year period, all 
sub-elements showed at least a strong relationship to the use of resources score in at 
least one of the years. However, from this it can be only concluded that no single sub-
element contributed to the improvement in the use of resources score over the four-
year period.  This will be examined further in the next section of this document and will 
also form part of the next stage research study (document 3). 
 
Detailed Individual Analysis Conclusions 
 
The detailed individual analysis examined the relationship between improvement in 
CPA score and the various sub-elements for individual local authorities rather than for 
the groups of local authorities. Once again, there is no clear common pattern of 
correlations across each of the local authorities and many local authorities display a 
strong or very strong correlation for a number of the sub-elements.   With regards to 
the sub-elements the frequency distribution of the significant correlations shows that 
once again ability to improve and the use of resources sub-elements show a strong 
potential relationship with overall improvement in CPA score. This re-affirms that these 
sub-elements are worth examining further in the qualitative phase of the research 
project (document 3).   
 
Within the use of resources sub-element at an individual local authority level it was 
also found that Financial Reporting had the lowest frequency of strong correlations to 
an improving use of resources score.  This is perhaps not surprising given the audit 
scrutiny and national emphasis that there has been in over the years on the production 
of timely financial accounts for the organisation.  What is more surprising is that the 
two sub-elements that appear most frequently are Financial Management (8 times out 
of 11) and Financial Standing (7 times out of 11).  It is these sub-elements that are 
showing the strongest relationship to improvements in the use of resources score.  
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These then are two specific areas that can be examined further as a line of enquiry in 
the next phase of the research. 
 
For District Councils, the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis are limited 
by the data available.  However, there does seem to be a common thread that no 
single sub-element was responsible for improvement in the overall CPA score and 
therefore improvement in a wide range of sub-elements is expected.  This will form the 




A range of both STCCs and district councils have been identified for further analysis at 
the qualitative stage of the study in document 3 and the final thesis.  Gaining access to 
these organisations will be a key determinant as to which ones will form the basis of 
future case studies but it is hoped that at least 3 organisations representing a mix of 
STCC and district councils will be able to chosen. 
 
With regards to the lines of enquiry that can usefully be undertaken in the next stage 
of the study, three main issues have emerged.  Firstly, a more detailed analysis of the 
ability to improve sub-element can be undertaken beyond the data contained in the 
CPA datasets.  This sub-element relates directly to the corporate management 
processes of the organisations concerned as such will link directly to the overall 
objectives of the DBA study given in document 1.  Secondly, the use of resources sub 
element will also be worthy of further investigation during the next stage.  A number of 
interesting aspects have arisen form this analysis including the apparent difference in 
impact that use of resources had between the two STCC time periods and the evidence 
from the detailed analysis of the use of resources sub-element between 2005 and 
2008.  This sub-element will also be useful to explore for district councils for which 
there is limited data currently available with in the CPA dataset.  Finally, it has been 
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established that for the remaining sub-elements, there is no evidence for a strong 
relationship existing between these sub-elements and improvement in CPA score.  As 
such each local authority will have experienced different pathways for improvement in 
relation to these sub-elements, if at all, reflecting local circumstances and needs.  This 
local dimension can also be explored further in the next phase of the study within the 
specific case study organisations selected. 
 
Areas for further study 
 
In addition to the findings of this study and those areas identified for further study in 
subsequent documents it has also been identified that there are a number of 
interesting factors arising form the high level analysis of all local authorities.  The main 
findings have been the generally overall good performance of the majority of local 
authorities within the CPA framework.  As such it would be interesting to establish the 
main reasons for this; were many local authorities already well managed or did they 
merely play the game of working within the CPA framework as a measure of good 
performance?  Furthermore, what impact did the change in CPA methodology for 
STCCs have in 2005 onwards?  Did this make it more difficult to achieve and maintain 
good performance? Finally, the CPA score trajectories highlight that local authorities 
undertook a range of trajectories over the lifetime of CPA.  Some maintained 
consistently good performance, while others fluctuated in performance over the 
lifetime of CPA.  For some performance started off as good and then became poor over 
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SINGLE T IER AND COUNTY COUNCILS
Correlations 2002-2004 by Local Authority
Islington CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 .866 .866 .866 . .866 . .866 . .866
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Bromley CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 . . . 1.000 ** -1.000 ** . . . 1.000 **
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Bury CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 . .866 .866 . 1.000 ** 1.000 * * .866 .866 .866
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Coventry CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 1.000 ** . 1.000 ** .500 . . .866 .500 .500
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
East Sussex CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 . . 1.000 ** . .500 . . . .
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
North Tyneside CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 1.000 ** 1.000 ** . . . . .500 . .866
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
South Tyneside CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 1.000 ** . 1.000 ** . -.500 1.000 * * .500 . .500
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Southwark CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 .866 .866 . .866 -.866 . 1 .000 ** . .
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Torbay CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 .866 . . . .000 . .866 .866 .866
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
W akefield CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 .866 . 1.000 ** .866 .866 . .500 . .866
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
W indsor & Maidenhead CPA IM P ED SCA SCC ENV HO U BEN LL UO R
Correlation Coeffic ient 1.000 . 1.000 ** . 1.000 ** 1.000 ** . 1 .000 ** . .
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Correlations
Spearm an's  rho CPA
Spearm an's  rho CPA
Spearm an's  rho CPA
CPA
Spearm an's  rho CPA
Spearm an's  rho
CPA
Spearm an's  rho
Spearm an's  rho





Spearm an's  rho CPA
Spearm an's  rho
Spearm an's  rho
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SINGLE TIER AND COUNTY COUNCILS
Correlations 2005-2008 by Local Authority
Waltham Forest CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .943 . .816 . .889 1.000** .544 . -.544 . .816 . .943
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Barking & Dagenham CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .816 .816 . .833 .816 .000 .816 .816 . . .833 .816 .816
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .816 1.000** .333 . .544 1.000** -.577 .333 1.000 . . .816 1.000** 1.000**
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Bedfordshire CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 1.000** .333 .577 . .816 .000 . .816 .333 .816 .577 .816 1.000**
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .816 .816 .816 .000 . 1.000** .000 . 1.000 .816 .833 .707 1.000** .816
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Bury CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .707 .000 .000 . . -.500 .816 .816 .816 .816 .707 .707 .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .816 .577 .333 -.333 . . -.816 .333 1.000 1.000** 1.000** .577 .577 .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Hackney CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . . . .889 .236 .816 .889 .943 .816 .943 . .943 .544
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .943 . . . .943 .000 .577 .943 1.000 .577 1.000** . 1.000** .577
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Havering CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 1.000** -1.000** . .816 1.000** . . 1.000** .577 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient 1.000** 1.000** -1.000** . .816 1.000** . . 1.000 .577 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Kingston-Upon-Hull CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .816 .707 . .707 .000 .000 .707 .816 .707 .816 .816 .833 .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .816 .333 .577 . .577 .333 .333 .577 1.000 .577 1.000** 1.000** .544 .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Merton CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .816 . . .816 .816 .816 .000 .707 .816 .707 .816 .707 .707
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .707 .577 . . .577 .577 .577 -.577 1.000 .577 1.000** .577 1.000** 1.000**
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
North East Lincolnshire CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . .816 .577 .816 .577 .333 .577 .816 .272 .816 .816 1.000** 1.000**
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .816 . .500 .707 .833 .707 .000 .707 1.000 .500 .833 1.000** .816 .816
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Sefton CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .816 . . .943 . .833 .943 .816 -.544 .236 1.000** .544 .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .816 1.000** . . .577 . .816 .577 1.000 -.333 .577 .816 .333 .
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Wakefield CPA IMP CYP SCA HOU ENV CUL BEN UOR FINR FINM FINS IC VFM
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .816 . .816 -.943 .544 .544 .272 .943 .833 .943 . . .816
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Correlation Coefficient .943 .577 . .577
-1.000** .577 .577 .577 1.000 .707 1.000** . . .577





























SINGLE TIER AND COUNTY COUNCILS
Correlations 2002-2008 by Local Authority
Coventry CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.939** .828* -.214 .756* .566 .076
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Islington CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.872* .676 .637 .886** .834* .637
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Wakefield CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.930** .941** .000 .749 .310 -.196
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Waltham Forest CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.971** .890** . .769* -.371 .813*
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Bedfordshire CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 1.000** .669 . .911** . -.411
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Bromley CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . .725 .678 -.176 .114 .644
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Bury CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .663 .529
.770* .770* .840* .094
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Ealing CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .535
.756* .772* .751 .327 .249
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
East Sussex CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 1.000** . .636 . .000
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Enfield CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.907** .663 .663 .852* .939** -.321
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hackney CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.813* .816* .801* .806* .801* .734
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kingston-Upon-Hull CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.907** .428 .842* -.321 .772* .334
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Lambeth CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.870* .668 .525 .680 .793* .813*
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Merton CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.890** .816* .892** .829* -.519 .223
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
North Tyneside CPA IMP SCA HOU ENV BEN UOR
Correlation Coefficient 1.000
.837* .764* .837* .764* .000 .316




















District Council Correlations by year
DISTRICT COUNCIL CORRELATIONS 
      
         
2003/04     CPA03 AMB03 PRI03 CAP03 PM03 ACH03 
Spearman's rho CPA03 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .324 .559** .654** .542** .289 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
AMB03 Correlation Coefficient .324 1.000 .490* .364 .133 .139 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
PRI03 Correlation Coefficient .559** .490* 1.000 .362 .281 .115 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
CAP03 Correlation Coefficient .654** .364 .362 1.000 .559** .141 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
PM03 Correlation Coefficient .542** .133 .281 .559** 1.000 .067 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
ACH03 Correlation Coefficient .289 .139 .115 .141 .067 1.000 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
2008     CPA08 AMB08 PRI08 CAP08 PM08 ACH08 
Spearman's rho CPA08 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .061 .469* .418* .438* .358 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
AMB08 Correlation Coefficient .061 1.000 .456* .060 -.129 -.490* 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
PRI08 Correlation Coefficient .469* .456* 1.000 .452* .237 -.252 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
CAP08 Correlation Coefficient .418* .060 .452* 1.000 .418* -.275 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
PM08 Correlation Coefficient .438* -.129 .237 .418* 1.000 -.146 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
ACH08 Correlation Coefficient .358 -.490* -.252 -.275 -.146 1.000 





District Council Correlations by Local Authority
District Council CPA scores 
      
  
      
Council   CPA AMB PRI CAP PM ACH 
Castle Point 2003 1 2 2 2 1 2
  2008 4 3 3 2 2 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
Chester-Le-Street 2003 1 2 1 1 1 2
  2008 4 2 2 2 3 3
  rho 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Harlow 2003 1 2 1 1 1 2
  2008 4 3 3 3 2 2
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
North Shropshire 2003 1 1 1 1 1 2
  2008 4 2 2 3 3 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Rossendale 2003 1 1 1 1 1 2
  2008 4 4 3 3 3 2
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
Torridge 2003 1 1 1 1 1 1
  2008 4 4 3 3 3 2
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
North East Derbyshire 2003 2 2 1 2 2 3
  2008 5 3 3 3 3 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
Selby 2003 2 2 2 2 2 3
  2008 5 3 4 3 3 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
Tunbridge Wells 2003 2 2 1 3 2 2
  2008 5 3 3 3 3 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
Teesdale 2003 1 1 1 2 1 3
  2008 3 3 2 2 2 2
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 -1.000
Castle Morpeth 2003 2 1 2 2 2 2
  2008 4 2 3 3 3 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  102 
District Council CPA scores 
      
  
      
Council   CPA AMB PRI CAP PM ACH 
Congleton 2003 2 2 2 2 1 3
  2008 4 3 3 2 2 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  
Corby 2003 2 3 3 2 1 2
  2008 4 3 3 3 2 3
  rho 1.000   1.000 1.000 1.000
East Lindsey 2003 2 1 1 2 1 2
  2008 4 3 2 2 2 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
Mansfield 2003 2 2 2 3 2 2
  2008 4 3 3 2 3 2
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.000 1.000  
North Dorset 2003 2 2 1 2 1 2
  2008 4 3 3 2 2 3
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
Nuneaton and Bedworth 2003 2 2 2 2 1 3
  2008 4 3 2 2 2 3
  rho 1.000 1.000   1.000  
Ribble Valley 2003 2 3 2 2 2 3
  2008 4 3 2 2 2 3
  rho 1.000      
Rochford 2003 2 2 2 2 2 2
  2008 4 2 2 3 2 3
  rho 1.000   1.000  1.000
Shepway 2003 2 1 2 1 1 3
  2008 4 3 3 3 2 2
  rho 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.000
Stratford-on-Avon 2003 2 1 2 2 2 2
  2008 4 2 2 2 3 3
  rho 1.000 1.000   1.000 1.000
Watford 2003 2 3 3 2 2 2
  2008 4 3 3 3 3 2
  rho 1.000   1.000 1.000  
Weymouth 2003 2 3 3 2 1 2
  2008 4 3 3 2 2 3
  rho 1.000    1.000 1.000
Wyre 2003 2 1 2 2 2 2
  2008 4 3 2 2 2 3
  
rho 1.000 1.000      1.000
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This thesis explores the nature of strategic turnaround in English local authorities 
during the period of Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) between 
2002 and 2008. This period was unique in that it allowed the comparative 
performance of local authorities and their management practices using the holistic 
performance management framework of the CPA. Specifically, this study focuses 
on a group of local authorities that were poorly performing at the start of CPA 
era, but had sustained improved performance by the end. It aims to establish the 
turnaround approaches adopted by this group of local authorities, the impact of 
leadership and the extent to which the approaches adopted promoted sustained 
turnaround.  Publicly available CPA information and interviews with senior officers 
of turnaround councils and government lead officials are used to classify and 
analyse the changes in strategic processes. 
 
The thesis adopts a casestudy approach within a managerialist perspective and 
identifies ten approaches to turnaround that can be related to a longitudinal “7Rs” 
framework adapting the work of Boyne (2004) and others. This has been 
developed to include Realisation and Reinforcement at either end of the 
turnaround period. Realisation is required to kick-start the turnaround process 
and Reinforcement to embed the organisational changes necessary to sustain 
improvement over the longer term.  Leadership is a key aspect throughout the 
process, both in terms of introducing new leaders and the adoption of new 
leadership approaches to support and underpin sustainable organisational 
improvement.  Sustained improvement was found to be achievable by poorly 
performing councils.  The study also concludes that there was a continuing 
influence of managerialism, originally associated with new public management, 
throughout the CPA era. 
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This document is the final thesis of a study into the nature of strategic turnaround 
in English local government.  As Document Five, it is the culmination of an in-
depth doctoral study into aspects of strategic turnaround that occurred within a 
group of local authorities between 2002 and 2008.  This time period represents a 
unique era in the performance management of English local government, in that 
it corresponds with the introduction and operation of the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA) of English local government by the UK central 
government.  The CPA was developed and administered by the Audit Commission, 
the Department for Transport Local Government and the Regions (DTLR), the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) and the Department for Local 
Government and Communities (DGLC), and followed the Best Value inspection 
period enshrined in the Local Government Act (Best Value) Act 1999.  It 
represented the first attempt at both the comprehensive and comparative 
evaluation of the performance of all services and activities, including corporate 
and strategic processes, provided by local government organisations (Murphy et 
al, 2011). This comparability, and the associated documentation maintained that 
remains publicly available (Audit Commission, 2006; Audit Commission, 2009), 
gives an excellent opportunity to review various aspects of local government 
performance, management and leadership during the time period.  There is a 
small, but growing, body of academic literature focussed on the CPA era and, in 
support of other commentators, it is timely to undertake a study that makes use 
of the resources available (House of Commons CLG Select Committee 2012, 
Clarke 2008).   
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The thesis builds on the work of earlier studies into local government turnaround 
that were mostly carried out towards the start of the CPA era (Turner et al, 2004; 
Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Wilson and Moore, 2007; 
Beeri, 2009) and were discussed in more depth in the literature review in 
Document Two (Jones, 2008). The focus of this thesis is to explore the 
development of sustainable turnaround approaches by local authorities deemed to 
have been performing badly at the start of the CPA, but that subsequently 
became good or excellent by the end.  This is only one of many possible areas 
that could have been explored and the reasons for this choice of topic are 
discussed in greater detail in preceding documents, primarily Document One 




The objective is to establish the nature of strategic turnaround in the English local 
government sector and its conversion into sustainable strategic practices.  The 
definition of strategic turnaround was discussed in Document Two and is taken to 
be that of Brandes and Brege (1993 p186) namely;  ‘a process that takes an 
organisation from a situation of poor performance to a situation of good sustained 
performance’. The emphasis on sustainability is important (Brandes and Brege, 
1993) as to achieve a short-term improvement in performance, only to slide back 
at some later point in time, would be ineffectual for any organisation.  Previous 
studies focussed on the early years of the CPA era, and as such could not assess 
sustainability to the same extent. By studying organisations that have shown a 
sustained improvement in performance presupposes that changes have occurred 
to the strategic management processes at the heart of those organisations.  It is 
these strategic processes that the thesis is about rather than the specific policies 
and strategies that were introduced.  Strategic processes relate to those 
leadership and management activities and systems that are used within an 
organisation to inform decision-making and change. The study is therefore 
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internally focussed, dealing with the changes to strategic activities under the 
control of local councils, rather than examining the external environmental factors 
that they faced, or the specific policy responses to them.  
 
In order to achieve the overall research objective the following research questions 
were established for this document:  
 
1. What approaches to strategic turnaround were adopted by English local 
authorities?  
 
2. How did leadership impact upon the turnaround of the organisation?  
 
3. To what extent could the approaches to turnaround transfer into 
sustainable local authority improvement? 
 
An Overview of the CPA Era 
 
Previous documents have identified local authorities displaying turnaround 
characteristics and formulated lines of enquiry that could be used to establish the 
underlying causes of poor performance within them. These previous documents 
have considered the development of the CPA framework, its operation and the 
various iterations of its methodology in detail.  Nevertheless, it is useful to 
discuss the main characteristics of the CPA era here. 
 
CPA was a holistic (Jones, 2005) approach to reviewing the management of local 
authorities. As a mechanism, it combined pre-existing service based reviews, 
such as Ofsted inspections and financial audits with, for the first time, an 
assessment of the corporate workings of a local authority (Audit Commission, 
2006 and 2009).  These new aspects were reported periodically by the Audit 
Commission in the form of corporate assessments, which in turn contributed to 
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the overall CPA score of a local authority.  The CPA formed part of the Local 
Government Improvement Programme (LGIP) (Jones, 2005) implemented by the 
New Labour government. It followed on from the Best Value regime introduced in 
1997 and built on the need for local authorities to achieve best value and 
continuous improvement laid down in the Local Government (Best Value) Act 
1999 (Downe et al, 2010). 
 
It is important to recognise that criticisms have been levelled at the CPA regime 
(see Broadbent, 2003; Kelly, 2003; Jones, 2005; Kelly, 2006; and Clark 2008). 
Such criticisms focus on the potentially circulatory nature of CPA (Boland and 
Coleman, 2008) whereby the Government said, the Audit Commission policed and 
councils did; as such ‘you get what you measure’ (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2007 p 
298), or that it was a hierarchical control mechanism that could be used as a 
device to legitimise intervention (Grubnic and Woods, 2009) at the most senior 
levels within a local authority deemed to be poorly performing against the 
Government’s own priorities for change and service improvement. A more 
detailed consideration of these aspects was undertaken in Document Four. 
 
There is also the need to recognise that the CPA was a socially constructed 
(Gergen, 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2003; Fisher, 2004; Jankowicz, 2005) 
performance framework, emerging from the managerialist discourse around 
strategic leadership and new public management (NPM) over the last few 
decades. Rochet (2007 p11) refers to this as “a set of recipes based on neo-
classical principles”.  It is no surprise therefore that some of the lines of enquiry 
pursued in the corporate assessments mirrored strategic management concepts 
inherent within these literatures.  CPA was primarily an administrative discourse 
rather than a political discourse (Joyce, 2012), although it did contain some 
political reference points, for example by considering political leadership. It was 
also a command and control discourse more than a persuade and control 
discourse (Grubnic and Woods, 2009) from a central government perspective. 
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Despite allowing for some interaction and dialogue with stakeholders, there was 
the threat of punitive action should local authorities not tow the line. There is a 
need to recognise that the framework itself was developed collectively by the 
DTLR, ODPM, DCLG, the Audit Commission and the lead officials appointed from 
senior roles in local government.  It was enacted and refined by the Audit 
Commission and the lead officials (through the engagement programme (ODPM, 
2003)) and is therefore only one view of what a local authority should look like.   
The hegemony of the Audit Commission in this process needs also to be 
recognised. Since its creation in 1984, the Audit Commission had become an 
independent expert, an opinion shaper and a mediator within the local 
government/central government network (Kelly, 2003 and 2006).  As such, it was 
able to both directly and indirectly shape approaches to local governance and 
leadership. 
 
Furthermore, the CPA was not necessarily the only model for assessing local 
authority performance. Previous models have existed in the past and new models 
will no doubt emerge in the future, possibly based on a different discourse.  The 
most obvious of these would be to leave the assessment of the corporate 
management of a local authority to the democratic process, rather than 
overlaying ‘administrative’ measurement tools.  Through such an approach, the 
public would get the public services they vote for and local councils would be 
administered under traditional bureaucratic agency relationships (Pollitt, 1990 
and 1993; Hughes, 1998; Gregory, 2007; Greener, 2009). Alternatively, it is 
interesting to note that during the CPA era in England, different models of local 
authority performance improvement were in place in Scotland (Best Value Audits) 
and Wales (Wales Programme for Improvement). Similar claims have been made 
for all three approaches in that they improved corporate capacity within poorly 
performing councils (Downe et al 2010).  Finally, the incoming Coalition 
government of 2010 removed the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) 
regime, the replacement for CPA, before the first results were published.  Other 
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than the national service inspections (Ofsted etc) and the traditional audit and 
inspection regimes, no compulsory holistic method of performance assessment, in 
the sense that CPA attempted, now exists within English local government. The 
discourse is now apparently one of ‘Big Society’, decentralisation and localism. 
 
The Managerialist Perspective of the Study 
 
This thesis has been undertaken within a managerialist perspective.  This term 
has been ascribed different meanings at different times and as such requires 
further explanation regarding its use within the context of this study. 
 
The term new public management (NPM) (Hood, 1991) has come to epitomise 
changes that were externally imposed on public sector organisations by 
successive UK governments.  Managerialism (or managerialist) is the academic 
term that became closely associated with NPM.  While originally a term used in 
the private sector (O’Reilly and Reed, 2010) to denote the separation of control 
from owners to managers, managerialism was co-opted into the public sector 
following the introduction of what is now known as NPM, based on the theory of 
public choice, by many developed democracies in the 1980s.  Although often used 
interchangeably, over time NPM has perhaps come to mean a wider concept than 
managerialism in that it refers to a range of doctrines linked to neo-liberal 
ideologies regarding the shrinking of both the size and influence of the state, the 
primacy of market mechanisms and the introduction of alternative principal/agent 
relationships focussed on the public as consumers.  NPM therefore included 
structural changes such as privatisation, compulsory competition and the 
introduction of quasi-market mechanisms, as well as a focus on outputs and 
outcomes rather than inputs. It challenged and broke down the traditional 
administrative bureaucracies and accountabilities, rooted in public administration 
theory, which characterised many western governments in the 1970s.  Rhodes 
(1991, p1), defined NPM in the following way: 
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“The ‘new public management’ has the following central doctrines: a focus on 
management, not policy, and on performance appraisal and efficiency; the 
disaggregation of public bureaucracies into agencies which deal with each other 
on a user-pay basis; the use of quasi-markets and contracting out to foster 
competition; cost-cutting; and a style of management which emphasises, 
amongst other things, output targets, limited–term contracts, monetary 
incentives and freedom to manage”. 
 
Importantly for this study, NPM consisted of two elements. The “hard” structural 
(and primarily ideological) changes that were driven into the public sector, 
including local government, such as performance measurement, privatisation and 
CCT and the “soft” managerial changes that focussed on the way public bodies 
would be run, but that were more difficult to embed through external imposition. 
Hughes (2003) follows a similar line of argument in distinguishing between two 
separate changes that took place; marketisation and the trend away from 
bureaucracy.   
 
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) point to five external forces acting on public sector 
organisations under NPM that were essentially neo-liberal central government 
impositions of the new rules and structures of NPM. These were; output focussed 
performance indicators, a network of contracts linking incentives to performance, 
the introduction of purchaser/provider functions, competition and the de-
concentration of provider roles to allow users to utilise exit choice.  Within this 
broad NPM framework, Hood (1991) identified a range of common doctrines that 
were more internally focussed (Hughes, 1998), and have relevance to the 
management of local government and the development of the CPA framework.  
Namely; ‘hands on professional management, explicit standards and measures of 
performance, greater emphasis on output controls, a shift to disaggregating, 
greater competition, a stressing of private sector styles of management and 
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greater discipline and parsimony in resource use’ (Hood 1991, p 4-5). 
Managerialism in this context is part of NPM in that it refers to a range of 
management practices to be used within the public sector with the prime 
objective of improving efficiency and effectiveness by giving public sector 
managers the freedom to manage, away from political control.  With the 
exception perhaps of greater competition (although the option for this still 
remained), the remainder of Hood’s doctrines can all be seen to some extent in 
the development of the CPA framework, especially that aspect of it that related to 
corporate assessment. For the purposes of this study therefore, the term 
managerialism, or ongoing managerialism, is used in reference to changes in 
management practices. 
 
The value of NPM, and to some extent managerialism, is contested within the 
literature, for example Hood (2000) refers to a series of paradoxes that 
underpinned NPM and threatened to undermine it. Similarly, others express doubt 
as to whether NPM was ever fully implemented and whether politicians were 
prepared to hand over control to managers (Pollitt, 1990, 2000), or whether such 
separation was even possible (Hughes, 1998). In other words doubting whether 
public administration was ever fully replaced. Critics of NPM in particular, 
question whether the use of markets and the focus on individual choice inherent 
within NPM is appropriate to the equitable development and delivery of public 
policy, or whether the focus on managers rather than policy makers undermines 
agency relationships within the sector. Pollitt (1993), ascribes a more sinister 
meaning to the term “managerialism”, considering the focus on changing 
management practices as a smokescreen by right wing thinkers for restructuring 
the machinery of government and weakening traditional power bases. Despite 
Pollitt’s tendency to use managerialism instead of NPM, there is still the 
recognition of the distinction between structural change and management change 
referred to above.  
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Public Value, which increased in prominence during the 2000s (Beddington and 
Moore, 2011) sought to address some of these issues, but was also based on 
neo-liberalism and emphasised the need for public organisations to have 
appropriate strategic management processes in place to allow them to be 
responsive to changes in the political, demographic and economic environment at 
a national and local level. It can be argued therefore, that aspects of NPM, and 
managerialism in particular, have transcended changes in central political control, 
although their tenets have been adapted over time (Talbot, 2001). Linked to 
Hood’s doctrines, NPM and managerialism in the UK were represented in 
initiatives such as value for money (VFM), The Financial Management Initiative 
(FMI), Best Value (BV), and more latterly CPA.  While some of the elements of 
NPM have been watered down, e.g. competition is no longer compulsory in local 
government, some aspects were strengthened e.g. performance management in 
the form of public service agreements in central government and local public 
service agreements in local government (Talbot, 2001).  There are also those that 
suggest NPM has now stalled and that other reforms are replacing it, digital era 
governance (Dunleavy et al, 2005) for example, or joined up government 
replacing fragmentation, collaboration replacing competition and citizens 
replacing consumers (Newman and KcKee, 2005; Greener, 2009).  Despite this 
movement away from the harder structural elements of NPM, the managerialist 
discourse, and Hood’s more internally focused 1991 perspective, still remain 
within the public management discourse and clearly shaped the thinking of the 
Audit Commission, DCLG and ODPM when the CPA framework was developed and 
rolled out.  CPA’s measurement of KPIs, corporate strategic practices and the use 
of resources underline this.  Any attempt to consider local authority strategic 
processes and measure local authority performance during the CPA era is 
therefore best undertaken within this ongoing managerialist perspective.  The 
wider literature considered within this study as a whole, covering disciplines such 
as strategic turnaround, strategic management, public sector strategy, local 
government and leadership, is closely related to this managerialist discourse. The 
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objectives of this thesis focus on those aspects of strategic turnaround that were 
within the control of local authorities.  It is therefore an analysis of internal 
factors in keeping with Hood’s doctrines and related to the freedom to manage 
part of NPM, rather than the structural impositions.  It also does not focus on 
specific external and environmental factors affecting local authorities, but rather 
the mechanisms that existed and changed within councils to identify and respond 
to such factors.   
 
While recognising the existence of alternative discourses and approaches to local 
authority performance assessment, it is not the purpose of this study to challenge 
the development and operation of the CPA regime per se.  Rather, as has been 
discussed, the focus of the thesis is in identifying those strategic management 
practices and process that changed within local authorities that displayed 
turnaround characteristics.  The CPA is used as a measurement scale within this 
thesis to determine, at least initially, those local authorities that could be said to 
have turned around their performance in a sustainable manner. It also uses a 
conceptual framework developed in Document Two that draws on a range of 
wider theories but that are quite clearly related to managerialism. As such, the 
thesis adopts a realist approach from a managerialist perspective.   
 
It is also important to recognise that the CPA did not exist in isolation.  Its 
development and refinement can be seen as part of a wider range of measures 
that the New Labour government introduced while in power. The positioning of 
CPA within this wider framework is shown in Figure 1, which, although a 
simplification of a complicated set of policies and initiatives, demonstrates the 








The roll out of scrutiny arrangements, community engagement and community 
leadership as well as the planning frameworks offered by Local Public Service 
Agreements, Local Area Agreements and Local Strategic Partnerships all 
overlapped with the introduction and refinement of the CPA regime.  As such, 
some of the learning and improvement that took place within turnaround councils 
was informed and supported by the other initiatives taking place at this time. 
 
The Use of Corporate Assessments  
 
CPA documentation is used to analyse the changes in strategic management 
practices reported by the Audit Commission through the corporate assessments. 
These corporate assessments provide a snap shot of the performance and activity 
of the corporate core of a local authority at three distinct points in time; at the 
start of CPA (2002 for STCCs and 2004 for district councils), at the end of CPA in 
2008 and for some councils interim reporting was undertaken in or around 2004.  
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While not necessarily a definitive nor impartial historical record, the corporate 
assessments are useful in tracking the changes introduced and the outputs 
achieved. The focus on the corporate activities of local authorities means that 
they are well suited for this study, focussing as it does on the nature of strategic 
turnaround and changes to strategic processes.  The detailed use of the CPA 
assessment scores and the corporate assessments is discussed further in the 
following sections. 
 
The Role of Government Lead Officials (GLOs) 
 
Government Lead Officials (GLOs) were local authority senior officials (usually 
CEOs or Deputy CEOs) who had been appointed by the ODPM/DTLR (and more 
latterly the DLGC) to play an intervention and advisory role to poorly performing 
local authorities.  This process was termed engagement, which could be of 
varying degrees depending on the severity of the problems faced. Their roles and 
responsibilities were set out in practice guidance for lead officials (ODPM, 2003). 
Effectively GLOs were the first point of contact for poorly performing councils 
after receiving a poor or weak inspection.  They were not responsible directly for 
turning around the council (although did hold certain powers), but rather offered 
an advisory role to councils in addition to reporting back on progress to the Local 
Government Minister. They were in essence both critical friends and watchdogs 
and their involvement with the council ceased when it was deemed to be on a 
recovery trajectory. Their initial involvement in the turnaround process, however, 
made them a valuable source for this study. 
 
 
The Case Study Councils 
 
A large part of the analysis for this study was based on the Audit Commission 
corporate assessment reports for 23 turnaround councils and interviews with two 
GLOs.  From this, ten themes were identified as being the main approaches to 
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turnaround adopted by English local authorities.  These ten themes are used in 
Section 3 to explore the experiences of three councils in more depth.  While not 
full case studies in the traditional sense (Bryman, 2008; Gray, 2004; Jankowicz, 
2005; Yin, 2002), the unit of analysis is the council as a discrete body, offering 
the opportunity to provide comparative and multiple-holistic case analysis (Gray, 
2004).   This holistic approach allows the 10 CPA turnaround themes to be 
compared across councils to explore the findings of the document analysis and 
GLO interviews within specific organisational contexts.  The cases of the three 
councils were developed using elite interviews and the corporate assessment and 
CPA documentation of each council.  In addition, the author had delivered a 
training course for one of the councils during its turnaround phase and the 
development and delivery of this allowed for a degree of observation of both 
senior officers and elected members.  These experiences have been included in 
the case study analysis where appropriate.   
 
The three case study councils are introduced at the start of Section 3, and an 
overview of the interviewees is given in the methodology section in Section 1. 
Section 3 addresses the three research questions by firstly considering each of 
the ten turnaround approaches before discussing the relevance of leadership and 








The research in this thesis adopts a realist philosophy from a managerialist 
perspective using both deductive and inductive approaches to the analysis, as 
well as the triangulation of evidence between documentary records, interviews 
with council officials and interviews with GLOs. 
 
Realism recognises that within the social sciences external realities exist and can 
therefore be observed, studied and analysed objectively (Hammersley, 2002; 
Bryman and Bell, 2003; Fisher, 2004; Gray, 2005; Saunders et al, 2007).  
However, consideration needs to be given as to whether such external realities 
are permanent or temporary and whether they are universal or partially seen.  
Such debates reside more within the critical realist philosophy and require the 
consideration of the generative mechanisms that underlie observable experiences 
and events (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Fisher, 2004; Saunders et al, 2007).  The 
CPA era lasted for only a relatively short period of time between 2002 and 2008.  
As such this study is concerned with the nature of the reality in place at that 
time.  Also, as has been discussed above, CPA represented a managerialist view 
of what good local authorities should look like.  As this did not exist prior to and 
after this period, it cannot be regarded as a universal truth and as such does not 
fit with a positivist paradigm (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Fisher, 2004; Gray, 2005; 
Saunders et al, 2007).  The main focus of this study is on the observable changes 
that occurred during the turnaround era that resulted in performance 
improvement as measured by the CPA construction and as such this lends itself 
more to a realist approach, if in a subtle way (Hammersley, 2002).   It would 
have been possible to adopt a critical realist approach to undertaking the 
research, and indeed some of the conclusions of this study do make inroads into 
speculations about what some of the underlying generative mechanisms may 
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have been.  However, the focus is objective in identifying those strategic 
processes that changed within local authorities during the CPA era and whether 
this can give insights that will be helpful to future practitioners and researchers in 
this field of study.  
 
Overview of the Approach to the Analysis 
 
The analysis in this thesis is largely qualitative and combines deductive and 
inductive approaches. The primary analysis seeks to triangulate information from 
three sources in an attempt to identify those strategic practices that changed 
within improving local authorities.  The three main sources of information are 
represented in Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28: Sources of Primary Evidence 
 
 
The Audit Commission corporate assessment reports are publicly available 
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governance and management of local authorities during the CPA period. They 
were linked to and formed part of the CPA assessment framework (Audit 
Commission, 2009). They therefore offer a unique longitudinal insight into what 
was occurring within the corporate core of local authorities both at the start and 
during the CPA era.  Their content is also highly relevant to the focus of this study 
into the strategic management processes within turnaround councils. It is 
recognised that care should be taken when interpreting the assessment reports 
as they only offer one view of what was happening.  However, the Audit 
Commission is in itself a professional and experienced organisation, and as such it 
can be expected that due process and appropriate consideration were given in 
researching and compiling the reports, even if as has been said they may have 
had an influence on the way local authorities behaved. The reports were subject 
to a draft and review process before publication that allowed the local authority 
concerned to comment on the findings and to an extent can be said to be a 
“shared document”.  They can therefore be viewed as a high quality source of 
secondary data (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Also, while constituting a major part of 
the data used in the analysis, the corporate assessments were not used in 
isolation.  The findings of what has been called the ‘document analysis’ were 
compared to the findings of two sets of interviews.  The first set of interviews 
were with senior members of staff within three of the organisations identified in 
Document Three as being suitable turnaround councils.  The second set of 
interviews were with Government Lead Officials (GLOs) who acted on behalf of 
the government during the CPA period in part to assist, to varying degrees, local 
authorities that were deemed to be poorly performing. Both sets of interviews 
provided rich sources of data (Bryman and bell, 2003; Saunders et al, 2007) that 
offered reflections on the process of turnaround from both the individual council’s 
experience of turnaround and in the second case across a range of. The final 
point of triangulation was through both a priori and ex post comparison with the 
key literature identified as relevant to the study. 
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Identifying Turnaround Councils 
 
Document Four (Jones, 2010) used the main CPA inspection reports to identify a 
number of both Single Tier and County Councils (STCCs) and District Councils 
that displayed sustainable turnaround characteristics and would therefore be 
appropriate to study. Two rules were established in order to identify potential 
turnaround organisations from the CPA datasets.  The rules were determined in 
accordance with the definition of a turnaround organisation identified from the 
literature review namely, ‘a process that takes an organisation from a situation of 
poor performance to a situation of good sustained performance’ (Brandes and 
Brege 1993, p186).  
 
The first rule was that for a local authority to be deemed to be exhibiting poor 
performance it must have initially scored poor or weak on the CPA framework. 
The second rule was that for it to have moved to a position of improved 
performance, it must have moved up at least three categories into the good or 
excellent categories if it started with a score of poor, or have moved up three 
categories to excellent if it started out as weak.  Sustainability was judged to be 
where a local authority had maintained this improved position and not slipped 
back against the CPA scoring framework. The main CPA inspections were carried 
out and reported annually for STCCs.  However, this was not the case for district 
councils. Due to this difference in the timing of CPA inspections between STCCs 
and district councils, sustainability could only be considered for STCCs. 
 
In total, 23 local authorities were identified as being suitable for the analysis of 
turnaround authorities, consisting of 15 STCCs and 8 district councils.  The STCCs 
are given in Table 12 along with their CPA score during the CPA era and the 
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movement scores between the beginning and the end of CPA2.  The district 
councils are shown in Table 13 along with their CPA score at the start and end of 
CPA and their movement in score1. 
 
Table 12: STCC Turnaround Authorities 
 
 
Table 13: District Council Turnaround Authorities 
 
District Council CPA 2002/03 CPA 2008 MOVEMENT 
DC 1 1 4 3 
DC 2 1 4 3 
DC 3 1 4 3 
DC 4 1 4 3 
DC 5 1 4 3 
DC 6 2 5 3 
DC 7 2 5 3 
DC 8 2 5 3 
 
 
Even though the CPA reports used to compile the above analysis are available as 
a public record on the Audit Commission website, the local authority interviewees 
wished to remain anonymous.  Therefore, all the councils are anonymous in order 
protect the identity of these respondents. 
                                   
2 Note: There was a change to the descriptors used within the CPA between the 
various phases.  To allow comparison, a generic labelling was used for the 
purposes of this study. 1 = Weak/No Star, 5 = Excellent/4 Star 
COUNCIL CPA 2002 CPA 2003 CPA 2004 CPA 2005 CPA 2006 CPA 2007 CPA 2008 2002 2008 Movement
STCC 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 5 4
STCC 2 1 2 4 4 4 4 5 4
STCC 3 1 2 3 3 3 4 5 4
STCC 4 1 1 2 2 4 5 5 4
STCC 5 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 3
STCC 6 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 3
STCC 7 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 3
STCC 8 1 1 2 3 2 4 4 3
STCC 9 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 3
STCC 10 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 3
STCC 11 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 3
STCC 12 2 3 4 3 4 4 5 3
STCC 13 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 3
STCC 14 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 3
STCC 15 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 3
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Collecting and Analysing the Three Sources of Data 
 
The three data sources were collected and analysed in different ways but as part 
of a structured approach, which is illustrated in Figure 29.   
 
Figure 29: Structure of Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The approach shown in Figure 29 led to the development of ten key themes, 
which were used as the basis for the Analysis and Findings section of this thesis.  
The structured approach included the filtering and cross-analysis of the data from 
the three sources in order to ensure as far as possible the reliability of the 
findings through triangulation.  It is recognised that any form of research is not 
necessarily a perfect science as it can always be prone to researcher bias 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003; Fisher, 2004; Gray, 2005; Saunders et al, 2007), 
especially an approach that seeks to make sense of data from secondary and 
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social sources.  However, the use of this structured approach attempted to 
eliminate bias as far as possible through approaching the analysis objectively with 
reference to the conceptual framework, in keeping with the realist approach to 
the study. 
 
Collecting the Data 
 
The interviews with the council officers were undertaken first.  The purpose of 
these interviews was to allow the interviewee to tell their council’s story during 
the turnaround period.  These interviews were semi-structured and undertaken at 
the council offices concerned. They were also recorded, with the proviso that the 
recorder could be switched off if required. A prompt sheet, informed by the 
conceptual framework emerging from the literature review in Document Two, was 
prepared to help keep the interview on track and was given to the interviewees to 
preview at the start of the interview.  The prompt sheet is included as Appendix 
A.   
 
The loose structure of the interviews intended to capture information regarding 
three points in time: the pre-CPA period, the turnaround period itself and the 
time that the improved CPA announcement was made.  The pre-CPA period 
information was also used in Document Three, which examined the causes of 
poor performance.  Each interview lasted for about 2 hours and generally followed 
the prompt sheet. It was useful however to be able to hear the interviewees’ own 
accounts of what happened and to be able to probe more deeply with follow up 
questions.  The council interviews were not analysed until the document analysis 
of the corporate assessments was undertaken and the ten subsequent themes 
had emerged. 
 
For the document analysis, the corporate assessment reports for the 23 STCCs 
and district councils identified above were downloaded from the Audit 
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Commission website.  Spreadsheets were created to capture the content of the 
corporate assessments reports.  The structure of these reports was slightly 
different between the start and end of the CPA era, however, these differences 
did not affect the way in which the data could be analysed.  At the start of CPA 
the categories were Ambition, Prioritisation, Focus, Capacity, Performance 
Management, Achievement in Quality of Service, Achievement of Improvement, 
Investment, Learning and Future Plans.  At the end of CPA a reduced list of 
categories was used as follows: Ambition, Prioritisation, Capacity, Performance 
Management and Achievement.  The information captured from the corporate 
assessments was split between strengths and weaknesses and recorded for each 
year reported against each of the respective categories.  Appendix B (for a STCC) 
and Appendix C (for a District Council) give an example of the data collected for 
each council.  The next phase was to use two analysis frameworks to filter the 
base information into a form that was suitable for this study.  Two coding 
structures were developed to do this, one based on the turnaround processes 
identified in the literature review and conceptual framework of Document Two, 
and one based on the causes of poor performance identified in Document Three.  
The production of these coding structures and their application is discussed in 
more detail in the Analysis and Findings section.  However, it is important to 
mention them at this stage as the outcomes of this filtering were used to 
undertake content analysis to identify emergent themes within the analysed 
corporate assessment data (Fisher, 2004; Gray, 2005; Bryman 2008).  These 
themes were then used in turn to analyse the council interviews, as well as 
providing the basis for the structured interviews that were undertaken with the 
GLOs.  
 
Finally, the GLO interviews were carried out.  These were undertaken in a much 
more structured way than the council officer interviews.  The purpose of the GLO 
interviews was to explore the ten key themes that had emerged from the content 
analysis of the corporate assessments and as such these themes were used as 
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the structure for the interviews.  An outline of the key themes was given to the 
interviewees at the start of each interview and they were asked to talk about the 
relevance of the themes based on their own experience.  These interviews also 
lasted about two hours each.  The interviews were undertaken at the 
interviewee’s place of work and were recorded with the proviso that the recorder 
could be switched off. 
 
Selection of Interviewees 
 
As a start point for establishing where interviews could most advantageously be 
undertaken, reference was made to 23 turnaround authorities identified above. Of 
these, three were known to the researcher in terms of having existing contacts 
through a number of different networks.  Two councils came from the STCC group 
and one from the district council group, which represented a good balance of the 
mix of turnaround authorities identified. Each interviewee also displayed a 
number of desirable characteristics. Firstly, each held a senior position within the 
organisation they worked for. One was a CEO, the second a Director of Finance 
and Resources and the third a Senior Manager responsible for Finance and 
Transformation and reporting directly to the CEO.  As such they had witnessed 
turnaround from both a senior and cross-organisational perspective, rather than 
only seeing a limited aspect of it.  They had access to and had been involved in 
the strategic processes that are the focus of this study. Secondly, they had all 
been employed by their organisations for a long time and, significantly, 
throughout the CPA time period. They had therefore witnessed the turnaround at 
first hand.   
 
Rather than just focussing on the stories of the councils themselves, it was 
considered necessary to gain information on the national picture as well and, so 
to speak, from the other side of the fence.  As such two further interviews were 
undertaken with two of the government’s lead officials (GLOs) during the CPA 
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era.  One of the GLOs had also been a significant player within government in 
both the pre-cursor to CPA and the development and roll out of the CPA regime. 
 
It was felt that the two sets of interviews would provide useful counterpoints 
within the analysis, each balancing out to some extent the potentially partisan 
views of the officers towards their organisations and the GLOs towards the CPA 
regime.  On balance, it is considered that this generally occurred, although it is 
interesting that the findings from the two sets of interviews were generally 
supportive.   
 
The interviewees were therefore selected as key informants (Jankowicz, 2005) 
who would be able to provide an overview of the processes and the critical events 
that occurred during the CPA era. A pen picture of each of the interviewees is 
given below.  The names of each interviewee and their organisations have been 
removed to provide anonymity. This is because even though the CPA data is 
freely and publicly available on the audit commission web site, the interviews 
dealt with some potentially sensitive internal issues relating to the host 
organisations. As such some of the responses in the interviews and stories given 
should not be traceable directly to the organisation concerned.  Also, 
unavoidably, some of the responses represent the views of the interviewees 
themselves and in order to gain as much access as possible, assurances were 
given through the process of informed consent (Saunders et al, 2007) before 
commencing the interviews that interviewee’s anonymity would be maintained. 
 
The Government Lead Official 1 (GLO1) 
The GLO had previously been a local authority CEO but was co-opted by the 
ODPM to assist with the peer review and turnaround of failing local authorities 
under the Best value regime that predated CPA.  Subsequently, the GLO was 
appointed as one of a number of GLOs operating under the CPA regime and was 
responsible for overseeing the interventions and turnaround of failing local 
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authorities.  The GLO personally had an involvement in 11 CPA interventions, all 
of which were successfully turned around and was employed by the ODPM 
throughout the CPA era.  This GLO was the lead official for interview Council A 
and was therefore able to comment on the findings for this council. 
 
The Government Lead Official 2 (GLO2) 
Similar to GLO1, GLO2 had previously been a Deputy CEO before being appointed 
onto the GLO panel.  He did not serve for the full CPA era, but was nevertheless 
involved in a number of successful turnarounds. 
 
The Chief Executive (CEO) (Council A) 
The CEO had worked for the local authority (a small district council) for almost 36 
years.  At the time of the first CPA announcement the CEO held the position of 
Director of Finance, in itself a very senior role.  During the intervening period, the 
CEO was promoted a number of times.  First to Director of Resources, then 
Deputy Chief Executive, followed by Acting Chief Executive and finally CEO.   
 
The Director of Finance and Resources (DOFR) (Council B) 
The DOFR had been employed by the council (a metropolitan borough) for a 
number of years (“since Adam was a lad”) and had been DOFR since 1999.  In 
2002 the DOFR also took on responsibility for e-Government and IT with a focus 
on outcomes and transformation. 
 
The Finance and Transformation Manager (Council C) 
A Finance and Transformation Manager, reporting directly to the CEO, who had 
been involved with the organisation prior to CPA, although had only recently 







1.3 SUMMARY OF KEY LITERATURE 
 
Introduction to the Key Literature 
 
The body of literature on strategic turnaround in local government, though 
growing, remains relatively sparse.  In studying the topic it has therefore been 
necessary to consider a wide range of literature in the strategic management 
arena, from both the private and public sectors, to identify discourses that are 
relevant to framing the research analysis and findings. An overview of the key 
literatures reviewed in Document Two is given in Figure 30 below and is described 
as a series of overlapping fields.  
 
Figure 30: Overlapping Fields of Literature 
 
 
Document Two critically reviewed these fields of literature in some depth, and as 
such only key aspects relevant to this part of the research will be summarised 
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here. This summary focuses on literature that relates to turnaround directly, 
whether this be in the public or private sectors. Elements of the other literatures 
are brought into the analysis and conclusions where they are relevant. The 
definition of strategic turnaround used in this study is that of Brandes and Brege 
(1993, p186), ‘a process that takes an organisation from a situation of poor 
performance to a situation of good sustained performance’. This definition was 





There are a number of issues or concepts identified in the turnaround literature in 
both the public and private sectors, which have informed the appraisal of the local 
authority experience under CPA. These are summarised below. 
 
Mintzberg and Walters (1992) identified that turnaround is a distinct episode in 
an organisation’s lifecycle. In a sense, if organisations were good at strategy they 
would not be failing and therefore would not need to turnaround in the first place. 
In relation to local government, Jas and Skelcher (2005) identified that 
performance naturally fluctuates over time and where the organisation is in 
control of these fluctuations then they are described as self-regulating and able to 
correct poor performance before the need for turnaround arises. However, where 
organisations lack the necessary skills, then they become permanently failing, 
and are not able to recover, or are unable to recover within a reasonable 
timescale. A number of issues that impacted on this ability to recover were 
identified. Management and leadership cognition, capability and capacity (the 
3Cs) (Turner et al, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005) are important factors to 
enable both the identification that poor performance exists in the first place and 
then to be able to correct it. Having the right leadership capabilities in sufficient 
quantity in particular would appear to be key to this (Joyce, 2004). Otherwise 
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there is a danger that stress rigidity or threat rigidity (Wilson and Game, 2006) 
occurs whereby the leadership becomes retrenched against the changing 
environment often relying on the fallacy of past successes or a belief that the 
environment is wrong.  Situational factors (Turner and Whiteman, 2005) play a 
key role in terms of the culture, history, and politics within the organisation which 
can affect issues of capability, capacity and hence cognition.  They are identified 
as being primarily internal factors, with even the external context being more to 
do with the level of engagement by the leadership, rather than any distinct 
external reasons for failure.   
 
The above elements have dealt with the potential causes of poor performance.  
With regards to how turnaround can be enacted, different viewpoints have been 
adopted by different authors.  However, it is possible to link these viewpoints 
together. Hofer (1980) identified that there was a difference between strategic 
and operational approaches to turnaround adopted by private sector 
organisations.  Strategic relates to new business models and operational focuses 
on reduced costs/increased revenues in the short term. Hofer suggested that 
turnarounds fail if operational approaches are used when a strategic approach is 
required.  Linked to this, Snow and Hambrick (1980) considered whether 
turnaround represented strategic adjustment or strategic change. This can be 
linked to the concept of self-regulation in that if they are embedded within the 
organisation, the need for turnaround can be avoided.  However, in a turnaround 
situation, it is likely that strategic step change is required, rather than 
incremental adjustment.  
 
Such issues are a precursor to the main process based assessments of how 
turnarounds happen.  Initially, a period of realignment in organisational 
expectations occurs (Filatotchev and Toms 2006) between internal and external 
stakeholders, especially financial stakeholders in the private sector.  This occurs 
at an early stage to assess whether the organisation has the facility to enter the 
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next stage of retrenchment? If not they should give up and go into liquidation, 
although this is clearly not always an option in the public sector, if at all. 
Retrenchment is then likely to occur followed by recovery (Hofer 1980, Robins & 
Pearce 1992).  Retrenchment is primarily focussed on cost savings and 
efficiencies through downsizing and restructuring and could be linked to 
operational turnaround.  This is used to create the financial and operational 
capacity for a longer-term market focus (strategic turnaround).  This approach 
has also been considered in a public sector context by Boyne (2004) and Beeri 
(2009), and extends the renewal stage into restructuring, which could be both 
operational and strategic, and repositioning, which would tend to be strategic.  
Walshe et al (2004) reviewed the available literature in both the public and 
private sectors.  Their review identifies a typically staged process to turnaround 
consisting of decline and crisis, triggers for change, recovery strategy 
formulation, retrenchment, stabilisation and return to growth.   
 
Paton and Mordaunt (2004) identified that turnarounds often adopt a twin track 
approach and operate over different perspectives.  For example old blood is 
mixed with new blood, negatives (e.g. cut backs) run concurrently with positives 
(e.g. investments), financial control is centralised while decentralising occurs in 
other areas to foster involvement and the leadership creates capacity to change 
rather than directing change. They also suggest that organisations in the public 
sector need to avoid reductionism and instead recognise the complexity of the 
environment they operate within (Kelly, 2006), which runs counter to the 
simplification arguments often proposed for the private sector. 
 
The role of the change agent (Khandwalla 1983) appears to be key, whether 
temporary or permanent, internally or externally appointed.  They should be 
credible, mobilising the organisation in a participative way rather than using 
terror tactics.  This is closely linked to the role of leadership. A change in leader 
appears to have had a significant impact on both the success and speed of 
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turnaround.  This is a factor found widely in the literature on turnaround in both 
the public and private sectors (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Turner et al, 2004; 
Boyne, 2004; Joyce, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Wilson and Moore, 
2007).  Alternatively, Paton and Mordaunt (2004) found leadership itself to be 
important, but not necessarily a change in leadership (Paton and Mordaunt 
2004). A key role appears to be to build and rebuild links to external 
stakeholders, maintain a clear but simple focus and direction and create sharing 
and open cultures within the organisation (Joyce, 2004; Wilson and Moore, 
2007). Such changes in leader have tended to emphasise changes in the CEO, 
rather than the political leadership, and in a sense could underplay the political 
nature of local government (Kelly, 2006), although this is in part addressed by 
Wilson and Moore (2007). 
 
Other aspects to turnaround would include situational factors such as luck and 
timing and the impact of organisational size (Landrum et al, 2000; Wren, 2001; 
Francis and Desai, 2005).  Larger organisations can absorb shocks more easily 
and can put off the need to turnaround. But rigid structures can constrain 
turnaround and may miss the triggers of decline (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Environmental factors can also be both causes of decline and constraints to 
recovery (Dess and Beard, 1984) and can impact on the ability for recovery. 
Severe and rapid erosion of resources can be significant in causing decline and 
also make it impossible to recover (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Robbins and 
Pearce, 1992; Pearce and Robins, 1993; Joyce, 2001; Boyne, 2004). 
 
Clearly, since the literature review was undertaken additional literature has been 
forthcoming.  This has been included in the above discussion where it is 
particularly relevant to the study. Other literature has also been used in the 
Analysis and Findings section when necessary, to support the discussion of 
findings. 
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1.4 APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS 
 
Analysis of the Corporate Assessments 
 
The analysis of the corporate assessments was undertaken through a two-stage 
longitudinal content analysis (Fisher, 2004; Gray, 2005; Bryman 2008). The first 
stage was deductive in nature and involved the filtering of statements made 
within the corporate assessment reports through two coding schemes. The first 
coding scheme was based on the conceptual framework developed in the critical 
literature review in Document Two and the second on findings of the causes of 
poor performance identified in Document Three. The detailed development of 
these coding schemes is discussed further below. The second stage was to 
undertake a thematic inductive analysis (Bryman, 2008) of this filtered 
information to develop a final set of themes and sub-themes that were then used 
to code and analyse the corporate assessments and interviews within the main 
analysis.  
 
The literature review analysis develops a range of possible strategic processes 
that can be linked to corporate turnaround and seeks to identify the extent to 
which such processes were adopted by local authorities during the CPA period. 
This is called the ‘process framework’. The analysis using the GLO findings 
focuses on pre-conditions present within failing authorities at the start of the CPA 
process and is called the ‘pre-condition framework’.  This part of the analysis is 
used for two purposes.  Firstly to identify whether these conditions were indeed 
present in turnaround authorities at the start of CPA as part of the internal 
triangulation within the study. Secondly, the analysis tracks whether the 
occurrence of these conditions diminishes throughout the CPA period as might be 
expected from turnaround organisations. The relationship between these two 
aspects of the analysis would be that the process changes introduced have been 
used to overcome the pre-conditions that led to failure in the first place. 
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The inductive part of the analysis seeks to establish two types of finding.  Firstly, 
it seeks to establish whether there is any common pattern that emerges from the 
longitudinal analysis during the CPA period.  For example, did all/most authorities 
adopt the same approach and do the same things? Finally, the analysis will 
highlight any significant aspects that emerge that have not been identified within 
the deductive analysis.  For example, might there be some causes of poor 
performance and/or improvement processes that have not previously been 
identified, and may therefore be either distinct or unique to local authority 
strategic management, and the recovery of local authorities in particular.  
 
Coding Frameworks for Analysing the Corporate Assessments 1: The 
Process Aspects 
 
The literature review in Document Two developed conceptual framework of the 
likely impact that approaches to strategic turnaround could have on the 
successful and sustained turnaround of an organisation.  The conceptual 
framework analysed strategic approaches over three categories, namely the 
leadership approach, the strategic approach and the turnaround approach. Behind 
this conceptualisation, is a breakdown of more detailed aspects under each 
category that could either promote or inhibit successful and sustained strategic 
turnaround. The detailed discussion for this has already been undertaken in 
Document Two and both the conceptual framework and the aspects of strategic 
turnaround are reproduced below in Figure 31 and Figure 32 respectively. 
 
The conceptual framework identifies that while the turnaround approach adopted 
lies at the heart of any consideration of the likely success or failure of a 
turnaround, this in turn is impacted upon by both the leadership approach within 
the organisation and the general approach taken to strategy formulation and 
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implementation.  The three approaches are therefore linked together and cannot 
be viewed in isolation when considering approaches to strategic turnaround. 
 
Figure 31: Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: M Jones Document Two (2008) 
 
The more detailed aspects of turnaround given in Figure 32 below, highlight the 
range of possible approaches that could be undertaken with regard to turnaround.  
The negative and positive indicators, give an idea as to whether a possible 
approach will contribute to or inhibit successful turnaround.  Clearly there is some 
link here with the negative approaches to those factors that could have 
contributed initially to an organisation being in a failing situation.  Indeed, this 
was borne out in part by the findings of Document Three, which examined the 
causes of poor performance within failing local authorities under the CPA regime.  











Figure 32, relate the findings regarding the causes of poor performance in 
Document Three to the conceptual framework. As can be seen, these tend to 
paint a picture of intransigent, inward looking organisations that are out of touch 
with the environment they operate within, focus on the needs of a limited range 
of stakeholders (if at all) and have leadership structures that are exclusive, non-
facilitative and rigid. A number of aspects stood out from the analysis in 
Document Three regarding the main causes of poor performance. That is that it 
was likely to be due to internal causes (rather than external environmental 
influences) resulting from poor leadership and a consequent lack of strategic 
management skills.  Indeed, the distinction made by Jas and Skelcher (2005) 
between permanently failing and self-regulating organisations, linked to a lack of 
strategic cognition, capability and capacity, referred to here as the 3C’s (Turner 
et al, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005), were considered the overriding general 
causes of poor performance due to their consequent inter-relationship with the 
internal causes of decline and poor organisational performance. 
 
The initial content analysis of the corporate assessments uses the conceptual 
framework and the more positive aspects of turnaround approaches to provide 
one of the frameworks used in the initial content analysis of the corporate.  To do 
this, the aspects of turnaround have been revisited to refine them into a more 
succinct analysis tool that is more useful and practical for carrying out the 
archival analysis (Miles and Huberman, 2004; Saunders et al, 2007).  In essence, 
the aspects have been grouped to provide a coding structure that links back to 
the literature on turnaround, strategy and leadership. 
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Figure 32: Aspects of Sustainable Turnaround 
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Source: M Jones Document Three (2011), adapted from Document Two (2008) 
 
To produce the coding structure for the process based content analysis, the 
aspects of turnaround were reviewed to establish any inter-relationships that 
would allow the aspects to be grouped together. The aim of the reclassification 
was to establish a more succinct analysis tool that would be more useful and 
practical for carrying out the archival analysis (Miles and Huberman, 2004; 
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Saunders et al, 2007) and produce a set of general classifications that could be 
used across all of the local authorities analysed. This rationalisation was 
necessary as it would be difficult to use the full range of potential aspects, as not 
all local authorities are likely to display each individual feature.  Nine potential 
process aspects were identified across the three themes of leadership approach, 
strategic approach and turnaround approach (three from each theme). This 
recognises the interrelatedness of the three themes referred to above, while at 
the same time maintaining the focus on turnaround itself.  
 
Figure 33 below, illustrates how the aspects of turnaround have been linked 
together to establish the summary aspects that were used in the document 
analysis.  The bold and underlined aspects represent the nine summary aspects 
used in the document analysis.  The colour coding shows broadly how the aspects 
are linked within the groupings. It is evident that some of the aspects are 
grouped according to theme, whereas others cross themes. It should also be 
noted that there is scope for some aspects to be related to more than one of the 
nine groupings and while this is recognised, for the sake of expediency and to 
reduce the level of complexity within the analysis, the groupings identified are 
sufficient for the purpose intended.  The Findings and Analysis section will reflect 
on any further inter-relationships where appropriate. 
 
To aid the analysis further, the revised groupings were renamed to provide the 
final process coding structure. The revised names for the nine summary process 
aspects used in the coding are given below and examples of the analysis 
undertaken are given in Appendix B and Appendix C: 
 
• Officer / Member relations – (Officer or member/Officer and member) 
• Vision and Purpose – (Personal vision/Shared vision) 
• Cognition, Capability and Capacity (3Cs) - (Partial 3cs/Complete 3cs) 
• Planned/Emergent – (Planned and rational/Planned and emergent) 
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• Stakeholder Engagement – (Specificity/Ambiguity) 
• Distinct Phase – (Strategic adjustment/Strategic change) 
• Operational or Strategic focus – (Operational/Strategic) 
• New Faces, New Structures – (replacement/Realignment) 
• Self Correction – (Permanently failing/Self correcting) 
Figure 33: Development of the Summary Aspects Coding Framework 
 
LEADERSHIP APPROACH STRATEGIC APPROACH TURNAROUND APPROACH 
 




























































Incremental Prioritisation Intervention Engagement 
Dictatorship Facilitating 
 
Enforced Owned Turnaround Revitalisation 





Source: Adapted from M Jones Document Three (2011) 
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Coding Frameworks for Analysing the Corporate Assessments 2: The Pre-
Condition Aspects 
 
The second deductive coded analysis was undertaken based on the findings of the 
Government Lead Official (GLO) interview undertaken in Document Three (this 
aspect is considered deductive in Document Five as it is based on findings already 
reported in Document Three). This identified ten pre-conditions contributing to 
poor performance amongst failing local authorities under CPA.  The purpose of 
this part of the analysis was to attempt to track the pre-conditions of poor 
performance at the start of the CPA process and how these pre-conditions 
changed during the CPA period.  This analysis is different from that described 
above as it focuses on the pre-conditions present within organisations rather than 
the processes introduced.  The ten pre-conditions contributing to poor 
performance identified by the GLO are given in Figure 34 and are represented as 
a wheel. Within the ten pre-conditions, there is a degree of interrelatedness, and 
the shading of segments within the wheel seeks to illustrate this. 
 
Clearly the process aspects and pre-conditions are interrelated to some extent, 
but it is useful to consider them separately in order to broaden the scope of the 
analysis.  For example, the pre-conditions lack of corporate capacity and 
capability and lack of strategic leadership skills are clearly linked to the cognition, 
capability and capacity process aspects.  Equally, poor stakeholder management 
is related to the stakeholder engagement.  This is not considered problematic, as 
it serves to reinforce the use of both coding frameworks in the analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, as would be expected, there are still a number of pre-conditions 
not specifically related to the process aspects of turnaround, as the pre-conditions 
were present prior to the commencement of the turnaround process.   
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Figure 34: 10 Pre-Conditions Relating to Poor Performance 
 
Source: M Jones Document Three (2011) 
 
Generally, the pre-conditions could be expected to be prevalent at the start of the 
CPA process, i.e. in the initial corporate assessment reports, but their presence 
would be expected to diminish and/or disappear as the performance of the 
organisation improved. Again, to make the coding simpler, the pre-conditions 
have been renamed slightly and are given below and examples of the analysis 







• Capacity and Capability 
• Strategic Leadership Skills 




• Stakeholder Management 
• Service Failings 
• Prioritisation 
• Financial Management 
 
Deductive Analysis Issues 
 
The coding structures given to the deductive analysis of the corporate 
assessments were useful in providing a framework within which to carry out the 
analysis.  However, despite this there were still parts of the documentation that 
were difficult to code, either because they could have appeared in more than one 
coding category, or because they were ambiguous due to the high level of the 
documentary analysis (i.e. these were not the detailed working papers).  This is 
the nature of qualitative research in some respects (Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
and the approach taken to coding such information, was to allocate the 
occurrence to what appeared to be the strongest relationship.  Generally 
however, there was a tendency for issues raised in the corporate assessments to 
be identifiable to a particular coding requirement within either the process 
aspects or pre-conditions.   
 
In undertaking the coding, certain similarities/relationships were also identified 
within the two coding structures.  For example, within the process aspects, the 
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3Cs element overlapped to some extent with the self-correcting element.  To deal 
with this in the analysis, the view was taken that the 3Cs element would relate to 
specific processes put in place by organisations to increase cognition, capability 
and capacity to improve such things as strategic decision making, performance 
management and stakeholder engagement, whereas the self-correcting element 
would be used to identify examples of where the organisation had gained an 
outcome and improved its strategic ability.  For example, the introduction of 
processes to help facilitate the prioritisation of needs and resources, such as 
introducing training across staff groups or bringing in consultation mechanisms, 
were regarded as increasing the capacity of the organisation whereas, comments 
that the organisation had actually re-prioritised functions or resources were taken 
as evidence that the processes were working in practice and an improved 
outcome had been achieved for the organisation.  Within the pre-condition 
elements, there was a high degree of potential similarity between the Insularity, 
Collaboration and Stakeholder Management elements, also to some extent with 
the Capacity and Capability element.  In this case, the distinction was made 
between evidence that concerned specific delivery relationships (collaboration), 
aspects that dealt with formal stakeholder engagement issues, such as 
relationships with the NHS (stakeholder management) and those that dealt with 
organisational ability to understand its own performance in relation to local, 
national and cross sectoral requirements as well as internal process and culture 
issues that inhibited a wider view of requirements being taken (Insularity). For 
example an internal, service based approach to strategy rather than a holistic, 
corporate approach.   
 
Furthermore, relationships became evident between the introduction of processes 
and the overcoming of pre-conditions at the start of CPA.  For example, 
improvements in cognitive, capacity and capability processes that lead to 
improved outcomes in terms of self-correction ability, tended to overcome the 
insularity and prioritisation problems experienced at the outset of CPA. 
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The Generation and Analysis of Themes Emerging from the Corporate 
Assessments 
 
The second stage of content analysis involved a thematic analysis (Bryman 2008) 
of the filtered CPA information to identify and analyse any emerging themes and 
sub-themes within it.  These themes and sub-themes were then also used in the 
analysis of the local authority and GLO interviews.  The thematic analysis 
involved the iterative review of the filtered corporate assessment information, 
focusing on statements that conveyed similar meaning and could therefore be 
grouped together. By undertaking this approach iteratively through a number of 
sweeps of the information, and by continually grouping similar sets of statements 
together, themes started to emerge that appeared to be of importance.  These 
were essentially made up of three levels.  The overall themes themselves, sub-
themes within the themes and individual statements within sub-themes. Ten 
themes subsequently emerged namely; Turnaround Processes, Understanding 
Roles, New People and Structures, Strategic Management Processes and 
Systems, Prioritisation and Re-Prioritisation, Performance Management, Gathering 
Intelligence, Working With Others, Communication and finally Support Systems 
(see also Figure 35 in the next section). Each theme had a varying number of 
sub-themes within them and these have been used to help structure the Findings 
and Analysis section of the thesis in Section 2 and the case study analysis in 
Section 3.  An example of the subsequent content analysis produced for each 
theme is given at Appendix D, in this case for the Prioritisation and Re-
Prioritisation theme.  The content analysis involved recording the statements 
used in developing the themes against them so that they could be quantified and 
analysed (see Appendix D). The analysis captured district council and STCC 
information separately, in case there were any discernable differences between 
the two.  This was subsequently found not to be the case, something that was 
corroborated in the GLO interviews. 
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Once this had been undertaken, it was then possible to use the ten themes to 
analyse the three council interviews and this formed the basis of the internally 
focussed case study analysis in Section 3. This was done by taking statements 
made during the interviews and assigning them to relevant sub-themes and 
themes, both from the interview transcripts and by listening to the recorded 
interviews again.  Quotes from the interviews have been used to support the 
themed analysis where appropriate. The GLO interviews were undertaken using 
the themes as form of structure.  Interviewees were asked to discuss the 
relevance of the themes to their own experience during the CPA era. Again, 
quotes from these interviews have been used to support the analysis. 
 
A full analysis of the themes and sub-themes is given in Section 2.  This is 
essentially a narrative account of the combined analyse and findings arising from 
the thematic analysis.  This is followed by an analysis of the three case study 
councils in Section 3 allowing the ten themes to be considered within specific 













Ten themes have emerged from this thesis as being the important approaches to 
strategic turnaround adopted by turnaround councils. These findings relate to the 
first research question and are summarised in Figure 35 below.   
 
Figure 35: The Ten Approaches to Strategic Turnaround 
 
 
Each theme has been discussed separately in this section and sub-divided into a 
number of sub-themes. It is important to recognise that each theme to some 
extent also overlaps with, and is related to other themes. The discussion of each 
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The Role of the CEO
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One of the themes is specifically related to Turnaround Processes, whereas the 
others are ongoing internal strategic processes that improved during the 
turnaround phase – introducing and learning how to use these ongoing processes 
was a distinct part of the turnaround process. 
 
Each theme commences with an overview of the key aspects of the theme, before 
considering the sub-themes in greater detail through discussion of the corporate 
assessment and GLO interview findings. A summary of the main findings is given 
at the end of each theme. The ten themes are presented in an order intended to 
help the flow of the discussion and an understanding of the linkages between 
them.  The discussion of Turnaround Processes has been left until the end as it 
draws on aspects from other themes, which therefore require explanation first.   
  46





The need for actors within local authorities to understand their respective roles 
was a key finding of the corporate assessment analysis.  It had an impact on the 
original causes of poor performance, something that was also evident from the 
findings of Document Three, and has been seen in this latest analysis to be a key 
aspect of change within improving councils. This understanding of roles played 
out across a variety of spectrums including member to member, member to 
officer and officer to officer, and this is especially true for senior people, whether 
these be elected members or paid officials.  The development of a greater 
understanding of roles, also impacted upon organisational structures and 
communication networks as well as decision-making and performance 
management processes. Training, in part through IDeA training courses and 
external peer mentoring, played a key part in developing a clearer understanding 
of respective roles and the way in which these roles are played out. This section 
looks specifically at the nature of the roles of the various actors.  Clearly changes 
to these could and would be affected by changes in the personnel carrying out 
those roles.  Although this overlap is recognised here, it is discussed further 
under the New People and Structures theme. There are four sub-themes within 
this theme, namely Leadership, Politics, Community Leadership and finally 




A significant finding from the analysis was the question of where, if at all, 
leadership of the council was enacted. Importantly, there appeared to be a 
distinction between ongoing leadership and the specific role of leadership in a 
turnaround situation, as well as between the Leader of the Council and CEO 
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leadership roles. This aspect appears to have a continuous presence within the 
findings and is developed where appropriate throughout the themes of the thesis 
and in the conclusions section.  
 
Local authority leadership is essentially a symbiotic relationship between the 
elected Leader of the Council and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Wilson and 
Moore, 2007; Solace, 2005; IDeA, 2006). Some commentators refer to this as 
dynamic dependency (Entwistle et al, 2005).  The Leader of the Council is a 
formal role undertaken by the elected member who is the head of the party 
holding the majority within the council.  Leaders are either selected from within 
their own party, or, in the case of elected mayors (introduced by the Local 
Government Act 2000), elected by the public.  Very few councils under review 
had an elected mayor, with most adopting a Leader and Cabinet structure.  
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the political roles will be dealt with 
collectively under the term “Leader of the Council”, as the impact of the study’s 
findings would be the same whichever was in place.  
 
Overall, leadership is vested with the Leader of the Council for policy direction 
and performance outcomes, but the CEO is effectively the leader of the paid 
officers of the council, responsible for advising members on policies and ensuring 
they are carried out. The two roles are therefore very closely linked and in a 
leadership sense provide similar functions. To emphasise this, Dereli (2003), 
identified that a local authority CEO’s role was to lead strategy through the 
inclusion of members, rather than to direct strategy. Members, in turn, act as the 
bridge between the community and the council, but are ultimately responsible for 
taking the lead on the direction a council takes.  
 
A review of best practice examples provided on the Local Government 
Improvement and Development (LGID) (2012) website, shows that the role of the 
Leader of the Council is multi-faceted, but focussed on being the fulcrum of 
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decision making and leadership within a council.  Common phrases to describe 
the role include; providing political leadership; to be a figurehead; to appoint, 
manage and lead the executive of the council; to represent the council externally 
and act as an ambassador; to give leadership to partnerships and partnership 
working; to uphold ethical and governance standards and to work with officers to 
lead the organisation.  It is apparent from the analyses of the corporate 
assessments, that these facets of leadership were often missing or inadequate at 
the start of the CPA regime in 2002 and much improved at the end in 2008.  The 
evidence from the GLO interviews also supports that there was an improvement 
of understanding within the councils of this leadership role. 
 
These are useful observations and tend to follow a managerialist discourse of 
leadership, including the separation of political and administrative leadership 
(Joyce 2012). Alternatively, Pye (2005 p33) refers to the challenge of 
conceptualising leadership as “akin to capturing the ethereal qualities of the 
‘moon on the water’” and challenges such normative approaches to defining and 
articulating leadership, preferring instead to reframe leadership as a form of 
sensemaking (sic). Similarly, Spicker (2012, p34) refers to leadership as a 
“perniciously vague concept” and suggests alternative discourses that could be 
used to consider the “cult of leadership” (Spicker, 2012 p35) within a public 
sector context, such as economic and humanist stances. Such approaches are 
helpful in identifying that alternative views of leadership and its importance exist.  
Pye’s view, however challenging, does not compromise the managerialist 
discourse on leadership, or that seemingly adopted within the CPA regime.  
Rather it compliments it to the extent that one of the roles of leadership, whether 
it be political or administrative, is to make sense of what is happening within the 
organisation and the environment within which it operates (Joyce, 2012; Lawton 
and Rose, 1994).  To this extent, as with other themes identified, the discussion 
of the analysis of the corporate assessments and the interviews is framed within 
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the ongoing managerialist discourse emerging from the literature and the CPA 
regime. 
 
The analysis of the corporate assessments revealed a progressive improvement in 
leadership attributes during the CPA era.  Comments within the corporate 
assessments tended to relate to the Leader of the Council role rather than the 
CEO. For example, at the start of CPA, 15 councils were specifically identified as 
having negative statements regarding the Leader of the Council role.  These 
included reference to weak leadership of the council, inconsistent internal 
leadership and political leadership that was not strategic or lacked a clear 
strategic vision.  Other cases refer to an over reliance on the CEO, borne out by 
the council interviews, and gaps in leadership competencies. While others still 
refer to differences between the leader’s manifesto and the corporate plan, or 
that political stalemate was proving to be a barrier to organisational 
improvement.  Such statements identify that in many councils, the Leader of the 
Council role was not being played out effectively, and certainly not in accordance 
with the best practice examples referred to above.   
 
This can also be considered to have had a consequential negative impact 
throughout organisations in terms of councils lacking an appropriate vision and 
strategy, the ability to implement difficult decisions, and decisions in general, 
together with a sense that the council suffered from inertia and insularity without 
the drive or ambition to improve and meet the needs of both national and local 
priorities.  These issues are considered in more detail under the forthcoming 
themes, but are clearly linked to a lack of effective leadership.  Essentially, 
councils were left in a state of flux, unable to move forward due to a lack of 
engagement from the ultimate leadership role.  What is not clear from the 
document analysis are the reasons for such Leader of the Council inertia (Shaw 
1981), nor how long it had been allowed to fester (possibly through stagnant 
political control over a number of years for example).  It was not apparent that 
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there was any form of success fallacy (Jas and Skelcher 2004) from either the 
corporate assessments or the interviews, rather the council interviews tended to 
highlight that there had been a sense of arrogance that the leadership just 
thought they knew what was best for the council. 
 
In many cases, one of the main criticisms of poorly performing councils at the 
start of the CPA regime was either a lack of political leadership within the council 
or poor political leadership.  In some cases, this is linked to issues concerning the 
Leader of the Council’s relationship with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
whereby the Leader had essentially abdicated responsibility for decision making 
to the senior paid official. With regards to possible reasons for this detachment by 
the political leadership, the GLO interviews help to shed some light.  GLO1 
referred to the need for the CEO to “plug the gap” of any vacuum left by the 
political leadership.  In extreme cases, there is the scope therefore for the CEO to 
take on decision-making responsibilities to ensure that decisions are actually 
made.  This would be a failing of both the Leader of the Council and the CEO in 
fulfilling their respective functions, with the locus of leadership having moved to 
the wrong place. 
 
GLO2 offered a different interpretation however. 
 
“Councillors believe that the CEO is their intellectual superior and are overly 
respectful, and don’t question what they say”.  In such situations, there is “no 
strategic challenge, to go beyond what the officers told them they could do”. 
(GLO2 interview) 
 
Here, the elected members are showing a professional deferment to the CEO, in 
other words displaying a ‘he/she knows best’ attitude. 
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Surprisingly, very rarely were references made to poor leadership on the officer 
side, and poor CEO leadership was never referred to.  This is an interesting 
observation, as the interviews suggested that CEOs were not immune from being 
poor leaders, and as will be seen later, part of the turnaround process was to 
recruit new CEOs to replace their ineffective predecessors.  To emphasise the 
point of how ineffective the CEO could be, GLO1 gave the following example from 
a meeting with the CEO of a council who had just received its poor CPA rating. 
 
“his answer to one of the questions I asked was “well if we had guessed at 
different figures for our PIs (referring here to national performance indicators), 
would we have we avoided the intervention?”!  It is quite difficult for anyone who 
comes from a halfway decent authority, to realise just how poor some of these 
authorities had got to”…. “there was downright incompetence…” (GLO1 interview) 
 
Therefore, despite the member-centric problems painted by the corporate 
assessments, there was also an underlying problem with the CEO leadership role 
as well.  This underpins the findings of Document Three and of others (Turner et 
al, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Wilson and 
Moore, 2007), that problems in poorly performing councils were often self-
generated and resulted from poor internal leadership, whether this be from 
members or officers. 
 
The interviews with GLO1 and GLO2 suggested that part of the CEO role is to 
ensure that political leadership within a council is maintained.  This would require, 
the coaching of senior elected members, not in policy per se, but in the need for 
them to develop policy and ensure that appropriate capacity and capability for 
this existed within the council.  This could go as far as identifying new political 
talent within the council that could be nurtured for future senior roles.  Clearly 
the CEO needs to play a non-partisan (non-political) role in such activities.  In 
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addition, the symbiotic relationship between the Leader of the Council and the 
CEO was also emphasised by GLO1.  
 
“if political leadership creates a vacuum, then the CEO should fill it” (GLO1 
interview).   
 
This is not to say that the CEO should take on a political role, or be instrumental 
in shaping the policies of the council.  Rather, GLO1 went on to say that if the 
Leader of the Council preferred to be external facing and collaborative, then the 
CEO should focus on the internal management of the council.  If the Leader of the 
Council had a more internal focus, then the CEO would need to spend more time 
managing the external relationships.   
 
The emphasis here is on the CEO using their more permanent executive and 
professional capacity, rather than the more fluid nature of the Leader of the 
Council appointment through the electoral process, to compliment and support 
the political leader. It also emphasises the need for there to be a consistent focus 
on all aspects of leadership within the council, and as the senior paid official, the 
CEO needs to ensure this happens. Similar findings exist elsewhere within the 
literature (see Douglas et al, 2012).  
 
When it comes to identifying improvements in leadership by the end of CPA, both 
elected leaders and CEOs (often jointly) are specifically referred to in a positive 
sense within the corporate assessments. There are 21 separate statements 
referring to strong leadership or effective leadership or good leadership.  Under 
this type of comment, there are also references to the Leader of the Council being 
active and visible or setting a strong example.  Often, such comments refer to the 
Leader of the Council and CEO roles jointly, with specific reference being made on 
three occasions to the Leader and CEO having an effective working relationship. 
Where this is not specifically mentioned, it would appear to be implied through 
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statements that staff and stakeholders have confidence in the leadership of the 
council or in the joint statements made on visibility and the strength of 
leadership.  The relationship between Leader and CEO would appear to be a key 
one for the successful transformation of a local authority and one which overlaps 
with the more general understanding of officer and member roles which is 
discussed later in this theme.  The positive aspects of leadership displayed in both 
the corporate assessments and the interviews, echo the increased cognition, 
capability and capacity of leaders found by Turner et al (2004) and Turner and 
Whiteman (2005). They are also suggestive of the complexity of leadership 
requirements in local authorities, balancing the needs of multiple stakeholder 
groups and having to tackle change on a number of fronts (Joyce 2004; Mordaunt 
and Cornforth 2004; Paton and Mordaunt 2004; McAdam, 2005), especially 
balancing the needs of administrative and political visions of success (Entwistle et 
al 2005). 
 
The key role that the CEO has to play in the turnaround of local authorities was 
identified in the literature. However, changes to and/or developments in, the role 
of the Leader of the Council also appear to be an important aspect of recovery, as 
does the existence of a positive and supportive relationship between the Leader 
of the Council and the CEO.  As will be discussed under New People and 
Structures, responsibility for overseeing turnaround appears to have been more 
closely associated with new CEOs, both interim and permanent. It would appear 
however that the CEO does not operate in a vacuum and for them to be able to 
do this successfully there also needs to be appropriate political leadership from 
the Leader of the Council. 
 
It is important to recognise that there were also other factors running parallel to 
and in support of the CPA however.  Both the LGA (for members) and the IDeA 
(for officers) provided support, mentoring and training in leadership during the 
CPA period. Indeed, many members from poorly performing councils had mentors 
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from better performing peer councils.  This support network developed over time 
as the LGA in particular, learning from early CPA experiences, recognised the 
need for effective leadership within councils and became more willing to engage 




In a minority of cases, there was evidence within the corporate assessments of 
problems caused by poor political relations within the council.  Although not 
specifically identified, such poor relations could be taken to be in-party or 
between parties, and/or relate to a lack of cross party working.  This to some 
extent reflects the paucity of political leadership from the Leader of the Council 
role referred to above (Turner et al, 2004).  While improvements in this aspect 
are not generally mentioned in the corporate assessments at the end of CPA, the 
lack of specific comment would suggest that it has been overcome as a barrier to 
effective working.  More light is shed on this aspect from the GLO interviews.  
Poor cross party working was raised as a problem by both GLOs. If a council had 
a tendency for consistent political control over a long period of time (referred to 
as “long term fiefdoms” by GLO1), or stagnation (Turner and Whiteman, 2005), 
then there was more likelihood that the council would receive a poor CPA rating. 
This would be irrespective of which party was in control. The reason given for this 
was that the opposition was largely ineffectual, having no critical mass, in 
providing any form of challenge to policy decisions being taken by the council.  In 
such cases, there was a danger that policies were being politically driven rather 
than strategically driven.  The inference here being that decisions were taken to 
support the manifesto and get re-elected, rather than tackling the strategic issues 
that faced the council and its population.  GLO1 referred to this as “ideology 
based strategies, rather than evidence based strategies”.  To some extent this 
overlaps with the introduction of scrutiny functions within councils in the early 
2000s, which is discussed further below.  Nevertheless, there is a requirement to 
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recognise the politicised nature of the local authority environment, both at a local 
and national level (Worrell et all, 1998).  The view that policy decisions should be 
evidence based rather than ideologically driven could be challenged in that local 
government’s mandate is to provide local political accountability through the 
ballot box and as such the success or failure of a political regime should be 
measured by the re-election, or not, of the party in power.  Nevertheless, even 
ideological approaches to choice and decision making would need evidence to 
back them up, for example providing free or subsidised care in the home for 
elderly residents would need evidence of demographic trends, costs and quality 
for it to managed and resourced effectively, especially in relation to other 
priorities of the council.  As such, the use of evidence does not preclude the scope 
for ideological policy making but rather could be seen to help support the policy 
making process (Joyce, 2012). In this respect, GLO2 stressed the need for 
elected members to not just have training in leadership, but also in political 
leadership.  
 
“Members don’t want to train to be officers” (GLO2 interview) 
 
Neither do they see themselves as working for a particular sector.  
 
“Members work for their council” (GLO2 interview).   
 
As such the training and development of members in terms of leadership, needs 
to also encompass political dimensions as well. This is something that resulted in 
the development of mentoring and training programmes for members on political 
lines, i.e. elected members would prefer to be trained by and with people from 





Another finding was that positive comments regarding the general leadership of 
councils could also be related to improvements in the effectiveness of community 
leadership. This is mentioned on ten separate occasions and is reinforced by 
statements that the Leader of the Council, and often also the CEO, play an 
effective wider role in the leadership of external bodies and partnerships.  This 
aspect of improvement is closely related to the development of other mechanisms 
at around this time such as LAAs and LSPs, which were referred to in the 
introduction (see Figure 27). 
 
A key aspect of community leadership has been the involvement in Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) (Diamond and Liddle, 2005).  LSPs were brought in 
by the Government in 2000 and were intended to bring together local authorities, 
other public bodies, the business community and the voluntary sector within a 
given geographic area.  They link closely with the development of LAAs, which 
were introduced in 2004/05 following a series of pilots.  Initially, there was no 
remit for local authorities to take the lead role, even though they were 
responsible for helping them to form.  In essence, local authorities were 
discouraged from exerting too much influence over the business of the LSP.  
However, by 2008, Government guidance had changed with councils becoming 
the democratically elected leaders and convenors of LSPs.  This did not mean 
however that the LSP should be chaired by an elected member, and research 
undertaken by the LGID in 2009, showed that the percentage of 152 LSPs 
surveyed that were chaired by an elected member varied by region from between 
50% to 89%. Nevertheless, there are a number of occasions where the corporate 
assessments make reference to a council being associated with chairing the LSP, 
and often it is the Leader of the Council or CEO identified with this role.  This 
could be for a variety of reasons.  At the start of CPA, there was no requirement 
to take an active role in leading the LSP.  Those councils that were insular and 
with a low propensity to engage with collaborative processes, may have been 
disinclined to engage with the LSP and subsequently the LAA, something borne 
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out by the lack of community vision and engagement often referred to in the 
initial corporate assessments for these councils. The change experienced by the 
end of CPA may have been the result of a more outward looking leadership, a 
need to comply with changing government guidance or a desire to be in control of 
local agendas.  It is possible that an extremely critical corporate governance 
inspection at Lincolnshire County Council in 2005, which focussed a significant 
amount of criticism on the council’s approach to community focus, acted as a 
catalyst for other councils to realise that they would need to up their game if they 
were not to be treated in a similar fashion.  Whatever the underlying reason, the 
outcome is a positive engagement by the leadership with the wider community, 
rather than just an improvement of the leadership of the council. The two 
outcomes are clearly linked, but are not necessarily mutually dependent, either 
one could feasibly being achieved without the other, or at the neglect of the 
other.  That the observations show improvements in both the internal leadership 
role and the external leadership role, highlights that Leaders of Councils, and 
CEOs, had become a lot more sophisticated in their leadership approach (Corrigan 
and Joyce, 1997; Wilson and Game, 2006). 
 
Member and Officer Roles 
 
A further finding in this section is the extent to which the respective 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities more generally of elected members 
and paid officers impacted on poor performance and subsequently on recovery. 
Similar to the way in which the CEO and Leader of the Council roles are 
supportive and complimentary, elected members and officers need to exhibit the 
same kind of relationship. Entwistle et al (2005) refer to the presence of a 
dynamic dependency between the duel elites of members and officers and the 
importance of a shared agenda on the harmony or otherwise of this relationship. 
Usually, local authorities have a cabinet structure of elected members, appointed 
by the Leader of the Council with cabinet members having responsibility for a 
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service or policy portfolio.  Through this structure, and under the challenge of 
scrutiny committees (see later), elected members are responsible for setting the 
policy and strategic direction of the council, taking due regard of local and 
national priorities (Wilson and Game, 2006).  Under this structure, officers are 
responsible for advising on in the first instance, and carrying out in the second, 
the cabinet’s policy and decisions.  A degree of importance can therefore be 
attached to the respective roles of both officers and members and their 
interrelationship as found by Dereli (2003) and Joyce (2001). However, the 
potential for dysfunction could arise in a variety of forms; within the elected 
member group, within the officer group and between members and officers. Such 
dysfunction could be due to a number of factors such as; adversarial behaviour, 
apathy, compliance and intransigence.  
 
According to GLO1, the problems inherent within poorly performing councils were 
initially exacerbated by, but subsequently assisted by, the near simultaneous 
introduction of the cabinet and scrutiny governance structures at about the same 
time as the first CPA inspections, which were generally taking time to bed down 
nationally (Morphet 2008). 
 
A general finding of the corporate assessment analysis was that officer and 
member roles were not clearly understood and enacted in poorly performing 
councils, resulting in dysfunctional management and leadership.  Often criticisms 
were levelled at the member group, but to some extent officer roles were also 
specifically criticised.  The analysis of criticisms can be grouped under a number 
of common themes. In six cases, reference was made specifically to a lack of 
clarity and understanding of the roles and responsibilities of members and 
officers.  
 
The behaviour of members in particular is also identified as a theme from the 
corporate assessments, often being cited as inappropriate and in one case leading 
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to a blame culture that was “getting in the way”. In other cases this was linked to 
a lack of trust between officers and members and tension between the two 
groups.  A further theme concerned policy and strategy setting with ten 
references to either weak strategic leadership or management, which were also 
linked to comments regarding inappropriate (or in some cases lack of) member 
involvement. There was criticism of members becoming easily distracted and not 
driving change, resulting in a lack of future direction.  There was evidence of 
weak political engagement with partnerships, which was discussed above under 
leadership roles. 
 
These positions can to some extent be criticised as being a normative 
representation of the managerialist discourse coming from the government and 
Audit Commission at the time.  Fisher (1998) for example, identifies a muddying 
of the water between respective officer and member roles in resource allocation 
policy decisions and administration, as well as the increasing tendency for elected 
officials to expect ideological support from paid officials. Despite this, an 
improved understanding of these delineations of responsibilities did appear to be 
important to the turnaround phase of local authorities. 
 
By the end of CPA, a number of improvements are evident in the corporate 
assessments for those councils in the study.  In 18 cases, there were positive 
references made to officers and members being aware of their respective roles, 
one identified that the council had moved from being officer led to member led.  
Largely, this improvement in understanding appears to have been developed 
through training and development programmes.  In nine cases, specific reference 
is made to members attending training courses or being engaged on member 
development programmes, which in a few instances were mandatory. Often this 
training was described as being effective. Member and Officer training was also 
identified in the interviews as being a key contributor to improved understanding 
of roles.  Examples of training courses given included leadership training for 
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officers and members and financial management and audit committee training for 
members.  There was also the use of peer mentoring of elected members referred 
to in the GLO interviews, which was used to develop elected members’ 
understanding of their roles from other organisations. GLO2 made the following 
observation regarding the difficulties experienced in getting councillors in 
particular to look at their roles differently. 
 
“Essentially, councillors only work for one council, how do you get them to see 
things differently?…How do you get them to ‘taste the coffee’ in another council?” 
(GLO2 interview) 
 
In particular, according to GLO2, it is easier for paid officials to see things 
differently because as professionals, they are more likely to move around 
different organisations and be exposed to new and alternative approaches.  They 
are more able to recognise that things can be done differently.  It was more 
difficult to get elected members to address this and often the members had to be 
coerced initially to attend training courses, or be involved in peer development.  
However, once they had “got it”, then they very quickly adopted a more outward 
looking approach.  
 
There was also evidence from the corporate assessments that in a minority of 
cases personal development plans were being implemented for members, in a 
similar way to those that existed for officers.  This is an interesting finding, as 
despite the importance of the role of elected members, there are no national 
formal or legal requirements for members to have any training, not just in their 
roles vis-à-vis officers, but also in key management skills and competencies such 
as financial management, policy making and governance and accountability. 
Neither is there a requirement for any form of appraisal to be undertaken within 
the organisation. Appraising tends to be done at the ballot box. 
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With regards to behaviour, there are 12 positive references to the relationship 
between the elected Cabinet and the officer’s Strategic Management Team (SMT), 
with specific instances referring to this being positive, or there being appropriate 
and constructive working relationships, or respect and an open culture.  There 
were also five references made to improved, or good, cross-party working within 
the member group, with political concerns not being paramount.  This could be in 




There was clearly a lack of understanding of roles in poorly performing councils at 
the start of the CPA period. Improvements in understanding the need for effective 
leadership within councils, both from the elected members and from officers, as 
well as internally and externally with the local community and key stakeholders, 
represented a significant impetus for improvement and turnaround.  Two aspects 
seem to have been important in this, the separation of political and executive 
roles and the nature of the relationship between the Leader of the Council and the 
CEO. These aspects were dysfunctional at the start of CPA and improvement led 
not only to a focus on the need for improvement but also better ongoing 
functionality within councils in terms of decision making and performance 
management.  Whether this paucity in role understanding was a throw back to 
the era of NPM was not a focus of this study, but it can be speculated at.  Clearly 
the traditional public administration demarcation between elected officials and 
officers had broken down at some point prior to the first CPA assessments, and in 
the case of poorly performing councils had likely been dysfunctional for some 
time for things to have been so bad.  The improvements appear to have been 
guided partly by the corporate assessment reviews, but also significantly by the 
range of support available during the CPA period such as GLOs, LGA and IDeA 
mentoring and training. They can be linked to the ongoing debate on how to 
improve these relationships post NPM, which was clearly a concern of the local 
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government modernisation programme and continued into the public value and 
other discourses which followed it (Bennington and Moore, 2011 Greener 2009).  
 




Similar to the Understanding Roles theme, the New People and Structures theme, 
relates to both elected members and officers.  In particular, changes identified 
related to the Leader of the Council and the CEO, as well as other senior officers. 
Due to the summarised nature of the corporate assessments, they do not always 
reveal the extent to which changes in personnel, and the governance structures 
of a council, took place, but where these could be identified, they have been 
discussed here.  The interviews with the GLOs revealed themes that are pertinent 
to this section of the thesis and consider changes in key personnel (including 
elected members), as well as changes to structures, both internally, and those 
that enabled greater liaison with external stakeholders, agencies and 
organisations.  Changes in senior personnel was a theme identified in the 
literature review and conceptual framework of Document Two with the 
appointment of new CEOs a particular point of interest. Interestingly, a change of 
the senior political leadership was not something that was within the literature. 
This was not thought surprising at the time given that such roles are 
democratically chosen, either through the ballot box, or through the leadership 
election process within political parties.  Such roles cannot be changed simply 
through the normal hiring and firing procedures of an organisation and as such 
could be expected to be more difficult to change.  Nevertheless, there was 




This theme is broken down into four sub-themes, namely, new members, new 
officers, new cultures and new structures (which includes boards and other such 




As mentioned above, changing members of a local authority is a process that it is 
usually undertaken democratically.  This can occur at different times and in 
different sequences depending on the local authority concerned.  For example, 
some local authorities operate under a system whereby all members are elected 
at the same time, usually every four years.  Other local authorities have a 
proportion of the elected members standing for election each year on a four-year 
rolling cycle.  The main change that could be invoked through the electoral 
process would be a change in political composition of the council, i.e. a change 
from Labour to Conservative control or vice versa.  This would automatically bring 
about a change in the leadership of the council, effectively with cabinet and 
scrutiny roles reversed.   
 
There was no direct evidence within the corporate assessments of this occurring 
during the CPA period as a fundamental part of the turnaround process.  Indeed, 
it would be difficult to ascertain whether any such change was a direct result of 
electoral concern or protest against a poorly performing council, or whether it was 
due to other local or national factors that could affect the way the electorate 
decided to vote.  Also, in other studies into council performance during the CPA 
period, no evidence has been found that either the poor performance of a council, 
or its ability to improve is related to political control (Murphy et al, 2011), nor 
that a poor assessment affected political performance at the ballot box (Turner 
and Whiteman, 2005). What was more evident was that changes in the Leader of 
the Council had occurred, whether or not this was the result of the electoral 
process.  The evidence from the corporate assessments is relatively weak, with 
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only a very few councils specifically mentioned as having had a change of Leader.  
However, where this was evident, there was usually some attribution for the 
improvement of the council given to the new Leader.   
 
The evidence for change of elected Leader was much stronger in the GLO 
interviews (and in the council interviews discussed later).  For example, there was 
a striking reference given in one of the GLO interviews regarding changes to both 
Leader of Councils and CEOs (the CEO aspect is dealt with in more detail later in 
this section).  Following a poor or weak CPA assessment; 
 
“no leader or CEO that was part of the problem, were still in post after 6 months 
of the [first CPA] announcement” (GLO 1 interview) 
 
This is an interesting and powerful assertion, and one that was followed up in the 
interview. One thing to note from the quotation, is that the implied change of 
Leader was not necessarily universally applied, but only if they were regarded as 
“part of the problem”.  The first issue to ascertain was therefore how the GLO 
and/or intervention team assessed this. Determining whether or not a Leader 
should be possibly removed, depended on an assessment of whether the Leader 
had the “will and the wherewithal” (GLO1 interview) to facilitate change and 
improvement within the council.  Such an assessment was undertaken following 
meetings with other officials within the council and with partner organisations.  
 
Having established that a Leader of the Council was “part of the problem”, the 
next step would be to facilitate the removal of that Leader.  This was not 
necessarily a straightforward aspect of the GLO role; as to directly remove 
elected officials was outside the scope of their powers and jurisdiction (ODPM 
2003).  There was scope for the removal of an elected official at a senior political 
level, although this would require a separate legal process referred to the 
Secretary of State and was never undertaken (ODPM 2003). However, within the 
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remit of the GLO was the ability to remove or undercut the powers of the local 
authority as a statutory body, thereby circumventing the powers of the Leader of 
the Council and the executive. Such an approach was regarded as the “nuclear 
option” (GLO 1 interview) and as such was seldom used. However, when it was 
used, other councils quickly became aware of these powers. What was more 
effective was being able to use this option as a threat to the majority party group 
to try and invoke a voluntary response. Another quote from the GLOs as to how 
this was actually facilitated was through the “holding up of a mirror”  (GLO1 and 
GLO2 interviews) to the majority party group, showing them the weaknesses and, 
with the nuclear option threat in the background, invoking a voluntary change of 
leadership within the ruling group. Interestingly the term “holding up a mirror” 
was used by both GLOs and was also referred to in one of the local authority 
interviews, this time in relation to the CPA process as a whole, suggesting that 
the term is strongly associated with this period in local government performance 
inspection. The second GLO used another term of “tanks on the lawn” (GLO2 
interview) to figuratively illustrate one option discussed during a debate regarding 
the potential removal of the political leadership of one difficult council. In fact this 
approach was not adopted, but goes to show the strength (figuratively at least) 
that could have been brought to bear on a failing council if necessary.  
As was discussed in the previous section, improvements in the role of the Leader 
of the Council were an important aspect of the turnaround in council 
performance.  What is evident from these findings is that the improvement 
appears to have often gone hand in hand with the replacement of the person 
filling the role, either through internal processes or through elections (see also 
Wilson and Moore, 2007). 
 
Another, less contentious, aspect of changes in elected member roles during the 
CPA time period was the introduction of new specific member roles within a 
council.  Often, this was to tackle recognised areas of underperformance either at 
a service level, or within the corporate strategic systems.  For example, in some 
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cases from the corporate assessments, elected members of the majority party 
were given the role of ‘champions’ for specific areas e.g. Customer and 
Performance Champions and Councillor Development.  The use of such champions 
as symbolic artefacts (Pye and Pettigrew, 2006) is seen as a way of elevating the 
importance of a particular policy area to give it higher visibility within the council, 
and is therefore related to the branding issue discussed later.  Also, it gives the 
opportunity for someone in authority to monitor and report on progress made, in 
other words assigning accountability through the governance structure. 
 
Finally with regard to elected members, changes were experienced during the 
CPA period in terms of greater member involvement on various external boards 
and representative bodies.  This ran in parallel with the greater involvement of 
the Leader of the Council in such areas and was discussed in more detail in the 
Understanding Roles theme above.  This aspect appears to demonstrate a greater 
willingness by members to engage with, and in some cases manage, the external 




On the officer side of the equation, the most notable change was the replacement 
of CEOs (Turner et al, 2004; Boyne et al, 2008; Beeri, 2009). This is specifically 
mentioned in five of the corporate assessments, although given the comment of 
GLO1 above, it potentially happened in many others.  Changes to CEOs could 
occur in different ways and be either voluntary by the council concerned, or 
applied as part of the intervention process.  On a voluntary basis, a CEO would be 
removed and replaced by another permanent CEO. Under the intervention option, 
the outgoing CEO tended to be replaced with a temporary interim CEO, usually 
seconded in as part of the intervention phase, whose job it was to get the council 
on an improvement trajectory, before they in turn were replaced with a 
permanent CEO.  It is unclear from the corporate assessments whether the 
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changes in CEOs identified were voluntary or part of the intervention process. 
From the intervention perspective, the same conditions that were applied to 
Leaders of the Council would be considered regarding the possible removal of a 
CEO – do they have the will and the wherewithal to recognise there was a 
problem and to make the necessary improvements?   
 
According to both GLOs, new CEOs in such circumstances needed to be a certain 
type of leader.  Initially, both permanent and interim CEOs tended to be external 
rather internal appointments and would also need to be transformational in 
outlook.  The changes required to improve poorly performing councils often 
needed to be significant, deep and quickly applied.  Steady state and incremental 
leadership was not what was required under these circumstances. The two GLO 
interviews, and also two of the local authority interviews, referred to this 
requirement for the CEO to be transformational in approach (and it was implied in 
the third council interview).   
 
On a related point, there was little evidence that new CEOs were appointed from 
the private sector.  There is only one example of this in the corporate 
assessments, and the GLO interviews did not offer any support for this either.  It 
is assumed therefore that new CEOs, whether permanent or interim, tended to be 
recruited from within the local authority leadership pool (or at the very least 
public sector), certainly this was the case in the three councils interviewed.  In 
some cases, there was more than one CEO recruited during the turnaround 
phase.  This was sometimes mentioned within the corporate assessments and 
also referred to by the GLO and council interviews.   
 
The replacement of the CEO, though not an essential requirement for turnaround 
(Paton and Mordaunt, 2004), does appear to have been significant in the case of 
local authority turnaround, supporting the findings of other studies (Boyne, 2004; 
Boyne et al, 2008; Robins and Pearce, 1992; Turner et al, 2004, Beeri, 2009).  
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This is evidenced from a number of the cases in the corporate assessment 
analysis and reinforced by comments from both of the GLOs.   
The CEO, and specifically the appointment of an appropriate new CEO, seems to 
have been very important in these turnaround organisations. One aspect that has 
been identified as important in the complexity of local government turnaround 
situations is that there is no one size fits all approach to recovery (Turner et al, 
2004).  This variability in approach to turnaround appears to have been facilitated 
by appointing the right type of CEO, who is able to put the right processes and 
structures in place to allow the organisation to develop its own path to recovery 
(see also ODPM, 2003).  The CEOs are highly visible and engaged in opening up 
the organisation and empowering hierarchical levels to explore and develop the 
organisations strategy while at the same time building new external relationships 
(Harker, 1996). This sense of contingent leadership (Fielder, 1967) being 
important was reinforced by both the GLOs but GLO1 went further, explaining 
that not only was responsiveness to the situation important, but also that CEOs 
should exhibit “heroic behaviour” in order to take the organisation with them. 
Leaders “had to work harder and longer….visibly be the crutch by which you’d get 
out of the process” and “leaders needed to live the talk as well as talk the talk”. 
 
Other changes to the officer side of the organisation included new management 
appointments, the creation of new roles and the restructuring of management 
teams.  Restructuring of senior management teams was usually accompanied by 
a reduction in their size (see also Beeri, 2009).  This was not necessarily through 
people exiting the organisation, but rather that they were no longer included in 
the management team.  
 
From the corporate assessments, there is evidence in a number of cases that new 
blood was brought into the organisation.  In some cases, this followed a 
concerted effort to recruit into difficult-to-fill senior management roles, which had 
previously been unfilled or temporarily filled.  Where such changes did occur, this 
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appears to be linked to increasing the management and strategic capacity of 
organisations, recognising that there is a need to fill such posts if departments or 
policy areas are to be managed effectively. In some cases, these externally 
appointed managers brought with them new skills and experiences, which were 
shared with senior officers to increase strategic capacity.  
 
In terms of new roles, there is limited evidence from the corporate assessments, 
but nevertheless certain positions appear to have been created in response to 
specific areas of criticism levelled at a council, for example a Corporate Risk 
Manager and a Director of Partnerships.  In the same way that elected members 
were given champion roles, creating such officer roles gives a visible sense of 
importance to the issues being addressed and also provides management 
capacity to ensuring work is undertaken to overcoming them. In one council there 
was a focus on developing internal talent, presumably as a way of both improving 
and retaining managers within the organisation.  Specific programmes were 
created within the organisation named as “Phoenix” and “Breakthrough” 




It was not the purpose of this thesis to examine organisational culture in detail.  
However, it was noticeable from both the corporate assessments and the GLO 
interviews that phrases regarding changing the organisational culture were 
perceived as being linked to improving the performance of poorly performing 
councils.  In the corporate assessments, 12 statements are made that related to 
improvements in culture.  Such statements included references to their being an 
inclusive culture, a positive attitude to improvement throughout the organisation, 
an empowerment culture as well as good staff morale and positive staff feedback.  
All are indicative of a strong leadership focus on changing the mindset of staff 
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and members within the organisation, so that they are all working towards 




Finally in this theme the issue of structures is returned to, this time in terms of 
specific boards etc that were put in place as opposed to new staff or member 
roles.  One criticism raised in the corporate assessments at the start of CPA was 
that there was a tendency towards silo working within organisations with a lack of 
corporate focus.  The creation of new boards and governance arrangements 
appears in some cases to be designed to overcome this.  In other cases, changes 
have been brought into address specific weaknesses within the organisation 
identified in the initial CPA inspections.  Sometimes, such changes had an 
external focus such as the creation or restructuring of Partnership Boards and 
Regeneration Boards.  In other cases the focus was on internal matters and there 
are a number of references made to the creation of performance co-ordination 
groups, or performance centres, and audit committees.  This reflects general 
improvements in performance management and governance arrangements 




Internal change within the councils studied applied to both structural and cultural 
change.  This is to be expected in turnaround situations and can be linked to both 
the repositioning and reorganising identified by Boyne (2004). A more significant 
finding was the replacement of senior officials, and in particular the Leader of the 
Council and the CEO as a pre cursor to the turnaround period starting.  It would 
appear that despite parts of the literature asserting that such replacement is not 
necessarily a requirement of turnaround (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004), it was 
prevalent during the CPA period.  Critics of CPA may point to this as being the 
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legitimisation of central government intervention (Grubnic and Woods, 2009), in 
a similar way that NPM was used as a smokescreen for the marketisation of public 
services (Pollitt, 1993).  However, if the GLOs are to be believed, it wasn’t an 
automatic assumption that such replacement was necessary, but rather it only 
occurred after an assessment of “will and wherewithal”, essentially cognition, 
capacity and capability.  The replacement of political leadership occurred outside 
of the local election processes, something that critics may point to as 
undermining local democracy.  Nevertheless, the changes in Leader and CEO 
(whether interim or permanent) did precede the improvements in performance 
referred to in the previous and subsequent themes and as such can be thought to 
have had a significant impact on the turnaround of these councils.  This aspect is 
explored in more detail in Section 3, where the analysis of the case study councils 








This section reviews the changes that took place during the CPA era in the 
strategic management processes and systems of the councils under review.  It 
does not focus on those processes that might be considered specific “turnaround 
processes”, these are dealt with in the final part of this section.  The focus here is 
on identifying changes in the underlying approach to ongoing strategic 
management within councils. There was a significant degree of commonality of 
findings across a wide range of councils, whether they were district councils or 
STCCs.  
 
Apart from the relationship to turnaround processes referred to above, there is 
also a degree of overlap with other themes identified within the thesis, specifically 
the Working With Others theme, the Intelligence Gathering theme, the 
Prioritisation and Re-prioritisation theme and Performance Management theme.  
The detailed findings associated with these themes will be considered in their own 
sections, but reference to them will be made here where appropriate. 
 
The findings in this section cover a range of strategic processes and systems 
including what has been referred to here as visioning, formal plans, branding, 
challenge and scrutiny and finally governance, ethics and decision making.  They 
are clearly managerialist in nature.  By comparing the presence and performance 
of such processes at the start and end of CPA, the extent of learning, 
improvement and development during turnaround can be established.  Indeed, 
from the interviews it was evident that from a turnaround perspective it was the 
matter of introducing, evaluating and learning how to use such processes that 






Visioning is the process by which those within the organisation determine the 
vision for that organisation at some point in the future.  It is aspirational and 
establishes what the desired future state of the organisation will look like 
(Balogun and Hope Hailey, 2008). An organisation’s vision is sometimes termed 
its strategic intent (Johnson and Scholes, 2002) and is closely associated in the 
literature with developing mission statements and the strategic position of an 
organisation. The strategic nature of an organisation’s vision would imply that it 
should be long-term, cover the full scope of the organisation’s activities and be 
informed by the needs of stakeholders and any challenges facing the organisation 
in the future. In this way the vision can provide a degree of co-ordination across 
the organisation when dealing with complex strategic challenges that can by 
nature be both unknowable and unpredictable (Quinn, 1978).  
 
Poorly performing councils at the start of CPA were criticised within the corporate 
assessments regarding their organisational vision in a number of ways.  A few of 
the councils simply had no vision at all and were too focussed on short term 
planning.  Although these were in the minority, this was nevertheless a surprising 
finding given the previous history relating to NPM and managerialism, and the 
transference of private sector practices, especially strategic practices, into public 
sector organisations (Cochran, 1993; Dereli, 2003; Diamond and Liddle, 2005; 
Flynn and Talbot, 1996; Pollitt, 2003; Worrall et al, 1998) as well as more 
latterly, the drive to develop local strategic partnerships (LSPs) and local area 
agreements (LAAs).  The main concern emerging from the corporate assessments 
was that where visions existed, they were often vague or lacked clarity, were too 
general or were underdeveloped or weak. Linked to this, were concerns that 
visions were neither ambitious nor stretching, or, at the other end of the 
spectrum, that they were unrealistic and not deliverable. In a minority of cases, 
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reference was made to there being confusion between the vision and mission of 
the council, or that it was not shared with partner organisations (in LSPs for 
example).  As such, at the start of CPA, poorly performing councils were 
struggling with the concept of visioning, and the important role that an 
organisational vision can have in the development of strategic and operational 
planning.  Lacking the sense of focus that commentators claim the vision 
provides, it is not surprising that in later sections of this thesis, problems are 
identified with the prioritisation of resources and performance management, as 
there is no basis on which to refer these processes back to.  
 
By the end of CPA, a number of statements were identified within the corporate 
assessments that related to improved visioning processes.  In 12 cases, the 
vision is specifically referred to as being challenging or ambitious, and often this 
is linked to it being realistic.  Councils had now managed to grasp the concept of 
the purpose of a vision and were able to set a challenging desired future state 
that would move the organisation forward.  This is especially poignant given the 
legal need for councils to delivery continuous improvement as laid down in the 
Local Government Act 1999 and initially encapsulated in the Best Value regime 
that preceded CPA.  While the criticisms regarding visioning at the start of CPA 
did not specifically refer to the need to use stakeholder requirements to inform 
the vision, by the end of CPA there are a great number of positive statements 
made in this regard to suggest that it was possibly a significant failing of poorly 
performing councils. There are 16 cases where reference is made to the vision 
being informed, either by local or national needs, and in some instances that 
councils displayed a sound understanding of these needs, which is in part linked 
to the improvements in intelligence gathering and consultation that are referred 
to in later sections of this thesis.  As such, these councils were now better aware 
of the range of local and national priorities that shape the modern local authority 
and had been able to convert these into a sense of purpose for the council to take 
it forward.  This is supported by a number of statements making reference to 
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staff and councillors understanding the vision and the role that their work played 
in delivering it.  Finally, positive aspects relating to visioning include six specific 
statements referring to the vision being used to drive organisational strategic 
plans, showing an alignment of plans within the organisation which will be dealt 
with in more detail below.  This joining-up also extends to partnership and 
collaborative working, with 17 positive statements made regarding the alignment 
and ownership of partnership plans, and backed up by clear targets.  
 
Visioning is often associated with being a leadership function (Joyce, 2004; 
Senge, 1990b), but in the corporate assessments and the interviews, the vision is 
informed by both internal and external stakeholders, and indeed developed from 
these sources.  Leaders played a facilitating role (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989) and 
the conclusion here is that visioning operated across two dimensions; the internal 
dimension and the external.  Whereas the external vision is concerned with 
traditional approaches of what councils can deliver for the local community, the 
internal dimension appears to capture a vision of organisational confidence, which 
in turn seems to be based on improvement, listening and empowerment as well 
as capturing and promoting an internal sense of enthusiasm and purpose. 
Leaders play a key role in ensuring there is ownership of this internal vision 
across the officers and members. Internal visioning appears to have been a key 
aspect of the turnaround process in poorly performing councils, representing a 




The production of a variety of formal plans was also a major aspect of this theme.  
In particular this relates to a hierarchy of interlinked plans, at the heart of which 
lies the organisation’s corporate plan (referred to as strategic plan in some 
corporate assessments), which in turn is informed by the organisational vision.  
The corporate plan represents the long-term, consolidated strategic ambitions for 
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the whole organisation. Little is said about the detailed content of corporate plans 
in the corporate assessments, but they would likely cover a period of up to ten 
years (occasional references are made to 20 year plans, but these are very few), 
be focussed on delivering (and possibly setting) the vision of the council and be 
cascaded down into departmental service plans (sometimes referred to as 
business plans) and ultimately team and individual objectives.  A council’s 
corporate plan could also be expected to form links to any partnership or 
collaborative working such as the LSP and specific partnerships such as crime and 
disorder partnerships. This approach comes across very strongly from the 
corporate assessments and could represent a view within the Audit Commission 
and the Government that prescriptive approaches to strategic planning 
(Mintzberg, 1990, 1991) advocated by MBA programmes (Ansoff, 1988, 1991; 
Porter, 1996, 1998) were a necessity. 
 
At the start of CPA, it is clear from the corporate assessments that poorly 
performing councils did not have appropriate strategic planning systems in place.  
In a few extreme cases, there appears to be a lack of reliance on strategic 
planning and rather the emphasis is on reaction (rather than being proactive), 
crisis management and fire fighting (something which was borne out in all three 
of the councils interviewed). In three councils, corporate plans were referred to as 
being out of date or incomplete, which suggests both a lack of value was placed 
on developing plans as well as a lack of emphasis in using them.  Where 
corporate plans did exist, criticisms were of two broad types.  Firstly, in seven 
cases, plans were neither informed by stakeholders (e.g. users, central 
government and partners) nor by changes in the external environment (for 
example one plan was criticized for not taking account of demographic changes).  
Secondly, in 14 cases plans were specifically criticized for not focussing on 
improvement.  In particular this can be linked to the legislative requirement to 
continually improve referred to earlier, but specifically, this criticism also included 
references to plans not being outcome focussed, or not focussed on the delivery 
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of change.  There was also concern in some cases that plans were too 
incremental, suggesting that the council was potentially unaware that it was 
performing as badly as it was (Jas and Skelcher, 2005). It would be an 
expectation that poorly performing councils would need to undertake step-change 
(Hofer, 1980; Pandit, 2000; Khandwalla, 1983; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; 
Harker, 1996; Wren, 2001; Francis and Desai, 2005; Filatotchev and Toms, 
2006), or transformational change, rather than incremental change if they were 
to significantly improve, a point backed up by the interviews with both GLOs.  
This is linked also to corporate plans being too service based and not strategic in 
nature, a specific criticism levelled at two councils, but implied in others.  
 
By the end of CPA, the picture was transformed, with many councils receiving 
positive statements about the quality of their corporate plans and the processes 
used to develop and communicate them.  Corporate plans were now informed by 
a wide variety of stakeholder groups, through a range of engagement methods 
(see later sections).  In some cases, councils were using external stakeholder 
feedback to specifically set or amend future action plans. Corporate plans were 
now set in conjunction with partners, with the focus shifting away from 
organisational parochialism, to wider concerns at a regional and sub-regional 
level, including other public bodies as well as the private and voluntary and 
community sectors. Specifically, corporate plans are linked in with LSP and other 
community based plans.  Corporate plans now included action plans for 
improvement as well as focussing on long term, medium term and short-term 
objectives. In some cases plans were praised for identifying focussed priorities 
and in others for being simpler and easier to understand due to there being a 
limited number of key themes; a subject that will be returned to under the 
prioritisation theme.   
 
With regard to the production of the plans, or the planning process, this appears 
to have undergone a transformation in many of the councils studied. Not only was 
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there the inclusion of stakeholder input to inform the plans referred to above, but 
also there was a move towards a more fully integrated planning framework.  
Corporate plans were not only linked externally to community based plans, but 
also internally throughout the organisation, informing service plans (business 
plans), the medium term financial plan, the human resource plan and information 
technology strategies.  These in turn informed organisational wide procurement, 
risk and project management approaches as well as team and individual plans 
through performance appraisal processes.  What becomes evident is a cascading 
of planning throughout the organisation, starting with the vision for the 
organisation, which is then translated into priorities through the corporate plan. 
In some cases, plans were praised for being aligned, giving a sense that the 
organisation was moving in the same direction.  Other comments referred to staff 
and partners being empowered by the planning process.  It is evident from many 
of the authorities in the corporate assessments, that planning was taking place 
within a cycle rather than it being a one off event. This suggests strong links to 
the planned strategic approaches favoured by much of the strategy literature in 
both the private and public sectors.   
 
There is a tension here that the adoption of such a rigid and universal approach 
perhaps places too much emphasis on traditional managerialist perspectives, 
especially the more prescriptive approaches to strategy development.  This 
tension also came through in the GLO interviews.  
 
“There was huge emphasis placed on plans by the Government and the Audit 
Commission. But this emphasis was misplaced”  (GLO1 interview) 
 
GLO1 went onto emphasise that with hindsight, getting bogged down in too much 
planning detail was not what was important.  What mattered more was that 
councils were able to articulate the nature of relationships between key 
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stakeholders.  Could they work together and collaborate in a multi-agency way in 
the community interest? 
 
“Initial plans were like war plans.  They didn’t survive first contact with the 
enemy” (GLO1 interview) 
 
This is suggestive of the need for councils to understand the nature of the 
environment and challenges faced and to be able to see what needed to be done 
and take action on it, rather than being able to produce a document.  It is about 
having the capacity to be self-aware and adaptive, features of a self-regulating 
organisation, which lead to longer-term improvement, a view, that according to 
GLO1, the Audit Commission also came to over time.    
 
Another observation made by both GLOs, was that the emphasis on planning 
could be used by councils to make it look as if they were improving, even though 
longer-term problems still persisted. From GLO2’s perspective, there was scope 
for some councils to make incremental changes around the edges rather than 
focussing on the corporate issues. This was described as “box ticking and 
wriggling” in an attempt to move up a CPA category.  GLO1 highlighted the 
danger of councils that went for short-term compliance, in that they might get 
the figures right for a year, but couldn’t get out of the intervention process in the 
longer term. Here councils were producing plans but not producing improvement 
in organisational capacity. 
 
Despite these criticisms of focussing too much on the planning frameworks, there 
was recognition from the GLOs that given the poor state of the councils at the 
start of CPA, the emphasis on planning processes at least provided a vehicle 
through which councils could be encouraged to improve.  There is a temptation to 
view such plans as artefacts of the strategic process, rather than having any real 
tangible benefit. However, the planning systems appeared to lay down on the one 
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hand a set of guiding principles for councils to follow and the other provided the 
catalyst for the organisation to start to understand itself and its environment 
better.  It was more about seeing plans as a means to an end rather than an end 
in themselves (Pye and Pettigrew, 2006), and for those councils that improved 
during the CPA period, their greater ability for self-awareness and self-correction 
appears to have to a large extent developed out of the benefits derived from 
seeing planning in this way. 
 
This theme of the study is related to the more general aspects of ongoing 
strategy formulation within organisations. To an extent it is what councils should 
have been doing anyway under a managerialist paradigm.  However, it also 
represents the culmination of a period of learning for councils throughout the 
turnaround period, which can be considered a distinct phase of improvement for 
poorly performing councils.  Clearly if organisations were good at strategy in the 
first place, they would not have found themselves in a poorly performing 
situation. Also, this ongoing strategic approach would be closely related to self-
correcting rather than permanently failing organisations (Jas and Skelcher, 
2005). Issues regarding specific turnaround approaches are referred to in a later 
section of this thesis, however it is clear that developing this strategic capability 
and capacity (Turner et al, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005) during the 
turnaround phase was a necessary and fundamental aspect of organisational 
learning, if councils were to sustain their improved position over the longer term.  
This learning is therefore identified as being related to the sustainability of 
improved performance after the turnaround period has ended. 
 
This emphasis placed on visioning and strategic planning generally appears to 
advocate the more structured approach to strategy apparent in the literature of 
Porter and Ansoff, rather than the more creative and emergent approaches 
suggested by Senge and Mintzberg and Quinn.  However aspects of creativity 
were identified by the study, suggesting that although formal strategic planning 
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frameworks appear necessary to co-ordinate complex public sector organisations 
there is still scope for a combined approach to be taken (as per Mintzberg’s later 




An interesting facet of the adoption and improvement of strategic planning 
processes arising from the corporate assessments was that a number of councils 
had used branding to help in championing and communicating the corporate plan 
and vision.  The branding often took the form of a named document that used 
positive phrases to give the corporate plan an apparent sense of purpose, 
enhancing the internal narrative of turnaround within the organisation (Jas and 
Skelcher, 2005). The use of branding is not explained within the corporate 
assessments, but by giving the plan a unique identity could be seen in some way 
to elevate its importance both within the organisation and also to external 
stakeholders such as service users and partners.  The brand, could have provided 
a rallying point behind which employees could come together, with the focus on 
improving organisational performance and enhancing destiny development 
(Harker, 1996).  Alternatively, to name the plan gives it a sense of identity, 
raising its importance, over and above previous attempts at planning.   
 
Scrutiny and Governance 
 
The role of scrutiny and governance was another key improvement identified 
under the strategic planning theme. Figure 36 below gives an overview of the 
external and internal scrutiny arrangements faced by councils during the CPA 
period.  These can be seen to include a combination of both vertical and 
horizontal arrangements as well as formal/informal and statutory/non-statutory. 
The greater willingness to accept external scrutiny is discussed further in the 
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gathering intelligence theme. This sub-theme focuses on internal scrutiny 
arrangements. 
 





The inclusion of formal and effective challenge and scrutiny processes within a 
local authority’s governance arrangements, had become a fundamental 
requirement by the early 2000s (see also Figure 27). The role of such scrutiny 
arrangements is to hold the elected cabinet to account and provide a means of 
challenge to decision making within the organisation. Different models of scrutiny 
can be adopted, for example establishing a scrutiny committee that is chaired by 
a member of the opposition party, and to some extent the model chosen will 
depend on the leadership model adopted by a council, which was discussed 
earlier in this thesis.  Which model is chosen is not as important as how effective 
the scrutiny function is, and at the start of CPA for those councils under 
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consideration, scrutiny was almost exclusively problematic.  It was often 
described as being ineffective, underdeveloped or providing a lack of effective 
challenge.  In some cases, it was specifically referred to as not focussing on the 
impact of policies, nor on monitoring progress.  The reasons for such a lack of 
effective scrutiny are unclear from the corporate assessments, but are most 
probably symptomatic of the lack of understanding of effective leadership and 
governance approaches that have become evident throughout the study. 
 
By the end of CPA, the position is once again reversed, with the majority of 
councils now being described as having effective scrutiny arrangements in place. 
In many cases, scrutiny has been specifically attributed with contributing to policy 
development and service improvement, suggesting that the function is not merely 
a structural change, but an embedded change in the approach to decision making 
and recognised as such by both the majority and opposition political parties. A 
number of references are made to a wider opportunity for councillors to challenge 
decision making through the scrutiny process. In a minority of cases, specific 
reference is made to there being good officer support for the scrutiny function as 
well as the cabinet function, although it can be assumed that such conditions 
must have been present in other organisations given the significant improvement 
in scrutiny that was experienced. 
 
Other findings associated with this theme include improvements in governance 
and ethical arrangements as well as decision-making within local authorities. 
Although less is said about these in the corporate assessments, there is a definite 
sense that they improved during the CPA period. A number of statements are 
made at the end of CPA that governance and ethical frameworks are either 
working well or developing and improving, whereas at the start there are some 
references to there being a lack of delegation or that accountabilities were not 
clear.  With regards to decision making, the emphasis at the end of CPA is that 
decision making is timely and transparent and that it supports the priorities of the 
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council, whereas at the start of CPA references are made to there being 
inconsistent evaluation in decision making and there being a lack of focus on 
action.  While the evidence for these aspects is not as strong as the other 
elements discussed in this section, their impact could possibly have been wider 
than implied, given the developments referred to in the rest of the section.  For 
example, the more embedded nature of scrutiny within councils, would imply that 
governance arrangements had improved; the greater emphasis on strategic 
planning and visioning, aligned with more comprehensive information, could have 
helped to improve the nature of decisions made, at least in terms of them being 




Consideration of underlying strategic processes clearly has roots back to the NPM 
era and it was therefore a surprise to find the paucity of such processes at the 
start of CPA. It is unclear why strategic processes were so poor but it may  
indicate that while NPM was successful in implementing the harder structural 
changes such as privatisation and competition, the regimes associated with NPM 
were less successful at embedding underlying strategic processes.  The changes 
that took place are clearly managerialist in nature, but they transcend the NPM 
discourse and are also referred to as important within other discourses, for 
example public value (Bennington and Moore, 2011). As such they are seen as 
continuing to be important in helping councils understand the nature of the 
environment within which they operated and how to respond to it. It seems clear 
that their introduction represented a period of learning by councils and that this 
learning took place on two levels. One was learning how to develop and 
implement strategic planning processes, which seems to have been through 
iteration and refinement.  The second is that by doing this councils were able to 
understand themselves better, clearly contributing to the greater self-awareness 
and confidence identified in other themes.  It was not necessarily the production 
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of a plan that was important, but it was the greater organisational understanding 
that this brought, something borne out by the GLO interviews and the literature 
(Hughes, 2003).  The improvements in these processes enabled better co-
ordination of resources and decision-making, which in turn contributed to 
improved service scores under CPA, as well as improvements in the corporate 
assessment score. The learning and embedding of effective planning and the 
organisational learning that went with it is also seen as a key aspect of 
sustainability.  If councils were good at this, they would not have been poorly 
performing in the first place.  It follows that in order to maintain improved 
performance, the embedding and reinforcement of these strategic processes was 
also important. 
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The prioritisation theme is one of two themes that were also used as categories 
by the Audit Commission (2006) to evaluate local authorities in the corporate 
assessment reports.  It was also one of the ten themes identified by the GLO 
interview in Document Three. Prioritisation is essentially about putting things in 
order of importance.  This is particularly challenging for public sector 
organisations, dealing as they do with extensive multi-stakeholder complexity 
(McAdam et al, 2005). From the strategic point of view, prioritisation could be 
undertaken across a variety of spectrums.  In one sense it relates to establishing 
the relative importance of stakeholder groups whose views impact upon the 
organisation.  In another, it entails decisions about what functions and services 
should be provided by the council and at what level of activity; and which 
services are more important than others over time. At another level still, it 
concerns the distribution of financial and other resources across these 
organisational objectives (Worrall et al, 1998; Fisher, 1998). Linked to 
prioritisation is the concept of re-prioritisation. This would entail shifting the 
relative importance of objectives from time to time, and, importantly, making 
decisions about how to shift resources from one part of the organisation to 
another. For local authorities, priorities could be expected to be informed by a 
range of factors, including; government policy, local political influences and local 
need within the communities served (demographics and economics for example). 
To an extent therefore, armed with the appropriate information, establishing what 
the priorities of a local authority could be relatively straightforward. If there is a 
shift in government policy, this should be reflected in the priorities of the council.  
If there is a change in local political control, this will most likely change the 
priorities of the council.  If there were a change in the age, gender or ethnicity of 
the local population then this would inform priorities on education and social care.  
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However, local authorities are not starting from a blank sheet of paper when 
establishing priorities.  Rather, there will already be a set of espoused and/or 
underlying priorities that will have shaped the activities and distribution of 
resources of the council in the past.  The more difficult process therefore for local 
authorities, would be the re-prioritisation of objectives and resources in response 
to changing circumstances, and the reason for this would be that it entails 
change. This is different from re-prioritising in the private sector, where all such 
decisions would link back to the common denominator of increased financial 
return (and could therefore be viewed as sub-priorities).  In a local authority, the 
relationships between variables and choices are complex and concerned with 
maximising public value (Wilson and Game, 2006; Moore, 1995). This is best 
summed up by a quotation from one of the interviews undertaken. 
 
“We are very good at taking on additional demands on our services in response 
to, say, changes in government policy, whether or not these are backed up by 
additional resources.  What we are not so good at is deciding what we no longer 
need to do”. (Council B interview) 
 
In essence, this encapsulates the dilemma faced by local authorities when 
determining what is important and what is not important. The quote illustrates a 
tendency to take on more responsibility, or more workload, in one area of 
service, but that this doesn’t necessarily mean that workloads and resources 
elsewhere within the organisation are reduced to compensate for it.  There is a 
danger that everything that is currently done by an organisation is seen to be 
important, if not unquestionable, and that where additional demands are placed 
on the organisation, these are simply absorbed within existing resources.  The 
implication here for organisations is that they become on the one hand 
overstretched, placing increasing stresses on organisational systems and the 
people who deliver them, and on the other hand the organisation ends up with a 
large and unwieldy set of objectives, the result of which is that it lacks focus and 
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is unable to take effective decisions regarding direction and scope.  It is argued in 
this thesis, based on the findings of the corporate assessment analysis and 
interviews, that prioritisation, or more specifically the ability to re-prioritise, is 
one of the fundamental capabilities required by an effective local authority, and 
that it was the absence of this capability that contributed significantly to initial 
poor performance.  The ability to learn how to improve prioritisation and re-
prioritisation capability during the turnaround phase was one of the key findings 
of the study. Being able to retain this capability is considered to be critical to 
sustained organisational performance.  
 
The findings on prioritisation are considered across four sub-themes; deciding on 
priorities, scope of priorities, taking difficult decisions and finally links to other 
plans. 
 
Deciding on Priorities 
 
With regard to deciding what is important and what is not important, at the start 
of CPA the ability of the poorly performing councils in the study is heavily 
criticized. There are 15 specific references to organisations being unable to 
distinguish between priorities and non-priorities, or that organisations were 
unclear as to what was not important.  In one case a specific reference is made 
that priorities were not identified, at all.  These references are linked to 
comments that there was a weak basis for the setting of priorities (implying a 
lack of understanding of the external environment), that priorities were not 
informed by any form of intelligence or that the impact of priorities was not 
clearly understood.  As will be seen later, what emerges from the Gathering 
Intelligence, Communication and Performance Management themes, is that 
priorities were not at this stage understood by staff, nor were they reflected in 
their individual performance assessments. This paints a picture of local authority 
leaders and mangers that are unfocussed in their direction, or focussed on the 
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wrong issues, perhaps bogged down in historical perceptions of what services 
should be undertaken either through ignorance, apathy or direct opposition to 
central government policy and/or local need.  There is also the issue that for 
some organisations, deciding on priorities was not always an easy or comfortable 
task.  Where responsibility lies for determining priorities is also important.  GLO1 
made the observation that “members thought this was what officers did”, 
reinforcing the sense that at the start of CPA members were disengaged from the 
process of organisational leadership and decision making. 
 
By the end of CPA, what can be seen is a range of positive statements about the 
way in which prioritisation is undertaken within local authorities.  There are 12 
references to local authorities being clear about priority and non-priority areas 
and in some cases, reference was made to there being a structured approach to 
the development of priorities.  It is not always clear what such structured 
approaches looked like, and to an extent such references reinforce the ongoing 
managerialist approach adopted under CPA, but they would most likely have been 
linked to some of the other positive statements made about the prioritisation 
processes. For example, there were 13 references to the effect that priorities 
were based on a sound understanding of national and local requirements.   
 
As will be seen later under the Gathering Intelligence theme, this improved 
understanding has been informed by an increase in the range and quality of 
intelligence gathering processes from internal, local and national stakeholders.  
There is evidence that increasingly councils were using consultation and feedback 
processes to both inform and revise priorities. Such consultation and intelligence 
gathering included the use of councillor surgeries, detailed demographic 
information, impact assessments and neighbourhood engagement to name but a 
few (these were recorded under the Intelligence Gathering theme but are linked 
here). In two cases, priority matrices were mentioned as being used to help 
decide on prioritisation.  There is one reference that prioritisation had been used 
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effectively to turn around performance.  The main message here is that councils 
have become better and more sophisticated at recognising and acting on the key 
drivers for prioritisation and that this greater understanding has been used to 
shape the direction of the organisation. Significantly, GLO1 identified that 
members were better able to understand the term “priorities” rather than 
“strategies” and this was their path to greater engagement with the strategic 
processes.  They had learnt that they had discretion over organisational priorities 
and it was this learning that helped them develop their strategic role more 
effectively.  
 
Scope of Priorities 
 
There is also criticism raised at the start of CPA that some councils were unable 
to effectively determine a range of workable priorities. In some cases, references 
are made to councils having too many priorities to be effective, leading to 
confusion within the organisation as to where action and resources should be 
targeted.  On other occasions, priorities are described as being too broad and not 
able to direct action effectively.  This is again symptomatic of dysfunctional 
decision making within the organisations, in a similar way that a lack of an 
effective vision makes it difficult for leaders and managers to decide what is 
important, potentially leading to conflicting or dysfunctional decisions being 
taken, or possibly no decisions at all.  This aspect is referenced within the 
corporate assessments at the start of CPA, but not referred to specifically at the 
end.  However, it is presumed that the situation improved, given the apparent 
increased ability of councils to determine what is, and what is not, important.  
 
Interestingly, this appears to have been somewhat of a learning curve for 
councils as negative statements on an increasing numbers of priorities, or there 
being an unworkable number of priorities, occur not just at the start of CPA but 
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also in the second corporate assessments for STCCs in, or around, 2004.  It was 
also evident in the GLO interviews, for example; 
 
“Members had no ability to focus on the five things they needed to do.  They were 
trying to focus on too many priorities…and not being good at anything” (GLO2 
interview) 
 
More recently in the literature, Andrews et al (2009), reviewed local authority 
strategic processes against the Miles and Snow (1978) model of strategic 
management.  In one aspect of this research, the ability to prioritise was 
considered a significant component of strategy closely associated with the 
prospecting and defender organisational types. A lack of ability to prioritise was 
more closely related to the reactor type of organisation. 
 
Taking Difficult Decisions 
 
Linked to the improvement of prioritisation, is an improvement in the ability of 
the elected members to take difficult decisions.  This phrase, “taking difficult 
decisions” (or sometimes tough decisions), appears frequently in the corporate 
assessments and seems to carry a certain level of significance.   
 
Specific reference to it is made on 13 separate occasions within the corporate 
assessments and it is often linked to statements such as “despite opposition”, or 
“despite challenge”, either internally or externally.  On at least five occasions, 
members are praised for also following through on the decisions, in other words 
making things happen despite opposition.  Examples of such difficult decisions 
include the outsourcing of services, the closure of uneconomic front line facilities 
and changes to procurement processes.  This aspect highlights the importance of 
the taking of action, once the problems of determining priorities have been 
overcome.  This is regarded as being very important. What is the point of 
  92
spending time and resources identifying a clear set of focussed priorities, if they 
are then not subsequently followed through?  The fact that members were 
prepared to take such difficult decisions, and follow them through, signifies a 
change of attitude and outlook, a desire to make things happen, to bring about 
change for the better, which didn’t seem to exist in these organisations at the 
start of the CPA process.  It also suggests a degree of increasing ownership of 
decision making, presumably backed up by a better understanding of roles, as 
well as greater confidence in being able to take decisions, supported by improved 
decision making information, but also by the clearer focus having a set of 
priorities enables.   
 
By contrast, at the start of CPA councils were criticised for having no track record 
of making and sticking to difficult decisions. In one case this was referred to as a 
tendency to “play it safe”.  With regards to the depth of prioritisation at the start 
of CPA, reference is made to councils being unclear as to how excellent services 
translate into outcomes, or what success looks like, or what a good council looks 
like.  Such statements as these are suggestive of councils espousing a vision that 
aims to position the council as being excellent, but at the same time being 
unclear as to how to translate that vision into action, thereby limiting members’ 
confidence and ability to take decisions.  The impression derived from the 
corporate assessments is that during the turnaround phase, the use of effective 
prioritisation and re-prioritisation has allowed the organisational vision to be 
translated into a concise set of workable, meaningful and targeted priorities 
against which decisions for action can be reviewed and taken.   
 
Links to other Plans 
 
Finally in this theme consideration is given to the way that corporate priorities 
were associated with the other plans within the organisation.  Primarily, the 
evidence for this relates to the improved ability that councils had developed to 
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move resources around the organisation from non, or low, priority areas to those 
that were considered more important. In some cases this was simply utilising 
efficiency savings, often due to changes in support services, and redirecting them 
to priority activities.  At the start of CPA, criticism was levelled at councils for not 
matching resources to priorities.  This would suggest that even though corporate 
plans, and possibly service plans, were identifying new and/or changed 
classifications of priority areas, the underlying budget of the council (and most 
likely the human resources that it paid for) continued to reflect historical positions 
of service delivery.  This aspect again returns to the need to be able to re-
prioritise, and hence take difficult decisions.  To put revised priorities into action 
requires a realignment of resources, financial and human, taking them from low 
priority areas and switching them to areas of higher importance.  
 
By the end of CPA, specific reference is made in the corporate assessments to 
resources following priorities, or resources being aligned with priorities.  As will 
be seen later, this is also related to improvements in medium term financial 
planning, whereby the financial plans of the organisation are looked at over the 
longer term in direct association with the way in which priorities are due to 
change over that period.  There are also links here to improved human resource 
planning, information technology planning and procurement practices, which will 




The ability to effectively prioritise resources and decisions was clearly a problem 
for decision makers at the start of CPA.  These problems are linked to the lack of 
strategic planning processes and the dysfunctional nature of leadership.  Once 
these two aspects had been targeted within councils, the opportunity was created 
to focus on the development of priorities, whether these were political or 
operational.  It can be argued that prioritisation is to public sector organisations 
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what traditional strategy development is to the private sector (Joyce, 2012), 
something that was confirmed in the GLO interviews.  The ability of members to 
prioritise and, significantly re-prioritise, is therefore seen as a key strategic 
competence that was missing at the start of CPA, but had become embedded by 
the end.  This is not to say that prioritisation was easy or risk free, but that 
members in particular had become more engaged and comfortable with the 
prioritisation process. This engagement was also learnt iteratively during the 
turnaround phase.  
 
It is also apparent that prioritisation (and re-prioritisation) provided the link 
between the strategic processes discussed previously and the remaining themes 
that follow.  It was the aspect of turnaround that allowed members to engage 
with strategy and linked them to external stakeholders.  It became the driver for 
gathering intelligence to inform decision-making and performance management 








Many of the other themes considered in this thesis, such as Strategic 
Management Processes and Systems, Prioritisation and Re-Prioritisation and 
Performance Management, are to a large extent reliant on an organisation having 
a good understanding of the environmental conditions under which it operates.  
This does not just apply to the current conditions, nor should it be a recounting of 
what has happened in the past.  Rather, it should be forward looking and seeking 
to establish the challenges and changes that the organisation is likely to face in 
the future.  Although this follows the prescriptive approaches to strategic 
planning and positioning advocated by much of the literature (Ansoff, 1988; 
Mintzberg, 1998) and is sometimes referred to environmental scanning, it would 
be equally relevant to emergent strategic processes (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1985).   A key aspect of this strategic process is the gathering and assimilation of 
appropriate intelligence from both internal and external sources. Organisational 
leadership that does not in some way undertake intelligence gathering activities, 
would very quickly find that the organisation is out of touch with the scope and 
direction that should be taken, given the multi-stakeholder complexity of the 
sector (McAdam 2005).  Making effective choices about the vision of the 
organisation, corporate planning, prioritisation, and service planning and 
performance management are all heavily reliant on the gathering of intelligence 
from appropriate sources.  Permanently failing organisations (Jas and Skelcher, 
2005; Meyer and Zucker, 1989), fail to understand that there is anything wrong 
them and, whether this be through denial, ignorance or arrogance, at its heart 
lies a lack of knowledge and understanding that there is a problem in the first 
place.  Key sources of intelligence will come from both internal and external 
sources (Turner and Whiteman, 2005).  It is these three themes then, of internal 
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intelligence, external intelligence and self-awareness that are considered under 




With regards to effective internal intelligence gathering, very little is said within 
the corporate assessments at both the start and end of CPA.  Certainly there are 
very few criticisms of this aspect at the start, suggesting that potentially it was 
not on the Audit Commission’s radar at this time, or that there were no 
associated problems. However, given the general poor level of internal 
communication evident within the Communication theme in a later section, it is 
likely that gathering intelligence from staff was not likely to have been that 
effective.  
 
At the end of CPA there is a little more information on the use of internal 
intelligence gathering from the corporate assessments, although this is also quite 
sparse.  Favourable comments are made regarding the use of staff suggestion 
schemes and that in some cases there is effective staff engagement.  There is 
also evidence that the motivation and morale of staff generally improved by the 
end of CPA.  In a minority of cases there is evidence that staff welcome a more 
open culture and the ability for two-way dialogue. There was also more extensive 
and effective use of performance appraisal and staff satisfaction surveys, 
suggesting a greater level of internal engagement and more opportunities for 
staff to feed ideas into the planning and delivery of services.  
 
The introduction of internal intelligence gathering, links back to some of the roles 
of effective leadership mentioned previously and from the council interviews it 
was seen that new leadership within the Council (either the CEO or Leader of the 
Council) was instrumental in bringing about this change, which was both cultural 





External intelligence gathering, on the other hand, gets far more coverage both at 
the start and at the end of CPA, and this is in part due to the government’s 
localism agenda at this time (See also Figure 1).  A number of cases refer to 
there being poor or no community engagement or that this is underdeveloped or 
not co-ordinated across the council.  Specific reference is made to there being 
little consultation at a local level to inform priorities.  Furthermore, criticism is 
levelled at some councils for not gathering intelligence at the national level and 
there being no link between the council’s plans and national priorities.  This is 
backed up from the interviews with both GLOs. One example of this is that 
“councils just didn’t know what they didn’t know” and another is “you would be 
amazed that some were so internally focussed”.  Perhaps the most telling quote 
from the GLO interviews was as follows:  
 
“some councils had never heard of the IDeA, didn’t go to the LGA conference and 
didn’t allow members to cross the boundary [into other councils]” (GLO1 
interview) 
 
The IDeA was set up as an arms length independent body from the LGA to 
provide support to local authorities. For councils not to be aware that it existed 
shows how insular such organisations were.  To not allow members to visit other 
councils is telling in its own right, and clearly contributed to a lack of 
understanding of what councils should and could be achieving. Getting members 
to “look over the boundary” and “taste the coffee” as referred to earlier, was 
regarded by both GLOs as a fundamental change in outlook that could be used as 
a catalyst to changes in the approach of the council. 
 
  98
“if they knew what a good authority was, you could have a debate, and they got 
themselves sorted out” (GLO1 interview) 
 
 By the end of CPA, councils were being described as having effective community 
engagement practices resulting in good local knowledge and in some cases 
resulting in imaginative ambitions for the council.  This change has resulted from 
the use of extensive consultation at the local level both of communities, service 
users and partners.  Examples given of such engagement approaches include 
community surveys, neighbourhood and area forums, citizens’ panels, community 
partnerships and youth forums.  One council was praised for having up to 60 
separate engagement initiatives in place by the end of CPA.  Other forms of 
external intelligence gathering included census data and information from partner 
bodies.  In some cases, joint policy groups with public sector, private sector and 
voluntary and community groups were also used.  This aspect was also tied into 
having a shared vision for the area and developing joint and shared priorities.  To 
some extent, this external intelligence gathering overlaps with general means of 
communication, which is dealt with in a later theme. Under this context however, 
the emphasis is on gathering intelligence to inform policy and priority decisions, 
so the communication stance is very much about communication into the 






The final aspect associated with this theme is that of self-awareness, which was 
also a key finding of Document Three. To an extent, the previous aspects of this 
theme, and also improvements identified within other themes are a pre-cursor to 
the development of self-awareness.  For example the assimilation of internal and 
external challenge would be important to becoming self-aware. It can also be 
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considered to be cultural in nature, rather than being process driven and 
represents perhaps the most significant evidence that the councils under review 
had moved away from an unresponsive, insular and denial based culture to one 
that was outward looking, self-challenging and self-regulating (Jas and Skelcher, 
2005) in the development of organisational awareness.  At the start of CPA, a 
number of councils were specifically criticised for having a lack of self-awareness, 
or for it being inconsistent across the organisation.  This supports the findings of 
Document Three. In addition, this lack of self-awareness tended to be referenced 
to a lack of systematic and shared learning within the council. In part, this was a 
failure to learn from the successes and failures of the organisation, but 
significantly it was also about not having the capability to share learning from one 
part of the organisation with other parts.  There were also comments made 
reinforcing this sense of insularity and denial, in that “bad news was not 
welcomed” and there was a tendency to see problems as being caused by the 
external environment rather than through any fault of the leadership and 
management within the organisation. This was in some cases also linked to there 
being a lack of benchmarking. Overall, this gives a sense that councils were 
inward looking and not understanding the depth of problems they faced. 
 
By the end of CPA, it is evident from both the corporate assessments and the 
interviews that there was a much greater level of self-awareness within those 
councils studied. Specific statements are made that councils are aware of the 
extent of improvements needed and that self-assessment exercises now 
recognised that problems still existed.  What emerges from the analysis is that 
councils were now learning from themselves and from others.  There was much 
more willingness to learn from mistakes and to share this information around the 
organisation.  In one case within the corporate assessments, specific reference is 
made to an initiative whereby a successful senior manager from the education 
department was used to develop a management improvement programme for use 
across the council. There is also evidence of a cultural shift with managers and 
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staff recognising that learning from others was considered important.  Reference 
is also made to staff being encouraged to continuously improve and learn, and in 
some cases this was referred to as a “continuous process of improvement”.   
 
There is also the use of councillors visiting other organisations and also engaging 
in mentoring programmes (see also Whiteman, 2004).  This was usually at the 
cabinet level, but also included, on at least one occasion, opposition members as 
well. The use of benchmarking and best practice comparisons were also in 
evidence at the end of CPA with 11 councils identified as undertaking such 
activities. Often this was mentioned as being proactively sought out by the 
councils, rather than it being seen as an imposition. 
 
This theme is significant in that it cuts across many of the other themes.  It is 
considered to be a fundamental step change in approach and culture, which was 
been developed through the turnaround period and enhanced the ongoing 
strategic capacity and capability of councils (Turner and Whiteman, 2005).  To be 
self-aware, impacts upon leadership approaches, strategy setting and 
prioritisation.  The cultural shift to a greater acceptance of criticism in a proactive 
and directed way, enables councils to break free from a permanently failing 
situation to one where it is better able to be self-correcting.  Achieving and 
reinforcing self-awareness is therefore also considered to be an essential element 




Gathering external intelligence was in part driven by the Government’s localism 
agenda and as such it is not surprising that this aspect improved during the CPA 
era. Being informed about community and stakeholder needs was an important 
aspect of this.  The greater willingness to look internally, and to look to other 
councils was a key improvement and one that would have contributed to greater 
  101 
self-awareness.  This to an extent demonstrates a move away from the more 
competitive and inward looking environments encouraged by the marketisation 
rhetoric of NPM, to one that is more inclusive and collaborative in terms of 
identifying organisational improvement.  These three aspects, and self-awareness 
in particular, all contribute to self-regulation (Jas and Skelcher, 2005) and as 
such their maintenance and reinforcement after the turnaround phase is complete 
are seen as important to sustained improvement. 
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Performance management is the second of the two themes that was also part of 
the Audit Commission corporate assessments. Performance management is the 
process by which actors in an organisation set targets for the organisation, assess 
the achievement of those targets and take appropriate corrective action where 
necessary (Radnor and McGuire, 2004; Lebas, 1995). Performance management 
in local government has grown in significance from the early 1980’s and grew in 
prominence under NPM and especially through the value for money (VFM) 
approaches to managing the sector (Flynn, 2007; Wilson and Game, 2006; 
Longo, 2007; Fryer et al, 2009).  It is therefore part of the ongoing managerialist 
discourse that permeates the sector. It was part of the Best Value regime 
introduced New Labour government and was seen in the use of national, service 
based key performance indicators (KPIs) which ultimately formed part of CPA, as 
well as league tables and external assessments from bodies such as Ofsted and 
the Care Quality Commission (CQQ). It would also include financial and budget 
management, although this is dealt with in a later section of this thesis.  All of 
these approaches to performance management have been external impositions 
on the sector, and while they are loosely connected to this section, they are not 
the fundamental part of it.  They are included here to give context to the 
continuing and growing emphasis on the need for performance management of 
the sector at a national level during the Blair and Brown governments, which, as 
will be seen, has permeated to an expectation that local authorities should also 
be able to manage themselves effectively on an ongoing basis.  This section 
focuses on this internalisation of performance management, as distinct from 
performance measurement (Fryer et al, 2009; Radnor and McGuire, 2004; Lebas, 
1995), and the improvements and value added (Radnor and McGuire, 2004; 
Radnor and Lovell, 2003) experienced during the course of the CPA era.  
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A key process of assimilating levels of performance is that of challenge, whether 
this be internal or external challenge.  The acceptance of challenge as a 
fundamental aspect of strategic development will lead to self-awareness and 
ultimately self-regulation (Jas and Skelcher, 2005).  Cleary there are links from 
this theme to other themes discussed previously and subsequently, and this 
section will focus on the sub-themes of managing performance, challenging 
performance as well as monitoring and taking action.  To be effective, 
performance management should be exercised at all levels of the organisation, 
from the strategic to the operational, for front line services and for support 
services (Fryer et al, 2009).  The corporate assessments tend to talk generically 
about performance management, rather than targeting specific levels or systems 
and as such this analysis will also be generic in nature, but drawing on specific 





At the start of the CPA regime, the number of references made in the corporate 
assessments would indicate that approaches to performance management were 
inadequate for the councils studied. In eight cases, statements were made 
indicating that there was no performance management framework in place. This 
was also reflected in the council interviews where none of the three councils had 
a performance management system in place at the start of CPA.  This was 
surprising given the focus placed throughout the NPM era on performance 
management over the decades leading up to CPA (Pollitt, 2003). Where internal 
performance management frameworks did exist, these were often described as 
being inconsistently applied across the organisation, with some services or 
functions using performance management processes relatively effectively, but 
others not applying them appropriately, or at all (Harris, 2005). There is a sense 
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that departments had been left to their own devices to voluntarily adopt and 
devise performance management frameworks.  Also, there was no sense that the 
corporate centre was driving performance management within the organisation, 
or even being aware that it was necessary.  This is perhaps not surprising given 
the discussion on leadership and roles and relationships early in the thesis. In a 
number of cases there was reference to there being a lack of a performance 
management culture and a lack of delegation of responsibility and accountability.  
These are important aspects of an effective performance management framework 
(Fryer et al, 2009). Not just that members and officers know what they are 
responsible for in a process and governance sense, but also that there is a 
cultural desire within the organisation to improve and monitor those 
improvements.   
 
Similarly, a number of references were made to there being no performance 
management culture within councils.  This included references to there being a 
tolerance of poor and weak performance, and inertia among managers to take 
action.  There was also seen to be a lack of focus on outcome-based targets that 
could be used by the performance management framework to drive 
improvement.  Consequently, this made it difficult for managers to assess the 
impact of decisions and monitor progress. In some cases, organisations were not 
even achieving their own internally set targets. 
 
By the end of CPA, there was an overwhelming sense that performance 
management cultures had become embedded within the councils.  In 19 cases, 
reference was made to there being an effective performance management culture 
(Fryer et al, 2009), or that a comprehensive and effective framework was in 
place.  Specific references were made that culture was strong or embedded with 
clear accountabilities identified.  Within this, specific quotes from the corporate 
assessments include “it drives everything the council does” and “it supports 
performance improvement” and “staff are committed to improvement”.  Also 
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there was evidence that councillors, and in some cases staff, had become actively 
involved in challenging performance.  This again is linked to there being a better 
understanding of respective roles, especially on the part of elected members.  In 
terms of understanding what is needed, councillors and staff were found to be 
very aware of the priorities of the council and understood how their work 
contributed to the achievement of those priorities.  With regards to monitoring, 
eight specific references are made to there being good quality monitoring 
information available. This included reference to the regularity of information and 
the use of alternative forms of presentation (for example traffic light systems). 
The performance management frameworks have by this time developed the use 
of action plans underpinned by outcome-based targets that in turn were linked to 
the council’s priorities.  In one council performance management is referred to as 
being integral to the business planning framework.  Interestingly, in three cases, 
service users were involved in contributing to the performance management of 
services.  This represents a significant step change during the turnaround phase 




A further aspect evident from the corporate assessments is the extent to which 
the use of challenge had improved during the CPA period.  This is different from 
the internal scrutiny challenge referred to earlier in that it is concerned with the 
use of external processes and recognises the need to address multiple 
stakeholder complexity within the sector (McAdam et al, 2005). This external 
challenge comes from a variety of sources and often represents formalised 
approaches to accepting challenge within the council.  These were summarised 
previously in Figure 36. At the start of CPA, numerous statements are made 
regarding the lack of willingness to accept any form of external challenge.  In 
some cases this is to do with being unresponsive to customer complaints and in 
other cases not being accepting of external criticism, for example from IDeA peer 
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review assessments and even the first round of CPA inspections.  This to a large 
extent reflects the presence of insularity and denial discovered in Document 
Three among those local authorities that were regarded as poorly performing. It 
also helps to explain the criticisms levelled at the visioning and prioritisation 
processes referred to earlier.  In one case, poor intelligence was specifically 
blamed for hindering prioritisation.  There was also reference in some cases to 
councils not making effective use of benchmarking, a process by which 
organisations can challenge their own performance and processes by directly 
comparing themselves to good organisations.  
 
By the end of CPA there is a much wider use of challenge, and external challenge 
in particular, across the councils studied.  The findings fall into three main 
categories.  Firstly, there is much greater use being made of external peer 
review.  Under peer review, external actors are brought into the organisation to 
assess and comment on the ability of the organisation.  This could be over a 
range of management practices as well as in terms of service delivery. On ten 
occasions specific reference is made to the effective use of such peer reviews as 
contributing to the development of a council and there is evidence of councils 
being active in seeking out successful councils to facilitate it.  Such a phenomena 
would not be too surprising at the start of CPA as it was one of the activities 
made available and facilitated by the IDeA.  In some cases such peer reviews 
were a mandatory part of the recovery process at the start of CPA. The fact that 
it is still being carried out, and now on a voluntary basis at the end of CPA shows 
a greater willingness to engage with others and an acceptance of the importance 
of external challenge as part of the strategic process.  Relating back to the 
performance management theme, there were three examples given where 
councils had invited an external assessment of their performance management 
frameworks to help facilitate improvement and development of these systems.  
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The second aspect of challenge relate to the more formal processes that exist, for 
example the CPA assessments themselves, or Ofsted and QCC inspections.  By 
the end of the CPA period, again a further ten favourable comments are made 
regarding the use and acceptance of such external challenges, demonstrating an 
overcoming of the denial phenomena and showing a greater willingness to accept 
external views, rather than being insular in approach.  Related to this, is evidence 
that some councils were using consultants to advise on and review processes and 
services within the council.  This occurred in two of the interview councils where 
consultants were used to review approaches to such things as partnership 
working and transformation processes including business process re-engineering. 
 
Finally, a further significant aspect is in regard to the acceptance of criticisms 
from service users.  In particular, this entails the use of user complaints and 
feedback in a constructive and proactive way. In 18 cases, reference is made to 
councils acting on user complaints and feedback.  The phrase “acting on” is 
important here as it suggests that the improvement is not just about collecting 
user complaints and feedback, but rather taking action in response. Reference is 
also made to councils setting up systems to monitor and track complaints and 
feedback, suggesting that it had become part of the performance management 
systems. Two examples were also found of formal and branded approaches to 
getting customer feedback. In one there was a councillors “call for action” and in 
another the initiative was called “you said, we did”.  Both of these were attempts 
to capture citizen and user feedback in a highly publicised way, culminating in the 
communication of how the council had subsequently taken responsive action. 
 
Monitoring and Taking Action 
 
Finally, there is a sense from the final CPA corporate assessments that councillors 
have fully engaged with the concept of performance management.  This is 
typified by 13 separate references made regarding councils targeting areas of 
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poor performance, with remedial actions being taken, a far cry from the position 
outlined at the start of CPA. In some cases performance review panels, or similar, 
were set up to focus poorly performing services.  Often these involved cabinet 
and scrutiny members and portfolio holders, although the frequency of such 
meetings varied by organisation between weekly, monthly and quarterly. 
 
Once again the development of performance management systems represented a 
process of learning during the turnaround phase, which included the development 
of performance measures and indicators, as well as accountability and reporting 
arrangements. From an overview perspective, GLO1 in a similar way to GLO2, 
stressed the importance of being able to focus in on the 20 or so key performance 
indicators that you needed to run a council. There was a process of reducing the 
amount of performance management information used at the strategic level, with 




This theme has considered the development of a performance culture within the 
councils studied.  External performance monitoring had been in place for a 
number many decades, and was a key tenet of the NPM changes introduced in 
the 1980s.  Despite this, the corporate and service performance of these councils, 
and others in the sector, were variable and in some cases quite poor.  As such, 
the NPM approach to performance management appears to have failed not only to 
bring about service improvement, but also to embed the need for effective 
performance management within some councils.  While the CPA approach did not 
necessarily exclude councils from playing the performance management game, in 
the case of these poorly performing councils the improvements seen seem to 
have gone beyond mere box ticking exercises.  The scrutiny and support that CPA 
offered appears to have helped councils to engage with performance 
management in a less superficial way.  The incoming CEOs, certainly in the case 
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study councils considered in the next section, appear to have taken a strong lead 
in implementing performance management systems that encouraged councils to 
take account of the views and criticisms of internal and external stakeholders, 
and to include them within decision-making and resource allocation processes. 
This can be considered to be an internalisation of the need to monitor 
performance and is closely linked to self-awareness and self-regulation and 
therefore sustainability.   
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The remit of a local authority cannot be seen in isolation.  Many services provide 
a natural linkage to the roles of other public bodies such as the National Health 
Service (NHS) (and the current Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in particular), the 
Police and the Fire and Rescue services (Morphet, 2008). Indeed, over time, 
different local government structures have formally included services such as 
Police, Fire and Rescue and Further and Higher Education as part of the statutory 
local authority remit, until more recently being unincorporated from local 
authority control. Parts of the health services were at one point also within a local 
authority’s remit, until being transferred over to the NHS. Even services such as 
highways and environmental services are closely related to central government 
departments and regional bodies, as well as at times over lapping more directly 
with the objectives of other public bodies. Street lighting contributes to both 
public safety and road safety and the police and fire and rescue services work 
closely with the highways function at road traffic accidents.  Local authorities also 
have an overarching responsibility for local neighbourhoods that goes beyond the 
statutory reach of direct accountabilities for services and implies the need for 
multi-agency working.  The local authority convening role of Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) referred to earlier (see also Figure 1) is one example of this 
(Diamond and Liddle, 2005).  More recently, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
have been introduced that again give local authorities a prime role in facilitating 
local improvements.  Such relationships require a wider role for collaboration and 
partnership than just the obvious ones where services overlap, and also bring in a 
bigger range of potential partners and collaborators.  Increasingly, this wide 
range of partnering activity is being required to be played out at local, regional 
and sub-regional levels. In such circumstances, the full range of potential 
collaborators would include those from the public, private and voluntary and 
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community sectors, for example; other local authorities (of all types), parish 
councils, community and faith associations, NHS organisations, Higher and 
Further Education institutions, Police, Fire and Rescue, Government Departments 
and Agencies, local businesses, chambers of commerce, voluntary and 
community sector organisations and representative bodies as well as registered 
social landlords (Jones and Liddle, 2011; Wilson and Game, 2006; Morphet, 
2008).  Each of these organisations are not only impacted upon by the 
performance of a local authority, but they can also contribute to the direction, 
resources and delivery capacity of the council in a variety of ways and in a variety 
of circumstances (Jones and Liddle, 2011). 
 
The importance of effective working with others, can therefore be seen to be a 
potentially fundamental aspect of local authority strategic management.  Indeed, 
poor collaboration was identified as key reason for failure in Document Three and 
the conceptual framework developed in Document Two also highlighted 
stakeholder engagement as being important. While it was not a separate analysis 
theme within the Audit Commission corporate assessments, it was a topic that 
was referenced frequently across the range of themes included in those reports. 
From the point of view of this thesis, some of the elements of stakeholder 
engagement and collaboration are referred to under other themes.  However, it is 
important to examine certain aspects of working with others separately, and as 
such the four sub-themes considered under this theme are setting priorities, 
delivery and capacity, monitoring and finally governance and leadership. All of 
these sub-themes are considered elsewhere within this thesis, sometimes as a 
theme in their own right and sometimes as a sub-theme.  The purpose of this 
theme is to focus on these aspects in terms of how they specifically relate to 
working with others rather than within individual councils. 
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Setting Priorities 
 
Setting shared priorities with partners for the local area is identified as a key 
aspect of both delivering effective services through a range of public, private and 
independent bodies, as well being key to ensuring that partnership relations are 
maintained effectively.  At the start of CPA some criticisms were made regarding 
a legacy of mistrust among partners, with local authorities showing ineffective 
and inconsistent levels of engagement and collaboration. This was also reflected 
in the understanding roles theme, where ineffective community leadership was 
identified as resulting in part due to the reluctance by leaders within councils to 
effectively engage with partnership arrangements.  This consequently resulted in 
poor, or weak, strategies for the community that were often not shared by all 
partners.   
 
By the end of CPA, there was a much more positive relationship between 
partners, with councils seemingly increasing their role within partnerships. 
Positive comments include references to working well to deliver shared priorities 
and the effective sharing of information to inform priorities, something which also 
relates to the intelligence gathering theme, the positive aspects of which can be 
seen repeated here.  In one case specific reference is made the joint production 
of a Local Area Agreement (LAA) acting as vehicle to improve relationships across 
the partnership network.  In one sense, focussing multi agency organisations on 
developing joint strategies and priorities for an area could be seen as a natural 
vehicle to promote closer working relationships, in a similar way that the 
emphasis on formal strategic planning processes perhaps helped to steer councils 
towards a more structured approach to corporate management and strategic 
direction.  However, partnership and collaborative working is not easy in practice 
to put into action. Parochialism, self interest, apathy, arrogance, 
misunderstanding and mistrust could all stand in the way of effective 
collaborative working.  That references are made to improvements in this area 
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suggests that councils must have worked hard and taken seriously the need to 
make such relationships work.  This is in part evidenced by the increasing role 
played by senior council representatives on partnership boards mentioned 
previously.  It is also borne out by the council interviews undertaken where each 
council was working more effectively with other organisations in the local area 
and region.  
 
Delivery and Capacity 
 
In the discussion above, collaborative working entails the lining up of shared 
priorities across multi-agency and multi-sector functions, with each separate 
organisation having its own role to play in the delivery of the priorities of the 
partnership.  Another aspect to working with others is through the use by a 
council of external bodies to improve its own delivery capacity (Jones and Liddle, 
2011; Diamond and Liddle, 2005; Wilson and Game, 2006; Flynn 2007).  This is 
not outsourcing per se, which is dealt with later under procurement, but forms 
part of the commissioning agenda to establish those functions and services that 
exist outside of the council, which could be harnessed to either supplement or 
replace existing direct council provision.  At the start of CPA, there appears to 
have been little use of partnership working to enhance the delivery capacity of 
councils. Although at the start this is only referred to on four occasions within the 
corporate assessments, by the end of CPA up to 16 references are made that 
demonstrate that there has been an improvement in this aspect of local authority 
service delivery. On a number of occasions improved partnership working has 
been used to augment delivery capacity, whether this be with other local 
authorities or the voluntary and community sector.  In one case there is evidence 
that a council has stopped duplicating services provided by other bodies in the 
area, allowing savings to be transferred to other priority areas. The use of shared 
services also starts to appear at the end of CPA, usually for support service 
functions such as procurement and audit, with resulting efficiency savings being 
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ploughed back into other council services.  This focus on increasing delivery 
capacity through partnerships and shared services demonstrates a mind-shift in 
the leadership of councils away from insularity, as well as an increase in the level 




Monitoring is linked to the performance management theme discussed elsewhere, 
but in this part is focussed on those comments specifically related to the 
monitoring of partnership type arrangements.  Little is said at the start of CPA 
regarding such arrangements although on some occasions specific reference is 
made to partnerships not being evaluated.  However by the end of CPA, there is 
much stronger evidence that this is something that was improved by councils with 
a number of references made that performance management of partnerships is 
now effective or that it works well. In one case, a council is described as having 
“led the way” in developing effective partnership monitoring arrangements and 
another had evaluated “over 100 partnerships and put in place a partnering tool 
kit”.  This development and improvement in monitoring arrangements most 
probably links together the raised awareness of the importance of both partnering 
and performance management.  
 
Governance and Leadership 
 
Finally in this theme, the topics of governance and leadership are returned to. 
While there is not an overwhelming body of evidence to suggest that such 
arrangements were improved during the CPA period, there is nevertheless an 
implied improvement, especially regarding the related evidence presented under 
other themes (for example the strengthening of community leadership discussed 
earlier). Some comments were made at the start of CPA regarding weak joint-
working arrangements and political engagement. Sometimes this was referred to 
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as a limited commitment to the LSP or weak engagement with regional partners.  
As has been discussed earlier there was also little active engagement from council 
leadership in such collaborative arrangements.   By the end of CPA, references 
were made regarding the effective management of other entities, there being 
compact arrangements with the voluntary and community sector and senior 
officials (e.g. Leader and/or CEO) being present on partnering boards, and in 
some cases chairing them.  Furthermore, scrutiny had become a more embedded 
process by the end of CPA (see Figure 1 and Figure 10) and the pending 
implementation of CAA meant that councils were already considering how to 
monitor the work of partners.  This applied to STCCs in particular. While the 
documentary evidence is not particularly strong for this aspect of working with 
others, governance arrangements are clearly a key aspect of the effective running 
of partnership and collaborative arrangements, and as such the fact that there is 




Partnering and collaboration became an important aspect of the New Labour 
agenda for local government, especially with regard to STCCs.  It is no surprise 
therefore that it appears as a theme in this study as it was certainly on the Audit 
Commission’s radar when undertaking the corporate assessments.  The working 
with others theme in one sense encapsulates many of the other themes of this 
thesis, but at an extra-council level, rather than just internally. It is unlikely that 
CPA alone drove the improvement in this theme, but rather a combination of the 
various initiatives summarised in Figure 1.  It is an interesting finding that the 
improvements were not just limited to the planning and monitoring functions of 
local authorities, which might be expected due to the focus on LAAs and LSPs 
during this time. There was also an improvement in the delivery and capacity of 
services using external partners. In some cases this may have included private 
firms, but there was also an increased use of voluntary sector organisations, and 
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a rationalisation of functions provided by other public bodies.  This can be seen to 
represent a change in the mindset of local authorities, which up to that time, 
based on the other evidence within the corporate assessments, had displayed 
inward looking and protectionist tendencies. 
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The communication theme is closely related to the Gathering Intelligence theme.  
However, it has been treated separately as the focus here is slightly different.  
When gathering intelligence, the focus is on bringing information into the 
organisation to inform decision-making. Communication in this theme relates to 
the imparting of information by the leadership to internal and external 
stakeholders.  By communicating effectively, the leadership of an organisation are 
better able to inform stakeholders regarding the intentions and purpose, priorities 
and actions of the organisation.  By communicating effectively, the internal and 
external stakeholders are better able to understand the role they play in 
delivering organisational objectives and what they can expect from the 
organisation.  The communication theme is discussed under the two sub-themes 
of improvements in communication and the role of the CEO. 
 
Improvements in Communication 
 
At the start of CPA, the main finding was that councils’ communication with both 
internal and external stakeholders was ineffective, with numerous statements 
regarding the poor quality of communication of the vision and priorities of 
councils’ to internal and external groups.  Internally, this would include staff and 
elected members and externally citizens, service users, partners (public, private 
and voluntary and community) as well as government agencies.  Specifically, the 
priorities of councils were not understood by staff and partners, a contributory 
factor to poor staff satisfaction surveys and failures to manage public 
expectations.  There was also reference to staff being unclear about the direction 
that the organisation was taking, something which is closely aligned to the 
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understanding of priorities by staff and how they contribute to them, referred to 
earlier. 
 
The corporate assessments appear to show that by the end of CPA there was a 
broad range of communication taking place; from members to senior officers, 
from members and senior officers to staff and between members and the public 
and that the quality of communications had been transformed.  Often councils 
were praised for clearly stating and presenting priorities to a variety of audiences, 
resulting in them being understood by staff and external stakeholders. Methods of 
communication varied between internal and external stakeholders with a range of 
methods being used. In some cases reference was made to the vision and 
priorities of councils being prominently displayed on council buildings and in 
council publications. For internal stakeholders, regular (not specified) 
staff/manager/councillor briefings had started to emerge as a form of 
communication, as had business review communications (taking to be a form of 
staff briefing paper either in paper or email form).  There are also monthly 
meetings between councillors and what are referred to as “top” manager groups 
in some councils.  The number of managers involved in these varies between 
councils, such as “Top 40” and “Top 130”.  This improvement in internal 
communication is linked in the corporate assessments to improved relationships 
within the councils such as staff valuing effective two-way communication, the 
organisational culture being supportive and empowering as well as there being 
effective engagement of staff by politicians and senior officers.  Such 
improvements in internal communication are also linked to other themes such as 
greater self-awareness and a better understanding of respective roles within 
councils.  They also feed into effective personnel development programmes.  
Externally, a range of media are used to communicate with stakeholders. The 
vehicles mentioned earlier under gathering intelligence such as neighbourhood 
and civic forums, citizen’s panels and youth forums are used as a two-way 
communication device, both gathering intelligence and imparting information 
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about the council. In addition to this there are examples of council newspapers 
and “State of the District” reports being used to disseminate information to 
external stakeholders. Various partner groups that have been established by 
councils were also used to good effect for two-way communication. 
 
The Role of the CEO 
 
As has been discussed elsewhere, improvements in the approach to 
communication by the CEO seem to have been an important aspect of both 
improvement generally and turnaround in particular.  Improved communication 
with internal stakeholders seems to have been significant from the perspective of 
the CEO, something reinforced by the GLO interviews as well as within the case 
study councils.   These internal communication channels were used by CEOs to 
promote the changes required, assist in refocusing of the culture of the council 
and opening up a dialogue with both staff and members.  Externally the increased 
visibility of the CEO to external stakeholders and partners would have contributed 




This theme focussed on the ability to communicate the vision, priorities and 
achievements of the councils to internal and external stakeholders.  Despite not 
having the underpinning importance attached to say visioning and performance 
management, the improvements demonstrate a greater willingness on the part of 
councils to engage with and become a part of the local community.  The 
significance of this is that such improvements are a very visual representation of 
a movement away from the insularity displayed by poorly performing councils at 
the start of the CPA era. 
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Support systems play an important role in underpinning the strategic 
infrastructure of an organisation. While the prime function of such systems could 
be said to be operational in nature on a day-to-day basis, they do nonetheless 
provide the information and infrastructure that is so important to effective 
strategic leadership, direction setting and monitoring identified under other 
themes.  The support systems that lie at the heart of an organisation in 
supporting these functions, can, if performing poorly, take on strategic 
significance if they are having a consequential adverse impact on decision-
making, intelligence gathering, monitoring and communication. This can be seen 
to good effect in the value chain of Michael Porter (1998), whereby the firm 
infrastructure plays an important part in delivering value across the organisation. 
The worth of such support mechanisms can be seen in terms of the added-value 
they create for the organisation in terms of tangible and intangible benefits 
through increased capacity, capability and cognition (Turner et al, 2004; Turner 
and Whiteman, 2005).  From a pragmatic accounting point of view, such systems 
are often regarded as overheads to the organisation in that they do not 
contribute directly to the delivery of front line services.  As such, the financial 
burden they represent needs to be justified against the benefits provided in 
delivering improved strategic capability.  Support systems are often delivered 
through professional departmental delineations; accountants, lawyers as well as 
information technology and human resource professionals.  As such there is a risk 
that they become professional fiefdoms, operating in silos, and becoming out of 
touch with the organisations they are set up to serve, despite the cost invested in 
them.  Conversely, they are also a potential easy target for criticism within 
organisations, as they are not delivering services directly to the front line; they 
are not at the coalface.  Potentially this could be associated with low financial 
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priority when set against the sexier front line services.  Politically therefore, it is 
easier to be seen to be cutting the cost of bureaucracy, than closing say a front 
line service such as a school.  There is a tension therefore between the 
professionalisation of support services and their ability to grow themselves 
disproportionately if left unchecked, and the possible under investment they face 
if viewed too much as an unnecessary overhead.  In either case, such services 
may not effectively support the organisation in terms of its strategic capacity and 
capability.  The findings of this thesis identified a wide range of potential support 
functions that had taken on a strategic significance and can be seen as having 
improved during the CPA period. Such functions could be split into three major 
sub-themes with a further sub-theme covering a range of other secondary, 
though no less important, functions.  The sub-themes are information technology, 
human Resources and finance, with the other secondary functions identified as 




Information technology (IT) is increasingly becoming a fundamental part of local 
authority infrastructure.  IT systems have been used for many years by local 
authorities to provide the necessary support for financial and accounting systems 
as well as human resources functions. More recently their use has extended to 
client records databases, geo-mapping and engineering support systems and the 
like, in other words they have become more client facing.  Advances in new 
technology have impacted significantly on the use of IT within councils, the most 
notable being the use of the Internet and intranets as well as email systems 
(internal and external) as a form of communication.  Indeed, government policy 
has been to encourage the use of such technologies within local authorities and 
other public bodies, the most recent of which being the ‘digital by default’ agenda 
of the current Coalition government.  
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The discussion in this section centres on the use of IT as a strategic tool rather 
than the operational aspects of IT.  Although it should be recognised that if IT is 
not effective at an operational level, it can take on strategic significance if as a 
consequence front line services are starved of information or are inefficient.  At 
the start of CPA, the main criticism of IT within councils was that there was a lack 
of IT strategy in place and that the IT systems did not support the council.  The 
lack of an IT strategy could be suggestive of a lack of importance associated with 
IT and could also have resulted in a lack of investment in IT infrastructure (Beeri, 
2009).  Alternatively, where investment had occurred the lack of strategy could 
mean that funding was misplaced or misguided. In at least one council there was 
evidence that there was a lack of common IT systems, suggesting a piecemeal 
approach to IT development making it difficult for systems to share information 
and take a holistic view.  By the end of CPA, there was evidence of increasing 
investment in IT infrastructure.  In some cases this was to do with increasing 
frontline capability and capacity, for example by increasing access to services by 
service users such as self-service functionality for housing and council tax benefit, 
a general improvement in services and in one case the introduction of a customer 
contact centre, supported by telephone and web based communications 
networks.   
 
Other IT investments were in support systems such as performance management 
information and financial management systems. At least two organisations had 
also introduced what were described as customer relationship management 
systems, thereby using the capacity offered by IT to improve both their customer 
engagement and intelligence gathering simultaneously.  In some cases, IT 
investment was linked to the generation of efficiency savings, which could then 
be transferred to other priority areas within the council. Tying this together, there 
was an explicit, although sometimes implicit, improved use and development of 
IT strategies to underpin such investments.  In two cases this was specifically 
referenced as there being an IT strategy linked to the priorities of the council. 
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Human Resources 
 
The focus for improvements in human resources tended to be on those changes 
that were made to the human resource function at a strategic level. There has 
been much debate on the role of human resources and the devolution of some of 
the traditional accountability for human resource managing to line managers 
within organisations.  What is meant here by the human resource function, are 
those core elements of human resource management that are retained within a 
human resource department, usually at the centre of an organisation and 
undertaken by human resources professionals.  This would include such roles as 
strategic human resource planning, the development and administration 
(although not necessarily delivery) of appraisal processes and, similarly, training, 
development and skills programmes, as well as recruitment and disciplinary 
advice and monitoring.   
 
At the start of CPA there was criticism that such human resource functions were 
weak, outdated and not used effectively to support the organisation.  Essentially 
human resource functions were not operating strategically in poorly performing 
councils.  This was typified by a lack of workforce development planning and an 
inconsistent, or unsystematic, approach to the training and development of staff. 
There was also evidence that there was either a lack of staff, and member, 
appraisal undertaken, or that such appraisal systems that did exist were applied 
inconsistently across organisations.  Perhaps as a consequence of some of these 
failings, poorly performing councils were also experiencing high levels of sickness, 
as well as high turnover of staff and difficulty recruiting into some positions 
(especially middle management positions), therefore carrying high levels of 
vacancies.  This was having an impact on the capacity and capability of some 
councils to deliver services effectively.  
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By the end of CPA, human resource functions were now being described as 
modernised and effective and this was further reinforced by evidence that a more 
strategic approach was being taken including the use of systematic and effective 
workforce development planning, something specifically referred to in ten cases.  
Furthermore, reference is made to the use of skills development and training 
programmes, which, in a minority of cases, included shared, or joint, officer and 
member training.  Appraisal and performance development review processes 
were also being used more effectively at the end of CPA both for staff and, in 
some cases, elected members. There was also evidence that appraisals were now 
being more effectively related to corporate priorities and objectives, which 
supports the finding expressed earlier that staff and members had a greater 
awareness of organisational priorities and how their work contributed to them.  At 
least six councils had achieved, or were seeking, Investors in People awards (IIP), 
demonstrating a need to recognise the importance of such improved approaches 




Financial management also covers both strategic and operational elements.  
Medium term financial planning (MTFP) would be considered strategic, as would 
the appraisal of significant financial investments.  Budget monitoring (and to 
some extent budget setting), as well as the closure of the final accounts would be 
considered operational. It is the more strategic elements of financial management 
that are considered here, unless changes in the operational aspects have 
themselves taken on a strategic significance, usually because they are directly 
related to one or other of the other themes identified in this thesis.  
 
At the start of CPA, there was much criticism levelled at poorly performing 
councils regarding the paucity of their MTFP systems.  In some cases they were 
none existent and in others they were poorly conceived, with financial plans and 
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investment plans not linked to ambitions and priorities or specified outcomes. In 
some extreme cases this had led to a decline in financial capacity and was 
impacting on other areas of performance within the council.  Generally this was 
attributable to poor financial management at the corporate level, although in a 
few cases, poor service level financial management was also identified.  There 
was also a sense that financial plans were not being developed in line with 
corporate priorities and just as service plans were not initially joined upwards and 
across organisations, so the financial plans lacked these vertical and horizontal 
linkages.  As such councils’ ability to move and reprioritise resources around the 
organisation was severely limited.  On a number of occasions, a poor focus on 
value for money (VFM) was identified as being a contributory factor to poor 
performance.  This is surprising given the strength and longevity of the VFM 
agenda within local government and the emphasis it had had both within the Best 
Value regime and the CPA regime under the use of resources assessment. 
 
By the end of CPA, financial management appeared to have improved 
dramatically. In the vast majority of cases references are made to finance being 
managed effectively, there being robust financial systems in place (supported by 
good financial information) and councils having sound finances.  Significantly, 
positive references are made to the existence, and effective use, of a medium 
term financial strategy (MTFS) linked to MTFP throughout the organisation. MTFS 
included plans for day-to-day expenditure as well as capital investments and in 
some cases were clearly demonstrating how resources had been moved between 
and across organisational priorities. There was evidence that resources were now 
following priorities and being removed from low to high priority areas. In other 
words action was being taken to make priorities happen.  There is also evidence 
at the end of CPA that councils were more focussed on VFM in financial decision 
making, in part this would have been in response to the Gershon efficiency 
agenda that was still ongoing at that time, but the favourable references within 
the corporate assessments would suggest that VFM was not merely being applied 
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as a result of external imposition, but had taken on a fundamental aspect of the 
challenge role referred to in an earlier theme. From a self-awareness point of 
view, reference is made to a limited number of councils understanding the 
financial pressure they face and making plans to address them, rather than 
ignoring them and hoping they will go away. 
 
Across these three major sub-themes within the support services theme, there is 
an overriding sense that councils had started to see the importance of IT, HR and 
Finance not just in an isolated way, but in ensuring that from a strategic 
perspective they were dealt with in a joined up fashion. In public sector 
organisations human resources have always tended to account for around 80% of 
costs.  Their effective and efficient use is therefore inextricably tied into the 
effective use of financial resources across the organisation. IT systems are 
increasingly starting to support and in some cases replace some of these human 




The final sub-theme under support services considers a number of secondary 
support roles; project management, risk management and procurement.  Little 
detail is given in the corporate assessments about these areas, but enough is said 
for them to have stood out as areas that improved during the turnaround 
process.  It could also be argued that they are not necessarily strategic in nature, 
but more operationally based except in the extreme (e.g. disaster recovery for 
risk management).  However, the fact that they stood out when reading across all 
the corporate assessments, makes them to an extent strategic as they were 
clearly contributing to the poor assessment, and therefore failure, of some of the 
councils reviewed.  Needless to say, the negative aspects attached to each of the 
three areas at the start of CPA tended to focus on them being poor or weak, 
totally lacking in some councils and lacking a strategic focus in others.  All were 
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subsequently improved by the end of CPA with project management processes 
often adopting the public sector standard PRINCE2 methodology.  Risk 
management approaches were becoming embedded in all aspects of decision 
making at the end of CPA with approaches being described as robust and in one 
case even informing new strategy development (although how is not mentioned). 
Procurement processes were often described as being improved or sound and in 
one case delivering savings, which were then diverted elsewhere, and in another 




This theme has considered what might be though of as the more operational 
aspects of organisational infrastructure.  It is perhaps unusual therefore to 
consider them in terms of strategic turnaround. However, such was the paucity of 
these support systems, that they had taken on strategic significance to the 
councils concerned through the impact they were having on the ability to plan, 
resource and monitor strategic activity.  What is more surprising is these systems 
were so poor at the start of CPA. Financial management, HR, procurement and, to 
some extent, IT were all systems that represented the underpinning foundations 
of NPM.  There is not enough information within the corporate assessments to 
speculate why this was the case, but it is clear that weaknesses were present in 
many of the councils.  The need for such systems did not reduce after NPM, and 
the emphasis placed on them in the corporate assessments clearly makes the 
case that they were still regarded as important in post-NPM managerialist 
discourses.  This of course is not peculiar to the public sector, or local 
government in particular.  Councils appear to have improved these support 
systems as part of a structured approach to improving the infrastructure of 
decision-making and control, but also as part of the development and 
empowerment of officers and members during the turnaround phase. 
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This theme focuses on the specific approaches to turnaround adopted by the 
councils studied. It first looks at the way in which the previous themes were 
related to turnaround, each having been learnt and embedded during the 
turnaround phase.  For example, the development of leadership capacity, whether 
at the member or officer level, developing and maintaining strategic processes 
and generating self-awareness and the ability to prioritise, are things that from a 
managerialist perspective councils should have been doing anyway.  The findings 
of this thesis have shown that in turnaround councils, all of these were absent or 
deficient at the start of CPA and have involved a period of learning during the 
turnaround phase.   
 
This theme also examines the more specific turnaround approaches that were 
identified in the literature in Document Two. These elements are discussed under 
the sub-themes of learning how to change, operational or strategic turnaround? 
and planned or emergent turnaround? before focussing on CPA as the potential 
trigger for change.  Finally, this theme draws together all the themes in a 
discussion of the timing of a number of key phases that appeared to be present 
within these turnaround situations. 
 
Learning How to Change 
 
It is surprising that many of the ten themes identified in this thesis relate to the 
improvement of what can be considered some of the fundamental underpinnings 
of the ongoing managerialist discourse. The previous decades of NPM should have 
meant that these elements were already embedded, especially with regard to 
strategic management, performance management, financial management etc.  
  131 
Even as theoretical debates moved on to consider public value and collaboration, 
continuous improvement still required a focus on a cycle of direction setting, 
planning, implementation and delivery followed by review (Norman, 2011).  The 
main difference from NPM was that this continuous improvement cycle was a self-
assessment tool rather than an accountability mechanism.  Even under a post 
NPM discourse, the ten themes identified here are still considered to be 
important, more so as self-awareness is required if self-assessment is to be 
honestly undertaken, if at all. 
 
It is unclear why these corporate processes were in such a poor state of repair at 
the start of CPA, but it suggests that NPM was unsuccessful in embedding the 
softer managerialist agenda within some local authorities.   The GLO interviews 
identified that this may have been due to the disjointed and service specific basis 
of the previous inspection and intervention regimes (eg Ofsted, QCC and Audit), 
meaning that intervention in problem areas drew strategic resources away to 
“fight fires”, promoted an internal focus and reduced capacity for taking a more 
strategic view.  Furthermore, being under the scrutiny of external regulators may 
have prompted responses of denial and defensiveness, exacerbating insularity as 
a dominant culture. The lack of focus on corporate processes within previous 
inspection regimes allowed them to fall into or remain in disrepair, and, if not 
encouraging insularity, at least allowed it to fester.  A key feature of the CPA, 
especially after the introduction of the “Harder Test” in 2005, was the focus on 
corporate processes as well as the traditional service and resource based 
inspections.  This ultimately forced the consideration of how these underlying 
strategic mechanisms operated, in order to develop and improve them.  This had 
an impact, certainly in the case study councils, on overall improvement under 
CPA.  It appears that this was not just due to the improved scores for the 
corporate processes themselves, but also that service scores improved across the 
board as planning, prioritisation and performance management became more 
informed and co-ordinated.  The closest evidence for this from the case study 
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councils was in Council B during the early years of CPA, which was unable to 
improve its overall CPA score until it had improved its core strategic processes 
and was better able to co-ordinate across a range of service improvements, 
rather than dealing with them in a piecemeal fashion. 
 
It is not the role of local councils to ignore or reject central government policy, no 
matter how ideologically opposed local politicians may be, or how disadvantaged 
a council may become because of them, although this does not obviate the 
potential for lobbying and engagement with central government and for 
interpretation when it comes to policy implementation.  The agency relationship 
of local government not only includes the local political accountability of 
politicians to residents and council tax payers, but also, through partial autonomy 
(Wilson and Game, 2006), the relationship with central government, backed by 
funding, agreements and statute.  The role of local government in these 
circumstances is to make sense of these potentially competing pressures and to 
prioritise resources and services in such a way that benefits the locality served. 
 
Local councils face many pressures for change that will vary over time. These 
include external influences such as central government policy, as well as national 
and local economic and demographic conditions. A similar case can be made for 
internal influences, such as a change in political control within the council.  
Collectively or individually, these internal and external influences could potentially 
destabilise a council’s equilibrium and performance.  It is inescapable that the 
factors impinging on local councils will change over time, however the need to 
respond to these in an effective way remains constant.  It is also true that the 
impact such changes will have on councils will vary considerably depending on 
both the nature of the change itself, and the incumbent state of the council. 
Nevertheless, the need to respond appropriately again remains a constant. It is 
clear from the analysis so far that improvements in the underlying corporate 
processes were needed in poorly performing councils to meet these needs. 
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The nine themes considered so far therefore represent a period of learning for 
turnaround councils. This learning extended to realising the need to improve each 
of the themes, implementing and modifying the various changes required and, in 
order to maintain sustainability, embedding this learning within a council’s 
infrastructure. 
 
Operational or Strategic Turnaround? 
 
Whether an organisation adopts an operational or strategic approach to 
turnaround was found to be a key aspect of the literature review.  Hofer (1980) 
identified that organisations may adopt either an operating approach to 
turnaround or a strategic approach (see also Schendel et al, 1976 and Ansoff, 
1988).  In the private sector, where the Hofer study was based, strategic 
turnaround relates to the development of new business models and operational 
turnaround focuses on reduced costs/increased revenues in the short term. Hofer 
found that turnarounds were likely to fail if operational approaches are used when 
a strategic approach is required, although if the problems faced were operational, 
a strategic approach could still enable turnaround.  Translating this into a local 
authority context would require consideration of whether the approach adopted 
focussed on service recovery (operational), or whether it was focussed on 
changes at the corporate level (strategic).  In the context of this study, many of 
the themes identified previously would fit into the strategic category.  Even the 
support systems theme, which to some extent feels operational, has been 
discussed in a strategic context due to the scope of the impact improvements in 
such systems was able to achieve.  The analysis of the corporate assessments 
and the interviews, therefore pursued the specific line of enquiry as to whether 
the turnaround was operationally based or strategically based.  This also relates 
to whether the approach to improvement had a short-term or a long-term focus, 
which is important when considering sustainability.  In the short-term, 
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operational weaknesses could be addressed by councils in order to cover up the 
cracks in performance and bring about some improvement.  However, if 
fundamental weaknesses were not addressed, performance in the longer term 
may well slip back and improvement would not be sustainable.  This can be 
displayed on the following model in Figure 37.   
 
Figure 37: Possible outcomes for turnaround sustainability over time 
 
 
There was evidence from the corporate assessments that some councils had 
focused first on short-term and operational improvements, with more strategic 
aspects being tackled only once these had been addressed. This mirrors Hofer’s 
(1980) findings in the private sector that management seldom selected a 
strategic position, preferring instead to adopt an operating position. For example, 
in some councils there was a focus in the short-term on improvements to poorly 
performing services.  In other councils reference was made to concentrating on 
the improvement programme first followed by the development of wider 
corporate priorities, in others reference was made to a focus on service 
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improvements first followed by broader strategic approaches.  In two corporate 
assessment cases at the end of CPA, reference was made to the council now 
being focussed on strategic and not operational issues, indicating that there had 
been a shift in emphasis.  This suggests that the main focus of turnaround 
councils, at least initially, was on achieving short term, service based success 
rather than looking at the underlying strategic issues.  These may also be 
regarded as quick wins.   
 
This was backed up from the GLO interviews, for example: 
 
“one of the things councils could do very quickly, was to get better at some of the 
service scores….revs and bens [revenues and benefits] was an example where 
changes could be made quickly and the service score improved….it was a quick 
win for them” (GLO1 interview) 
 
There appears to have been a need to show improvement quickly to reinforce 
that something was being achieved.  However, despite this, councils did not 
necessarily receive an improved CPA score.  Rather, if the strategic processes 
underpinning the council were neglected, councils could be held back and a poor 
rating could still be given (Council B was an example of this).  This holding back 
is reflected in some of the mid-term corporate assessments, as well as comments 
given in the council and GLO interviews.  
 
Despite there being the need to recognise that bespoke approaches are required 
for individual turnarounds (Turner et al, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005), this 
may be more applicable to the operational aspects of turnaround, which will 
necessarily focus on poorly performing services particular to a council and may be 
linked to retrenchment (Boyne, 2004; Robbins and Pearce, 1992) and strategic 
adjustment rather than strategic change (Snow and Hambrick, 1980). If 
improvement is to be sustained however, the focus would need to be on 
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revitalising the organisation over the longer term (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992). 
It would therefore seem to have been important for poorly performing councils to 
have focussed on both strategic and operational turnaround, with the strategic 
aspects tending to be more generic. 
 
 
Various authors have considered common processes that can occur in turnaround 
situations; conveniently they all begin with the letter R.  Robins and Pearce 
(1992) identified a period of retrenchment preceding recovery. Filatotchev and 
Toms (2006) recognise this but suggest that realignment precedes it in the 
process.  Finally, Boyne (2004 pp98) suggests that the “3Rs” of retrenchment, 
repositioning and reorganisation could feasibly be used by local authorities faced 
with turnaround situations.  He also hints at a fourth R of management 
succession (which can be called replacement).  Beeri (2009) found further 
evidence for the existence of the “3Rs” in turnaround local authorities and 
incorporated aspects of realignment into Boyne’s repositioning aspect. What 
emerges from the analysis of the corporate assessments and the interviews is 
that in fact all of these Rs could be present during a local authority turnaround. 
Replacement has been identified in terms of either or both the elected Leader of 
the Council and the CEO. This change in personnel has helped facilitate (possibly 
with assistance from the intervention process) a realignment of organisational 
values and priorities and approaches to leadership and management.  In the 
short-term operational changes have been made to improve service based 
performance, akin to retrenchment, whereas in the longer term, repositioning 
occurs to ensure improvement is sustainable. Reorganisation appears to be both 
a short-term and long-term phenomenon, being part of the replacement, 
retrenchment and the repositioning phases. 
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Planned or Emergent? 
 
With regard to whether improvement was part of a planned or emergent strategy 
(Ansoff 1988, 1991; Mintzberg 1975, 1978, 1979, 1987, 1990, 1991; Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985; Mintzberg et al 2003; Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999; Mintzberg 
and McHugh 1985; Mintzberg and Westley 1992; Porter 1981, 1996, 1998) the 
evidence from the corporate assessments and the interviews would suggest that 
it was very much planned.  Many of the themes identified in this thesis have 
focussed on what can be called planning frameworks; knowing who does what, 
deciding what the organisation stands for, introducing and enhancing strategic 
processes, gathering intelligence and prioritisation are examples of this. 
Becoming self-aware seems to have taken place within a planned framework, 
although there were some examples starting to appear at the end of CPA that 
would enable emergent elements to occur within the planned framework, i.e. both 
could possibly occur but due to accountability and governance requirements, 
planning is likely to be the dominant factor both in the turnaround phase and in 
the longer term (Worrall et al, 1998).   
 
Also there was evidence that turnaround was a distinct phase or episode of the 
organisations life (Mintzberg and Walters, 1992). The branding of the turnaround 
approach by some councils definitely suggests it was seen as a distinct phase. 
Some councils underwent corporate governance inspections that pre-dated and 
were the precursor to the corporate assessments of CPA.  In any event, all 
councils underwent a period of improvement during the CPA lifecycle suggesting 
that it was a distinct phase, moving the organisation from poor performance to 
good performance, significantly through changes in strategic processes.  
References to the use of Lean Thinking and Business Process Re-engineering and 
transformational approaches to change also back this up.  
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CPA as the Trigger for Change 
 
Finally, there was evidence to suggest that CPA acted as a strong external trigger 
(Jas and Skelcher, 2005) for change and improvement within poorly performing 
local authorities that had become entrenched in a permanently failing situation 
(Meyer and Zucker, 1989).  CPA appeared to act in a similar way to other crisis 
triggers that can act on public services in creating the necessary leverage for 
major paradigm shifts (Rochet, 2007).   
 
Even though there were cases where awareness of the need for change had 
started to build up internally prior to the initial CPA inspections (see also Paton 
and Mordaunt, 2004 and Wilson and Moore, 2007), it was the threat of impending 
CPA inspection that created the opportunity for change to occur. It is not 
uncommon for actors without power within organisations to recognise that things 
could be done differently.  However to change independently would require 
revolution (or perhaps mutiny) from within the organisation, something which 
would be difficult to carry out within the bureaucratic and power laden fiefdoms 
(political or not) of local government. The CPA regime, and the availability of the 
peer assessment and support mechanisms that went with it, created the strategic 
window (Hofer, 1980) that allowed the incumbent leadership to be usurped, and 
the latent talent within the organisation to surface as a precursor to the change in 
outlook and approach usually implemented by the incoming CEOs.  In a sense, 
this threat posed by CPA acted as a contestability trigger (Prowle, 2008) to 
change the mindset of internal actors and pave the way for the change that was 
to come. 
 
The intervention process itself, including the creation of improvement boards 
(Yapp and Skelcher, 2007) and mentoring support (Whiteman, 2004; Atterton et 
al, 2009), although providing a backdrop to this study rather than being its focus, 
clearly targeted change within councils whether this be in leadership, structures 
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or processes.  However, while intervention played an important role in monitoring 
and facilitating improvement, it was not responsible for delivering improvement, 
this was squarely on the shoulders of the leadership of the council and 
improvement had to come from within the council (ODPM, 2003).  The 
intervention teams could put pressure on elected members to bring about a 
change in Leader of the Council, or to advise on the removal of the CEO and bring 
in an interim CEO as change agent.  However, once leadership was established 
within the council, the intervention team role was to monitor and help facilitate 
improvement and to exit once this had started. As such, the improvements 
witnessed by this study, are held to represent internal organisational 
improvements, rather than impositions.  All the improvement themes identified in 
this study can be related to the turnaround phase of council development as they 
represent a period of learning, or evolution (Worrell et al, 1998), during this 
period. It is this growth in organisational capacity and capability, and significantly 
the realisation that it is required, that has been one of the most significant 
findings of this doctoral study, and the one that has the potential to ensure that 
the improvements in performance experienced can be sustained and reinforced. 
 
The CPA for the first time took a holistic view of the performance of local councils.  
It brought together not only the pre-existing service based assessments of 
overseers such as Ofsted, and other judgements such as the audit of council 
funds, but extended this to include a review of the ways in which councils were 
managed corporately.  This examined not only the strategic and administrative 
processes, but also the role of political leadership and local community 
leadership.  By bringing all these components together for the first time, and 
some were only examined for the first time under CPA, there was an opportunity 
created for councils to reflect on how they ran themselves and whether this was 
good enough.  The external light of inspection, and the very public reporting that 
went with this, appears to have created the trigger for improvement, self-
reflection and change.  In some cases this change in corporate processes was 
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initially enforced through the intervention and engagement process, in other 
cases change came voluntarily once the trigger had been pulled or, in the case of 
at least one council studied, in anticipation of it. It is concluded that for the 
councils studied, the CPA era encouraged a move away from ad hoc service based 
fire fighting, to a more holistic approach of cross service prioritisation and co-
ordination.  This also extended to extra-council activities by the end of CPA and 
into the brief and defunct CAA era.  The ability of councils to provide this 
corporate wide and sustained improvement was not dependent on individual 
service expertise or improvement, but rather the corporate capacity and 
capability of members and the executive to pull together the collective demands 
placed on the council and to convert these into a coherent, meaningful and 
achievable strategy that was then monitored, managed and delivered over the 
medium to long term, supported by a range of robust corporate support systems.   
 
It is inconclusive whether the CPA alone was responsible for improvement in 
council performance during the period 2002 to 2008. Other government initiatives 
in service areas (such as housing benefits and council tax, waste and housing) 
and at the sub-regional level (LAAs and LSPs for example) clearly would have had 
an impact by focussing attention and activity into those areas and as a result, de 
facto, bringing about service based improvement. Similarly, the criticism that 
improvement was only being measured against a set of centrally determined 
targets may be partly justified and the way in which CPA took service 
performance into account does present the opportunity for it to be self-fulfilling in 
the way it measured improvements. Nevertheless, a case can be made that CPA 
strengthened the corporate capacity of councils in a way that no other 
assessment regime had done in the past and that the legacy of this is that 
councils are now better prepared for, and able to recognise and respond to, the 
strategic challenges they face, whether this be from local demographic and 
economic pressures, or from new and revised central government initiatives and 
ideologies. 
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Whether a need remains for a similar centralist and compulsory regime is unclear, 
however the main benefit of CPA appears to have been the focus on, and 
improvement in, those core corporate skills associated with managerialism (as 
opposed to NPM), the need for which it is argued remains. 
 
Approaches to Turnaround 
 
A key finding from the literature was the “3Rs” of retrenchment (Robbins and 
Pearce, 1992), repositioning and reorganisation (Boyne 2004), in addition to 
realignment (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006) and possibly replacement (Boyne, 
2004).  These have been considered and developed further, building on the 
findings of the analysis. The “5Rs” described above, have been combined with 
two further “Rs” seen as being important within the analysis, those of Realisation 
(in response to the CPA trigger and linked to the overcoming of denial through 
increased cognition and self-awareness) and Reinforcement (in that if turnaround 
was to be sustained, the improvements to the underlying processes within 
organisations needed to be constantly promoted and monitored from senior levels 
within the organisation).  An approach to turnaround has therefore been put 
forward based around the “7Rs” of Realisation, Realignment, Replacement, 
Retrenchment, Repositioning, Reorganising and Reinforcement.  These “7Rs” are 
represented in Figure 38 below and have been linked to the ten themes 
developed in the thesis (shown in bold italics).   
 
Given the longitudinal nature of this study, it has been possible to assign the 7Rs 
to key phases in the turnaround cycle; from the initial trigger point, referred to as 
“Ground Zero”, through the turnaround phase and on to the sustainability of 
performance improvement.  It is argued that realisation, realignment and 
replacement occur prior to the actual turnaround phase, but are necessary 
precursors for the turnaround phase to start.  The turnaround phase itself 
consists of Boyne’s “3Rs”. The final R, reinforcement, appears to be concerned 
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with maintaining the core strategic systems and processes that were introduced 
during the turnaround phase.   
 
Figure 38: The “7Rs” of Sustained Strategic Turnaround in Local 
Government 
 
It can be seen that the ten themes identified in the primary analysis, and in some 
cases aspects of these themes, can be associated with each of the 7Rs.  Some 
themes, for example prioritisation, appear to be so crucial, that it is argued that 
they appear in a number of places and critically in more than one of the three 
phases. An initial prioritisation would appear to occur during realignment, when 
the organisation is seeking to align itself to the needs of external stakeholders, in 
this case the intervention team acting on behalf of the ODPM/DLGC. Short-term 
and long-term prioritisation (and re-prioritisation) of policies and the resources 
attached to them will also occur during retrenchment and repositioning. During 
reinforcement, if improved performance is to be sustained, it will be necessary for 
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the organisation to continually re-prioritise in order to maintain self-correction 
(Jas and Skelcher, 2005).  Similarly, the introduction and subsequent 
maintenance of strategic management systems and processes, as well as self-
awareness (through intelligence gathering) and performance management, will 
occur in both the turnaround and sustainability phases. 
 
Consideration can also be given as to whether the elements within each phase 
occur sequentially or concurrently, some of the basis for which is drawn from the 
findings of the case study councils that appear in the next section.  At ground 
zero, realisation of some form is likely to be the start point of the process.  
Realisation may come from voluntary peer review or self-assessment (as in the 
case of Council B), from a change of leadership (possibly through the democratic 
process or the appointment of a new CEO as in the case of Council C) or, as 
appears to have been more often the case, from some externally imposed 
influence, in this case the CPA (as happened in Council A).  After realisation has 
occurred, realignment and replacement appear to need to happen quickly if 
turnaround is to start.  Council C displayed an awareness of a need to change 
after the initial inspection, but turnaround did not start effectively until there had 
been a change in both political leadership and the CEO.  Under CPA and the 
intervention programme, there was a possibility that realignment could occur 
without replacement if leaders showed the “will and the wherewithal” to improve.  
However, the GLO interviews appear to indicate that in the case of poorly 
performing councils this was rarely the case and some form of replacement had 
to occur whether this was interim or permanent. In such cases, it is likely that 
realignment and replacement happened at roughly the same time.  This is also a 
key finding of the council interviews where both the Leader of the Council and the 
CEO were replaced before turnaround commenced. 
 
The turnaround phase offers up a paradox in that the reorganising element could 
also be present during retrenchment and possibly during repositioning.  
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Furthermore, even though retrenchment implies a short-term immediacy of 
action and repositioning a longer-term outlook, this does not mean that both 
activities cannot be carried out and developed at the same time. Retrenchment 
activity appears to have included a more operational turnaround focus, whereas 
repositioning a strategic focus (Hofer, 1980), in this sense, although it is not 
always evident that it was a planned approach, local authorities appear to have in 
some cases adopted a twin track approach to turnaround (Paton and Mordaunt, 
2004).  Council A is closest to this approach in that it addressed operational 
service based weaknesses (partly because they had become strategically 
significant) while at the same time starting to develop its strategic processes of 
visioning and corporate planning.  Council B on the other hand made significant 
improvements at the service level, and even had an early change in culture under 
the guidance of the new permanent CEO. However, despite this it had still not 
implemented some of the longer-term strategic processes, which the interviewee 
recognised, probably held the organisation back. 
 
Finally, there appears to be a more ethereal element within the findings.  If 
sustained improvement is to be maintained, then turnaround is not just about 
coming up with a set of artefacts such as strategic plans, consultation exercises, 
or performance management systems.  To do so may have given the ability to 
pull the wool over the Audit Commission’s and lead official’s eyes in the first 
instance by creating an impression that change was occurring when in fact it 
wasn’t.  However, the organisations studied, especially the STCCs, not only 
achieved sustained levels of performance improvement, but also did this within 
an assessment regime that in itself went through a process of refinement (The 
Harder Test). Something deeper appears to have been happening that changed 
the outlook of the organisations at all levels and for both officers and members. 
This is not something that was evident from the corporate assessments, nor from 
the GLO interviews (their role was over once performance was heading in the 
right direction not when it was sustained (ODPM 2003)).  It was something that 
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came from the interviews with the council officials.  In part, it was the 
enthusiasm that they all still showed for their involvement in the improvement 
period, as well as their accounts of improved staff satisfaction surveys and 
positive staff reactions to being involved, informed and engaged in the 
improvement.  There appeared to have been a sense of conviction that had 
developed within the organisations, and Council A and B in particular, to not want 
to be seen as a poor organisation and this contributed to driving the 
improvement. 
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SECTION 3 
 
3.1 ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY COUNCILS 
 
This section reviews the experiences of the three case study councils, using the 
ten themes identified in the previous section as an analysis framework.  The ten 
themes, or approaches to turnaround, are considered in the same order, with the 
extent of each council’s experience considered as appropriate.  Inevitably, some 
themes are longer than others and the extent to which the interviews allowed a 
discussion of each theme varies.  Finally there is an additional sub-section based 
on the leadership and sustainability experiences of the councils.  This to some 
extent cuts across the thematic analysis, although is separate to it, and allows for 
the consideration of both the second and third research questions of the thesis 
that relate to leadership and sustainability. 
 
Due to the managerialist nature of the study and the use of the ten themes as 
the analysis framework, the focus of this analysis is on the internal rather than 
external factors that impacted on turnaround.  The findings focus on changes that 
took place within the councils, rather than considering specific external 
environment factors that may also have had an impact, for example changes in 
government policy, or the needs of specific stakeholder groups.  Where external 
issues are considered, they are dealt with in terms of a councils’ own processes 
for capturing, interpreting and using information about the external environment. 
 
The three case study councils were selected from the turnaround councils 
identified in Document Four, with two STCC and one district council matching the 
balance of types of council represented within the 23 turnaround councils.  The 
analysis of the case study councils follows the ten themes identified in the 
Findings and Analysis section that are summarised on page 44.  This thematic 
analysis is used to consider the findings in relation to the first research question 
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given on page 3 of the thesis.  A consideration of the findings relating to 
leadership and sustainability is given at the end of the section in response to the 
second and third research questions (also on page 3). 
 
A summary of the case study councils is given below and pen pictures of the 
interviewees within the councils were given within the Methodology and Methods 
section. Also within the Methodology and Methods section, Figure 28 and Figure 
29 show the relationship of the case study interviews to the other sources of data 




Council A is a rural district council, operating under a Leader and Cabinet model 
system of governance. The council has had a history of strong Labour political 
control, and was under Labour control throughout the CPA period.  Council A 
undertook a self-assessment exercise prior to the first CPA inspection, to assess 
itself against the CPA criteria.  The council scored itself as fair whereas the result 
of the first actual CPA inspection was weak. The Council went into intervention 
and subsequently had two interim CEOs before a permanent external CEO was 
appointed.  This CEO stayed only a short time, leaving to join a larger council, 
following which a permanent CEO was appointed from within the organisation.  
The internally appointed CEO was still in post at the time of the interviews for this 
study.  
 
The corporate assessment report for 2005 mentions that investigations were 
taking place into both the Leader of the Council and the CEO in place at the time 
of the first CPA inspection, both of whom subsequently left the council. It was 
recognised within the report that these investigations had hampered somewhat 
the performance of the council during this time. The investigations into the senior 
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officials resulted in a change to both the CEO and the elected Leader of the 
council. 
 
The initial CPA inspection of weak was based largely on the lack of long-term 
vision and cohesive strategic management within the council.  Despite some 
services such as planning and leisure offering good services, other services such 
as housing and benefits were either not improving or were getting worse. 
 
In addition to the problems created by the investigations into to the leadership of 
the council, the elected members were regarded as too hands on at an 
operational level and there was a lack of prioritisation taking place at the 
strategic level.  As such, everything was regarded as important and there was a 
mismatch between the stated aims of the council and what was actually 
happening on the ground. 
 
From this weak position the council was able to improve against the CPA 
framework and received an excellent rating in 2008, the first council to do so. It 




Council B is a metropolitan council, providing the full range of local authority 
services under the Leader and Cabinet model. Like a number of councils, it had 
been involved in an IDeA a peer review exercise prior to the initial CPA inspection 
in 2002.  The results of this exercise were not favourable and resulted in the 
removal of the incumbent CEO one year prior to the CPA inspection and the 
subsequent appointment of a long serving, permanent CEO.  This CEO was still in 
place at the time of the interviews for this thesis. At the start of CPA, the council 
was Labour controlled, although with a small majority.  This political structure 
changed during the CPA period, with a reduced Labour majority in 2004 and then 
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a swing to minority Conservative control by 2008. The CEO’s continued tenure 
after a change of political control during the CPA period offered some continuity. 
 
Despite the pre-emptive change of CEO and the introduction of a number of new 
initiatives aimed at improving both the services of the council and the corporate 
management processes, Council B was judged to be weak under the first round of 
CPA. In its first assessment, reasonable performance scores in some service 
areas were offset by weak scores in others.  Typical of many councils at the time 
therefore, performance was inconsistent across the main areas of service delivery 
used by the CPA assessment framework.  This was mirrored within the corporate 
assessment judgement, which was scored at 2 in the first assessment (1 being 
low and 4 being high). Here, low scores in achievement (which received a double 
weighting), prioritisation, capacity and performance management offset better 
scores in ambition, focus, learning and investment.  At the time of the first 
inspection, the Audit Commission recognised that the council was ambitious and 
had accepted the need to change, primarily illustrated by the change in CEO and 
the new initiatives this brought.  However, the judgement at the time was that it 
was too early to be sure whether such changes had had an impact on the 
performance of the council and whether this would be maintained. 
 
Subsequent CPA assessments showed a year on year improvement in the main 
service scores under the first CPA methodology, something that was generally 
carried over into the “Harder Test” methodology from 2005 onwards. The 
improvement in service scores resulted in an overall progression from weak to 
fair to good under the original CPA methodology. The first score under the Harder 
Test methodology in 2005 was only 2 star, with higher service scores being offset 
by poorer scores for use of resources and the corporate assessment. Despite 
some minor fluctuations in some of the service scores, a gradual improvement in 
the use of resources and corporate assessment scores enabled Council B to 
improve its overall rating in 2008. 
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Council C 
 
Council C is similar to Council B in that it is also a metropolitan council and 
operated under the Leader and Cabinet model. It was also initially Labour 
controlled, but subsequently went through a period of “No Overall Control” before 
becoming Conservative controlled in 2004 following boundary changes.  The 
potential effect on political control of these boundary changes was known by the 
political parties, which potentially led to a lack of focus in political leadership.  
 
The first CPA inspection for Council C in 2002 was weak, mainly as a result of also 
due to poorer service scores and a poor corporate assessment score offsetting 
some better service scores. During the CPA period, the council had a temporary 
internal acting up CEO and two permanent external CEO appointments.  It did not 
go into corporate intervention, but there was a formal intervention into one of the 
services.  
 
Interestingly, neither of the new CEOs was appointed as a direct result of the 
initial weak CPA inspection.  The first acting up appointment was made some time 
after the initial inspection in 2004, with the original CEO being left in post to try 
and turn things around, although this was unsuccessful.  The acting up CEO 
appointment was made after the removal of the incumbent CEO following the 
change in political control and a permanent CEO was appointed further into the 
CPA period in 2005. 
 
In a similar vein to Council B, the initial CPA and corporate assessment for 
Council C in 2002 refer to it being ambitious and in the process of implementing a 
change programme aimed at improving internal business processes as well as 
community engagement and partnership working. It was reported that there had 
been some improvements to some of the services provided, but that there had 
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also been deterioration in others.  This again reflects the somewhat variable 
performance of councils across the range of services delivered at this time.  
However, unlike Council B, there was not the improvement in service scores 
during the early CPA years.  Council C is regarded as a late improver, with the 
many of the service scores remaining static for and some even falling back in the 
early years of CPA. Similarly, the corporate assessment stayed at 2 out of 4 
during this early period. Despite this, improvements in some service scores did 
enable the council to improve its overall CPA score in 2004. 
 
It is after the introduction of the “Harder Test” in 2005 that Council C started to 
show improvement across the board with service scores showing either improved 
performance, or maintaining a high level of performance. These beginnings of 
improvement to the assessment scores coincided with the change in political 
control and the appointment of the permanent CEO. 
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For a variety of reasons, the case study councils were being poorly led at the time 
of their first CPA inspection. Each council suffered significant weaknesses in both 
the incumbent Leader of the Council and the CEO, as well as the relationship 
between these two roles.   Throughout the turnaround phase, all three councils 
witnessed an improvement in both the political leadership of the Leader and 
members, as well as the professional leadership of the CEO.  It was found that 
though the improvements in political leadership were significant and clearly 
favourable to the improvement in the overall CPA ranking, they represented the 
bringing up to standard, in part due to LGA support, of the political leadership to 
what should already have been in place within the council.  It was not therefore 
just improvements in political leadership that brought about the transformation of 
council performance.  Instead, this aspect was clearly attributed in the interviews 
(and to a lesser extent the corporate assessments) to the leadership of the new 
CEOs, who, in all three councils, were regarded as personally instrumental in 
driving through the structural, cultural and performance based improvements that 
resulted in turnaround. Improved political leadership therefore, though no less 
important, ran parallel and complimentary to the improved professional 
leadership of the councils under the new CEOs and senior managers.  
 
It is worth noting here, that in all three councils, the improvement in CPA ranking 
preceded the appointment of both a new Leader of the Council and a new CEO, 
and this aspect is considered in more depth under the next theme. What is 
considered further here is the greater understanding of leadership roles that 
occurred, and the changes to leadership approach that this brought with it. 
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The poor leadership at the start of CPA spilled over into both political and 
professional managerial leadership failings (Behn 2001, in Pollitt 2003), which 
were present to some extent in all three organisations.  From the council 
interviews, there is an overriding sense that at the start of CPA leadership was 
inappropriately and disproportionately focussed in the CEO, albeit in one case 
through a close relationship with the elected leader.  The elected members were 
disengaged from the strategic leadership process, leaving this to the officers, 
resulting in a lack of appropriate political leadership and therefore corporate 
governance (Pollitt 2003, Grace 2006).  The fire fighting and disjointed nature of 
the CEO leadership in at least two of the organisations also exposed weaknesses 
in the leadership capability and capacity of the CEO and the senior management 
teams.  Once these officer failings had been identified and accepted by the 
members however, this led directly to the removal of all three incumbent CEOs.   
 
In all three councils, the lack of understanding and effective acting out of the 
political and managerial leadership roles at the start of CPA, was identified as the 
overriding reason behind the poor organisational performance at the start of CPA 
and the major contributing factor to the failings identified in the other themes in 
this thesis. Following on from this, it is the improvement in leadership capacity 
and capability, and the roles that leaders played, especially the CEOs, in 
transforming their organisations, which is most significant to the turnaround of 
the councils concerned.  
 
The initial inadequacy of political leadership referred to in the findings of the 
analysis in Section 2 was evident in all three of the council interviews. In Council 
A, the organisation was described as dysfunctional and “officer led” as opposed to 
being member led.  This was despite the presence of what was considered a 
strong political leader of long standing and had resulted from the remaining 
elected members being disengaged from the strategic leadership of the council. 
Relational problems also existed, with strong allegiances having been formed 
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within the senior management team; some of the senior managers supporting the 
political leader, and others the CEO. The “relationship problems” as they were 
described, between the political and managerial leadership were so bad that one 
of the senior management team members left prior to the first CPA inspection, 
knowing that the CPA was likely to be weak, and not wanting to be associated 
with it.  “He was only xx (age withheld) and he wasn’t taking his pension or 
anything.  He’d had enough”.   
 
For both Council B and Council C, the elected members deferred to the CEO for 
decision-making purposes.  In Council B, when a problem arose the “fire fighting” 
CEO, given the pseudonym of “Red Adair”, was told to get on with things and sort 
them out. This suited the members who preferred a “hands off” style of decision 
making. The problems experienced by Council B were considered by the 
interviewee to come from there being too cosy a relationship between the officers 
and members generally, and also there being a very close and longstanding 
relationship between the leader and the CEO.  This resulted in the organisation 
being jointly led, but not in a positive way, with the relationship being described 
as a “cabal, to keep the organisation where it was”.   In Council C, the CEO called 
the shots, with the members being “not particularly strong because they knew 
they only had a limited time in power”, due to forthcoming boundary changes.  
 
Throughout the interviews, leadership was consistently referred to as 
dysfunctional at the time of the first CPA inspection, and the problems the 
councils’ faced were identified by the interviewees as being internally created. 
 
“It wasn’t government funding or anything of that nature…(or)…issues that were 
coming from the public.  It wasn’t that. Internally we needed to improve. We’d 
got poor corporate management. We’d got a lack of strategic direction”.  (Council 
A Interview) 
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Awareness of respective roles, and the enactment of these roles, improved in 
each council during the turnaround phase.  Some of the emphasis for the 
improvement was associated with elected members and resulted from improved 
political leadership, a better working relationship with the CEO, greater ownership 
of and involvement in the strategic direction of the council and also the effective 
challenging of the CEO, while at the same time taking on board the professional 
advice they offered. This in turn led to improvements in CEO performance.  
Initially through the appointment of new and appropriately experienced CEOs, 
followed by allowing the CEO to commence and undertake the changes required 
within the council to bring about improvement. 
 
In Councils A and B, the first part of this process was the recognition that there 
was a problem, prompted by the first CPA inspection and a pre-CPA peer 
assessment respectively.  In both cases an internal review of the underlying 
causes prompted the removal of the incumbent CEO.  This demonstrates much 
greater political leadership than had previously been the case.  Following on from 
this the political leadership in both councils worked with the new CEOs, as well as 
external actors (including GLOs, the LGA, the IDeA and other councils), to 
develop their political leadership capacity. In Council A this was backed up by the 
introduction of member training and the achievement of a members charter which 
are discussed further under the next theme.  In Council C, the improvement in 
political leadership came about later in the CPA timetable, following the change in 
political control in 2004 due to boundary changes.  Up to this point in time, 
political leadership had been weak, as the incumbent councillors knew there 
would be a change in political control once the boundary changes had occurred.  
Following this, the new cabinet took a much tighter grip on the council, removing 
the incumbent CEO and appointing a new one in 2005. It also had a clear policy 
agenda that informed the strategic direction of the council. 
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Political leadership therefore improved in all three councils, albeit in different 
ways and at different times, and had a complimentary knock on effect of 
improving the politics, community leadership and member and officer roles 
discussed below.  However, it was also the case that it was not the political 
leadership that necessarily took control of the turnaround process.  In all three 
councils this was quite clearly the remit of the CEO, albeit supported and 
challenged by a more effective set of members as well as the external support 
networks provided by the engagement process and the IDeA. 
 
With regard to the finding that the CEO plays a key role in ensuring that political 
leadership is undertaken and enacted within councils, this is to an extent 
rienforced by the interview with Council A with the following comment showing 
how a subtle change in the role of the CEO, helped to give the members back 
their role as policy makers, while at the same time emphasising the importance of 
the CEO role: 
 
“every organisation, that’s going to be a good organisation, and I don’t care who 
it is (sic), has to have leadership from its chief executive, if it’s going to achieve. 
But that doesn’t mean that it is an officer led organisation, it means that that 
chief executive has got the drive and ambition to carry out the policies and the 
strategies that the members have set” (Council A interview) 
 
The interviewee is referring here to a change in role focus by both the Leader of 
the Council and the CEO, and was a result of the replacement of both the Leader 
of the Council and CEO. In Council A, the change in the political leader resulting 
from an investigation into the incumbent leader at the time of the first CPA 
inspection was referred to as being significant in that the new leader was much 
more open to the need for both political leadership to occur within the council and 
that the relationship with the CEO, albeit interim CEOs initially, needed to change. 
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Changes to the CEO leadership approach were linked in the interviews to the new 
incoming CEOs, and as such some aspects of this are considered in the New 
Officers theme under the next theme.  They are also discussed more fully within 
the final section of the case study analysis. 
 
Key changes in CEO approach focussed around a number of common elements. 
These included improved working relationships with the Leader of the Council, 
leading from the front in a visible way, being transformational, devolving 
accountability and responsibility to mangers within the council while still 
supporting them, implementing performance management systems, improved 
internal communication with staff (two way), restructuring and taking control of 
the management team, usually through down sizing, being prepared to “ease 
people out”, as well as engaging with managers and staff to develop a culture of 
improvement and confidence. 
 
It was the CEOs, that were given most credit within the interviews for making the 
turnarounds happen, and this was irrespective of whether there had been one or 
more CEOs or whether they were temporary or permanent.  Despite the 
commonalities expressed above, there were some differences in approach 
identified varying from being hands off but supportive, to limited examples where 
tighter control was exercised over the management team at certain times, 
although not all the time. This aspect was not really developed in the interviews, 
but it may be an example of the CEO keeping tight control of certain aspects of 
the turnaround, for example in terms of making sure key changes happened, 
while at the same time gradually releasing control to the managers.  This allowed 
the managers themselves to become assimilated into the changed working 
environment and improve their individual and collective performance, as well as 
the services for which they were responsible. 
 
  158 
Politics 
 
The issue of political fiefdoms stemming from long term political control was 
identified in both GLO interviews as a potential cause of stagnation for councils.  
Such stagnation could be the cause of insularity, arrogance and denial from the 
leadership as well as policy based on ideology rather than evidence based 
appropriate to the local and national environment.  This aspect was strongly 
evident in Council A, which, apart from a brief period in the 1970s, had been 
Labour controlled since its creation in 1973, and is still Labour controlled today. 
At the time of the first CPA inspection, Council A was described as being 
traditionally “iron fist old Labour”, and the strength of political control meant that 
there was little need for the controlling party to engage in evidence based policy 
making. Indeed the political focus at this time was described as being 
ideologically focussed on defending jobs and services.  In the past, this approach 
had led to direct confrontation with the national government and, even under the 
years of the New Labour government, there was still a degree of antipathy, which 
was attributed as one of the reasons why the council could not change. The 
strength of political control effectively allowed the political leadership to abdicate 
responsibility for policy making to the officers of the council, albeit within the 
confines of an “iron fist”.  The issue of politics here then was not one of cross 
party political fighting and blocking, but rather of a lack of engagement with, and 
understanding of, local and national issues, derived from a lack of need to engage 
politically and resulting in the council being out of touch with the demands that 
were being placed on it.   
 
The trigger of the CPA assessment had the impact of capturing the members’ 
interest, and they now wanted to know where the problems lay and 
commissioned an internal report into what had gone wrong. The change 
inleadership created the opportunity for the deputy leader to step into the role of 
Leader, adopting a significantly different approach.  This change saw the Leader 
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and the Cabinet take a much more active role in the leadership of the council, 
developing policy using evidence provided by the officers in a much more locally 
focussed way, and changing the emphasis from “protecting jobs and services”, to 
“making a difference” and putting local citizens needs at the heart of decision 
making. Decisions are still made from the political perspective of the majority 
party, but informed by national and local requirements. The importance of this 
change in political leadership approach was summed up in the interview: 
 
“If you’ve got somebody [the new Leader of the Council] who’s prepared to sit 
down and be reasonable and listen and hasn’t got that political dogma, you can 
take the organisation forward.” (Council A interview) 
 
The Leader of the Council has received an MBE for services to local government. 
 
For councils B and C, there had not been the same length of political tenure in the 




Improvements in community leadership were most evident in Councils A and B.  
For these councils, there was simply no desire from the top leadership on both 
the member and officer side to engage with wider community roles at the start of 
the CPA process.  This stemmed partly from a general lack of willingness to look 
outside the confines of the organisational boundary, and partly from the 
dysfunctional leadership coming from the respective CEOs and Leaders of the 
Councils. During the period following the first CPA inspection however, both 
councils became a lot more active in regional and external activities and by the 
end were actively fostering and managing relationships with other public service 
agencies such as Police, Fire and the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).  For Council B, 
a significant aspect of this was the development of local area agreements (LAAs) 
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and local strategic partnerships (LSPs), which it “threw itself into” at an early 
stage. This was subsequently extended into joint service developments and public 
private partnerships, which would have been an anathema to the leadership at 
the start of CPA.  It also developed a scrutiny process that included an External 
Scrutiny Panel, specifically tasked with monitoring the performance of partner 
organisations and the council’s relationship with them. Senior members and 
officers were also actively engaged in participating in or chairing regional and 
national boards and committees relevant to the work of the council. 
 
For council A it was about working with other agencies such as the County 
Council, Police and the PCT to tackle some of the more deprived areas of the 
district on issues such as crime, employment and health.  
 
“The real issues are around how do you raise aspirations of failing communities, 
how do you change the culture, how do you increase life expectancy of people 
living there, ……….and for me that’s the really exiting challenge.  How do you 
convince people that they don’t have to accept what they’ve got and what role 
can you play in it.  Because you can’t do it on your own.  The PCT can’t do it on 
their own.  Police can’t do it on their own. But everybody has a role to play and 
the challenge is how do you bring everybody together to actually improve that. “ 
(Council A Interview)  
 
It was evident from the interviews of Council A and B that the change in political 
and professional leadership approaches had led to a greater acceptance of and 
involvement in the community leadership role of the councils. 
 
Member and Officer Roles 
 
Improvements in the understanding and enacting of member and officer roles 
were mentioned in only two of the interviews.  Firstly, there was improved 
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recognition of the need for members taking responsibility for making decisions on 
policy using advice provided by officers.   In Council A this was summed up in 
that there was “a lack of strategic direction from members” at the time of the 
initial inspection but by the end, “members now make decisions after being 
advised by officers”.  This process took time to get fully up to speed, and was 
helped by the training and development initiatives discussed elsewhere.  
 
Secondly, officers became much more accepting of their role of implementing 
policy decisions, and to be accountable for this implementation. For Council A in 
particular there was significant emphasis placed on the improvement in member 
officer relationships. 
 
“The Leader talks about “Team [name of council]”, which is the relationship 
between members and its corporate management team, which have never been 
better.  In fact, we’ve just been awarded the member development charter …. 
which you have to go through an inspection to see how your actually supporting 
your members to have the corporate and strategic capacity to deliver.  So again 
it’s a change, a complete turnaround from where we were about members being 
disengaged, and an officer led organisation.” (Council A Interview) 
 
For Council B, relations between officers and members were described as 
historically always having been generally good.  However, the leadership 
approach at the time of CPA had inhibited the ability of both parties to exercise 
their respective roles.   The change in leadership approach post CPA overcame 
this. 
 
There was also supporting evidence from the interviews on the complementary 
role that the introduction scrutiny arrangements had on improving the 
understanding of member and officer roles.   
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Member and Officer training was also identified in the interviews as being a key 
contributor to improved understanding of roles, for example.   
 
“A big one of those was around member development. Members’ attitudes 
changed dramatically because they hated being perceived as a weak authority 
and they wanted to change so we were pushing at an open door there.  So 
members were sent on training courses, some of them went on the leadership 
course, 6 of them managed to get their diplomas in leadership, which was 
brilliant from that point of view and gradually you could see the organisation 
beginning to turn round.” (Council A Interview) 
 
Examples of training courses given in the interviews included leadership training 
for officers and members and financial management and audit committee training 
for members.  There was also the use of peer mentoring of elected members, 
which was used to develop elected members’ understanding of their roles from 
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Two of the case study councils had a change in Leader of the Council at the start 
of the CPA process but for very different reasons. In one case the Leader was 
removed due to legal issues, which cannot be discussed in this thesis.  The then 
Deputy Leader stepped up to the role of Leader, and sustained this position 
throughout the turnaround period.  In the second council, the Leader was 
replaced just prior to CPA as the result of a “four year rule” which required the 
incumbent Leader to stand down after four years in office.  The new incoming 
Leader held office for most of the turnaround period.  Both new Leaders of the 
Council were seen as instrumental within the organisation for leading and 
enabling the change process that brought about improvement, and in particular 
this was attributed to a more inclusive approach to leadership, with a lack of 
political dogma. In the third council, change in council leadership came much 
later in the turnaround period as a result of political change through the ballot 
box.  Council C’s turnaround trajectory was more delayed than the other two 
councils and to some extent this delay could be attributed to the later change in 
political leadership, which was described as bringing about “a completely different 
picture”. These represent situational factors (Francis and Desai, 2005; Landrum 
et al, 2000; Wren, 2001) and in the case of Council C, the delayed turnaround 
was partly due to a difference in the cognition of the problem of the two political 
leaderships (Francis and Desai, 2005; Turner and Whiteman 2005). In fact, this 
lack of cognition that there was a problem was displayed by the leadership of all 
three councils prior to the CPA period. Councils A and B overcame this quite 
quickly, but Council C carried on performing poorly even after the announcement. 
 





All three of the council interviews identified that there had been at least one 
change in CEO related to the CPA. In two cases there had been more than one 
change, while in the third there had only been one. 
 
Council A went into intervention and as such an interim CEO was appointed. 
However, the extract from the interview below illustrates that the removal of the 
incumbent CEO was prompted by the members themselves, although their 
pursuit of this followed a “holding up a mirror” exercise referred to by GLO1. It 
also shows that support and advice was given from both the GLO and the Audit 
Commission. 
 
“The members after the weak score came to me….. telling me that they were 
unhappy with the performance of the Chief Executive.  Would I put a process in 
to deal with the situation for them.” (Council A Interview)……… 
 
………“Well, quite simply what they [the members] thought – “we have been 
judged a weak authority, what role has the CEO played in it?  Have we got 
confidence in [the CEO] to turn it around?” And they said no, they blatantly said 
no.  I was a new director just come onto the corporate management team so 
they approached me, in a letter, and said “these are the issues that we’ve got, 
what process have we got to deal with it?” So I had to take external legal advice. 
I spoke to [the GLO], I spoke to him when I was home at the weekend.  “.. help 
me. I’ve got problems on such and such”. And he was really good.  But also the 
district auditor, I spoke to him quite a lot and we appointed a set of solicitors …. 
who actually advised us right through the process” (Council A interview)   
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Two of the local authority interviews, referred to the requirement for the CEO to 
be transformational in approach (and it was implied in the third council 
interview).  In relation to Council C’s delayed turnaround , the CEO at the time of 
the initial poor CPA announcement was not replaced until the change of political 
administration some years later.  During the intervening period, very little change 
and improvement took place within the council.  It was not until the incumbent 
CEO was “asked to leave” by the new administration, that change began to take 
place. 
 
One of the local authority interviews (Council A) revealed that that council had 
two interim CEOs followed by one short-term external permanent appointment, 
before recruiting another permanent CEO internally.  In this case, the interim 
CEOs were regarded as transformational in their approach, and instrumental in 
laying the foundations for improvement which subsequently followed. The same 
was true of the relatively short-term, permanent appointment. The final 
permanent appointment carried on this transformational approach, something 
that they referred to themselves, but was also confirmed in the interview with 
GLO1, who had knowledge of this case.  
 
Conversely, another of the local authorities interviewed (Council B) only had one 
replacement CEO during the turnaround phase.  This council replaced the 
incumbent CEO with a permanent external appointment prior to the first CPA 
inspection as a result of a poor peer assessment by the IDeA (this is referred to 
as a pre-emptive strike in Document Three).  This council did not go into the full 
intervention process. It was clear from the interview that the new CEO was 
regarded as pivotal to the improvement of the council and “breathed a sense of 
purpose into the organisation” (Council B interview) through the introduction of 
strategic approaches to managing the organisation, such as improved delegation 
and decision making within the senior officer team, restructuring the council and 
introducing corporate planning processes.  The CEO was also credited with culture 
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change at the top of the organisation, focussing more on a can-do culture rather 
than a “woe is me” attitude, a point returned to in the Visioning sub-theme under 
Strategic Processes. 
 
What is interesting from the council interviews is that no common theme emerges 
regarding the replacement of the incumbent CEO. In the cases of the three 
interviewed organisations, experiences differ between internal, voluntary changes 
and those externally imposed.  For Council A, the CEO was effectively replaced as 
part of the statutory intervention process.  For Council B, the CEO was replaced 
some 12 months prior to the first CPA inspection (following an IDeA peer review – 
a “mock” CPA).  For Council C, the new CEO was appointed some years after the 
initial poor CPA score following an eventual change in political leadership through 
the ballot box. The incumbent CEO of Council C was ineffective in bringing about 
change, possibly due to being uncertain as to their role in a turnaround situation 
(Parry 1999). Council C had two new CEO appointments during the turnaround 
phase. 
 
Despite the differences in replacing incumbent CEOs, some commonality was 
experienced with regards to the approach adopted by the newly appointed CEOs.  
Through cross-referencing the three interview responses, there do appear to have 
been similar phases of approach adopted by CEOs with strong links to 
managerialism.  Initially, there tended to be a focus on changing the 
management approach within the organisation.  This simultaneously attempted to 
streamline the senior management team, making it smaller, and also introduced 
more devolved accountability structures to senior managers.  There was also an 
emphasis on performance management linked to customer service in all three of 
the councils interviewed.  Rather than having to report back on every aspect of 
their work, the reduced management team were given a remit and told to get on 
with it, reporting back on progress, rather than for approval of decisions. In one 
example from the interviews, there was also an emphasis on getting core 
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systems up to speed, such as the budgeting and planning processes and 
performance management systems.  In this way planning and performance 
information was supporting the devolved accountability framework. Here again 
CEOs are managing on different fronts (Joyce, 2004). Furthermore, CEOs tended 
to be more open and inclusive in their approach to staff within the organisation, 
getting out and talking to staff and maintaining visibility and enthusiasm 
(Khandwalla 1983, Harker and Sharma, 2000; Fielder, 1967). A consistent 
approach was to promote the enhancement of adaptability within the organisation 
through adopting designer, teacher and steward roles (Parry, 1999; Senge, 
1990b). 
 
The CEO taking control of the senior management team was also a key finding.  
This was not necessarily in the sense of exercising excessive control, as has been 
said above there was usually a devolved management approach introduced.  
Rather it was about changing the power configurations (Mintzberg, 1984) within 
the organisation. There was the need to ensure that they got “like minded people 
together” (Council B interview) who wanted to take the organisation forward.  
Such approaches could foster collective intuition and constructive conflict 
(Eisenhardt, 1999).  In Council A, this seemed to occur quite easily with no 
significant changes to personnel on the management team.  In Council B, 
reference was made to the CEO “easing people out” who were not going to 
contribute to the future of the organisation.  Council C appears to have faced the 
most challenges when it came to changing the approach to the way the 
organisation was managed.  Although similar approaches were introduced in all 
three councils, the management team in Council C managed to block the changes 
under the tenure of the first new CEO and it required the appointment of a 
second CEO for them to be implemented effectively.  Much of this was put down 
to the respective styles of the two CEOs as outlined in the two interview extracts 
below:  
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“[the first CEO] brought a leadership style that wasn’t appreciated by all people 
because it was very much the emotional intelligence type of leadership, quite 
feminine in approach to leadership, but people took advantage of that…..the 
organisation was very macho and didn’t really like the emotional intelligence style 
of leadership and the management structure couldn’t be changed”. (Council C 
interview)…………. 
 
……………“[the second CEO] has very much brought back a much more hierarchical 
sort of leadership style at the moment, and I can understand why because they 
needed to put their foot down and say “right, I am the Chief Executive, I’m not 
going to be woolly about this, we are not going to have an emotional intelligent 
discussion about it””. (Council C interview) 
 
With regards to the second CEO, the interviewee was aware that they were using 
a different style than the one used in their previous organisation and had 
appeared to pick a style that was appropriate to the situation.  In this case a 
more authoritarian style was adopted by the CEO that included replacing all 
members of the senior management team, which had previously been a blockage 
under the previous new CEO.  The essence of changes brought in by the previous 
CEO were retained, but the manner of getting them adopted was much more 
authoritarian “when something is decided at management team, managers are 
expected to get on and do it, not spend three months arguing about it” (Council C 
interview). 
 
Other changes to the officer side of the organisation included new management 
appointments, the creation of new roles and the restructuring of management 
teams.  Restructuring of senior management teams was usually accompanied by 
a reduction in their size (see also Beeri, 2009).  This was not necessarily through 
people exiting the organisation, but rather that they were no longer included in 
the management team. Examples of management teams of up to 40 people were 
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given in two of councils interviewed.  Typically, structural models from the 
interviews tended to focus on a small number of executive directors accountable 
for organisational priorities with responsibility for one or more departments within 
the council.  In all of the council interviews, this was regarded as breaking down 
the previous silo mentality of the council. Departmental management then filtered 
down from the executive directors to assistant directors and departmental 
management teams, creating a hierarchical structure combining team based 
leadership with a strong leader (either the CEO or the CEO/Leader of the Council 
combination) (Landrum et al 2000, Moore 1995). 
 
For the council’s interviewed, a wholesale change in management team only 
occurred in Council C, and this was only after the appointment of the second 
permanent CEO during the turnaround phase, as referred to above.  Never the 
less, new ideas and approaches were seen to have permeated the councils by 
other means such as peer observation, informal bench marking, mentoring and 




This was reflected very strongly in the local authority interviews with similar 
terminology being used across them.  The interviews revealed that targeting the 
organisational culture was seen as a significant aspect of the change and 
improvement programme whether this was focused on a “customer oriented 
culture” in Council A, a “performance culture” in Council C, or the introduction of 
a “culture of change” in Council B.  In Council B, one of the main factors of the 
change process was that it was a “planned culture change driven by the CEO” and 
reinforced by communicating positive results and publicising success, both 
internally and externally.  For Council A, the refocusing on customer needs at all 
levels within the organisation was seen as a significant aspect of the turnaround 
and was supported by training and periodic council wide meetings to reinforce the 
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message. Successes, such as awards from external bodies and publications, were 
also widely publicised as part of this reinforcement by both Council A and B. 
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The role of visioning was particularly significant for Council A, which adopted a 
vision for the council early on in the turnaround period.  The vision for Council A 
was described as “Making a Difference” and was used to help shift the culture of 
the organisation from one that was about “defending jobs and services” to one 
that “put customers at the heart of service delivery”.  In the words of the 
interviewee: 
 
“This meant changing everything we did and how we did it.  We went from an 
organisation to keep people employed and have control to….how do you serve 
your public?…to give bloody good customer care and quality services” (Council A 
Interview) 
 
The vision was used by Council A to send a clear message to staff and managers 
that things were going to be done differently from now on and that the outlook of 
the council had changed. It also was used ultimately to develop the corporate 
plan of the council and subsequently the structure and focus of the members’ 
portfolios and strategic directors according to external and internal facing 
priorities. 
 
The use of visioning was not always something that happened early on in the CPA 
process.  Council C in particular did not appear to have a unified driving vision in 
place until much later in the CPA regime (possibly in part due to this organisation 
being a late starter) and it was only at the time of the interview that this had 
been linked to strategic planning processes. The comment at the time of the 
interview was that there “now” felt like there was a vision and the organisation 
was being led, although this was clarified as being very CEO focussed, 
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emphasising the professional role that the CEO can play in bringing strategic 
processes into an organisation.   
 
For Council B, despite making improvements in service delivery, which greatly 
helped improve the CPA score, there was no clear sense of vision linked to the 
development of strategic planning processes for much of the turnaround period.  
This came later on for Council B where there was some resistance to the 
emphasis put on strategic planning processes by the Audit Commission.  
However, at the time of the interview), there was a recognition that the Audit 
Commission “were probably right” and once the vision was in place, this helped to 
pull together the other strategic processes. 
 
Linked with, and possibly a precursor to, the development of an external vision, 
was the development of what has been termed earlier as an “internal vision”. It 
came across very strongly from the council interviews that prior to improvement 
taking place, there was a change in the feel of the organisation. This was 
represented as both a desire to do better, in response to the poor CPA 
assessment, and a belief within the organisation that improvement could be 
achieved.  The comment made in the Council B interview about the CEO 
breathing a new sense of purpose into the organisation is direct evidence for this, 
but the emphasis placed on the CEO’s ability to enthuse the staff within the 
organisation by the other two council interviews also supports it.  It is reasonable 
to assume that the leaders of the organisations would have played a key role in 
changing the mindset of both the staff and members within the organisation. In 
some cases this was supported by the poor CPA score representing a galvanising 
event that could be used by the leadership to rally the troops. Once the internal 
vision was adopted and became embedded, the external vision could be 
developed with greater relevance out of an acceptance of the need to look outside 
the organisation and gather intelligence. 
 
  173 
Formal Plans 
 
Consistent messages came from the council interviews with regards to formal 
planning. All three councils made specific reference to there being no formal 
corporate or strategic planning in place at the start of the CPA period.  For 
example, for Council B, the organisation was “not based around planning…not 
based around strategy” but rather around “single issues and prejudice”.  Council 
A “didn’t do any proper corporate planning” and Council C was described as 
“chaotic”. 
 
The interviewees add further weight to the importance to improvement of the 
development of strategic planning processes throughout the turnaround period.  
All three asserted that formal planning processes had been introduced during the 
period and that these were, over time, linked to external community plans as well 
as departmental and group plans within the organisations.  Council A perhaps 
best illustrates the development of strategic planning as being somewhat 
iterative, going through a number of cumbersome versions of the process over a 
number of years before settling on a more streamlined version.  This experience 
was shared by all three councils.  The development of the planning approach was 
described as an “evolution” and at the time of the interview, Council A were just 
about to launch the latest version of the plan, which now captured all the key 
strategic elements on two sides of A4.  The strategic plan is for five years, 
“outward facing” and is underpinned by three priorities, which in turn are 
supported by outcome-focussed objectives.  The plan has been informed by a 
number of external facing mechanisms including Citizens panels, focus groups 
and a “place survey”. It is also linked to, and informed by, both the medium term 
financial plan and the risk register of the council.   
 
Council B on the other hand had only more latterly embraced the strategic 
planning approach.  Indeed, initially strategic planning as a process was seen as 
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something of an unnecessary distraction. The interviewee for Council B referred 
this as a “member issue”: 
 
“They (the members) were not interested in strategies but just wanted us to do 
the job….start performing” 
 
As such, Council B “played at strategy” in the early years, but started to “do it 
better” from about 2006 onwards, although even then the language and 
terminology was described as being wrong. During this time there was some 
conflict between the Audit Commission and the council (the CEO in particular).  
Despite recognised improvements in service delivery, and receiving the Local 
Government Chronicle most improved council award, the corporate assessment 
score was held back due to there being inappropriate strategic plans in place.  
The absence of a prescriptive strategy is a theme developed by Mintzberg and 
Walters (1985) and others (Alford, 2001; Flynn and Talbot, 1996; Worrell et al, 
1998) 
 
“it was the longer term stuff. Being clear about the direction [of the council]….the 
language of strategy” (Council B interview)……… 
 
………“we focused on the performance issues, so there were task and finish teams 
set up.. “get in there, get bloody housing repairs sorted out”,… “get in there, 
make sure the planning processes are sorted”…it was about doing all that sort of 
stuff… and I suppose we weren’t particularly good at strategy…and that kept 
coming back to clobber us.  They’d [Audit Commission] say “Yeah we know you’re 
doing really well, but you haven’t got a strategy. If you haven’t got a strategy, it 
must be a fluke you’re doing really well.” And we thought well we know what 
we’re doing, we know where we’re going, we just haven’t written it down” 
(Council B interview). 
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In some respects, Council B seemed to have achieved much without having the 
normative formal planning processes in place, certainly at the start of the 
turnaround phase.  However, by the end of CPA Council B had adopted a more 
cohesive approach to planning with the familiar linkages both externally and 
internal to the organisation. 
 
For all three councils, this iterative and evolutionary experience to developing 
strategic plans represented a learning curve.  First in terms of recognising the 
need to develop strategic plans across the organisation, then by developing the 
processes for doing this while at the same time learning from mistakes and 
embedding the culture of strategic planning throughout the council.  The strategic 
plans now provide a focal point for both the co-ordination of activities and the 
development and monitoring of policy and it is the learning that has been taken 
from this that has allowed the councils to become what was described as more 




From the interviews, two of the councils branded their strategic plans, for 
example “the State of the District” and “Shaping the Future”.  At this stage this is 
simply an observation from the interviews, but it could be usefully explored in 
further research into the development and implementation of strategic plans 
within local government. 
 
Scrutiny and Governance 
 
All three of the councils interviewed placed an emphasis on there being improved 
scrutiny arrangements, although this was more strongly put across in Councils A 
and B. For example, Council B had developed three discreet scrutiny 
arrangements; an overview scrutiny function that reviewed policy development, 
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an internal scrutiny function that focussed on performance management and 
financial management and an external scrutiny function that scrutinized external 
partnering arrangements with PCTs, the Police and the Local Strategic Partnership 
(LSP). This is interesting as it not only represents internal scrutiny as per Figure 
36, but also seeks to apply scrutiny outside the boundaries of the council. 
 
All three councils introduced or strengthened governance and decision-making 
processes. This included the introduction of portfolio and scrutiny arrangements 
on the member side of the organisation and more inclusive support for this from 
the officer side.  Improvements in governance arrangements also included the 
introduction of an Audit Committee in Council A.  Support for decision-making 
included not only the strategic planning and performance monitoring 
arrangements discussed elsewhere, but also the introduction of business case 
reporting for investment decisions and resource reprioritisations. 
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3.5 PRIORITISATION AND RE-PRIORITISATION 
 
Deciding on Priorities 
 
A common experience within all three councils were difficulties in deciding on the 
priorities that needed to be addressed.   At the time of the first inspections, 
priorities were unfocussed and uninformed.  There was also difficulty in 
determining what was important. In a similar way to the difficulty in determining 
what no longer needed to be done the interview with Council B summed this up 
well when discussing the situation prior to the first CPA inspection: 
 
“the members will tell you what their priorities are until the cows come home, but 
ask the Leader to set out what the main priorities are and he turns his mobile off 
for a month” (Council B interview) 
 
Determining priorities was referred to as a “challenge to Members”, especially in 
deciding what were not priorities. Council C outlined a sense that priorities were 
vague and no one knew what they were doing.  This in turn allowed for ambiguity 
in the alignment of priorities. 
 
Improvements in determining priorities were linked to improvements in strategic 
planning and performance management processes as well as having access to 
better quality of information.  Council A used regular member and senior officer 
away days to help inform and determine what the priorities of the council needed 
to be.  A consistent message from all three councils was that as time went on, 
priorities became more and more informed by information on national and local 
needs, including customer surveys and focus groups. In one case this was also 
linked to bottom up processes that included staff views as well, and this was 
implied in the other two interviews.  The emphasis on setting priorities became 
focussed on the members and the emphasis for delivery within the officer group. 
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In the early stages of turnaround, determining priorities was linked to the 
feedback from the CPA assessments, but as time went on two of the councils 
referred to this becoming more of an internally driven process that the members 
had taken control of.  
 
Over time, there is evidence of the councils becoming better at reprioritising their 
resources.  Undertaking business case reviews of services and back office areas 
to identify where required outcomes could be achieved with alternative 
arrangements, which in turn generated savings that could be transferred to other 
areas. Examples included leisure services, waste collection, street cleaning and 
the re-engineering of back office services into a shared call centre.  
 
Scope of Priorities 
 
With regard to councils experiencing a learning curve in developing an 
appropriate range of priorities, this is something borne out by the interviews with 
local authority officers who also stated that the process of recognising the 
importance of setting priorities developed over time. At first this resulted in a 
proliferation of priorities, usually coming from service areas. A more corporate 
and strategic approach to settling on fewer, more manageable strategic priorities 
came later in the turnaround phase. 
 
“Members started to develop priorities, but started out with far too many.  We 
had to step it down to what was more manageable…focus on what’s important 
within resources” (Council B interview) 
 
“We had a number of days away where we said “what are going to be our major 
priorities, what are we going to focus on?” And at one time we had too many we 
had about 18 priorities and we had reshape them right down, we had to go to the 
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members and say look if you really want to do this you’ve got to focus on it 
because you haven’t got the corporate capacity to deal with all of it and they said 
right OK what can we throw out of these.  So we actually shaped it down to 
something that was much more manageable.” (Council A interview) 
 
For Council A, this refining of objectives continued throughout the turnaround and 
was linked to the rationalisation of strategy documents referred to earlier. 
 
This demonstrates that it was not simply the recognition that prioritisation was 
important that led to turnaround, but it was learning how to prioritise and 
improve the effectiveness of prioritisation and re-prioritisation, that led to the 
embedding of this key process.  This is regarded as being fundamental to the 
sustainability of turnaround, rather than it being just a box ticking exercise for 
short term, apparent improvement. 
 
Taking Difficult Decisions 
 
Reference was also made to a new ability to take difficult decisions in two of the 
council interviews, for example: 
 
“We never shied away from hard decisions, we just got on and did it” (Council B 
interview) 
 
There is evidence from Council C that the use of business cases were increasingly 
used to inform members about prioritisation and re-prioritisation decisions.  This 
was also linked to improvements in financial control systems, giving the ability to 
realign financial resources.  Initially business cases ran to 40 pages, but in 
common with the learning displayed in other areas throughout the turnaround 
phase, increasing confidence in the process has meant these have now been 
reduced to around 3 pages. 
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Links to other Plans 
 
This is to some extent tied in with the financial budgeting literature concerned 
with for example the relative merits of incremental budgeting verses zero based 
budgeting (Henley et al, 1993; Jones and Pendlebury, 2000; Coombes and 
Jenkins, 2002), although no direct evidence was found for this from the council 
interviews.  Council C had moved to an enhanced incremental budgeting 
approach, rather than adopting zero based budgeting.   
 
By the end of CPA, specific reference is made in the corporate assessments to 
resources following priorities, or resources being aligned with priorities. In Council 
A for example, savings resulting from the re-engineering of support services and 
investment in IT, were able to be ploughed back into front line services, or 
protect them from budget cuts.  For front line services the phrase used was 
“reshaping”. By being more creative with for example the provision of leisure 
facilities, allowed some facilities to be closed, while still enabling the achievement 
of health and well-being priorities.   
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At the start of CPA there was very little engagement with staff within the councils.  
In some cases it was simply not on the agenda, whereas in the case of Council C 
it occurred but in a very selective way.  There was an “in crowd” and an “out 
crowd” when it came to having the ear of the CEO.  In Council A, motivation 
within the organisation was very low, with a staff satisfaction survey just after the 
CPA announcement giving very poor satisfaction ratings.  Indeed, it was said in 
the interview that staff were embarrassed to work for the organisation, with 
many sneaking out of the back door so as not to be associated with it.  This was 
the first such survey that had been undertaken, in itself showing a lack of 
willingness to engage with staff, and the leadership at that time took the decision 
not to publish the findings.   
 
The introduction of staff satisfaction surveys featured in each of the three council 
interviews.  For Council A, the second staff satisfaction survey results were 
described as “fantastic”, even though the organisation was going through a period 
of turmoil and change, the staff were aware of and comfortable with the changes 
due to an ongoing dialogue from members and the SMT. 
 
Council B also introduced staff satisfaction surveys and the quote below illustrates 
how this helped to improve the internal information gathering within the 
organisation.  
 
“Yeah, we brought those sorts of things in and they gave us some clear messages 
about the need for better communication, the need for more emphasis on 
training…and that’s when we started to bring in the IIP stuff. Because the 
messages coming back from the staff were…”we don’t feel loved and valued”.  It 
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took some time to get that through to them, but then that started to get down 
and suddenly people at the lower level were having team meetings… and were 
able to pass information… and get it given to them…. and it’s like “Wow! What’s 
going off here”. I remember going out to meetings with my staff and they said 
“are we actually allowed to say what we think”… and I said “yeah”… and it’s like 
“wow!”…and you could feel the organisation blossom, it was a really cool time, an 
exciting time”. (Council B interview) 
 
The introduction of internal intelligence gathering, links back to some of the roles 
of effective leadership mentioned previously and from the council interviews it 
was seen that new leadership within the Council (either the CEO or Leader of the 
Council) was instrumental in bringing about this change, which was both cultural 




Councils B and C both introduced customer satisfaction surveys during the 
turnaround phase.  For Council B, this was not something that had been 
undertaken prior to the first CPA inspection.  The comment from the interviewee 
was that “they [the public] got what they were given, and were grateful”.  This 
reinforces the insularity and lack of self-awareness identified in poorly performing 
councils by Document Three.  However, this outlook changed during the 
turnaround phase resulting in what was described as one of the council’s proudest 
moments. 
 
“we got one of the best local satisfaction survey results….That to us mattered…. 
Because at the end of the day, whatever the inspectors think, or we think…it's 
about the public, and they were saying they really liked a lot of what we were 
doing” (Council B interview) 
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This represents not only an improvement in the way that the public viewed their 
relationship with the council, but also the way the council viewed its relationship 
with the public. 
 
For Council C, there was evidence that surveys were used to inform decision-
making. 
 
“yes we do use them to make decisions and realign budgets…..that happens now. 
For example, street cleaning wasn’t amazing and people were complaining about 
it, so in the last three budget processes there has been investment put into that” 
(Council C interview) 
 
External intelligence gathering did not just relate to customer satisfaction 
surveys.  In Council A the now CEO (then a Director) attended a regional IT 
working group soon after the first CPA inspection.  It became clear that the 
previous attendee had not fed back to the council the activity of the group 
meaning that the council was lagging behind in its IT development strategy and 
had also missed out on the opportunity to access external funds to help support 
IT development. 
 
All three councils developed stronger external intelligence gathering processes 
during the turnaround phase, whether this be from service users and citizens, or 
improving links with other public agencies.  In Council A, there was an executive 
director responsible for external affairs, which included information gathering and 




Document Three discussed the use of self and peer assessments prior to the 
initial CPA inspections.  Council A severely misjudged the outcome of their self-
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assessment, scoring themselves too highly and showing a clear lack of self-
awareness. For Council C, there was also a lack of self-awareness at the start of 
CPA.  This was apparent from the interviewee’s own experience of joining the 
council. 
 
“I don’t really seem to think they were bothered…. I think it was lip service 
really…because I remember reading the job description and doing the research 
through all the application pack that you get, and it’s like yeah they’re weak but, 
oh we’re doing this, this and this, and we’re really working towards it….and I 
though that’s great, I’m a bit bored where I am…lets go somewhere different. 
And when I got here it’s like “bloody hell its chaos”, where’s all this spin that I’ve 
been reading about how we’re doing this and we’re doing that….it was just words, 
there was nothing in there” (Council C interview) 
 
In Council B, a peer assessment was undertaken, following concerns from some 
of the more junior members and officers that the council would not fair well.  This 
external assessment was more realistic and was used as a lever to replace the 
incumbent CEO.  To an extent, the prompting of the peer assessment shows a 
degree of self-awareness from those within the council of the real state of play, 
even if, as was said in the interview, this view was not shared by the top 
leadership of the council. 
 
These examples from the interviews illustrate how far away from self-awareness 
the councils were at the start of the turnaround phase. Becoming self-aware was 
something that happened to different councils at different times, which 
subsequently had an impact on the speed of turnaround. 
 
Council B and Council C, to some extent entered into forms of benchmarking, 
although both understood that it was not formal benchmarking in its truest sense, 
but rather a discussion and comparison of how other organisations did things, for 
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example in developing management structures and scrutiny functions.  
Nevertheless, this change in outlook reflects a greater sense of self-awareness 
and willingness to change within the councils. 
 
By the end of CPA each council regarded itself as both self-aware and able to self-
correct.  There was a much greater ability to look for and accept good practice 
both within and outside the organisation, and to use this to develop the internal 
structures and processes of the council.  One of the terms used in two of the 
councils was improved confidence and this related to both confidence in accepting 
that change was needed, but also confidence in having the subsequent ability to 
carry out the change.  This aspect was also referred to in terms of the managers 
within the councils relishing the challenge that such opportunities brought, rather 
than shying away from them. 
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In all three councils there was an initial focus on improving performance 
management processes at the start of the turnaround phase. This was linked to 
restructuring of the management teams and the devolution of accountability and 
responsibility to senior staff that was then expected to percolate down the 
organisation, although more was said in the interviews regarding the 
management level.  Managers were given specific responsibilities linked to 
delivery based performance targets, which were reported on periodically to the 
members.  This reporting varied between monthly and quarterly across the 
councils.  Managers were also given freedom to manage and “take risks” 
autonomously, without having to get approval from the CEO or members.  In one 
case, the CEO would only be involved with decision making if he “needed to 
know”, in other words if there was a problem or a likely problem.  In another 
case, managers were given high-level performance targets, with the “how to do 
it” up to the individual managers concerned.  This was described as “the 
uncorking of potential” with managers able to “breathe again”. This change in 
culture at the top of the organisation replaced the previous CEO’s micro 
management with trust, and after a period of assimilation was motivational and 
service performance improved “almost over night”.  
 
The introduction of performance management frameworks was attributed to the 
incoming CEOs in each case (the interim CEO in the case of Council A) and seems 
to have been a key aspect of the CEOs taking control of the management teams 
as a way of focussing on performance improvement. In all three councils there 
was regard to managers being given devolved autonomy, although there was 
evidence from one council that the CEO kept a close eye on what was going on at 
least in the early stages of turnaround, until performance had started to improve. 
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Wider staff appraisals were implemented in all three councils, but only discussed 
at length in one of the interviews.  In thiscase the appraisals took time to bed 
down and were at first inconsistently applied by managers. They did become 




This is most relevant for Councils A and B in terms of their acceptance, after 
initial shock and denial, of the unfavourable CPA assessment. An increasing ability 
and willingness to work with external parties such as peers, the IDeA, the Audit 
Commission and the GLOs all give weight to there being a greater acceptance of 
external challenge and a move away from being insular in approach. This 
extended later in the turnaround phase to voluntary arrangements for peer 
review and benchmarking type activities. 
 
The introduction of customer/user surveys in the councils, which were used to 
help shape both operational and strategic decision making, also highlights a 
significant change in approach and was regarded as symptomatic of the more 
informed and evidence based approaches to decision making as the councils 
became more self-aware. 
 
As an internal development of this theme, Council C had gone so far as to 
introduce an internal peer review of budgets, which included both members and 
officers.  Plans were in place at the time of the interview that this would be done 
in future using critical friends from a neighbouring council on a reciprocated basis 
to mutual benefit. 
 
  188 
Monitoring and Taking Action 
 
From the interviews, it became apparent that newly appointed CEOs, were 
instrumental in implementing performance management regimes as one of the 
first things they did.  The focus of the regimes was on ascribing accountability, 
setting targets and monitoring performance in order to bring about change and 
service improvements.  Significantly, managers started to be held to account for 
poor performance and structures and boards were put in place to facilitate 
reporting and challenge mechanisms. This enabled poor performing areas to be 
explained and appropriate corrective action taken, in some case resulting in 
reprioritisation of resources either to or form the poorly performing areas. For one 
CEO it was “not about whether I like you, it’s about your performance”. 
 
For Council B, this “improved performance overnight….next thing we were most 
improved council! (referring to Local Government Chronicle award)”.   
 
The introduction of performance management systems were not necessarily 
viewed negatively by managers.  They were referred to in two of the interviews 
as empowering managers, who were able to take ownership of decisions and take 
direction to improve and reshape services.  This suggests an appropriate degree 
of delegation and autonomy for decision-making, supported by improved 
monitoring information. 
 
It was notable from the council interviews that the introduction of performance 
management frameworks across the organisation was significant to the 
interviewees. These performance management frameworks were brought in by 
the new CEO appointments right at the start of the turnaround phase and were 
used to develop a performance culture within the organisations, holding 
individuals accountable for performance.  Importantly, the CEOs showed 
commitment (Fryer et al, 2009; Radnor and McGuire, 2005) to the introduction of 
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performance management, which in one case was described as empowering 
senior management to take ownership of their performance. 
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Elements of this have already been discussed under the community leadership 
sub-theme of Understanding Roles, and will not be repeated here. Additionally 
however, for Council B in particular the LAA “became important” and helped to 
focus on the development of local priorities and targets, rather than just on those 
imposed nationally.  Similarly, it got “ahead of the game” on Corporate Area 
Assessment (CAA), the replacement to CPA and was able to do this because of 
the earlier work it had done in developing partner relationships. 
 
These other external initiatives that were implemented during the CPA era, 
appear to have helped focus attention and provide a framework for the 
development of processes to enable greater joint working to occur. 
 
Delivery and Capacity 
 
From the interviews, there was evidence of increased partnering capacity, 
especially with regard to shared services and pooled budgets.  For two of the 
councils, such approaches would have been unheard of prior to CPA representing 
a significant change in outlook and approach.  Two of the councils have also 
moved to shared appointments for some key posts such as sharing CEOs with 
other councils and sharing Director posts with other councils and NHS 
organisations. 
 
Monitoring, Governance and Leadership 
 
Very little was said on this in the interviews.  The only reference made was 
regarding the improved scrutiny arrangements in Council B, which included a 
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specific scrutiny panel focussed on external partnership arrangements.  While not 
mentioned by the other councils interviewed, these scrutiny arrangements were 
developed as a result of peer assessment, so it can be concluded that similar 
arrangements existed elsewhere. 
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3.9 COMMUNICATION 
 
Improvements in Communication 
 
Improvements in external and internal communication have been referred to 
throughout the case study analysis, and so will not be discussed in detail here.  In 
summary, there was a change in focus by both the political and professional 
leadership to both aspects of communication and there was evidence in all three 
councils of a greater level of engagement with staff, communities and partners in 
terms of publicising the change in approach that the council was adopting.  
Internally, communication media included bulletins, briefings, workshops and 
team meetings.  Externally, focus groups and panels were used to promote 
inward and outward communication and there was also the publicising the council 
achievements. In one case “banners were put up all round the city”, to promote 
this. In Council A an initiative was undertaken targeting school children giving 
them the opportunity to both meet and question senior councillors, but also to 
play at being councillors for a week. This was seen as a long-term initiative to 
raise awareness among young people of the role the council played within the 
community. 
 
The Role of the CEO 
 
From the council interviews, greater emphasis was placed on the role of the CEO 
in communicating internally within the organisation. For example, CEO bulletins 
or newsletters were introduced and the CEO attended team meetings, road shows 
and staff workshops to update staff.  This identifies the potential need for the 
CEO to be visible and ‘busy’ within the organisation during the turnaround phase.  
Reasons for this could be to demonstrate the importance of the message being 
given, a sense that ‘we are all in this together’ and to display commitment to the 
staff and to the changes taking place from the highest echelons of the 
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organisation. For Council B, a significant message seemed to be “the Chief going 
out and saying thank you to people, talking to the troops”. There was also the 
importance attached to there being a consistency of message from the CEO (and 
members) that they were determined for improvement to occur and would get 
behind the staff to make it happen.  This was referred to as “bog standard stuff” 
that hadn’t been done before and was regarded as a culture change that took 
time to work through. 
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From the council interviews, Council A in particular, attributed much to the 
investment in IT within the council.  One of the reasons the council was regarded 
as poor was that it had accumulated significant financial balances over the years, 
which had not been used in service delivery.  The CEO used a large proportion of 
these balances to invest in the IT infrastructure of the council and the e-
government agenda in particular which he believed “drove the transformation 
process” within the council. This was most obviously manifested in the 
introduction of a customer contact centre that acted as a one-stop-shop for 
incoming enquires. This was an example of linking the council’s IT strategy with 
its vision and corporate strategy, which were largely based around improvements 
in customer care. The customer contact centre was regarded as so important that 
it was classed as a front line service within the council, even though it had 




The council interviews all also showed the implementation of staff appraisal 
systems and gaining the IIP award to have been significant events within the 
turnaround period. Little was said about these within the interviews other than 
that they had been introduced during the turnaround phase.  The IIP award in 
particular seems to have been treated as a badge of honour within two of the 
councils providing a sense of achievement or quick win.  Council C highlighted 
problems with the introduction of the appraisal system initially due to what were 
termed “blockages” within the senior management team.  Therefore despite the 
strong presence of appraisal systems within the corporate assessments, this does 
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The council interviews also showed the introduction of MTFP and MTFS as a 
means of prioritising the resources of the council in line with the strategic aims 
and objectives, something that was also reinforced in the GLO interviews.  Other 
evidence from the interviews relates to the creation of specific reserves either to 
fund core priorities and facilitate the re-prioritisation of resources across the 
organisation, or to pump prime invest to save schemes, which in turn would 
generate savings in later years that could be redistributed.  In some ways this is 
similar to retrenchment activity suggested by the literature.  In one council this 
was funded through an increase in council tax, with cross party support, where 
the council had always set relatively low council taxes.  In another council, 
significant accumulated balances that had been built up prior to CPA were used.  
Both these examples show the reversal of previously poor financial management.  
On the one hand setting council tax at a level too low to deliver the quality of 
services required, and on the other not spending the council tax in the year it was 
collected.  It also represents the disconnection between the financial planning of 
the organisation and the strategic planning and control systems within the 
organisations concerned.  In Council C, the main change in financial management 
was a greater respect given to the financial professionals within the organisation.  
This also extended to other professional groups such as legal and human 
resources.  Prior to the turnaround, such professionals had been marginalized 
from the management team and were not involved in advising on decision 
making within the council.  The new CEOs that came to the council during the 
turnaround phase “unblocked” the Director of Finance allowing him to get on with 
his job and overhaul the financial management processes. This in turn facilitated 
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a greater control over financial resources, focusing decisions on a VFM basis and 
allowing resources to be redistributed around the council in line with priorities. 
 
Project Management, Risk Management and Procurement 
 
 
These aspects were not forthcoming in the interviews. 
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3.11 TURNAROUND PROCESSES 
 
Operational or Strategic Turnaround? 
 
All three council interviewees stated that operational issues had been 
concentrated on first, followed by the development of more strategic processes. 
The operational changes were targeted at service improvement and linked to the 
introduction of performance management regimes discussed earlier. Changes in 
management structure and the greater use of devolved accountability 
frameworks were also used to promote a focus on getting things done.  However, 
the interviews proved useful in identifying that it was not just a straightforward 
case of doing operational before strategic change.  The changes in key personnel 
and management structures also refocused the organisational culture and ran 
concurrently in some cases with the operational changes taking place, but took 
longer to bed down.  They were also the precursor to the introduction of strategic 
processes such as visioning, strategic planning and prioritisation, described as 
iterative and evolutionary and which were learnt during the turnaround phase. As 
such, it was apparent that there was a twin track approach (Paton and Mordaunt 
2004) adopted in the three councils interviewed and the focus on operational 
issues was in part due to necessity, where service areas had scored badly in the 
CPA assessment, and in part they were used as quick wins.   
 
This focus on quick wins, while not necessarily giving an improved corporate 
assessment score, did benefit the councils internally by giving the leadership 
something to show staff that change was occurring to maintain momentum. 
Examples from the interviews included “most improved council” awards, gaining 
IIP status, the municipal journal e-government award and receiving a member 
development charter.  Councils publicised these successes internally and 
externally.  References were made in the interviews to displaying certificates and 
plaques in reception and “putting up banners around the city”.  These examples 
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were also described as being a “badge of honour” and fostering “corporate pride”.  
Two of the councils interviewed also rewarded staff for achievement with both 
giving staff extra days leave in recognition. In one council there was also an 
evening party given for the staff to celebrate the success of improved CPA 
performance, which was mainly funded from external sponsorship. 
 
Whether this twin track approach was a conscious decision by council leadership 
was less evident. Council B indicated that there had been an initial focus on 
performance “at the expense of doing the strategic stuff”, suggesting that though 
changes were being made to strategic processes throughout the turnaround 
phase, realisation of their importance only came later. A similar sense is present 
in the other two councils interviewed and the pressure exerted through the CPA 
inspections and corporate assessments, and by the intervention teams and GLOs, 
seems to have ensured both elements were covered eventually.   
 
It can be concluded therefore, that for these poorly performing councils, 
improvement was tackled on two fronts simultaneously with operational 
improvements running in parallel with a more gradual improvement in strategic 
processes.   
 
Planned or Emergent Turnaround? 
 
Councils A and C in particular displayed strong evidence of undertaking the 
turnaround using planned strategic frameworks which included determining a 
vision, producing long term strategic planning documents and linking these to 
financial and other plans.  However, echoing findings of other studies within the 
public sector (Alford, 2001; Flynn and Talbot, 1996; Worrell et al, 1998), Council 
B was different in the early part of the turnaround phase and can be viewed 
descriptively rather than prescriptively.  It was able to bring about short-term 
performance based success as well as introduce some of the building blocks for 
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long term recovery in a more emergent way (Mintzberg and Walters, 1985; 
Mintzberg, 1985 and 1987), without having formal strategic processes in place. 
Despite arguing vociferously with the Audit Commission at the time that such 
processes were not needed, with hindsight, the interviewee recognised that 
during the early stages there was no clear control of the improvement process.  
One service area would be sorted out and then they would move onto the next, 
only to find that the other service had slipped back in its performance.  However, 
once such strategic processes were implemented, it was easier to maintain the 
sustainability of the turnaround. 
 
It is concluded therefore that while a planned strategic approach was not a pre-
requisite for operational improvements to occur, it was necessary for sustained 
improvement to occur.  The refinement of these processes over time has enabled 
councils to be better prepared and more confident in taking the decisions required 
to maintain improved performance. 
 
CPA as a Trigger for Change 
 
In one of the councils interviewed, the poor CPA score is referred to as a 
galvanising event (Moss Kanter, 1983). In another an example is given of the 
new CEO giving a speech after the initial poor CPA announcement to around 150 
managers from across the organisation saying,  
 
“They think your crap.  Do you think your crap?” (Council B interview)   
 
This was described as a “pivotal moment” in the change in attitude that helped to 
turn the organisation around.  
 
Similarly, for Council A, the poor CPA score become something to fight against. 
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“the initial trigger was the CPA score. After that it was about self-awareness 
about where we wanted to be.  Once we’d started on this journey of 
improvement, it became infectious.  It became infectious across members; it 
became infectious across staff and senior managers.  We didn’t want to be a 
weak authority we wanted to be an excellent team and so there was a lot of 
internal drive at that time.  But the first trigger was CPA.  I don’t think we would 
have changed if CPA hadn’t come along.” (Council A interview) 
 
For Council B, it acted as a lever for change 
 
“[after the first CPA result] we were all pretty shocked and upset.  But it acted as 
a real catalyst for us.  In fact, from [the new CEOs] perspective it was probably 
the best thing that could have happened, because it rallied the troops in a way 
that I think nothing else could have done, if I’m honest.” (Council B interview) 
 
Despite the delay in turnaround experienced by Council C, there was still a sense 
that it would not have happened without the CPA process. 
 
“the changes came from external intervention, or inspection……in our situation it 
was clearly an external trigger that started the process” (Council C interview) 
 
There have been criticisms levelled at CPA as a tool for measuring local authority 
performance (Broadbent, 2003; Wilson, 2004; McLean et al, 2007, Boland and 
Coleman, 2008) however, despite this there was a high level of support for the 
approach coming from the councils interviewed.  Even though all displayed a 
sense of denial at the start of the process and thought the inspection had got it 
wrong, by the end of the turnaround they thought CPA was valuable.  An example 
of this is given in this extract from Council B. 
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“I liked CPA, if I’m honest. I think it did a lot of good stuff.  It was a little bit 
formulaic, but actually I think that was OK.  Particularly on use of resources for 
instance.  I used to say [to the Audit Commission], “if you think we’re doing 
something wrong, tell me and I’ll do it”.  Let’s be honest.  Let’s have that honest 
conversation.  It certainly sharpened us up substantially, because it gave us a 
template for the best……you know, “If you want to be good – do that”.  And most 
of it I agreed with.”  (Council B interview) 
 
This links back to previous comments made by the GLOs that before poorly 
performing councils could be engaged with, they needed to know what a good 
council looked like. 
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3.12 ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY EMERGING FROM THE 
CASE STUDIES 
 
Without doubt, political and professional leadership within the case study councils 
improved significantly during the turnaround phase and is attributed as the main 
reason why change and improvement occurred within the councils and why it was 
sustainable. This section focuses on the more detailed aspects of changes in 
leadership that occurred within the case study councils during the turnaround 
phase. It links together some of the elements that have already been discussed in 
the previous sections, but also identifies specific events and actions that were 
relevant to the improvements that took place.   
 
The language used within the interviews suggested that the CEOs were able to 
straddle the discourses relating to public management.  On the one hand, for 
example, approaches included downsizing and a focus on efficiency with the 
language used referring to customers and not citizens, favouring a NPM 
discourse.  On the other, phrases such as adding value and making a difference 
were used, which fit better with Public Value. The language in use within 
government at this time no doubt influenced this. Nevertheless, it is evident from 
the analysis that the leadership, and CEOs in particular, were working within a 
continuing managerialist discourse in terms of the approaches they adopted, 
focusing as will be seen on delegation and accountability, performance 
management, strategic planning and culture change.  This managerialist focus 
may have been due to the need to comply with the CPA corporate assessment 
lines of enquiry, or may have been due to their background and training, coming 
as they did in the main from good or excellent authorities elsewhere, and as such 
already presumably well schooled in the tenets of public management. It was 
probably due to a combination of the two. 
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Replacement of the Leadership 
 
In the first instance it is important to note that all three councils experienced a 
replacement in both political and professional leadership immediately prior to the 
turnaround phase commencing. The reasons for, and timing of these changes, 
were different in all three councils studied.  Also, in two of the councils, the 
changes were neither directly prompted by the intervention process nor the 
involvement of GLOs.  This demonstrates that there is not necessarily a singular 
approach to the removal and replacement of the leadership of the organisation. 
While the literature suggests that it is not necessarily a requirement for this to 
occur in turnaround situations (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004), the physical 
replacement of both political and professional leadership is considered to have 
been a fundamental precursor to the improvement process in the three councils 
studied. 
 
The evidence for this comes from the very different timing of when the 
turnaround phase commenced.  For Council B this started a year prior to the first 
CPA inspection, following the simultaneous change in the Leader of the Council 
(due to a four year rotation rule) and the removal of the CEO following the IDeA 
peer review of the council. The new CEO remained in post throughout the CPA 
era. For Council A, the change in Leader coincided with the first CPA inspection 
but was due to an external investigation of the Leader, rather than the CPA 
inspection itself.  Following a weak CPA assessment, the members instigated a 
review into the operation of the council, which ultimately contributed to the 
removal of the incumbent CEO, who was replaced by an interim CEO through the 
intervention process. Further CEO changes occurred before a permanent CEO was 
appointed from within the organisation.   Both Council A and B started the 
turnaround phase early in the CPA era and were quick to improve. These swift 
changes in leadership were seen as being instrumental to this.  For Council C the 
turnaround phase started later in 2004/2005.  Following the initial weak 
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assessment in 2002, both the Leader of the Council and the CEO remained in 
place until local elections in 2004 resulted in a change of political control of the 
council.  The new cabinet removed and replaced the CEO, first with an internal 
acting up appointment and subsequently with a permanent external appointment 
in 2005.  This was a voluntary process and not part of the intervention process.   
 
The contrasting timing of the commencement of CPA improvement across the 
three councils ties in with the timing of changes in both political and professional 
leadership.  It is Council C’s experience that reinforces this in that while the 
incumbent leadership remained in place for two years after the first CPA 
inspection, no improvement in overall CPA score was achieved, despite there 
being minor improvement in some of the service based scores. Improvements to 
the CPA ranking only occurred following the change in Leader and CEO.  From this 
discussion it is concluded that for these three councils the simultaneous 
replacement of both the Leader of the Council and the CEO (whether interim or 
permanent) were instrumental in initiating the turnaround phase and subsequent 
recovery.  
 
The case study councils offered comparisons between internal and external CEO 
appointments as well as between the continuity of a single CEO versus the 
recruitment of a number of CEOs.  There is no compelling evidence to suggest 
either way whether these factors affected the timing and speed of turnaround. 
 
Changes in Political Leadership Approach– The Leader of the Council 
 
It was not just the physical replacement of the Leader of the Council in all three 
councils that was significant.  There was also a change in approach to the way 
political leadership was undertaken within the councils.  In all three councils the 
Leaders of the Council were described as being disengaged from the strategic 
management process at the start of the CPA period.  It was this unwillingness to 
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take responsibility for the strategic direction of the council that this was described 
as being a major contributory factor to the poor performance of the councils 
concerned.  This lack of engagement included deferring to officers for decision 
making, not asking for or receiving performance reports and a general lack of 
awareness, or acceptance, of the local and national needs that were placed on the 
councils.  There was also a lack of willingness to engage with strategic partners in 
terms of policy setting and service delivery, which in two councils was described 
as being an anathema to the Leadership.  Relationships between the Leader of 
the Council and the CEO were also dysfunctional in each of the councils studied, 
whether this was being at loggerheads in Council A, too cosy in Council B or 
maverick in Council C.   
 
While the council interviews tended to focus on the role of the CEO during the 
turnaround, there was recognition from the interviewees that the change in 
approach by the political leadership both contributed to council’s improved 
performance and also supported and enabled the CEO to undertake the wider 
changes that occurred. The changes in approach to political leadership were 
similar in all three councils. In the main this saw the leaders of the council taking 
responsibility for the strategic direction of the council, appointing suitable CEOs 
and maintaining an appropriate relationship with them. It also included actively 
seeking and engaging with a variety of information including needs assessments 
(local and national), strategic plans, financial information and performance 
information.  There was also a greater willingness to engage with external 
stakeholders and develop the community leadership role of the council. These 
improvements were in part associated with the introduction of member training 
programmes and peer mentoring in two of the councils.  The willingness to 
engage with such training programmes is in itself a significant change in 
approach. All these elements demonstrate an improvement in the cognition, 
capacity and capability of the Leader, and run parallel to similar improvements 
within the elected members generally. This re-engagement by the political 
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leadership is regarded as the realisation that the causes of poor performance 
were internally driven and that it was the members’ responsibility to sort this out 
through taking the lead and making decisions, even if these were subsequently 
enacted by the CEO. 
 
Changes in Professional Leadership Approach – The CEO 
 
Similarly, it was the change in approach that the new CEOs brought to the 
councils that is regarded as being significant to the turnaround and the 
sustainability of improved performance.  All three of the council interviews were 
unanimous regarding the significant and pivotal role that the CEOs played in 
bringing about the respective turnarounds. It is clear from the changes brought in 
that the CEOs were clearly working within a managerialist context, with many of 
the initiatives identified having roots within the NPM agenda. 
 
The leadership styles of the CEOs at the start of CPA were also described as being 
dysfunctional. This, as discussed above, in part related to the relationship with 
the Leader of the Council, but was also more widespread in terms of the way the 
councils were structured, managed and evaluated, which had a negative impact 
on the culture of the council. Common aspects of the interviews refer to CEOs 
who were controlling (even bullying) micromanagers who fostered a fear of 
failure. They employed large management teams (in one case up to 40 managers 
were included on the management team), and this enabled silo based cultures to 
emerge and decisions to be made based on short-termism and personal 
preferences rather than strategic and informed decision-making (in one case this 
was described as prejudice).  CEOs tended to be fire fighters sorting out problems 
as and when they occurred, rather than being proactive and strategic in their 
approach. In two cases there was evidence that management team infighting was 
the norm, even to the extent that second tier managers could leap-frog the 
Director level to get decisions made, if they had the ear of the CEO.   
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The changes in leadership brought by the new CEOs can be discussed in two 
ways, firstly with regard to processes introduced and secondly their leadership 
approach. 
 
The CEOs across all three councils were credited with introducing a range of 
processes that contributed to improvement.  These to a large extent overlap with 
the themes identified in the previous section of the thesis, and the conclusion 
here is that the CEOs were the important driving force in ensuring the structure, 
governance and planning and performance systems were appropriately 
introduced and embedded.  Such processes included strategic planning, 
prioritisation, performance appraisal and restructuring of the organisation, as well 
as the downsizing and restructuring of the strategic management team (SMT) and 
improvements in support services, such as finance and human resources.   
 
This downsizing and refocusing of the SMT was common to all three councils, with 
executive teams based around responsibility for service areas and service 
outcomes, rather than traditional departments.  There was also a focus on 
performance improvement, especially in service areas and in particular against 
the national key performance indicators. This was complemented by the 
introduction of corporate performance management systems in all three councils 
at an early stage in the CEO’s tenure.  In one sense, this was about focussing on 
the services and processes identified in the CPA assessment that needed 
improving. 
 
This initial focus on service improvement against KPIs, and the positive impact it 
had on the overall CPA ranking could be regarded as simply “box ticking” to make 
the organisation look good, rather than actual permanent and embedded change 
within the organisation.  This however was vehemently denied by all three 
interviewees.  While they recognised this as a possible interpretation, they 
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stressed that the service based improvements were necessary for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, some services were poor and needed to be improved. Secondly, 
in some cases the information to justify good performance was simply not 
available within the organisation at the start of CPA, itself a failing.  Improving 
the availability and quality of the information through having better management 
systems in place, could improve the overall performance.  All three councils 
referred to this as having the evidence available.  Finally, targeting services that 
could be improved quickly sent the right message across the organisation that the 
council could improve, especially if there was a knock on effect on the overall CPA 
score.  This strategy of identifying and using quick wins is something referred to 
below when considering some of the approaches the CEOs used and also relates 
back to one of the comments made by the GLOs. Council B summed this 
approach up as “box ticking for a reason”. 
 
In terms of CEO approach, the interviews highlighted the freeing up of the senior 
management team, and from here the rest of the organisational hierarchy, as a 
significant factor in the change of culture that led to the turnaround of the 
organisations.  This was done through simultaneously creating the devolved 
management and accountability structures referred to earlier, while at the same 
time placing trust in the individuals concerned to deliver.  This was described as 
moving from a culture based on micro-management to one where there was the 
freedom to take decisions and take measured risks, something which the 
interviewees described as empowering. In terms of galvanising the organisation, 
CEOs used the poor CPA score to fire the managers up and encouraged visits to 
other organisations to identify best practice.   CEOs also increased their visibility 
to managers and staff and were identified as giving a consistent message about 
the need for improvement, and that they would be there to help the staff achieve 
it.  In one case this visibility included a back to the floor approach with the CEO 
undertaking such tasks as grave digging and street cleaning. There was also 
evidence of the staff periodically being invited in to talk to the CEO in groups to 
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discuss their needs and improvements that could be made.  This is linked to 
improved communication, which was also undertaken through periodic CEO 
briefing sessions. As referred to above, quick wins in service improvements and 
external awards seem to have been used to promote and embed the changes 
being made. In two councils staff were rewarded with either an additional day off 
or an evenings entertainment to celebrate the improved CPA ranking. 
 
While the main improvements in performance generally occurred under the 
tenure of an externally appointed CEO in all three councils, there is some 
evidence to suggest that this is not necessarily a requirement.  This evidence 
comes from the experience of Council A and Council C in particular. For both 
Councils, there was a limited period of time where an internal appointment acted 
up into the CEO role, prior to a permanent external appointment being made.  For 
Council C, this followed the change in political administration and for Council A it 
was during a gap between two externally appointed CEOs. Both acting up CEOs 
made some structural and governance changes that no doubt contributed to the 
commencement of the turnaround phase.  In Council A, the acting up CEO 
referred to above later became CEO towards the end of the CPA process, and was 
in post when the excellent rating was awarded.  While not conclusive, this does 
suggest that turnaround is more likely dependent on the CEO displaying the right 
leadership approach in the given situation, rather than there being a requirement 
to appoint an external CEO. 
 
Aspects Relating to Sustainability 
 
Aspects of sustainability have discussed throughout the themes and in respect of 
the changes to leadership and leadership approach that occurred throughout the 
turnaround phase and as such only need to be summarised here.  The role for 
ensuring sustainability of improvement was maintained is attributable to the 
leadership of the council, both the Leader and the CEO, but also through the new 
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internal structures, the senior management team.  While primarily driven by the 
CEO, it was the change in management culture that seemed to reinforce the 
changes made.  Achieving sustained improvement requires focussing on the 
underpinning strategic processes as part of a twin track approach.  Ideally these 
should be done at an early stage, evidenced by the experience of Council A which 
having done this, became the first council to go from weak to excellent under 
CPA.  Councils B and C only did this later on and as such their ultimate 
improvement was delayed.  The main reason why early adoption of these 
processes seems important is that it takes time to learn how to use and refine 
them within the context of the council. The CEOs had a key role in ensuring the 
changes adopted during the turnaround phase were reinforced within the 
councils.  Much of this was to do with visibility and consistency of message to 
members of staff, which again represented the reinforcement aspect evident 
within the turnaround process. After turnaround has been achieved, it is 
necessary to continually reinforce the organisational learning developed during 
the turnaround phase, especially with regard to self-awareness and self-
regulation.  The case study councils were still in the process of developing and 
refining corporate systems such as strategic planning and performance 
management at the time of the interviews. This does not mean that such systems 
were inadequate, but rather by continually reviewing them, kept them in focus 
and as such contributed to reinforcement.  This was similar for the gathering 
intelligence and working with others aspects.  There is a risk that focussing in 
systems in this way means that overtime the become ends in themselves, rather 
than means to an end.  Whether this happens remains to be seen and certainly 
there was not evidence of this at the time of the interviews. 
 
 





This thesis has studied the changes to strategic practices that occurred within a 
group of English STCCs and district councils that had experienced turnaround 
under the CPA regime between 2002 and 2008. Debates continue as to the value 
of the CPA regime itself and whether it was an appropriate mechanism with which 
to hold local authorities to account.  While these are recognised, it was not the 
purpose of this thesis to explore these arguments in detail. Rather, this thesis 
was concerned with the internal changes that took place within local authorities to 
bring about and sustain improvement. 
 
The objectives of the thesis were threefold: 
 
1. What approaches to strategic turnaround were adopted by English local 
authorities?  
 
2. How did leadership impact upon the turnaround of the organisation?  
 
3. To what extent could the approaches to turnaround transfer into 
sustainable local authority improvement? 
 
Each of these objectives has been addressed within the thesis and each appears 
to be interrelated. 
 
The findings of this thesis are generally supportive of the findings of other studies 
into the turnaround of local authorities (Jas and Skelcher 2005, Turner et al, 
2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Beeri, 2009; Wilson and Moore 2007; 
Douglas et al, 2012). All these studies, including this one, have used a similar 
approach, in that they have used the CPA era as a way of identifying local 
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authorities that had significantly improved their performance during this 
timeframe. However, despite these similarities, this study differs from other 
studies in a number of ways.   
 
The ability to take a longitudinal perspective, meant that sustainability aspects 
could be considered in more detail, although due to the timing of the CPA 
inspections, sustained turnarounds could only be identified for STCCs. The study 
has used the triangulation of corporate assessment documents with key 
informant interviews of both senior council officers and government lead officials, 
to build up a combined picture of what was happening within turnaround councils 
immediately prior to, during and importantly at the end of the CPA era. The 
findings of this study are therefore able to add ex-post reflections from 
practitioners allowing the themes emerging from previous studies to be 
developed from a different perspective.  Taken together, the findings of the three 
primary research based documents (Document Three, Four and Five) build up to 
show which councils improved during the time period and what were the main 
approaches to strategic turnaround. 
 
Conclusions on the Nature of Strategic Turnaround 
 
While the ideology that shaped local government changed over time, for example 
from NPM to Public Value, a need to focus on the strategic processes at the heart 
of councils remained.  What is surprising is that given the importance placed on 
such systems by NPM, that they were still so poor at the commencement of the 
CPA era in the councils studied.  This indicates that while NPM was successful in 
driving through many of the harder structural changes in terms of privatisation, 
competition and externally driven targets, it apparently failed when it came to the 
softer areas of organisational design and organisational culture.  In the 
introduction it was argued that managerialism, although clearly part of NPM, 
could be seen as separate from it as it focussed on the internal aspects of 
  213 
organisational design.  It would appear that, certainly up to the end of the CPA 
era, such ongoing managerialist concepts were still viewed as important by the 
developers and regulators of CPA and these concepts became embedded and 
accepted as important features of organisational design within the turnaround 
councils. This then was the nature of strategic turnaround within the councils 
studied and shows that despite changes politically and ideologically at the 
national level, within local government poor performance resulted from the weak 
application or absence of the ten themes identified in this study and that 
sustained improvement came from the learning and embedding of them during 
the turnaround phase.  The remainder of this conclusion expands on this by 
addressing the three research objectives posed in the introduction.  
 
 
Conclusions on Approaches to Strategic Turnaround 
 
Ten themes have emerged from the analysis as being important approaches to 
strategic turnaround within the local authorities studied. These themes (identified 
previously in Figure 35) are as follows: 
 
• Understanding Roles 
• New People and Structures 
• Strategic Management Processes and Systems 
• Prioritisation and re-Prioritisation 
• Gathering Intelligence 
• Performance Management 
• Working With Others 
• Communication 
• Support Systems 
• Turnaround Processes 
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Each theme has been discussed separately, but it is important to recognise that 
each theme also overlaps with, and is related to, other themes. One theme 
relates to specific turnaround processes, whereas others are ongoing strategic 
processes that were implemented, improved, learnt and embedded during the 
turnaround phase.  It is argued that the introduction of and learning about how to 
use these ongoing strategic processes was a distinct part of the turnaround 
process and a key aspect of sustainability. 
 
It is concluded that turnaround approaches represented a mix of operational and 
strategic, as well as planned and emergent aspects. As turnaround is a distinct 
phase of a councils strategic lifecycle, responses were probably bound to be more 
planned than emergent, although the somewhat rigid framework of the CPA itself 
and the approach adopted by the Audit Commission early on may well have 
dictated this and impacted on some turnarounds that would otherwise have been 
less prescriptive (Council B for example). 
 
It is also concluded that it was improvements to the corporate processes 
represented by the first nine themes that led to the overall improved performance 
of councils, and not just improvements in individual service scores.  While on one 
level this was self-promoting through the corporate assessment scoring system 
and its impact on overall CPA score, this phenomena also contributed to the more 
joined up nature of councils’ corporate and business processes, assisting with 
keeping all service aspects in balance. 
 
The approaches to strategic turnaround have been summarised within the “7Rs” 
framework (Figure 38) of Realisation, Realignment, Replacement, Retrenchment, 
Repositioning, Reorganisation and Reinforcement.  Realisation and Reinforcement 
are concepts that have arisen directly out of this thesis.  The longitudinal nature 
of the study has also allowed the development of three turnaround phases 
namely; ground zero, the turnaround phase and the sustainability phase. It is 
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possible to identify the “7Rs” with the different phases, with some appearing in 
more than one phase.   
 
Within this, certain aspects seem to have been important.  Learning how to 
prioritise and re-prioritise and developing processes to allow this to happen 
appears to have been significant for both members and officers, as was a 
realignment of their respective roles.  In essence this was part of realignment and 
retrenchment, but was a key skill that needed to be learnt.  Given the current age 
of austerity, it is likely to need to be retained.  Gathering intelligence both 
internally and externally was key to this in terms of learning about the needs of 
the local population and the local area, understanding what other councils were 
doing and engaging with other organisations at a local, regional and national 
level. 
 
Another interesting finding is that strategic processes that were embedded by the 
end of the CPA period were learnt during the turnaround phase, part of the 
reinforcement aspect.  Strategic plans were produced, but it was the learning that 
took place in producing the plans that was more important than the documents 
themselves (Pye and Pettigrew, 2006).   Also, internal plans were linked to 
external plans such as LAAs and SLPs.  This helped councils to understand how to 
work with others for the benefit of the local community, something which appears 
to have been learnt and embedded rather than being a superficial process.  It 
was these aspects that also contributed to the sustainability of improvement.  
 
Conclusions on the Role of Leadership 
 
Within the study, leadership was found to have had a significant impact both on 
the causes of poor performance and also the success of sustained turnaround. 
Leadership here refers to both the political and administrative leadership of 
councils and the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the Leader of the 
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Council and the CEO in particular.  Although having clearly separate formal roles, 
there is an overlap between these two positions when it comes to organisational 
leadership in turnaround situations.  The Leader of the Council and CEO 
relationship was seen to be a significant contributor to poor organisational 
performance if it was dysfunctional. Such dysfunction would lead to internally 
created problems for the organisation in terms of entrenchment, insularity and a 
lack of vision and direction. In essence it was poor leadership that internally 
generated the weaknesses in the 10 themes referred to above. 
 
Leadership was significantly important in bringing about change.  This had two 
aspects.  Firstly, that a replacement in the leader(s) of poorly performing 
organisations was needed before turnaround could start, and secondly that the 
leadership needed to do the right things for turnaround to be achieved and 
sustained.  CEO leadership was particularly important.  While both political and 
executive leadership improved during CPA, it was the executive leadership of the 
CEO that specifically addressed the issues of turnaround within the councils 
concerned. 
 
During turnaround situations, leaders were replaced on both the officer and 
member side. In the case of the councils interviewed both were replaced at or 
around the same time.  This seems to be important as in the one organisation 
where neither initially happened, the turnaround was delayed until a new Leader 
and new CEO joined the organisation at a later point in time.  Leaders also 
appeared to need to have certain attributes. To be transformational rather than 
transactional and to be flexible, contingent and situational.  The case put forward 
by the GLOs would appear to suggest that interim CEOs needed to be put in place 
to get the council on an even keel before a permanent CEO could be appointed.  
However the interviews with the council officers did not back this up and with 
Council B in particular, and to some extent Council C, there is evidence that 
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permanent CEO appointments could be as effective if the right person was 
appointed. 
 
New leaders were seen to have taken control of and downsize the management 
team, making greater use of devolved accountability frameworks.  This was the 
case in all three of the council interviews; the corporate assessment data is more 
vague.  CEOs used their position to ease some managers out but this is not 
always the case.  It seemed more important to have like-minded people on the 
management team focussed on improvement, whether these came form inside or 
outside the council. 
 
While the duality of leadership has been recognised as being important, the day-
to-day leadership of the turnaround appears to have come from the CEO.  The 
Leader of Council took on political leadership, taking guidance on process (not 
policy) from the CEO, mentors and/or the GLO. As mentioned above, the CEO 
was given responsibility for making turnaround happen (see also Douglas et al 
2012). 
 
Changes in the approach to leadership (the verb) as opposed to a change in 
leader (the noun) (Pye 2005), were also important.  An effective leadership 
approach, whether this be from the elected Leader or the CEO, appears to have 
pervaded all aspects of the turnaround process, something borne out in other 
areas of the literature (Joyce, 2004; Boyne, 2004).   In particular, the leadership 
needed to focus on both long-term and short-term aspects simultaneously.  The 
short-term aspects were needed to correct poor operational performance and 
included retrenchment. The longer-term were more strategic in nature and 
included realignment and the introduction of strategic management processes.  
These aspects needed to be started early on to give the opportunity for 
organisational learning in how to maintain such approaches that would sustain 
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the improvement beyond the end of the turnaround phase and also included 
empowering staff and members.  
 
Another aspect associated with CEO leadership is that there appeared to be a 
need to change the internal vision within the organisation before an external 
vision for the organisation could be created.  This refers back to the ethereal 
sense of conviction referred to earlier and is thought at this stage to be 
attributable to both the response to the CPA challenge of being seen as poorly 
performing, but also something that was developed and nurtured by the incoming 
CEOs; “they think your crap, do you think your crap?”  
 
Conclusions on Sustainability 
 
The sustainability of turnaround was evident within the STCCs studied through 
the corporate assessments, and in the two STCCs case study councils. 
Encouragingly therefore, it is possible for poorly performing local authorities to 
improve their performance and sustain this over a period of time.  The 
sustainable aspects of the turnaround approach appeared to lie in the 
reinforcement of the changes that had been learned during the turnaround phase.  
From a managerialist perspective this would focus on the continued development 
and maintenance of prioritisation and re-prioritisation processes linked to 
intelligence gathering and strategic management processes and systems, 
including performance management. It is the role of leadership, and in particular 
the CEO to ensure that this happens. 
 
Developing aspects of the strategic approach during the turnaround phase and 
maintaining them into the future is seen as being critical to sustained turnaround 
and corporate improvement. It is also supportive of more recent findings in the 
literature (Andrews et al, 2009; Beeri, 2009). Despite the need and pressure to 
improve operationally in the early stages of turnaround, especially under the 
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spotlight of public CPA reporting, it is important to start to address the 
improvement of underlying strategic processes early on as well, if these are to 
become embedded within the organisation.  There is a danger that an operational 
focus can undermine sustained improvement (Hofer, 1980), as this can consume 
strategic capacity and take attention and resources away from the underpinning 
changes required to ensure sustained recovery. This was possibly the reason for 
the paucity of strategic processes at the start of CPA, with previous performance 
regimes focussing in a piecemeal way on service based, and as such, operational 
failings.   
 
It was a factor in most of the turnarounds studied that a twin-track approach had 
been adopted, establishing quick-wins on the operational front, but also starting 
to tackle the underlying weaknesses in role understanding, strategic processes, 
prioritisation, intelligence gathering and performance management. The 
development of these iteratively over time allowed councils to both learn how to 
apply them effectively in their own situations, but also to gain a greater 
understanding of the organisations themselves. Much credit for this was given to 
the new CEOs, especially within the three case study councils and the GLO 
interviews.  This was also true of the change in organisational culture, in part due 
to the introduction of devolved accountability frameworks, which became less 
insular and more confident as the turnaround progressed and the latent talent 
within the councils was allowed to grow.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that the 
CPA methodology, especially after the introduction of the “Harder Test”, also had 
a part to play in this, as it maintained the focus on corporate processes, rather 
than just service delivery.  
 
4.2 SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Opportunities to undertake further research have been identified within the 
thesis.  Firstly, it would be useful to revisit the organisations that formed the 
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basis of this study to see if performance improvement has been sustained over a 
longer time period, especially during the age of austerity.  Secondly, the current 
lack of a compulsory holistic performance management framework for local 
government leaves the potential for organisational performance to slip back. A 
comparison of performance between the two periods could be undertaken to 
establish whether or not such holistic approaches are indeed useful. The 
challenge here would be to design appropriate performance measures that could 
be used to compare the two periods.  Finally, there appeared to be a sense of 
conviction present within the local authorities used as the basis for the interviews.  
It would be useful to research what generative mechanisms prompted this, how it 
was apparently maintained and whether it was experienced in other turnaround 
organisations. This could be applied across a wider range of organisations both 
within the public, private and the voluntary and community sectors. 
 
As a postscript, a number of research papers are currently being produced as an 
outcome of both this thesis and the wider research study that accompanied it.  
One of these papers has already been published and a second has been accepted 
pending publication.  A third paper has been presented at conferences as a 
discussion paper.  One interesting aspect that has come forward from this 
process is whether local authorities were susceptible to institutional isomorphism 
(Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004) during the CPA era.  This could also be applied 
to turnaround local authorities. 
 
The CPA, as with other performance measurement regimes, represented a 
constructed view of relative organisational performance (Osborne et al, 1995). As 
such the ways in which councils responded to CPA can be seen from a neo-
institutional isomorphic perspective.  Such theoretical interpretations have been 
used in the past to explore the development of new public management (NPM) 
(McSweeney and Duncan, 1998; O’Shea, 2007), local government modernization 
(Wayenberg, 2006) and political decision-making (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; 
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Goldman, 2005).  In particular, neo-institutional isomorphism, whether coercive 
or not, could be used to develop the research further. Change often results in the 
development of a high degree of homogony across organisations over time and 
can arise due to three potentially interrelated mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b), now widely adopted by 
social scientists (Currie, 2008).  Coercive isomorphism implies the presence of 
some external force or organisation (a higher level of government for example or 
the imposition of CPA) and may be both formal and informal.  Mimetic 
isomorphism uses the modelling (or benchmarking) of other organisations within 
the field in order to imitate innovation, whereas normative isomorphism results 
from the gradual professionalisation of an organisation or service over time.   
 
Local authority change and improvement during the CPA era could therefore be 
potentially linked to one or all of these isomorphic mechanisms, especially if 
changes appear to occur generically, as seems to be apparent from the analysis.  
Furthermore, isomorphism could be the result of individuals or organisations 
responding rationally, to uncertainty; to sanctions or constraints; or to 
institutional rewards both financial or regulatory leading to intra-organisational 
homogony (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b, Currie, 2008). This could also reflect the 
impact on the respective isomorphic mechanism, or combination of mechanisms, 
followed by a given organisation.  Given that the CPA regime generated both 
incentives for improving performance and sanctions for poor performance, such 
an approach may provide a useful critical perspective for further research into 
organisational responses to CPA and to successor performance regimes. 
 
4.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH TO PRACTICE 
 
One finding of the thesis was that the CPA acted as a trigger for change and 
improvement in poorly performing councils – it prompted realisation, which 
helped councils to overcome denial and insularity. The usefulness of this to 
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practice is twofold; firstly it demonstrates to local authorities the importance of 
recognising external threats where they exist and secondly that understanding 
and engaging with these threats can bring about organisational improvement. It 
will be interesting to see how corporate performance in particular is affected by 
the recent removal of the CPA/CAA framework by the Coalition government.  It is 
to be replaced by a new regime based upon self-assessment, peer review and 
voluntary intervention co-ordinated by the LGA.   
 
The various improvements to corporate processes identified in this study could be 
undermined by a variety of factors within the local government environment.  
Some evidence for declining performance has been found already through a study 
of service specific areas (Murphy et al, forthcoming).  While evidence at this stage 
is tentative, it does indicate this aspect warrants further examination over a 
longer time period. Changes to political control could weaken the political 
leadership of councils, with new political leaders lacking the strategic cognition, 
capability and capacity identified as a requirement for successful leadership by 
this and other studies.  The potential for this was evident in a number of the 
corporate assessment reports for councils where there had been a change in 
political control. There could also be a weakening of the positive aspects of the 
CEO and Leader of the Council relationship, potentially throwing councils back 
into dysfunctional leadership relationships.  These could happen within any 
council, even those that have traditionally been excellent.  Similarly, the age of 
austerity will impose financial pressures on councils to reduce costs and the 
pressures for effective prioritisation and re-prioritisation of resources will grow.  
In particular initiatives designed to develop and maintain the strategic capacity of 
councils (both internally and externally) may become eroded, increasing the 
potential for performance to decline. As financial and political pressure intensifies, 
there is the risk that councils fall back into intransigent and insular positions 
based on a belief that as they have overcome hardship in the past, they would be 
able to do so in the future. These aspects taken together suggest that there is, or 
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will be, the need to provide support to councils, peer reviewers, oversight bodies 
and inspection bodies of the potential indicators of a corporately poor performing 
council.   
 
In essence, the CPA regime, although criticised in some quarters, was recognised 
as a trigger for change by those councils studied. Given the voluntary nature of 
the LGA model, it is uncertain how any warning signs of declining performance 
will now be consistently picked up, especially as denial and insularity were 
identified as being key causes of poor performance. Councils displaying these 
traits would be unlikely to see the need to voluntarily engage with an inspection 
process.     
 
The findings of this study can help to address these issues in three main ways: 
 
Firstly, the ten themes can be developed as lines of enquiry to help review the 
current state of a council’s corporate performance.  They are not as 
comprehensive or intensive as the CPA lines of enquiry, and offer a broader 
approach to assessment to identify possible initial areas of concern that could 
then be investigated further.  This could be done through self-review, peer 
assessment or external inspection and could therefore be linked to the LGA 
initiative. 
 
Secondly, where weaknesses are identified, the findings of the study can be used 
to focus attention on those aspects that could be improved.  The ten themes and 
associated sub-themes provide approaches that can be taken to improve 
corporate performance.  The focus of attention would clearly be dependent upon 
the aspect(s) that were weak within a given council, but could include member 
training, leadership training, mentoring and support in developing performance 
management and strategic planning, as well as prioritisation and managing 
external relationships. 
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Thirdly, the findings of this study could be used to raise and maintain awareness 
within the local government community and its key stakeholders of the causes of 
performance decline.  They can also contribute to the ongoing debate within 
government as to the need for and use of inspection regimes. 
 
A further practical application of the study would be in assisting in the design and 
development of any future corporate assessment type framework for local 
government, or other parts of the public sector.  Despite the relatively recent 
removal of such frameworks, concerns over public sector corporate performance 
have re-surfaced recently in Health and Social Care.  A consultation on a revised 
government protocol on Fire and Rescue Authorities has recently been 
undertaken.  The scope for corporate assessment and intervention clearly exists 
within the new protocol, but its application is only vaguely mentioned (Murphy 
and Greenhalgh, 2012).  The findings of this study could support the development 
of such protocols, in this and other service areas, especially given the proximity 
of local government to their Fire and Rescue counterparts. 
 
Finally, despite the removal of formal and centralised corporate assessments in 
the UK, there is still an appetite for applying them in other countries.  The 
intervention model developed for project management in the UK has been 
franchised by HMT to a range of countries including Australia, New Zealand, 
Ireland and Canada as well as to many European countries.  There is clearly 
practical scope to use the findings of this study to both develop a similar 
franchised model, and/or to compare and contrast the UK experience to that of 
other countries to facilitate the development and improvement of future regimes. 
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For use with Senior officials within turnaround councils. 
 
The interviews are to be used as source material for both Document Three and 
Document Five 
 
The general purpose of the interview is to gather evidence from senior officers on the 
strategic turnaround process and its sustainability.  The findings will be linked back to 
the conceptual framework from the literature and the findings of Document Four on 
specific councils with further research being undertaken into the inspection reports of 
each council. 
 
The interview is semi-structured and is intended to be as free flowing as possible at 
this stage to allow the official to tell the story of their council’s turnaround. 
 
The general structure is based as follows: 
 
Pre-CPA inspection – (reasons, announcement, reaction,) 
During the turnaround – (what and how and when) 
Post-final inspection – (announcement, reaction, current environment) 
 
Post Script – Animal and Car describing council – plus explanation 
 
 
Interviews will be confidential 
 
Interviews will be recorded if acceptable to the interviewee 
 
 
While the interviews are intended to be free flowing and story telling, the following 
prompts have been devised to give the story a beginning, middle and end and to 
manage the time available. 
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Pre-Initial CPA Announcement 
 
• What were the main causes of poor performance? 
o As per the CPA inspection 
o As viewed from within the council 
  
• Prior to the announcement did the council perceive itself to be poorly 
performing? 
o Was there a different view between officers and members 
  
• In the period leading up to the inspection how would you describe the stability of 
the council? 
o Political control 
o Officer/member relations 
o Leadership (where did this come from?) 
  
• Did the CPA act as the trigger for improvement and if so why? 
  








During Turnaround Process 
 
• To what extent was intervention used throughout the turnaround process? 
 
• Was the level of intervention supportive/useful/inhibitive? 
 
• How easy was it for the council to come to terms with the need to turnaround? 
o Timescale 
o Key players 
o Denial v Ownership 
  
• What were the key milestones/critical incidents that stood out for 
you during the turnaround process? (linked to point below) 
 
• What strategic processes were changed or introduced to bring about the 
required turnaround? (spend time on this aspect as it covers a lot of ground) 
  
• How did the outlook of the council change when deciding to turnaround? 
 
• Who do you feel led the turnaround process? (individual or group)  
 
• How would you describe this leadership approach? 
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• Which of the following words would you associate with the turnaround process? 
(could be extremes or a mix of both): 
 
 
o Operational or strategic 
o Retrenchment or renewal 
o Replacement or realignment 
o Permanently failing or self correcting 
o External trigger or internal trigger 
o Singularity of approach or duality of approach 
o Box ticking or embedded change 
o Intervention or engagement 
o Turnaround or revitalisation 
o Internal causes or external causes 
  
 
• To what extent were the changes you have made targeted at sustainable 
improvement? 
 




Post-Final CPA Announcement 
 






• Environmental changes have occurred since the revised assessment, what are 
the key strategic challenges now facing the council?  
 
• Following the revised assessment, to what extent will the changes you have 
made to the running of the council support or inhibit your ability to respond to 





What animal and car would you use to describe the nature of the council: 
• Pre-initial announcement 
• During turnaround process 
• Post-final announcement 
 
What specific attributes of each lead you to this choice? 
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Appendix C: District Council CPA Example 
 
 
Appendix C follows on the next 5 pages.
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Appendix D: Example of Thematic Content Analysis of the 
Corporate Assessments: Prioritisation and Re-Prioritisation  
Deciding on Priorities 
(+) 
Priorities are revised following consultation (2D, 3S) 
Structured approach to developing priorities/Clear about 
priority and non-priority areas (6D, 6S) 
Used effectively to turnaround performance 
Priorities based on a sound understanding of needs 
(national/local priorities, demographics etc) (7D, 6S) 
Priority Matrix (or similar) (2D) 
(-) 
Unclear about what is not important, what are/are not 
priorities are not identified (6D, 9S) 
Priorities not linked to vision (2D) 
Weak basis for priorities/not informed (2D, 3S) 
Impact of priorities not understood (1D, 3S) 
Scope of Priorities 
(+) 




Too many priorities or too broad to be strategic/leading 
to confusion (2D, 5S) 
Increasing number of priorities (2S) 
Making Difficult Decisions 
(+) 
Difficult (challenging/tough) decisions are taken/often 
despite opposition (7D, 6S) 
Followed through on decisions/takes action/sustained focus 
on priorities (3D, 4S) 
(-) 
No track record of making/sticking to difficult decisions 
(2D, 1S) 
Tendency to play safe  
Unclear how excellent services translate into 
outcomes/what success looks like/what a good council 
looks like (3D, 2S) 
Links to Other Plans 
(+) 
Resources moved with/aligned to/follow resources (3D, 
5S) 
Priorities cascade through service plans/clear framework 
to deliver priorities (2D, 3S) 
(-) 
Resources not matched to priorities/budget not matched 
against priorities (4D, 3S) 
Unclear about capacity required to improve (1D) 
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“Of all delectable islands the Neverland is the snuggest and most compact, not 
large and sprawly, you know, with tedious distances between one adventure and 
another, but nicely crammed. When you play at it by day with the chairs and 
table-cloth, it is not in the least alarming, but in the two minutes before you go to 
sleep it becomes very nearly real. That is why there are night-lights. ” 
J M Barrie (1911 pp8)  
 
This document is the final of six documents submitted as part of the Doctor of 
Business Administration (DBA).  It is a reflection on my personal development 
and experience throughout the process of undertaking the DBA.  The first point of 
reflection is “This is the final document”, “Phew! Thank God for that!” This is not 
to say I have not enjoyed the process of undertaking the DBA. On the contrary, 
at times I have loved it.  To say I have loved every minute of it however would be 
wrong, there are times that I wished I had never started it. But that it seems is 
common amongst many of my peers. To be at the end of the process brings with 
it a sense of relief.  As one of my supervisors keeps telling me “you’re nearly 
there now, you’re on the final lap”.  At times however, it felt like it was never 
going to end.  Perhaps there will always be a legacy of this buried deep in my 
psyche, but at least from now on I can tell myself that it is over. 
 
I suppose this poses the question, why do it in the first place?  The answer to this 
is simple; it is something that I wanted to do. At the time of starting out it was a 
natural thing to do in terms of my career.  As an academic working within a 
university, doing a doctorate is what you do after doing a masters degree.  It 
helps with career progression.  It would also give me the opportunity to explore 
my academic discipline in more depth and become more knowledgeable about the 
technical subject matter. But that was then and this is now, and had I known 
then what I know now, I would have said that the motivation was more about 
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self-development and improvement, and finding out about myself, rather than 
about career progression and subject knowledge.  And, most importantly, 
growing in confidence. 
 
This brings me back to the more enjoyable aspects of the course.  As part of my 
studies on a previous course, I had undertaken an assessment of my preferred 
learning style. While I cannot now remember the exact scores, what I do 
remember is that my preferred learning style was Activist with a bit of Reflector 
mixed in (Honey and Mumford, 1982). This perhaps explains why I loved the 
workshops.  I loved being with other students and discussing the complex issues 
we were presented with.  I loved the content of the workshops and exposure to 
new ways of looking at the world and the processes within it.  I even loved the 
big words and the Greek references and in some cases the rather odd teaching 
methods (Kitchen utensils? Blur song lyrics?).  It was all fantastic, and I looked 
forward to attending and getting involved in the sessions. But attending and 
participating in the sessions does not get you a DBA.  You have to do the 
documents, and this is where the real learning takes place. 
 
I have decided to structure this document based around a series of learning 
points that I have developed following a mind mapping exercise. I have taken 
time out to reflect on what has happened to me during the course of completing 
the DBA, identifying those critical incidents and revelations that have struck me 
as being important to my own personal development.  This reflection reveals a 
series of ups and downs, peaks and troughs, triumphs and defeats.  It has been a 
long journey.  I feel a certain amount of trepidation writing this document given 
that despite the highs of attending the taught sessions, the first low came with 
the submission of Document One.  It was returned requiring amendments, as I 
had not been reflective enough. At the time, this was devastating.  I had fallen at 
the first hurdle, was there any point in getting back up and carrying on? Well I 
did, and I’m glad I did.  Document Two received an excellent pass – I was, 
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potentially at least, good enough.  However, the lack of reflection in document 
one perhaps does not bode well for producing a reflective document in its own 
right, hence my current trepidation.   
 
My reflections are not confined to the period of the DBA alone.  We are all shaped 
by our past histories, both in terms of how we see and construct the world around 
us, but also in terms of the values we hold and the confidence we have in our 
own abilities.  It is important therefore to track my journey to the doctorate from 
an early stage, to identify the con-texts, pre-texts, sub-texts and inter-texts 
(Usher, 1997) that have helped shape my development as a researcher and a 
reflective practitioner. 
On the Precursors 
 
At school I had no particular desire to go to university.  Personal family 
circumstances (my father had cancer for many years and died when I was 19) 
and the fact that no one had gone to university in my close family, meant it 
wasn’t on my agenda of things to do at that time.  So despite being given a place 
on an art degree at Nottingham Trent University’s School of Art and Design, I 
took the first job I was offered and joined the rank and file of finance assistants in 
the Treasurer’s Department at Nottinghamshire County Council (a strange choice 
perhaps for someone wanting to be an artist).  
 
There are three notable things that stand out for me during my early career as a 
non-academic that are worth summarising here.  Taken together, this summary 
should help to explain why I lacked confidence in tackling the DBA. Studying my 
professional qualification (CIPFA) at University was ultimately my pathway to an 
academic career, although it was not perhaps that helpful initially in preparing for 
doctoral studies. At that time the qualification was assessed through both 
assignments and examinations.  Surprisingly perhaps, the assignments were 
quite academically based for a professional accounting qualification. Despite 
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failing the practice assignment (an inauspicious start), I quickly came to enjoy 
doing them and certainly preferred them to the examinations. The final 
assessment point was a work-based project.  This was not exactly the same as an 
MBA dissertation, but did share some similarities in terms of process and certainly 
helped when I came to do my MBA dissertation later on. It even had a Viva 
examination attached to it. Perhaps that will help later on too. This was my first 
foray into this type of assessment and again, looking back I perversely enjoyed it.  
The journey had begun.  
 
My second key memory was being appointed by the University and interviewed by 
the then Dean of the Business School (who I shall call Peter). I never thought I 
would get the job given some of the questions I was asked at the interview and, 
by contrast, the paucity of my answers. It seemed to me that Peter had a brain 
the size of a planet, (I subsequently learnt that he did) and thought there was no 
way on God’s earth that he would consider even appointing me.  Even though I 
probably lacked confidence because of this when joining the university, looking 
back there was something in me that thought, “Could I be like that?”.  
 
The final memory comes from studying for my MBA and a cameo slot from a tutor 
(who I shall call Colin) on, I think, business ethics, but it might have been 
research methods (of all things).  I remember Colin saying that he was a 
historian who had developed an attraction for research and philosophy and ethics. 
I got the impression that he was very happy with his change in career. There was 
something about that session that stuck with me, this time making me think “I 
want to do that”.   
On Being an Accountant 
 
By profession I am an accountant (but please don’t hold it against me, I always 
tried to be a nice accountant). In previous professional lives I have worked and 
trained as a finance assistant, been a management accountant, an auditor and a 
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finance manager.  I have studied for and gained a professional accounting 
qualification and applied this learning in a world of controls, accountabilities, 
decision-making and performance reporting. I now teach other people to be 
accountants, following the rigid and directing syllabi of professional accounting 
bodies and undergraduate degree programmes. Accountancy is by and large 
objective in nature. It deals with money which lends itself very well to being 
added up, multiplied, modelled and compared in very objective ways giving the 
ability to demonstrate, through a body of evidence, whether or not something 
should be done and whether something has performed well or badly (this was 
probably one factor that drew me to study the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment).  My early career as an accountant may not have been that helpful 
from a researcher’s perspective, as it very successfully fostered in me an 
accounting constructed view of the world. This no doubt contributed to my initial 
and ongoing confusion and frustration with concepts of methodology while doing 
the DBA. My understanding now is that there is not just one view of the world, 
although this is something that took a long time for me to wrestle with. One 
outcome of doing the DBA is that I have been able to put this development phase 
into some perspective and realise that different methodological positions were 
shaping my early career constructions than is now the case.  
On Not Being an Academic 
 
I do not have a first degree.  I left school after doing ‘A’ levels and went straight 
into work. There I was trained as an accountant, and then I went on to do an 
MBA during which time I joined the University.  Looking back, the MBA was also 
quite structured and formulaic in its approach to syllabus and learning, adopting 
as it I did the Johnson and Scholes “bible”, if you are religiously inclined, or 
“encyclopaedia”, if you are not, of strategic exploration. I was recruited by the 
University to deliver professional accounting programmes and in-company 
training courses, rather than as a “REFable” academic who would contribute to 
the research score of the University. However, as I have learnt more about 
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academia, it has become apparent to me that both in research and on academic 
programmes, such as undergraduate and post graduate degrees, there is more 
scope for freedom of thought and expression than I first thought possible.  Quite 
apart from there being alternative approaches and viewpoints on technical 
aspects of accounting (which are a lot less constrained than I had been led to 
believe), there is also a topic called ‘research methods’.  Before commencing the 
DBA, I had been involved in teaching research methods to unsuspecting 
undergraduate and postgraduate students and supervising them through their 
dissertations.  At first, as I didn’t have a traditional academic background, this 
was quite daunting and I had to get up to speed quickly in the fairly traditional 
way of being one chapter ahead of the students.  This again seemed fairly 
formulaic. There was a difference between methodology and methods.  Reality 
either existed out there, or it was internally created.  You were either a positivist 
or an interpretivist (in the early days this was called phenomenology and I still 
get tempted to use this with the students because it is such a great word). You 
had to consider the reliability and validity of your approach, you needed to think 
about triangulation and you needed a bit on ethics. Similar to accountancy in 
many respects. I would tell the students that selecting methods was the easy bit 
and that they were likely to struggle with methodology but needed to give it a go.  
Eventually I became comfortable with the subject, and even came up with some 
strategies to help students overcome their methodological problems.  For 
example if they were struggling to come to terms with whether they should use 
positivist or interpretivist approaches when doing their research, I would get 
them to think about Stephen Hawkin. Hawkin, I would tell them, is trying to come 
up with a grand unifying theory that connects the big things in physics, such as 
gravity, with the little things, such as atoms (see Hawkin, 1995 and Bryson, 
2004). Both fields are understood in their own right, but how they are related is 
not.  If Hawkin (or other like minded physicists) can join the two things together, 
then they will know the origins of the universe and the “Big Bang” and everything 
that goes with it.  Put simply, Hawkin is trying to find the formula for absolutely 
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everything and as such is the ultimate positivist. This formula would necessarily 
also be predictive. If you are looking for something that can be measured 
objectively and be predictive, I would tell them, you need to use positivism.  If 
you are not, then everything else is interpretivism.  Then I started the DBA. How 
wrong can you be? 
On Being Methodologically Challenged 
 
And so I come to the JM Barrie quotation at the start of this document.  The 
quote is clearly from Peter Pan and, if you have read the book, you will know that 
it is preceded by a discussion of what the inside of a person’s mind might look 
like.  We all have Neverlands in there, asserts Barrie, but everyone’s is different. 
At first glance, you may think that I have included the quote to discuss an 
interpretivist philosophical perspective. In other words that reality does not exist 
outside of a persons mind, but is rather constructed within it.  Or maybe I am 
using it to demonstrate that reality must be external, or why else would we read 
fiction, other than to take us away from the real world? This is not the reason for 
using the quote however. It is used simply because it struck a chord with me on 
my journey through the methodological minefield of doing a DBA.  I came across 
it while watching the opening ceremony of the London Olympics in 2012.  I was 
lucky enough to be watching at the time that JK Rowling (another children’s 
author of some repute) read out the quote that I have reproduced at the start of 
the introduction and “Bang!” it hit me. “That is just like what doing a DBA is like”, 
and in particular learning about methodology.  When you play at it in the 
classroom and seminars, it is not the least bit alarming. In fact, as I have said, it 
can be very enjoyable. But in the two minutes before you have to hand in your 
documents, it becomes very real, and that’s why there are supervisors. 
 
Coping with the methodological aspects of doing a DBA was probably the most 
challenging part of the whole process.  My supervisors will attest to this. I can 
remember emailing them at one point saying, “Help! I am methodologically 
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challenged”, or words to that effect.  Unfortunately the email has been deleted, 
as it would have been amusing to read it again now. In approaching the 
documents I always struggled to come to terms with the different methodological 
positions that could be applied. Especially given that the more you seemed to 
look, the more possible positions there were.  
 
It was comforting to hear that my supervisors, and other tutors on the DBA, had 
also wrestled with their own methodological positions over the years, and that 
over time I would reach a conclusion as to what it was all about (but that this 
might change again later on). As a student trying to write research papers that 
were to be assessed, though comforting, this was not that helpful.   
 
In my main primary research documents I, along with my mentors and peers, 
constantly wrestled with what might be appropriate methodological positions. 
Although it all seems something of a blur now, looking back at the documents 
again at the end of this period of study, what I have written still seems to make 
sense to me in the context of each particular study undertaken.  In fact, I was left 
with a sense of “wow, did I write that?” I have been an interpretivist, a critical 
realist and a realist (possibly a subtle realist and at some times a pragmatist), 
although interestingly never a positivist. 
 
So, do I now fully understand methodology?  If I am honest, no, not fully. I do 
understand it better though and its importance as an academic discipline in 
constructing research methodologies and selecting research methods. The 
approach to Document 4 is a good example of how I was able to develop and 
adapt methodological approaches during the DBA process.  The first aspect of this 
was that I decided that Document 4 should actually be the third document of the 
study and not the fourth. The reason for this was that as part of the study, I 
needed to establish potential turnaround councils to examine as well as lines of 
enquiry that could be used to focus the research in documents three and five. 
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Although aware of the CPA and its impact within local government, I was by no 
means an expert on it, only having seen a relatively small part of it when working 
as a Finance Manager at a large county council.  The requirement for Document 4 
was to produce a structured analysis, essentially requiring the use of statistical 
models.  An obvious methodological route would have been a positivist approach, 
as structural analysis lends itself well to hypothetico-deductive analysis using 
statistical techniques to develop hypothesise and test them (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). However, there were a number of reasons that meant that such an 
approach was not suitable given Document 4’s placement within the study.  The 
first of these was that Document 4 was exploratory rather than explanatory 
(Fisher, 2004).  As such it was not an objective of the document to find cause 
and affect relationships, but rather to establish lines of enquiry that could be used 
in later documents.  The second aspect was that the CPA was identified at an 
early stage within the study as being a socially constructed performance 
framework, operating during a short period of time within a paradigm of public 
sector performance management, itself shaped by competing ideological views of 
right and wrong, good and bad.  As such the CPA, although apparently quasi-
scientific, did not offer a scientific reality of good performance, but rather one 
view of it.  Any analysis undertaken could only at best provide an indication of 
relative performance within the CPA framework, rather than a universal view. The 
final aspect was that the analysis was undertaken using secondary data that 
represented the potentially subjective judgements of oversight bodies and 
regulators whose views formed the inputs to the CPA scoring mechanism, itself a 
construction.  Taken together, these elements meant that although statistical 
methods were used during the study, the analysis of the findings was undertaken 
within an interpretivist rather than a positivist paradigm.  The exploratory nature 
of Document 4 subsequently led to the identification of potential turnaround 
councils that were used as the basis for Document 3 and 5, as well as 
establishing that further analysis of the corporate assessment process and 
documentation, would be a good basis on which to undertake Document 5. 
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Finally in this section I would like to acknowledge all those who have helped me 
on my methodological journey. Thank you to Gill and Johnson (1991), Miles and 
Huberman (1994), Saunders et al (2007), Hammersley (2002), Bryman and Bell 
(2003), Fisher (2004), Gray (2005), Jankowicz (2005), who have been my 
constant companions.  And of course thanks to my supervisors Colin and Joyce, 
who have always been there. 
On the Use of Supervisors 
 
If I’m honest, I probably didn’t use my supervisors as much as I could have, and 
probably not as much as I should have.  Despite this I have to say that I was 
blessed with a pair of what I consider good supervisors, by which I mean they 
were challenging academically, but extremely supportive. They also turned my 
work around quickly. Undertaking doctoral research can be a lonely experience, 
and a confusing one.  Making use of supervisor meetings and feedback was 
helpful on a number of levels but mainly in terms of untangling the conversations 
I was having in my own head about what I was doing and what I should or could 
be doing methodologically, framing research questions and analysing and writing 
up research findings. They were a sounding board that in most cases gave 
positive indications that I was heading the right direction.  They also helped me 
to focus and bring me back on track; “you just need to make a decision about 
what you are doing, and then go and do it” to paraphrase the feedback from one 
meeting. In this sense they formed a significant part of my development and 
learning as a researcher. Neither supervisor was an expert in the CPA process, 
nor local authorities in particular, so it was not the technical subject area that the 
supervision assisted with.  It was the research process itself, which is considered 




On Ansoff v Mintzberg 
 
A strange heading perhaps, but a critical incident in my development through the 
DBA.  While doing the literature review, I came across a series of articles that 
fascinated me. Part of the focus of my DBA was strategy, and many of the 
academic articles I came across and read were not particularly griping.  Getting 
into some of them was often challenging and some were pretty much 
incomprehensible. If I’m honest, this was starting to affect my motivation and 
conviction.  It was a bit of a turn off.  Then I came across these fascinating 
articles that played out over successive editions of the Strategic Management 
Journal and essentially represented an academic boxing match between Igor 
Ansoff and Henry Mintzberg on whether strategy should be developed in a 
planned and prescriptive way, or whether it was emergent and descriptive 
(Mintzberg, 1991; Ansoff, 1991; Mintzberg, 1991).  It felt personal between 
them. Could this really happen? This caught my attention and raised my interest 
again.  I actually felt excited (excited!) about doing the literature review. I soon 
found that this was not an isolated incident and other somewhat personal 
assaults took place on a regular basis.  To say this spurred me on is probably too 
strong, but it certainly raised my level of motivation.  Generally, it taught me to 
expect the unexpected; a lot about doing research can be mundane, but 
occasionally you come across things that genuinely surprise and engage you. I 
got my best mark for the literature review. 
 
This I now know is part of the critical nature of research.  Not every critical article 
is personal in the way that Ansoff/Mintzberg were, but critical articles are 
challenging, and look at things from different perspectives and disciplines.  When 
starting the DBA, I was more attuned to Ansoff.  I liked the planned approach to 
doing strategy, I suppose because being an accountant it was more what I was 
used to.  Now I can see there is room for both approaches, which incidentally is 
where Ansoff and Mintzberg both eventually ended up.  So while on the one hand 
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this incident was motivational to me, it also helped me to become aware of the 
critical nature of research.  Viewing strategy through Mintzberg’s approach was in 
effect me challenging my previously held assumptions and as such represents 
double-loop learning (more on this later when I consider reflexivity). 
On Finding Things Out 
 
This was something of a road to Damascus moment. At one point, in the middle 
of Document Four, I was very low about the whole process of doing the DBA.  I 
had the mid-term blues you might say.  This wasn’t because of the volume of 
work or being bored with the topic, it was because of the methodological issues 
raised above. They were wearing me down.  While trawling through the research 
methods texts once again, I came across a comment that you did research to 
“find out” about things (Fisher 2004 p212).  It wasn’t a grand theory; it was a 
fragment within a sentence.  Nevertheless, it leapt out at me.  This was why I 
was doing it, to find out about things.  It didn’t matter that I was struggling with 
the methodological concepts, everyone does.  What mattered was that I wanted 
to find things out. That was simply it. It doesn’t seem much, but it was a major 
turning point for me.  From that point on I have been able to overcome my lack 
of confidence in not being ‘an academic’, build on those early forays into 
academic writing and weave an iterative path through the methodological 
minefield.   
On Reflexivity 
 
Reflexivity is linked to reflection, which is discussed in the next section, and the 
two can be seen as opposite ends of a continuum (Finlay and Gough, 2003; 
Finlay, 2008), with reflection consisting of thinking about something after the 
event and reflexivity, a more dynamic process that requires self-awareness. I 
have decided to separate the two in order to discuss the more detailed theoretical 
and methodological aspects here, and the more practical application to my 
development as a researcher in the next section. 
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Reflexivity can be discussed in a variety of ways.  In ethnographic research, there 
is a need for the researcher to be aware of the direct impact their presence may 
have on the situation being studied.  Even in covert settings, the presence of the 
researcher may shape the course of organisational actions and decisions in some 
way, especially if the researcher is a practitioner within the organisation (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991). This aspect of reflexivity was not relevant to this study, as I was 
looking from outside the organisations and from a historical perspective. 
 
There are however two aspects of reflexivity that I consider relevant to discuss in 
relation to this study.  The first is the impact I, as the researcher, had on the 
gathering of research data, in particular with regard to the interviews. The second 
is the way in which I analysed and interpreted that data. Both of these were 
informed by my previous understanding I brought to the DBA at the early stages 
of the process. 
 
This understanding was undoubtedly affected by my own socialisation into the 
discipline of public sector strategic management, which I have discussed earlier in 
terms of both my professional and academic development.  The choice of topic, 
the development of the literature review and conceptual framework, were all 
constructed at that early stage within a managerialist framework informed by the 
two linked experiences of having “grown up” as a public sector accountant during 
the New Public Management (NPM) era and having studied and taught strategic 
management within a “traditional” MBA paradigm. These two elements tend to 
reinforce each other, and I feel that this had a strong impact on my attraction to 
the topic and the boundaries within which I understood it. 
 
Using Gibbons et al’s (1994) typology of knowledge, the body of literature on 
strategic management can be identified as Mode 1, disciplinary knowledge and 
NPM can be associated with Mode 2, technical knowledge.  Scott et al (2004) 
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develop Gibbons et al’s typology further into Mode 3, dispositional and trans-
disciplinary knowledge and Mode 4, critical knowledge. As the DBA is a 
professional doctorate, there are implications here for the types of knowledge 
used and sought.  I remember my supervisor saying that the DBA was for 
researching professionals rather than professional researchers.  This would imply 
that mode 2 knowledge is a good starting point on the DBA, leading, through the 
incorporation of mode 1 knowledge, to modes 3 and 4.  I was not aware of these 
distinctions at the start of the DBA, and it was a product of the supervision 
process during the DBA that allowed me to reflect on this towards the end and 
realise the impact it had had on my drawing a ring around the concepts I used in 
collecting and analysing the data. I recognised this to some extent in the first 
submission of my thesis, but rather clumsily referred to it as a “normative” 
paradigm through which strategic management had evolved within the public 
sector. Pollitt (1990), Hood (1991, 2000) and others, would refer to it as NPM 
and/or managerialism.   
 
Establishing the conceptual framework for the study, and subsequently 
developing this into lines of enquiry, was undertaken within my existing 
experiences, whether these were mode 1 or mode 2. My understanding of the 
topic grew substantially, but still it was within the confines of a single- loop 
approach to learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978).  This extended to the analytical 
framework developed to analyse the corporate assessments, and it was not until 
later on in the analysis stage that I developed a double-looped approach and 
recognised the full potential for reflexivity (see below). One area where the scope 
for double-loop learning was more limited was with regard to the local authority 
interviews.  I was aware of the potential for reflexivity before undertaking these 
interviews and tried to establish as far as was possible an objective approach.  I 
thought that allowing the interviewees to tell the story of their organisation within 
a semi-structured interview, would reduce the direct impact that I as the 
researcher would have on what they said. I think this worked to some extent and 
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the observation that each of the three interviews developed in slightly different 
directions and focussed on different things goes some way to supporting this.  
With hindsight, I didn’t take into account that the interviewees were aware of my 
interest in both the CPA process and the managerial approaches that the 
organisations had changed to bring about organisational improvement.  This 
perhaps led them to discuss things from a managerialist perspective rather than 
from other angles.  If they had known I had been, say, a political scientist, they 
may have structured their answers differently.  I don’t think that this was a major 
factor in the study, but in future I may attempt to hide my disciplinary roots in 
order to reduce any potential impact.  A second, and probably more significant 
aspect of reflexivity in the interviews was the way in which I received and 
interpreted what the interviewees told me.  The interviews were recorded and this 
allowed me to review the transcripts during the analysis stage in a more double-
loop fashion (see below).  However, during the interviews I was quite clearly 
displaying single-loop learning and this impacted on the notes I took at the time 
and the follow up questions that I asked during the interviews. On reflection, I 
could have been more challenging of the insights given at the time and probed 
the interviewees as to why they thought certain things were important or why 
things happened in the way they did.  This may have revealed more explicitly any 
contradictions, embellishments or assumptions that could have been present 
beneath the surface.  My adherence to a managerialist context, and I have to say 
pleasure that some of things I had expected to see did actually play out in 
practice, perhaps limited my ability to capture a wider range of possible findings 
within the interviews. Mitigation of this aspect in particular is a learning point hat 
I will take with me into future research studies. 
 
From an analytical perspective, my early attempts at trying to make sense of the 
data and findings of the primary research were also constrained within the mode 
1 and mode 2 knowledge sets described above.  This was not too problematic for 
documents 3 and 4, which were mainly exploratory in nature, but it did require a 
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period of reflection during the production of document 5. Feedback from 
supervisors on document 5 revealed that it was perhaps too narrow in its 
approach and initially too accepting of what the findings appeared to be telling 
me within the confines of my conceptual framework. This prompted a questioning 
of whether other disciplines would also be appropriate to use during the study 
and represented a move away from single-loop learning to double-loop learning 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978).  This in turn led me to question whether the 
managerialist approach that I had adopted was appropriate.  For example, was it 
possible to make an overall judgement on a local authority’s comparative 
performance in the way that proponents of CPA claimed it did? Was such 
measurement possible or desirable? Was leadership really that significant in the 
change processes of organisations? On reflection, I think within the remit of the 
study that such claims are acceptable, especially when set within a managerialist 
framework.  What I have learnt from this period of study, which relates most 
closely to what Scott et al (2004) refer to as mode 3 knowledge, is that it is 
necessary to identify and challenge the original assumptions on which the study 
was based, but having done this, that it is still possible to accept that those 
assumptions hold true. The study was set within the world of local authority 
performance management that existed between 2002 and 2008. It was 
appropriate therefore that the study focussed on the academic and technical 
modal knowledge that the CPA regime drew from and contributed to. This process 
of dealing with reflexivity was not a simple one to get to grips with, nor was it 
free from confusion and uncertainty.  I do now however feel more confident in my 
ability to recognise my pre-held beliefs and their origins and to be able to 
approach the analysis of research findings in a more impartial and critical way.  
Even if on this occasion I ultimately worked within those pre-held beliefs, I know 
now that in future studies I can adopt alternative positions if it is appropriate to 





Unavoidably, some elements of reflective practice have been highlighted in the 
previous section.  The development of double-loop learning and mode 3 
knowledge are both closely linked to reflection on behalf of the research 
practitioner.  The discussion above however was focussed more on the reflexive 
impact of disciplinary and technical knowledge within the subject area, in this 
case CPA, NPM and managerialism.  This section focuses on the process of doing 
research from the viewpoint of a research practitioner. 
 
Finlay (2008) identifies that most reflection lacks socialisation and tends to be 
introspective.  This was certainly true of my own reflective processes during the 
DBA.  The learning set established at the start of the programme quickly fell into 
disuse for a variety of reasons (people leaving the course, extensions and, as 
time went on, a lack of appetite for them).  I wasn’t too worried about this at the 
time as I was much more concerned with getting on and getting started, and this 
to me seemed to be more of an individualistic pursuit. With hindsight, the 
opportunity to reflect within the more social context of the learning set would 
have been useful.  As it turned out the primary prompt for third party 
intervention in reflection was from supervision meetings, which were actually 
focussed on me as the researcher, and therefore still introspective in nature. Not 
that introspection is a bad thing. 
 
Schon (1983) identifies two types of reflection; reflection in action and reflection 
on action (sometimes referred to as reflection on reflection in action (Scott et al, 
2004)). From my perspective as a research practitioner, reflection in action 
occurred at times of “doing”, for example during the interviews, or during the 
analysis of documents and interviews.  At such times there was a need to think 
on my feet, and develop ways of capturing and structuring the data in order to 
ultimately make some sense of it.  This also applied to writing up the data and 
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initial approaches at being analytical, synthesising and sense-making.  I have 
reflected above on the process of interviewing and the need for me to take 
greater account of the scope for reflexivity in future studies. This would be an 
example of reflection on action. In general, I think that my reflection in action 
was suitable and it certainly got me to a point where I had some data to analyse, 
or a document to review.  Reflection on action was something that tended to be 
prompted externally however, usually following a supervision meeting or through 
presenting findings at conferences or internal research workshops. This prompted 
a need to look again at the approach adopted and to bring in ideas from other 
perspectives. My initial attempt at the literature review for example was returned 
from one of my supervisors with the comment “this is too journalistic”.  This was 
something of a blow as I had spent a lot of time finding articles, reading them 
and trying to compare and contrast them.  A discussion on the need to be more 
critical in my writing followed and this in turn led to a period of reflection and 
rewriting.  The final submitted document was awarded an excellent pass, and 
demonstrates that I not only had the ability to write critically, but also to learn to 
write critically.  As I have mentioned in a previous section, a similar pattern 
emerged with regard to the development of my methodological understanding.  
This was very much centred on a single-loop approach at the start of the DBA, 
but through challenge and reflection became a double-looped approach as time 
went on.  Challenge came again from my supervisors, but also from attending the 
DBA course workshops, which introduced new perspectives on methodological 
positions. Some would call this part of the process reflection before action 
(Greenwood, 1993). Methodologically I am a lot more confident now in identifying 
possible approaches from my own experience (and there are more of them to 
chose from), but I also now recognise the need to ask others if there is another 
way that I am not aware of.  At the start of the DBA this would have been a 
horrifying prospect, the fear being that I would not be able to comprehend or 
understand a new approach.  Now, even though I know it will be difficult, I also 
  21
know that I can take new thinking on board and adopt it within my own practice.  
Or, or course, I can chose to reject it. 
 
From the point of view of learning about myself as a reflective practitioner, I have 
learnt that I tend to do better at reflection in action (informed by reflection before 
action) rather than reflection on action.  This to me is grounded in my 
professional socialisation as an accountant, which tends to promote single-loop 
learning within the rules and technical knowledge of the professional discipline.  It 
also relates back to my earlier preferred learning style of activist. During the 
DBA, I have come to learn the importance of reflection on action and that this is 
related to a better facility for double-loop learning and also a move towards a 
more theorising and reflective learning style.  While writing this reflective 
document, I re-took the Honey and Mumford learning styles questionnaire.  This 
time my score was balanced across all four learning styles.  I still have a strong 
activist score, but now also have strong scores for reflector, theorist and 
pragmatist.  The theorist and reflector scores in particular would appear to 
support my development in terms of double-loop learning. An example of my 
development in these areas within the study was in considering the development 
of academic discourses around the changes to public management over the last 
30 years or so.  It is recognised within the literature that, confusingly, different 
terms have been used to describe similar features.  A primary example of this 
was the interchangeable use of the terms New Public Management (NPM) 
favoured by Hood (1991) and managerialism favoured by Pollitt (1990). These 
were two key authors at the start of what is now more generically know as the 
NPM era using different terms to essentially describe the same thing. Other 
authors subsequently used the terms interchangeably.  This was unhelpful for the 
development of the study and a critical review of the literature (eg Greener 2009) 
was needed to understand the key features being discussed.  The outcome of this 
was that in my mind at least there was a difference between the more 
structurally based ideological aspects of NPM, rooted in Public Choice theory, and 
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those aspects that related to the roles of managers, whether these be political 
leadership roles, or executive roles.  The more I looked, the more it seemed that 
these management aspects represented a consistent line of thinking that tended 
to transcend the wider academic developments from public choice to public value 
and beyond.  I therefore decided to adopt the term managerialism (or 
managerialist) to refer to the internal management processes that formed the 
focus of the study.  While taking such an approach is probably risky and can be 
contested, it did come to light later on that Hughes (2002) had adopted a similar 




On Being a Researcher 
 
In conclusion, I have learnt that the practice of undertaking research is complex, 
iterative and multi-faceted and requires an understanding of both research 
practice as well as the technical and disciplinary requirements of the subject area.  
Development as a researcher, for me at least, is best played out through active 
engagement with the process itself and this engagement works on two broad 
levels. The disciplinary and technical level requires an understanding of the topic 
being studied, whether this be from an academic perspective, a work based 
perspective or a combination of the two.  The level of research practice requires 
knowledge of the process of research, from initial concept to refining research 
questions and from methodology, through to data collection, analysis, synthesis 
and conclusion.   
 
The process of research can be learnt from any of the range of textbooks in 
university libraries.  The practice of research can only be learnt through action.  
This action requires the development of reflective practices at both the 
technical/disciplinary level and at the level of research practice. Kolb’s 
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Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb, Rubin and McIntyre, 1979 in Gill and Johnson, 
1991), is helpful in explaining my own learning in the practice of research. Kolb 
(1984) identifies 4 learning styles linked to the learning cycle. My preferred style 
here would be that of Accommodator, with the emphasis for learning coming from 
both doing and feeling.  This would suggest that my natural learning cycle starts 
with active experimentation, which in turn leads concrete experiences followed by 
reflection and conceptualisation, before returning again to experimentation.  This 
relates back to Honey and Mumfords’ activist style and I can recognise this in my 
own development throughout the DBA.  Most of the time I started with 
experimentation before settling on an approach and then undertaking the work, 
whether this be the literature review, collecting and analysing the data, writing up 
the drafts and final versions of chapters and documents or reflecting on the 
process undertaken.  For some tasks, such as developing frameworks for 
analysis, the cyclical process was rapid and frequent and this is where reflection 
in action took place.  At other times, the cycle took longer and was less frequent 
and this tended to be where I was reflecting on action, usually in response to 
feedback from supervisors or following presentations. It was at these stages 
where theorising took place. While initially needing the support of supervisors for 
these major reflections, I have now learnt to step back and instigate reflection on 
action myself.  Although this itself has also initially been a process of 
experimentation, the more I have thought and played with it, the more I have 
been able to incorporate it more fully into my research practice.  This has run in 
parallel with improved confidence in my own ability as a researcher and with my 
knowledge of the research process. I feel I will always need the input of others to 
help challenge and develop my understanding and viewpoints, but this is now a 
voluntary process rather than being part of the supervision process.  My 
understanding of these issues will also help me to support other new researchers 
and doctoral students in the future. 




Argyris C and Schon D (1978), Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional 
Practice, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Ansoff H I (1991), ‘Critique of Henry Mintzberg’s ‘the Design School: 
Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management’’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 12, 6 pp 449-461 
 
Barrie J M (1911), Peter Pan (2006 Edition), Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Bryman A and Bell E (2003), Business research Method, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 
 
Bryson B (2004), A Short History of Nearly Everything, Swan Publishing, London 
 
Finaly L and Gough B (2003), Reflexivity: A Practical Guide for Researchers in 
Health and Social Sciences, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 
 
Finlay L (2008), ‘Reflecting on ‘Reflective Practice’’, PBPL Discussion Paper 52, 
The Open University 
 
Fisher C (2004), Researching and Writing a Dissertation for Business Students, 
Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, England 
 
Gibbons M, Limoges C, Nowotny H, Schwartzman S, Scott P and Trow M (1994), 
The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in 
Contemporary Societies, Sage, London in Scott D, Brown A, Lunt I and Thorne L 
(2004), Professional Doctorates: Integrating Professional and Academic 
Knowledge, Open University Press, McGraw-Hill Education, England 
  25
 
Gill J and Johnson P (1991), Research Methods for Managers, Paul Chapman 
Publishing ltd, London, England 
 
Gray DE (2005), Doing research in the Real World, Sage Publications Limited, 
London 
 
Greenwood J (1993), ‘Reflective Practice: A Critique of the Work of Argyris and 
Schon’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19, 1183-1187  
 
Hammersley M (2002), ‘Ethnography and Realism’ in Huberman M and Miles M 
(2004), The Qualitative Researcher’s Companion (pp 65-80), Sage Publications, 
London 
 
Hawkin S (1995), A Brief History of Time, Bantam Press, London 
 
Hood C (1991), ‘A Public Management For All Seasons?’, Public Administration, 
69, 1 pp 3-19 
 
Hood C (2000), ‘Paradoxes of Public-Sector Managerialism, Old Public 
Management and Public Service Bargains’, International Public Management 
Journal, 3, pp 1-22  
 
Honey P and Mumford A (1982) The Manual of Learning Styles, Peter Honey, 
London 
 
Hughes OE (2002), Public Management and Administration: An Introduction (3rd 
Edition), Macmillan Press Ltd, Hampshire, England 
 
Kolb D (1984), Experimental Learning, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 
  26
 
Miles M and Huberman M (1994), Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook (2nd Edition), Sage Publications, London 
 
Mintzberg H (1990), ‘The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of 
Strategic Management’, Strategic Management Journal, 11,3,pp 171-195 
 
 
Mintzberg H (1991), ‘Learning 1, Planning 0 Reply to Igor Ansoff’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 12, 6 pp 463-466 
 
Pollitt C (1990), Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo American 
Experience, Blackwell, Cambridge 
 
Saunders M, Lewis P and Thornhill A (2007), Research Methods for Business 
Students (4th Edition), Prentice Hall, Harlow, England 
 
Schon D (1983), The Reflective Practitioner, Basic Books, New York 
 
Scott D, Brown A, Lunt I and Thorne L (2004), Professional Doctorates: 
Integrating Professional and Academic Knowledge, Open University Press, 
McGraw-Hill Education, England 
 
Usher R (1997), Telling a Story about Research and Research as Story Telling: 
Post-modern Approaches to social research, in McKenzie G, Powell J and Usher R 
(eds) Understanding Social Research: Perspectives on Methodology and Practice, 
Falmer Press, London 
 
 
 
